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PREFACE
During the Cold War, I was startled awake when the ground shook, frightened 
that nuclear war had begun; but it was Los Angeles, and only an earthquake. I 
have written this book with the wish that we all someday may awaken from 
the nightmare of armed conflict.
It was during the Vietnam War that I first learned about just war theory. 
In terms of just war principles, my belief was then, and still is, that the 
Vietnam War was unjust. After the Cold War, I was shocked by the genocide 
in Rwanda. In terms of just war principles, I believed then, and still do, that 
armed intervention there would have been just. My first article about just 
war theory, which featured the case of Rwanda – ‘Is armed humanitarian 
intervention to stop mass killing morally obligatory?’ (2001) – expressed 
theses that are precursors of theses in this book.
Truly, some uses of armed force are just, and some uses of armed force 
are unjust. The problematic of just war theorising is to formulate and support 
moral principles by means of which responsible agents can determine 
correctly whether a particular use of armed force would be just or unjust. 
This book is devoted to the study of such principles, which might be more 
aptly termed ‘unjust and just war principles’.
As the book’s subtitle indicates, my purpose is to develop a just war theory 
that is cosmopolitan, whereas more traditional just war theories tend to be 
state-centric. Stimulated by moral debate about the 2003 Iraq War, another of 
my articles – ‘Preventive wars, just war principles, and the United Nations’ 
(2005) – applied just war principles from the standpoint of the Security 
Council. Instead of being state-centric, my cosmopolitan just war theory is 
centred primarily on the Security Council.
During June 2004, I participated in an NEH Summer Institute at the US 
Naval Academy, ‘War and Morality: Re-thinking the Just War Tradition for 
the 21st Century’. Influenced by this instructive experience, I wrote an article 
that was a prototype for this book: ‘Generalizing and temporalizing just war 
principles: illustrated by the principle of just cause’ (2007b). In addition to 
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interstate wars, suitably generalised just war principles should be applicable 
to armed humanitarian interventions, counterinsurgency operations, armed 
revolutions and so forth. As its title indicates, this is a book about the ethics 
of all forms of armed conflict.
I am concerned especially with the question of how received just war 
theory should be rethought, so as to be applicable prospectively to present 
and future cases. This book is not a history of the just war tradition. Most 
of my real-world cases are recent – for instance, the cases of Afghanistan, 
Darfur, Libya, Rwanda and South Sudan. My purpose is to contribute to the 
cooperative endeavour of rethinking just war theory.
I have not served in the military, and I favour the use of armed force only 
as a last resort. Inspired by the civil rights movement, I wrote an article 
interrelating armed force and nonviolent action: ‘Before military force, 
nonviolent action: an application of a generalized just war principle of last 
resort’ (2009a). To counterbalance overemphasis of the idea of just cause, I 
emphasise a generalised last resort principle.
There are members of armed services who are advocates of just war 
theory. From 2005 onwards, I have participated in annual conferences of 
the International Society for Military Ethics (ISME). For instance, my talk 
at the 2007 ISME conference was based on my article ‘Military operations 
by armed UN peacekeeping missions: an application of generalized just war 
principles’ (2009b). The topic of UN peacekeeping is prominent among the 
topics considered in this book.
To establish that a proposed use of armed force would be just, responsible 
agents have the burden of proving by means of clear and convincing 
evidence that just war principles are satisfied. Sometimes, to obtain sufficient 
evidence, there is need for intelligence collection and analysis. Since 2008, I 
have participated in all but one of the annual conventions of the International 
Studies Association (ISA). My talk at the 2011 ISA convention was based on 
my article ‘Intelligence about noncombatants: the ethics of intelligence and 
the just war principle of noncombatant immunity’ (2011). To counterbalance 
overemphasis of the idea of just cause, I also emphasise the noncombatant 
immunity principle. (The proportionality principle is also emphasised.)
Indeed, the academic subject of just war theory is interdisciplinary. 
There are scholars of just war theory in departments and programmes of 
international studies, military affairs, peace and justice, philosophy, political 
science, religion and so forth. I am a philosopher, and I view just war theory 
especially through the lens of moral philosophy. However, a main theme of 
this book is that a just war theory should be interrelated with a variety of other 
theories, not only a moral theory, but also theories of global justice, human 
rights, international security and so forth.
A related main theme is that a just war theory should be interrelated with 
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real-world cases of armed conflict. To make such cases more vivid, I have 
provided some quotations from contemporary news articles, Security Council 
resolutions, statements by political leaders, reports by nongovernmental 
organisations and so forth. These (and other) quotations should be read as 
integral parts of the book.
I am particularly concerned to interrelate a cosmopolitan just war theory 
with a universalist theory of human rights. Some views about human rights 
that I expressed in a recent article – ‘Global health, human rights, and 
distributive justice’ (2012) – are also expressed here. Biomedical ethics is 
the most developed field of applied ethics. My conception of how just war 
principles should be applied to cases of armed conflict has been informed 
by my study of how general moral principles (e.g. distributive justice) have 
been applied to biomedical cases.
In summary, let me preview some distinctive approaches to the ethics 
of armed conflict that are interwoven in this book: a revisionist approach 
that involves generalising received just war principles, so that they are 
applicable by all sorts of responsible agents to all forms of armed conflict; 
a cosmopolitan approach that features the Security Council; a preventive 
approach that emphasises alternatives to armed force, including negotiation 
and mediation, nonviolent action and peacekeeping missions; a temporalist 
approach that prioritises the application of just war principles prospectively 
to present and future armed conflicts; a coherentist approach that interrelates 
just war principles, general moral principles (e.g. distributive justice) and 
real-world cases (e.g. the Rwandan genocide); and a human rights approach 
that encompasses not only armed humanitarian intervention, but also armed 
invasion, armed revolution and all other forms of armed conflict.
In these prefatory remarks, I have alluded to my past engagement in just 
war theorising. I want to stress that this book is not a collection of previously 
published articles. Although I have included some rewritten passages from 
some of those articles, the book is largely new.
I have striven to make the book accessible to a wide range of readers. 
There are many worthwhile writings about the ethics of war and peace, and 
I have profited greatly from my reading of them. (There is no space for 
a comprehensive bibliography. My list of references is limited to works 
cited; many significant works are not cited.) However, my book does not 
presuppose the reading of any other book about just war theory. It does not 
contain lengthy contestations of views of other just war theorists, nor are 
there notes cluttered with substantive remarks. The few notes in my book 
mostly contain my recommendations for collateral reading.
I have also striven to make the book reasonably academically rigorous. To 
strike a balance between rigour and accessibility, I have provided accounts of 
terms and ideas that might be unfamiliar to nonspecialist readers. Although 
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my argumentation is often demanding, it is largely self-contained. I have 
tried to state and support a cosmopolitan just war theory as cogently and 
completely as possible in the space available.
I have benefited considerably from thoughtful and instructive comments 
by Nigel Dower, Charles (Jim) Landesman and James Pattison about the 
entire penultimate draft of my book manuscript, and I wish especially to 
thank them for this. Over the years, I have had insightful conversations with 
many other persons about various topics in the book, conversations which 
surely helped to make it better than it otherwise would have been, and I 
wish to thank them also. Let me thank a few of them by name: Joe Betz, 
Michael Brough, Omar Dabhour, Randall Dipert, Jan Goldman, Carol C. 
Gould, Fran Harbour, Virginia Held, Phil Jenkins, George Lucas, Rosamond 
Rhodes, Jordy Rocheleau, Steve Ross and Harry van der Linden.
My work with Edinburgh University Press has proven very fruitful and 
pleasurable. I am especially grateful to Nicola Ramsey for her support and 
encouragement. I am also very appreciative of the helpfulness of other 
members of the editorial staff at various stages of the writing of this book – 
namely, James Dale, Michelle Houston, Jenny Peebles and John Watson. It 
was very gratifying to work on the cover design with Rebecca Mackenzie. 
My editing of the typescript was eased considerably from the advice of Eddie 
Clark. Finally, I am very indebted to Elizabeth Welsh for her helpful labours 
as copy-editor.
In closing, I would like to append some remarks about the cover. To me, 
this picture is chock-a-block with symbolism. The owl is an ancient symbol 
of wisdom. Just war theory aspires to morally constrain the use of armed force 
wisely. Nocturnal hunting by an owl is symbolic of the idea of a targeted military 
operation. The owl in the picture is a burrowing owl (Athene cunicularia), 
standing resolutely before a burrow, symbolising the idea of self-defence. 
Unwisely, the burrow is near an entrance to a public beach, symbolising the idea 
of fallibility in just war theorising. Burrowing owls are endangered by human 
economic development, symbolising the idea of collateral damage. The right 
of this vulnerable animal to security is symbolic of a human rights approach to 
just war theory. The photograph of this small owl (its length is less than 30 cm) 
was not taken with a powerful telephoto lens. (The picture is an enlargement of 
a photograph taken with a 100 mm lens.) The owl’s direct gaze is not an illusion 
of magnification. Unmistakably, as I photographed it a number of times, it would 
swivel its head to the left and right, but it would also look directly at me. On the 
cover of this book, the owl is looking at you, the reader, inviting you to enter its 
pages.
John W. Lango
New York, April 2013
The Ethics of Armed Conflict.indd   10 09/12/2013   12:10:05
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to ensure, by the 
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force 
shall not be used, save in the common interest . . .
Charter of the United Nations
This thoughtful passage from the Preamble of the UN Charter evokes ideas 
essential to a cosmopolitan ethics of armed conflict. What are the moral 
principles that should be accepted, in order to ensure that armed force is used 
only in the common interest? So as to protect civilians, what moral methods 
governing the use of armed force should be instituted? Should the term 
‘armed force’ encompass all forms of armed conflict? What is the common 
interest worldwide? Should such questions be answered by means of a just 
war theory? These questions are somewhat vague, but they serve to indicate 
the sorts of questions that I am striving to answer in this book.
I .  PREVIEW
Following some introductory remarks in the first and second parts of this 
chapter, the third part cites four epochal events that have been pivotal for 
just war theory – namely, the framing of the UN Charter and the founding 
of the United Nations, the Cold War practice of military deterrence, the 
post-Cold War recognition of the responsibility to protect and the advent of 
the current global war on terror. The fourth part contains some concluding 
remarks. Finally, in the last part, what might prove to be a fifth epochal 
event is tentatively discerned in a cluster of recent military operations – for 
example, the US targeted military operation that killed Osama bin Laden and 
the limited military intervention by the US and NATO during 2011 in Libya.
A.  GENERALISING AND TEMPORALISING JUST WAR PRINCIPLES
In response to contemporary forms of armed conflict, including genocidal 
civil wars and global terrorism, some advocates or practitioners of just war 
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theory (briefly, ‘just war theorists’) are presently engaged in projects of 
rethinking, revising or supplementing just war principles. My book is thus 
revisionary.
Some cases of armed conflict are hybrids of stock forms of armed conflict 
– for instance, an armed humanitarian intervention amidst a civil war, the 
parties to which commit acts of terrorism. Consequently, there is need for 
sufficiently general just war principles, so that diverse kinds of uses of armed 
force by diverse sorts of responsible agents can be interrelated coherently. 
For example, there is need for a sufficiently general noncombatant immunity 
principle – one that would be applicable both by agents responsible for a 
counterinsurgency operation and agents responsible for the insurgency.
Accordingly, a main thesis of this book is that received just war principles 
of just cause, last resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity should 
be generalised, so that they are applicable by all sorts of responsible agents 
to all forms of armed conflict. Of course, they should be applicable to large-
scale military operations – for instance, the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But they 
should also be applicable to small-scale military actions – for example, 
the use of air power to enforce no-fly zones and the use of naval power to 
intercept clandestine shipments of nuclear weapons. However large scale or 
small scale, armed force must not be used unjustly.
In the next chapter, a second main thesis is introduced. In addition to being 
generalised, received just war principles should be, in a sense that needs to 
be explained, ‘temporalised’.
A third main thesis is that just war principles should be elucidated by 
means of real-world cases of armed conflict – for instance, current US 
airstrikes against insurgents and terrorists. (This thesis is supported in 
Chapter 3, ‘Moral Theory’.) In contrast to invented schematic cases, which 
can be misleadingly simple, real-world cases are typically complex. I want 
to avoid making simplistic moral judgements about such real-world cases. 
Frequently (but not always), when I sketch a real-world use of armed force 
as an illustration, my purpose is neither to approve nor disapprove. There is 
no space to settle relevant disputes about international law, military strategy, 
alternative nonmilitary measures and so forth. Instead, my purpose is to 
illustrate how just war principles might be applied.
B. THE CORE JUST WAR PRINCIPLES
A fourth main thesis is that the just cause, last resort, proportionality and 
noncombatant immunity principles are the ‘core just war principles’. Roughly, 
each core just war principle is a necessary moral criterion for determining 
whether a proposed military action would be just.
Traditionally, moral principles governing the resort to war (e.g. the just 
cause principle) are distinguished from moral principles governing the conduct 
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of war (e.g. the noncombatant immunity principle). Customarily, the former 
are called ‘jus ad bellum principles’ and the latter ‘jus in bello principles’, 
but instead I term them ‘resort principles’ and ‘conduct principles’. A fifth 
main thesis is that the core just war principles are both resort principles and 
conduct principles.
Furthermore, there is the question of whether a just war theory should 
include ‘jus post bellum principles’ (or ‘aftermath principles’) – that is, 
principles governing peacebuilding, stability operations and so forth (Orend 
2002). And there is the question of whether a just war theory should include 
‘jus ante bellum principles’ (or ‘prelude principles’) – that is, principles 
governing conventional and nuclear deterrence, arms races and arms 
limitation treaties, military alliances and power balancing and so forth (van 
der Linden 2009). In theorising about just war principles, I investigate the 
interrelated subjects of the prelude to armed conflict, the resort to armed 
conflict, the conduct of armed conflict, the halting of armed conflict and the 
aftermath of armed conflict.
The set of core just war principles does not contain a principle of 
legitimate (or right, proper or competent) authority. It does not contain 
a principle of right (or proper or dominant) intention (or purpose). It 
does not contain a principle of reasonable hope (or chance, likelihood or 
prospect) of success. It does not contain a principle of minimum force 
(or necessity). And it does not contain a principle of goal (or end or aim) 
of peace. (Different just war theorists name these principles differently.) 
Nevertheless, ideas of legitimate authority, right intention, reasonable 
hope of success, minimum force and the goal of peace are still morally 
significant (but not as core just war principles).
C. THE BOOK’S CHAPTERS
Having previewed the parts of this introductory chapter, I will now preview 
the other chapters of the book.
The next chapter – ‘Just War Theory’ – appraises just war theory 
panoptically.
Two chapters – ‘Moral Theory’ and ‘Theory of Action’ – root just war 
theory in a broader theoretical framework.
The idea of just cause is studied especially in the chapter ‘Just Cause’, but 
also in the chapter ‘Last Resort’. The former chapter also explains why there 
should not be core just war principles of right intention and goal of peace.
The idea of last resort is studied especially in the chapters ‘Last Resort’ 
and ‘Last Resort and Noncombatant Immunity’, but also in the chapter ‘Just 
War Theory’.
The idea of proportionality is studied in the chapter ‘Proportionality and 
Authority’. That chapter also explains why there should not be core just 
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war principles of reasonable hope of success, minimum force and legitimate 
authority.
And the idea of noncombatant immunity is studied in various sections 
of the chapters ‘Moral Theory’, ‘Theory of Action’, ‘Last Resort and Non-
combatant Immunity’, ‘Proportionality and Authority’ and ‘All Things 
 Considered’.
The final chapter – ‘All Things Considered’ – investigates how the core 
just war principles should be applied conjointly.
I I .  PARTICULAR JUST WAR THEORIES
Just war theory is a moral theory, and just war principles are moral principles. 
Ideally, just war principles ought to morally constrain responsible agents from 
using armed force unjustly. Hence the name ‘just war theory’ is misleading, 
and the theory might be renamed ‘unjust war theory’. Correlatively, just war 
principles also ought to morally constrain responsible agents to use armed 
force justly – for example, to stop genocide. As the title of Michael Walzer’s 
magnum opus Just and Unjust Wars (1977) suggests, just war theory might 
be renamed ‘just and unjust war theory’; alternatively, to emphasise the task 
of constraining injustice, it might be renamed ‘unjust and just war theory’. 
For brevity, although I prefer the longer name ‘unjust and just war theory’, I 
retain the traditional name – ‘just war theory’.
A. CONTROVERSY
Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war.
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (1977: 282)
As this quotation epitomises, just war theory is controversial, as is moral 
philosophy generally. Similar to controversies among moral philosophers 
concerning fundamental moral principles, there are controversies among just 
war theorists about just war principles. What is the just cause principle? Is 
stopping genocide a just cause for armed humanitarian intervention? What 
is the last resort principle? Must diplomacy always be attempted before 
resorting to armed force? Different just war theorists answer such questions 
differently.
In the preceding paragraph, the term ‘just war theory’ is used to denote a 
field of inquiry, but the term has another meaning. Analogous to the distinction 
between the subject of world history and a particular world history (e.g. 
that of Arnold Toynbee), there is a distinction between the subject of just 
war theory and a particular just war theory (e.g. that of Michael Walzer). 
Primarily, a particular just war theory is a particular theory about the nature, 
justification and application of just war principles. In general, any theory about 
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moral principles is a theory about the nature (normative ethics), justification 
(metaethics) and application (applied ethics) of those principles.1
Presently, there is no single just war theory that is unanimously accepted. 
Instead, there are controversies among just war theorists about the nature, 
justification and application of just war principles.2
For the sake of illustration, let me mention such a controversy. Charac-
teristically, military actions have highly destructive consequences. Hence it 
might be contended that a just war theory should be a consequentialist theory. 
For instance, R. B. Brandt defended a rule-utilitarian theory of the rules of 
war (1972).
By contrast, a main thesis of my book is that a just war theory should be 
a deontological theory. Briefly, the deontologist makes moral judgements 
primarily about actions, whereas the consequentialist makes moral judge-
ments entirely about consequences (of actions). As the word ‘primarily’ 
indicates, the deontologist does not entirely disregard consequences. 
Although primarily concerned with moral (or deontological) constraints 
on uses of armed force, a just war theory should also be concerned with 
destructive consequences.
In the history of moral philosophy, the most influential form of consequen-
tialism is termed ‘utilitarianism’. For example, Jeremy Bentham advocated a 
greatest happiness principle – namely, ‘that principle which states the great-
est happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as being the right and 
proper, and only right and proper and universally desirable, end of human 
action’ (1907: 1).
Historically, the most influential deontological theory was propounded 
by Immanuel Kant. The moral theory that I am presupposing in this book 
is substantially influenced by his ethical writings, but I have no space to 
examine his views thoroughly.
There are controversies among deontologists about the stringency (or 
strictness) of morality. According to Kant, moral duties hold absolutely, 
whatever the consequences. By contrast, according to the deontological 
theory of W. D. Ross, moral duties are prima facie duties, which do not hold 
absolutely. (Roughly, a prima facie moral requirement may be overridden by a 
more stringent prima facie moral requirement.) Also substantially influenced 
by Ross, I am presupposing a moral theory that is thus non-absolutist.3
In armed conflict, there is moral conflict. Because prima facie moral 
obligations about uses of armed force can conflict, we can be ensnared in 
moral dilemmas.4 There are controversies among just war theorists about 
how moral dilemmas of armed conflict should be resolved.5 My way of 
resolving them is influenced substantially by the later moral theory of R. M. 
Hare (1981). More exactly, I am influenced by him insofar as he is a Kantian 
(1981: 4) and Rossian (1981: 38), but not insofar as he is a utilitarian.
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To complete this list of personal influences, my particular just war theory is 
substantially influenced by the particular just war theories of James Childress 
(1982) and Michael Walzer (1977).
Why are there controversies among just war theorists? Disputes about 
the justice or injustice of particular armed conflicts can be fostered by 
political bias or partisan ideology; and disputes about just war principles 
can be confounded by philosophical dogmatism or incoherent reasoning. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to realise that the phenomenon of moral 
disagreement is intrinsic to the dialectical process of rethinking, revising or 
supplementing just war theory. Throughout this book, I explore the question 
of why well-intentioned, knowledgeable just war theorists can profoundly 
disagree about principles and cases – briefly, it is the question of ‘principled 
moral disagreement’. Relatedly, there is the question of whether, when there 
is principled moral disagreement about time-urgent crises, there ought to be 
principled moral compromise.
B.  A PARTICULAR COSMOPOLITAN JUST WAR THEORY
In surveying the history of the ethics of war from classical antiquity to 
the present, various overlapping just war theories can be discerned, which 
together constitute, or appear to constitute, what is often termed the ‘just war 
tradition’.6 But there is not, nor should there be, a strictly orthodox answer 
to the question: what must a just war theorist accept from the history of 
theorising about the ethics of war and peace? I think of myself as a member 
of the just war tradition, because I am engaged in the project of revising 
received just war principles of just cause, last resort, proportionality and 
noncombatant immunity. However, my purpose in this book is not to study 
the history of just war theories. Instead, while considering some alternative 
just war theories, my purpose is to develop a particular just war theory.
More specifically, as the book’s subtitle announces, the particular just 
war theory that I am developing is one that is cosmopolitan. By contrast, 
many just war theories are, or tend largely to be, state-centric.7 Roughly, 
a state-centric just war theory understands just war principles as primarily 
applicable to wars between states. More explicitly, according to a state-
centric just war theory, the primary agents that apply just war principles are 
states (or rulers of states), and the primary targets to which those agents apply 
just war principles are states (or the military actions of states). Regard, for 
example, how a last resort principle has been formulated as a state-centric 
principle: ‘when conflicts of interest occur between two states, the use of 
force may be justified only as the last resort, that is, only when all nonmilitary 
means of conflict resolution have been tried’ (Coppieters et al. 2002: 101). 
For state-centric just war theories, the Second World War is a paradigm 
case. Did France have a just cause for waging a defensive war against Nazi 
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Germany? Did the US nuclear bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki violate the noncombatant immunity principle?
A main thesis is that, in contemporary theorising about just war principles, 
there ought to be a paradigm shift from a state-centric approach to a 
cosmopolitan approach. Just war principles are moral principles. But the 
idea of cosmopolitanism should not be simply a moral idea. It should also be 
a political idea. Indeed, it should involve a conception of moral universalism, 
but it should also involve political conceptions of global governance and 
global citizenship (Dower 2009: 62). In my cosmopolitan approach to just 
war theory, I consider these interrelated topics of moral universalism, global 
governance and global citizenship.
In developing a particular cosmopolitan just war theory, I feature a real-
world global political institution – the Security Council (SC). Why should the 
Security Council have the primary responsibility for security? Why should 
a cosmopolitan just war theory be SC-centric? These questions are explored 
especially in the chapters ‘Just War Theory’, ‘Proportionality and Authority’ 
and ‘All Things Considered’.
Antedating Enlightenment ideals of democracy and influenced by political 
thought in the Middle Ages, the just war tradition was originally monarchical, 
in that it empowered rulers of polities as legitimate authorities for war-
making. However, a cosmopolitan just war theory ought to include both top-
down and bottom-up standpoints. In addition to the top-down question of 
why the Security Council should have the primary responsibility for security, 
there is a bottom-up question: should the primary locus of moral authority 
be, fundamentally, each and every human being? In a cosmopolitan just war 
theory, should the concept of responsible agent encompass (potentially) all 
human beings? In developing a particular just war theory, I maintain that the 
received monarchical idea of legitimate authority ought to be revised in two 
interrelated cosmopolitan ways: it ought to be globalised, but it also ought 
to be democratised. Even if a cosmopolitan just war theory should be SC-
centric, it also should be (global) citizen-centric. (Like an ellipse, the theory 
can have two centres.)
Accordingly, instead of the impersonal term ‘responsible agents’, I often 
prefer to use personal pronouns. Ideally, we human beings ought to be 
morally constrained by just war principles.
There are ‘many varieties of cosmopolitanism’ (Dower 2007: 81), but 
I have no space here to study the subject of cosmopolitanism thoroughly. 
Presupposing general ideals of global governance and global citizenship, I 
want to explore issues that are specific to cosmopolitan just war theory as 
a field of inquiry. There can be alternative particular cosmopolitan just war 
theories.8 Different cosmopolitan just war theories might accept different 
cosmopolitan just war principles.
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However, my purpose in this book is to develop my own particular 
cosmopolitan just war theory. My view is that the core just war principles that 
I formulate here are compatible with some (even if not all) of the varieties 
of cosmopolitanism.
In developing her own particular cosmopolitan just war theory in 
Cosmopolitan War, Cécile Fabre reported that: ‘to my knowledge, there is 
no systematic, book-length cosmopolitan theory of the just war’ (2012: 2). To 
my own knowledge, her book is the first, and mine is the second. (Her book 
was published after I completed the penultimate draft of my book.) Let me 
summarise some differences. My theory is centred primarily on the Security 
Council, whereas hers is not. My theory emphasises the last resort principle, 
whereas hers does not (Fabre 2012: 5–6). My book contains chapters on 
moral theory and the theory of action, whereas hers does not. I utilise a 
Rossian conception of prima facie moral obligations, whereas she does not. 
My book contains chapters on just war principles, whereas hers does not. On 
the other hand, her book contains instructive chapters on different forms of 
armed conflict – namely, ‘Collective self-defence’, ‘Subsistence wars’, ‘Civil 
wars’, ‘Humanitarian intervention’, ‘Commodified wars’ and ‘Asymmetrical 
wars’ – whereas mine does not. It is in the midst of those chapters that she 
develops her own particular cosmopolitan just war theory.
My book does not presuppose the reading of Fabre’s book or any other 
book about just war theory. To ensure that my book is accessible to a wide 
range of readers, I have refrained from clogging the main text with knotty 
disputations of Fabre’s particular views or the particular views of other 
just war theorists. Sometimes, however, to encourage readers to make their 
own comparisons, I cite relevant writings in brief notes. My argumentation 
about just war theory is often demanding, but it is largely self-contained. My 
purpose is to state and support a particular cosmopolitan just war theory as 
cogently and completely as possible in the space available.
I I I .  FOUR EPOCHAL EVENTS
A. THE UNITED NATIONS
With the close of the Second World War, there was an epochal event, one 
that has been pivotal for just war theory – namely, the framing of the UN 
Charter and the founding of the United Nations. Although incompletely 
and imperfectly implemented and tragically eclipsed by the subsequent 
Cold War, the UN Charter expresses resplendent moral ideals that, from the 
moral standpoint of a cosmopolitan just war theory, still ought to be realised. 
Famously, the Preamble of the UN Charter begins: ‘We the peoples of the 
United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind’. A 
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fundamental purpose of cosmopolitan just war principles ought to be to save 
the peoples of the world from the scourges of all forms of armed conflict, 
both by morally constraining responsible agents from using armed force 
unjustly and by morally constraining responsible agents to use armed force 
justly. In developing a cosmopolitan just war theory, I feature moral ideals 
expressed in the UN Charter.
But who are the responsible agents? State-centric just war theories empower 
rulers of states as the morally right authorities for war-making. However, by 
signing the UN Charter, the 193 Member States of the United Nations have 
committed themselves to comply with it. In particular, according to Article 
24, the 193 Member States of the United Nations ‘confer on the Security 
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security’.
As a US citizen, I want to append a legal argument about the US Constitution, 
one that is admittedly controversial. The UN Charter is an international 
treaty, signed by the United States on 26 June 1945 and ratified by the US 
Senate on 28 July 1945. According to Article VI of the US Constitution, ‘all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land’. Therefore, Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter – which authorises the Security Council to make decisions for 
UN Member States about the use of armed force – is ‘the supreme Law’ of 
the United States.
Should there be a paradigm shift in just war theory from a state-centric 
approach to an approach centred primarily on the Security Council? To 
repeat, a main thesis is that just war principles should be elucidated by means 
of real-world cases of armed conflict. Abstracting from the particularities 
of such cases and levitating timelessly amongst purely moral concepts, I 
am inclined to endorse the moral ideal of a democratic world government. 
However, I am writing this book during the early years of the second decade 
of the twenty-first century. For brevity, let me refer to these years by means 
of the term ‘at present’. In light of moral ideals expressed in the UN Charter, 
a related main thesis is that, at present, the Security Council should have the 
primary responsibility for security.
For such an SC-centric approach to just war theory, there is a worrisome 
problem. Those states that are the members of the Security Council – notably, 
the five permanent members with their veto power, Britain, China, France, 
Russia and the United States – are too often motivated basically by national 
interests. For a state-centric approach to just war theory, there is a comparable 
problem. Individual states are too often motivated basically by national 
interests. In the just war tradition, a standard response to the latter problem 
can be summarised as follows. Just war theory is a moral theory. Ideally, 
state-centric just war principles ought to morally constrain states from using 
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armed force unjustly. My response to the former problem can be summarised 
comparably. Just war theory is a moral theory. Ideally, cosmopolitan just war 
principles ought to morally constrain the Security Council from authorising 
unjust uses of armed force. Both the Security Council and individual states 
ought to be motivated basically by a cosmopolitan ideal of the equality of 
interests of every human being everywhere in the world.
But suppose that, in a particular case of armed conflict, the Security 
Council fails to act or acts wrongly. A cosmopolitan just war theory can 
acknowledge that the Security Council has the primary responsibility 
for security, without accepting a legitimate authority principle as a core 
just war principle. Accordingly, another main thesis is that there may be 
alternative agents that have secondary responsibility for security – for 
instance, regional organisations, ad hoc coalitions of states or the United 
States alone. (The subject of such alternatives is discussed especially in the 
chapters ‘Proportionality and Authority’ and ‘All Things Considered’.) To 
be SC-centric, a cosmopolitan just war theory does not have to endorse SC-
autocracy.
B.  AFTER THE COLD WAR
Another epochal event that has been pivotal for just war theory was the ending 
of the Cold War. After the Cold War, the threat of a third worldwide interstate 
war greatly diminished. Sadly, instead of the emergence of global peace, 
numerous armed conflicts within states occurred during the first post-Cold 
War decade, many of which involved massive violations of human rights – 
for instance, the protracted civil war in Bosnia and the precipitous genocide 
in Rwanda. Notably, on 3 December 1992, a limited military operation 
of armed humanitarian intervention in Somalia, Operation Restore Hope, 
was authorised by Security Council Resolution 794 (1992).9 By contrast, 
the Security Council refrained from authorising the armed humanitarian 
intervention during 1999 by NATO in Kosovo.
In response to this decade of internal armed conflicts and quarrels about 
armed humanitarian interventions – and presumably influenced by the just 
war tradition – the seminal 2001 Report of the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), entitled The Responsibility 
to Protect, promulgated some ‘criteria for military intervention for human 
protection purposes’ (ICISS 2001a: 32). Subsequently, at the close of 
the 2005 UN World Summit, the General Assembly strongly endorsed 
the responsibility to protect (GA Res 2005: 30). Are just war principles 
applicable or generalisable to armed humanitarian interventions in internal 
armed conflicts?10 Must armed humanitarian interventions be authorised 
by the Security Council? How should a just war theory interpret the ICISS 
criteria for military intervention? In the second part of the next chapter – ‘The 
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Responsibility to Protect’ – I explore how these and related questions should 
be answered. Indeed, a cosmopolitan just war theory should incorporate a 
conception of the responsibility to protect (R2P).
C.  TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM
When just war principles are applied to particular cases, there is, as A. J. 
Coates warned, a signal danger: ‘A one-sided and exaggerated emphasis on 
just cause’ (1997: 146). A third epochal event was the advent of the current 
global war on terror, which has induced an emphasis on just cause that is truly 
one-sided and exaggerated.11
Since the end of the Cold War, these overlapping eras of armed humanitarian 
interventions and military counterterrorism operations have underpinned a 
hawkish stereotype of just war theory – namely, that the chief function of just 
war theory is, as the word ‘just’ suggests, to morally justify uses of armed 
force.12
But a just cause is not enough. It is important to recognise that, despite 
the word ‘just’ in the term ‘just cause’, it is not sufficient to satisfy only 
the just cause principle. Traditionally, the just cause principle must be 
satisfied, but so must other just war principles – in particular, principles of 
last resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity. To counterbalance 
overemphasis of the just cause principle, I am emphasising the last resort, 
proportionality and noncombatant immunity principles. These other just war 
principles are termed ‘ancillary just war principles’. How should a just cause 
principle be counterbalanced by ancillary just war principles? In the third 
part of the next chapter – ‘Ancillary Just War Principles’ – this demanding 
question is introduced.
D.  DURING THE COLD WAR
Looking backwards to the Cold War, there was then a dovish stereotype of 
just war theory – namely, that the chief function of just war theory is, despite 
the word ‘just’, to morally constrain uses of armed force. For example, the 
influential US Catholic Bishops’ Pastoral Letter on War and Peace declared 
that ‘just-war teaching has evolved, however, as an effort to prevent war’ 
(Bishops 1983: para. 83). Let me add that just war teaching has also evolved 
as an effort to prevent unjust uses of armed force in the conduct of military 
operations.
With the purpose of fortifying such moral constraint, a just war theory 
should include a crucial epistemic requirement. When we deliberate about 
whether to use armed force, we have to make the moral presumption that we 
must not. To override this moral presumption, we have the burden of proving 
that just war principles really are satisfied (Childress 1982: 64–73). We have 
the burden of proving that there really is a just cause for the use of armed 
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force; we have the burden of proving that the use of armed force really is 
a last resort; and so forth. In the words of the Pastoral Letter, ‘a decision 
[to go to war], especially today, requires extraordinarily strong reasons for 
overriding the presumption in favor of peace and against war’ (Bishops 
1983: para. 83 [emphasis in original]). In the cosmopolitan just war theory 
that I am developing, these epistemic conceptions of moral presumption and 
burden of proof are crucial.
Relatedly, a just war theory ought to include a crucial ‘publicity 
requirement’: to satisfy the stated burden of proof fully, rulers of states, 
leaders of armed revolutions and other responsible agents must promulgate 
their full proofs publicly. This publicity requirement is crucial to effective 
global citizenship.
The Cold War was cold, since there was neither a nuclear nor conventional 
war between the Soviet Union and NATO; nonetheless, it was a dangerous 
belligerent conflict, since there were spiralling arms races, limited wars (e.g. 
the Korean War) and fusillades of deterrent military threats. Hence the Cold 
War was itself an epochal event that was pivotal for just war theory, in that it 
demonstrated that the chief function of just war theory is not only to morally 
constrain actual uses of armed force, but also to morally constrain deterrent 
threats to use armed force. Memorably, just war theorists concentrated on 
policies of nuclear deterrence.13
However, a comprehensive just war theory should also be concerned 
with policies of conventional deterrence – that is, deterrent threats to use 
conventional weapons.14 The subjects of nuclear deterrence and conventional 
deterrence are not anachronistic, as a study of the 2010 US Nuclear Posture 
Review Report evidences (DOD 2010b).
A cosmopolitan just war theory should incorporate both a conception 
of the responsibility to protect and a conception of military deterrence. In 
interrelating the two conceptions, a key question that I address is whether 
it is morally permissible (or even morally obligatory) to attempt to prevent 
internal armed conflicts by means of deterrent military threats.
IV.  GENERALISING JUST WAR PRINCIPLES
In light of these epochal events – the framing of the UN Charter and the 
founding of the United Nations, the Cold War practise of military deterrence, 
the post-Cold War recognition of the responsibility to protect and the advent 
of the current global war on terror – is a largely new ethics of armed conflict 
required or would an appropriately revised just war theory be sufficient?
As signalled by the term ‘armed conflict’ in the title of this book, my 
answer to this question is that received just war principles of just cause, last 
resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity should be generalised, 
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so that they are applicable to all forms of armed conflict. Accordingly, 
they would be applicable not only to interstate wars, but also to civil wars, 
armed humanitarian interventions, armed revolutions, counterinsurgency 
operations, counterterrorism operations, military operations by UN 
peacekeeping missions and so forth.
Alternatively, rather than generalising just war principles, so that they are 
applicable to armed humanitarian interventions, specific ‘just intervention’ 
principles might be formulated – for example, the ‘jus ad interventionem’ 
principles formulated by George Lucas (2003: 85). Specific principles might 
also be formulated for other forms of armed conflict – for instance, just 
revolution principles. That such principles would be quite similar to received 
just war principles serves to indicate, I submit, that they should be understood 
as specifications of suitably generalised just war principles.
For the sake of concreteness, this book features a real-world global 
political institution – the Security Council. Nonetheless, Security Council 
authorisation – or authorisation by any other putative authority – should 
not be a necessary moral criterion for deciding whether a proposed military 
action would be just. The set of core just war principles should not contain 
a legitimate authority principle. Accordingly, those just war theorists who 
prefer a state-centric approach (e.g. Rawls 1999), or a cosmopolitan approach 
that is not SC-centric (e.g. Fabre 2012), or a feminist approach (e.g. Sjoberg 
2006) or some other approach could still find these generalised just war 
principles acceptable.
More exactly, then, my answer to the stated question is that those received 
just war principles should be generalised, not only so that they are applicable 
to all forms of armed conflict, but also so that they are applicable by all sorts 
of responsible agents. In addition to the Security Council, they should be 
applicable by regional organisations (e.g. NATO), individual states, terrorist 
networks, revolutionary groups and so forth.
To evidence that just war principles should be thus generalised, the subject 
of armed revolution is featured.15 (Also featured is the subject of ‘phases of 
escalation’; during the conduct of a military operation, generalised just war 
principles should morally constrain escalation.)
These generalised just war principles are in and of themselves moral 
principles. By contrast, Allen Buchanan’s ‘institutionalist’ approach to just 
war theory presupposes the following metaethical thesis: ‘Whether a norm 
is valid can depend upon institutional context’ (2006: 5). While agreeing 
that institutions matter, let me summarise how my approach differs. Each 
generalised just war principle is formulated as a moral principle, independently 
of real-world political institutions. However, when it is applied to a particular 
case, whether it is satisfied (in that particular case) can depend upon the 
particular institutional context.
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For example, a generalised last resort principle may be formulated 
(provisionally) as follows. It is morally obligatory not to perform a military 
action, if every reasonable nonmilitary measure has not been attempted. This 
principle is applicable to all forms of armed conflict by all sorts of responsible 
agents. It is formulated as a moral principle, independently of any real-world 
political institution. However, when it is applied to a particular case, whether 
it is reasonable to attempt a particular nonmilitary measure in that particular 
case can depend upon the particular institutional context. Consider, for 
instance, the case of armed conflict in Darfur between rebel groups, the 
Janjaweed and the Sudanese Government. In Resolution 1828 (2008), the 
Security Council called upon ‘the Government of Sudan and rebel groups to 
engage fully and constructively in the peace process’. Subsequently (2009), 
peace negotiations were held, ‘under the auspices of the Joint African Union-
United Nations Chief Mediator tasked with resolving the conflict in Darfur’, 
Djibril Yipènè Bassolé.16 Whether it was reasonable then to attempt those 
particular negotiations could have depended upon that particular institutional 
context.
The theory of such generalised principles might be named ‘unjust and 
just armed-conflict theory’. In an earlier writing, I proposed the name ‘just 
armed-conflict theory’ (2007b: 76). However, in acknowledgment of the 
source of generalisation, I prefer now to retain the traditional name – ‘just 
war theory’.
V.  TARGETED MILITARY OPERATIONS
In order to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and to save 
American lives, the United States Government conducts targeted strikes 
against specific al-Qaida terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted 
aircraft, often referred to publicly as drones.
John O. Brennan, then-Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism (2012)
Roughly, a targeted military operation has a narrowly focused goal, and 
the means of achieving the goal is a course of fittingly small-scale military 
actions – that is, military actions that are narrowly limited in fire-power, 
length of time, geographical extent and so forth. How are cosmopolitan 
just war principles applicable to targeted military operations? In various 
chapters of this book, I investigate how this contemporary question should 
be answered.17
Archetypically, the military operation by US Special Operations forces that 
killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan on 2 May 2011 was a targeted military 
operation. Paradigmatically, there are airstrikes by unmanned aerial vehicles 
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(UAVs) (or ‘drones’) that are targeted military operations – for example, the 
US drone strike in Pakistan on 22 August 2011 that killed Atiyah Abd al-
Rahman, ‘Al Qaeda’s second-ranking figure’ (Mazzetti 2011).18
Notably, there are such targeted counterterrorism operations, but there 
are also targeted military operations of other sorts – for instance, targeted 
armed humanitarian interventions. The armed humanitarian intervention by 
NATO in Kosovo during 1999 was relatively large scale (Wheeler 2000: 
258–84). During one day of the NATO air campaign, ‘NATO planes attacked 
electrical transformers throughout Serbia’ (Becker 1999). By contrast, the 
relatively small-scale armed humanitarian intervention by the US and NATO 
in Libya during 2011 was a targeted military operation. Significantly, precise 
airstrikes against Libyan Government forces provided ‘close air support’ 
(CAS) for Libyan rebel forces (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011).19
As signalled by the word ‘relatively’, targeted military operations can be 
more or less limited in fire-power, length of time, geographical extent and 
so forth. The concept of ‘small scale’ admits of degree, as does the concept 
of ‘large scale’. In the Kosovo intervention, NATO aircraft used precision-
guided munitions; and, according to a NATO statement about the inadvertent 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, ‘extraordinary care is taken to 
avoid damage to other than legitimate military and military-related targets’ 
(NATO 1999). Instead of a sharp distinction between military operations 
that are targeted and ones that are not, there is a gamut of limited military 
operations. Presumably, there is a threshold below which military operations 
are sufficiently limited to be deemed ‘targeted’ and above which they are not.
How, then, should the concept of ‘targeted military operation’ be defined? 
How, in general, should concepts relevant to a just war theory be defined? 
The subject of definition is discussed in the chapters ‘Moral Theory’ and 
‘Theory of Action’.
At present, a cosmopolitan just war theory should be SC-centric. ‘We 
have a clear UN mandate’, a NATO ‘Statement on Libya’ asserted, and we 
are ‘carrying out precision strikes against legitimate military targets’ (NATO 
2011). Indeed, on 17 March 2011, the Libya intervention was authorised by 
Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011). By contrast, the Security Council 
refrained from authorising the Kosovo intervention. How should just war 
principles be applied to targeted military operations that are authorised by 
the Security Council? When addressing this question in later chapters, I refer 
to this paradigmatic Libya case.
Let me provide another illustration. Customarily, within the framework 
of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorises the establishment of UN 
peacekeeping missions.20 Under some circumstances, a UN peacekeeping 
mission is given a ‘Chapter VII mandate’ that permits the use of armed force. 
(The term ‘Chapter VII’ refers to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.) Elsewhere, 
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I called such a mission an ‘armed UN peacekeeping mission’ (Lango 2009b: 
116). Presumably, an armed UN peacekeeping mission may conduct targeted 
military operations – for instance, to establish and protect safe havens. As 
Nigel Dower remarked, a military force authorised by the Security Council 
might be (approximately) a cosmopolitan military force, if it is ‘wholly 
devoted to cosmopolitan goals’ (2009: 69).
To summarise, a central question is: how are cosmopolitan just war 
principles applicable to contemporary targeted military operations? What 
might prove to be a fifth epochal event pivotal for just war theory is the cluster 
of recent military operations that includes the US targeted military operation 
that killed Osama bin Laden and the armed humanitarian intervention by the 
US and NATO in Libya.
NOTES
1. A classic introduction to moral philosophy is Frankena (1973).
2. Throughout this book, various particular just war theories are cited – for instance, 
Childress (1982), Coates (1997), Fabre (2012), Fisher (2011), Orend (2006), 
Sjoberg (2006) and Walzer (1977). For an introduction to just war theory as a 
field of inquiry, see Dower (2009), Frowe (2011), Lackey (1989) or Lee (2012). 
Concerning the broader subject of international ethics, see Coicaud and Warner 
(2001) and Harbour (1999).
3. For a fuller statement of my indebtedness to Ross’ conception of prima facie 
duties, see Lango (2001).
4. A classic article about moral dilemmas is Lemmon (1962). Various specific kinds 
of moral dilemmas in modern warfare are examined in Gross (2009).
5. A landmark article about such dilemmas is Nagel (1979).
6. An introductory book regarding that tradition is Bellamy (2006).
7. A concise statement of a particular state-centric just war theory is in Rawls 
(1999).
8. For different cosmopolitan approaches to just war theory, see Atack (2005), 
Caney (2005), Fabre (2012) and Moellendorf (2002). See also the remarks about 
cosmopolitan approaches to the ethics of war and peace in Dower (2007; 2009).
9. The standard abbreviated citation for this resolution is S/RES/1996 (2011). In 
citing SC resolutions, I omit the prefix ‘S/RES/’. Security Council resolutions 
are available at the UN website http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.
html (last accessed 22 July 2013).
10. Concerning armed humanitarian intervention, see Coady (2002), Pattison (2010) 
and Weiss (2007).
11. Concerning terrorism, see Coady (2008), Nathanson (2010), Steinhoff (2007) 
and Walzer (2006).
12. An example of such hawkishness is O’Driscoll (2008).
13. An example is Fisher (1985).
14. A Cold War book about conventional deterrence is Mearsheimer (1983).
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15. A book that studies how just war principles are pertinent to revolutions is Dobos 
(2012).
16. ‘Joint UN, African Union mediator convenes Darfur peace talks in Doha’, UN 
News Centre, New York, 10 February 2009. Available at http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29847&Cr=darfur&Cr1=&Kw1=darfur+peace+
talks&Kw2=&Kw3=#.UT356VeGe1c (last accessed 22 July 2013).
17. For some reportage about contemporary examples, see Sanger (2012).
18. A study of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency that endorses targeted 
military operations is Kilcullen (2009).
19. Some cases of US ‘discrete military operations’ are found in Zenko (2010).
20. A broad discussion of UN peacekeeping missions is found in Goldstein (2011).
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CHAPTER 2
JUST WAR THEORY
This chapter scrutinises just war theory generally, and later chapters 
concentrate specifically on the core just war principles of just cause, last 
resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity.
The chapter is divided into five parts. The first part addresses the question 
of how received just war principles should be elucidated, revised or 
supplemented, so as to be applicable from the standpoint of the Security 
Council. The second part considers the pertinence of just war theory to the 
intertwined topics of armed humanitarian intervention and the responsibility 
to protect. With the aim of ensuring that uses of armed force are sufficiently 
morally constrained, the third part discusses how a demanding just cause 
principle ought to be counterbalanced especially by means of a stringent 
principle of last resort. In the fourth part, the main thesis – namely, that 
received just war principles should be generalised – is illustrated. The fifth 
part introduces the related main thesis that received just war principles 
should be temporalised.
I .  THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY
[We must acknowledge] that the security threats we face reach far 
beyond states waging aggressive war; that they involve human security 
as much as state security; that they are interdependent and affect us 
all; that we have a shared responsibility to deal with them; and that we 
need fundamental and far-reaching changes to both our policies and our 
institutions if we are to exercise that responsibility effectively.
Gareth Evans, ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility’
(2005)
Why should there be a paradigm shift in just war theory from a state-centric 
approach to an SC-centric approach? Why should the Security Council have 
the primary responsibility for security? Paralleling the widely used acronym 
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R2P for the term ‘the responsibility to protect’,1 let me suggest that the term 
‘the responsibility for security’ might have the acronym R4S. R4S includes 
R2P.
A. FIVE BASIC CRITERIA OF LEGITIMACY
With the purpose of promoting a rethinking of the ideal of collective security 
in the UN Charter, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned (in 
September 2003) the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
(briefly, the ‘High-level Panel’). In the Report of the High-level Panel, A 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (December 2004), a wide 
range of different kinds of threats to the security of states and human beings 
is surveyed: poverty, infectious disease, environmental degradation, conflict 
between states, conflict within states, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism 
and transnational organised crime.2 Truly, the collective responsibility for 
security encompasses a broad variety of security threats. (The block quotation 
above is from a talk by Evans about the High-level Panel Report.)
Significantly, the High-level Panel Report (HLPR) contains the proposal 
that, whenever the Security Council deliberates about ‘whether to authorize 
or endorse the use of military force’ to counter a security threat, it ought 
to utilise the following ‘five basic criteria of legitimacy’ (HLPR 2004: 67 
[emphasis in original]):
(a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human 
security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima 
facie the use of military force?3 In the case of internal threats, does 
it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing 
or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or 
imminently apprehended?
(b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed 
military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other 
purposes or motives may be involved?
(c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat 
in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that 
other measures will not succeed?
(d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the 
proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in 
question?
(e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the 
military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with 
the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences 
of inaction?
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According to Evans, who was a member of the High-level Panel, these 
five criteria of legitimacy have ‘an explicit pedigree’ in the just war 
tradition (2008: 140). Indeed, the legitimacy criteria resemble received 
just war principles of just cause, right intention, last resort, proportionality, 
minimum force and reasonable chance of success. Most obviously, the 
legitimacy criterion of last resort resembles quite closely a just war 
principle of last resort. Also, the legitimacy criterion of proper purpose 
resembles a just war principle of right intention. In combination, the two 
criteria of proportional means and balance of consequences resemble just 
war principles of proportionality, minimum force and reasonable chance 
of success. Finally, the legitimacy criterion of seriousness of threat may 
be interpreted as a highly generalised just cause principle. Apparently, in 
accepting the legitimacy criteria, members of the High-level Panel were 
influenced appreciably by the just war tradition.
However, in contrast to state-centric just war principles, the legitimacy 
 criteria are applicable to all forms of armed conflict: interstate wars, civil 
wars, armed humanitarian interventions, counterinsurgency operations, 
counterterrorism operations, military operations by UN peacekeeping mis-
sions and so forth. In brief, the legitimacy criteria are tantamount to gener-
alised just war principles.
Mistakenly, the set of legitimacy criteria does not contain a noncombatant 
immunity principle. Roughly, the received noncombatant immunity principle 
prohibits harming noncombatants intentionally, but it permits proportionate 
foreseen but unintended harm to them. During the Cold War, it was often 
contended that, because of the indiscriminate destructiveness of nuclear 
weapons, the noncombatant immunity principle prohibits the waging of any 
nuclear war. Hence, although the principle is standardly categorised as a 
conduct principle, it can also be plausibly categorised as a resort principle. 
When appropriately generalised, it should govern both the resort to, and 
conduct of, every form of armed conflict, no matter how large or small scale. 
In deliberating whether to authorise or endorse the use of armed force, the 
Security Council also ought to answer the question:
Noncombatant immunity. Is it clear that the proposed military action 
will not involve the deliberate targeting of noncombatants?
In the consequent report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, Kofi 
Annan summarised the legitimacy criteria in the High-level Panel Report and 
recommended ‘that the Security Council adopt a resolution setting out these 
principles and expressing its intention to be guided by them when deciding 
whether to authorise or mandate the use of force’ (2005: para. 126). Later, 
at the close of the 2005 UN World Summit, the General Assembly adopted 
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a resolution, 2005 World Summit Outcome, which contains an endorsement 
of the responsibility to protect (GA Res 2005). However, this Outcome 
Document does not contain an endorsement of the legitimacy criteria, even 
though in an earlier draft there was reference to them: ‘We recognize the 
need to continue discussing principles for the use of force, including those 
identified by the Secretary-General’ (GA 2005: para. 56). Regrettably, the 
Security Council has not yet adopted a resolution of the sort envisaged by 
Kofi Annan.
Quite often, the gulf between academic work in applied ethics and the 
practical domain of public affairs appears unbridgeable. It is remarkable, 
then, that the five legitimacy criteria were endorsed by the sixteen members of 
the High-level Panel, persons with outstanding careers in public affairs – for 
example, João Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil), former Secretary-General of 
the Organization of American States; Mary Chinery-Hesse (Ghana), former 
Deputy Director-General of the International Labour Organization; Gareth 
Evans (Australia), former President of the International Crisis Group; Amre 
Moussa (Egypt), former Secretary-General of the League of Arab States; 
Sadako Ogata (Japan), former UN High Commissioner for Refugees; 
Yevgenii Primakov, former Prime Minister of Russia; Qian Qichen, former 
Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China; and Brent 
Scowcroft, former US National Security Adviser.
B.  COSMOPOLITAN JUST WAR PRINCIPLES
With the aim of helping to bridge the particular gulf between academic 
theorising about just war principles and practical deliberations about the use 
of armed force, I examine in this book the embodiment of just war principles 
in the High-level Panel Report as five basic criteria of legitimacy. There is 
no space for an extensive discussion of the entire just war tradition. The 
promulgation of these legitimacy criteria by Kofi Annan and the High-level 
Panel is a harbinger of a paradigm shift in just war theory from a state-centric 
approach to an SC-centric approach, or so I hope.
In formulating cosmopolitan just war principles, I start by examining the 
legitimacy criteria. My method of examining them is dialectical, in that I raise 
and answer controversial questions about them. In so doing, I make some 
proposals about how they ought to be elucidated, revised or supplemented. I 
have already proposed that the five legitimacy criteria should be supplemented 
by a sixth legitimacy criterion – noncombatant immunity.
My aim is to formulate generalised just war principles that are applicable 
to all forms of armed conflict by all sorts of responsible agents. According to 
Evans, the legitimacy criteria are ‘equally applicable to individual countries’ 
decisionmaking about the use of force’ (2008: 140). Additionally, my view 
is that they are equally applicable to decisionmaking about the use of armed 
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force by individual actors in civil wars, insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, 
armed revolutions and so forth.
C.  THE UN CHARTER
The powers given by the UN Charter to the Security Council are 
comprehensive. In the words of Michael J. Matheson in his book Council 
Unbound, the ‘Charter gives extraordinary power to the Council’ (2006: 33). 
In particular, according to Article 39, the Security Council has the power to 
‘determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security’. And according to Article 42, the Security 
Council has the power to decide to ‘take such action by air, sea, or land forces 
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’. 
(Articles 39, 41 and 42 are in Chapter VII.)
Nonetheless, these powers should not be unlimited. In Plato’s Euthyphro, 
Socrates asks Euthyphro whether the ‘holy is beloved by the gods because 
it is holy, or holy because it is beloved by the gods’ (1892a: 84). In answer 
to an analogous question about the Security Council’s powers, I want to 
reject the view that the use of armed force is necessary because the Security 
Council decides that it is necessary. The Security Council does not wear the 
mantle of Louis XIV. Instead, the Security Council ought to decide that the 
use of armed force is necessary because it truly is necessary. To make such 
a decision, there is need for objective and impartial principles. In deciding 
whether the use of armed force is necessary, the Security Council ought to 
be governed by generalised just war principles.
In his article ‘Platonism, adaptivism, and illusion in UN reform’, Michael 
J. Glennon objected that the High-level Panel Report ‘exhibits all the 
familiar shortcomings of old-style Platonic idealism, ignoring the real-world 
incentives and disincentives to which states actually respond’ (2006: 614). 
But Socrates’ question cannot be so cavalierly dismissed as old-fashioned, 
for it is archetypal of a controversial question that is debated more abstractly 
by moral theorists today: should an agent adhere to a moral principle because 
it truly is a moral principle, one that is universal; or is it only a moral principle 
for the agent, one that is only relative to the agent, because the agent adheres 
to it? An affirmative answer to the first part of this question may be termed 
‘moral universalism’ and an affirmative answer to the second part may be 
termed ‘moral relativism’.
Glennon also objected that the High-level Panel Report ‘evinces a view of 
a world governed by objective, universal morality rather than by competition 
for power and shifting national interests’ (2006: 614). More accurately, what 
the High-level Panel Report displays is a view that, although UN Member 
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States are motivated all too often by competition for power and shifting 
national interests, they ought to adhere to universal moral principles. 
However, the philosophical question of moral universalism versus moral 
relativism is controversial, and I have no space here to enter into this 
controversy. Instead, in opposition to moral relativism, I presuppose moral 
universalism. It is presupposed that there are universal moral principles to 
which agents ought to adhere.
Universalist moral ideas are expressed in the Preamble of the UN Charter: 
‘We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, 
in the equal rights of men and women’. Significantly, also expressed in the 
Preamble is a universalist idea of principles regarding the use of armed force: 
‘We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to ensure, by the 
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall 
not be used, save in the common interest’. Frequently, in moral philosophy, 
the idea of the common interest is a universalist moral idea. Evidently, the 
advocacy of the legitimacy criteria by Kofi Annan and the High-level Panel 
is in close accordance with the Preamble’s enjoinment that, to constrain the 
use of armed force, apposite principles should be accepted.
The just war tradition is universalist. Glennon claimed that a just war 
theory has to be grounded on a theory of natural law (2006: 616), but just 
war theories have been grounded on different universalist moral theories 
(e.g. a theory of human rights). Having presupposed generally that there are 
universal moral principles to which agents ought to adhere, I presuppose 
specifically that there are universalist just war principles to which states and 
other agents ought to adhere.
The presupposition of moral universalism does not terminate principled 
disagreement about moral questions. Among different universalist moral 
theories, which one is correct? Among competing universal moral principles, 
which one is right? Answers to such questions are debated by moral theorists. 
Accordingly, the presupposition that there are just war principles does not 
terminate principled moral disagreement about them. Among the various just 
war theories, which one is correct? Among the different universalist moral 
theories, which one best elucidates a just war theory? How should just war 
principles be applied to cases? Answers to such questions are debated by 
just war theorists. The predicament of principled moral disagreement is not 
unique to just war theorists. For instance, the presupposition that there are 
universal human rights does not terminate principled moral disagreement 
about them. Which human rights are most basic? In addition to civil and 
political rights, are there social, economic and cultural rights?
Therefore, we must not expect that the mere adoption by the Security 
Council of a resolution expressing its intention to be guided by the legitimacy 
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criteria ought to terminate moral debate about them. In the High-level 
Panel Report, it is asserted that the adoption of the legitimacy criteria by 
the Security Council ‘will not produce agreed conclusions with push-button 
predictability, but should significantly improve the chances of reaching 
international consensus on what have been in recent years deeply divisive 
issues’ (HLPR 2004: 3–4). Glennon was sceptical of this assertion – ‘there is, 
alas, little reason to think so’ – but his scepticism was based on his assumption 
that members of the Security Council would have to be ‘in unison’, that 
they would have to be of ‘one mind’ (2006: 616). By contrast, I think that 
acceptance of the legitimacy criteria by members of the Security Council is 
compatible with their being of two or more minds about them. Instead of 
being in unison, they could be discordant. Indeed, we should hope that the 
chances of their reaching consensus on deeply divisive issues of collective 
security would be significantly improved, but we should also expect spirited 
debate. Acceptance of generalised just war principles by the Security Council 
is compatible with principled moral disagreement.
Let me reply to a different sort of objection: it is not practically urgent for 
the Security Council to be morally constrained by the legitimacy criteria; 
even though under the UN Charter, the Security Council has the legal power 
to authorise the use of armed force, it does not have any real power, military 
or otherwise. This objection is supported by the following observation: 
‘Where the Council has failed during this [post-Cold War] period, typically 
it has not been because of excessive use of this authority but because of 
neglect, irresolution, or delay in using it’ (Matheson 2006: 241). Moreover, 
even if a Security Council resolution authorising the use of armed force were 
not blocked by the veto of a permanent member, it could be obstructed by the 
reluctance of UN Member States to implement it.
Granted, passivism in the Security Council is a problem currently, but 
there is also a (potential) problem of activism. Contemplating the threats to 
global security today – threats of poverty, infectious disease, environmental 
degradation, conflict between states, conflict within states, weapons of 
mass destruction, terrorism and transnational organised crime – it is not 
unreasonable to worry about future Security Council activism. Thus Ramesh 
Thakur, a member of ICISS, warned: ‘If and when the UN Charter is 
reformed, one item on the agenda should be curbs on untrammelled authority 
in the UNSC, that is presently subject to no countervailing political check or 
judicial review’ (2006: 306). Even if, from the point of view of the practical 
domain of public affairs, there is presently no urgency in answering the 
question of whether the Security Council ought to be morally constrained by 
the legitimacy criteria, it should be answered nonetheless, from the point of 
view of a universalist moral philosophy.
As a coda, let me respond metaphorically to a pithy metaphorical 
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objection to the moral universalism of the High-level Panel Report: ‘We are 
not yet singing from the same hymnal’ (Glennon 2006: 617). Indeed, there 
are different musical traditions in the world, but musicians from different 
traditions can still concertise together. At the Damrosch Park Bandshell in 
Lincoln Center (New York), I listened to such a concert, entitled ‘Absolute 
Arabian Nights’ (25 August 2007). A group of musicians trained in Western 
classical music, the Absolute Ensemble, concertised with a group of Arabic 
musicians, including Marcel Khalifé – a 2005 UNESCO Artist for Peace. 
The peoples of the United Nations might not yet sing from the same hymnal, 
but they still might sing harmoniously together.
I I .  THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Having introduced the general idea of the responsibility for security, I now 
consider the specific idea of the responsibility to protect (R2P). Why should 
the Security Council have the primary responsibility to protect? How are the 
legitimacy criteria applicable to armed humanitarian interventions?
In the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN World Summit, there is a strong 
endorsement of R2P:
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to 
help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis 
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly 
fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. (GA Res 2005: para. 139)
Should only the Security Council have the responsibility to protect by means 
of collective military action?
A. SIX CRITERIA FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION
Problematically, the legitimacy criteria are abstract and general. In particular, 
the criterion of seriousness of threat is too sketchy: ‘Is the threatened harm to 
State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify 
prima facie the use of military force?’ Especially problematic are the words 
‘of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious’. To elucidate this criterion 
adequately, the following questions need to be answered. Which kinds? How 
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clear? How serious? The first question is categorial, the second epistemic and 
the third evaluative. A fourth question also needs to be answered. What is 
meant by ‘justify prima facie’?
Let me consider briefly the categorial question – the question of relevant 
kinds. The words ‘of a kind’ can be elucidated by means of a distinction 
between a principle and its specifications (Beauchamp and Childress 2009: 
16–19). To decide whether the use of military force is prima facie justified 
in a particular case, the threat-seriousness criterion has to be specified 
appropriately for that case. In particular, the kind of threat to state or human 
security has to be specified.
In the High-level Panel Report, the threat-seriousness criterion is 
accompanied by a single illustration: ‘In the case of internal threats, 
does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently 
apprehended?’ In this illustration of the criterion, there are several kinds of 
threats to human security. For brevity, these several kinds may be collectively 
termed ‘mass atrocities’ (Evans 2008). For instance, the threat of genocide 
within a state is a threatened harm to human security that is of a kind to justify 
prima facie the use of military force, if it is sufficiently clear and serious.
Let me also briefly consider the evaluative question – the question of sufficient 
seriousness. Among the kinds of threats to human security specified in the 
illustration is the threat of large-scale killing. A sufficiently clear threat of killing 
within a state justifies prima facie the use of military force, if the killing is large 
scale. On the other hand, such a threat does not justify prima facie the use of 
military force, if the killing is not large scale. A threat of killing that is large scale 
is sufficiently serious, whereas a threat of killing that is not large scale is not 
sufficiently serious. As the term ‘scale’ indicates, the concept of seriousness is a 
scalar concept. Presumably, there is a threshold above which the scale of killings 
is sufficiently serious and below which it is not.
Because the term ‘large scale’ is imprecise, this threshold is problematic. 
Such threshold problems abound in just war theory and within moral 
philosophy generally. For instance, concerning the received noncombatant 
immunity principle, there is the problem of ascertaining the threshold 
between proportionate and disproportionate foreseen but unintended harms 
to noncombatants. How should such threshold problems be resolved? I 
want to stress that well-intentioned, knowledgeable just war theorists can 
profoundly disagree about how this question ought to be answered.
The 2004 High-level Panel Report was directly influenced by The 
Responsibility to Protect – the 2001 Report of the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). According to Evans, who co-
chaired ICISS with Mohamed Sahnoun, the legitimacy criteria in the High-level 
Panel Report draw ‘very directly on the language in the ICISS Report’ (Evans 
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2008: 45). In the ICISS Report, there are six criteria for military intervention 
– namely, principles of ‘right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, 
proportional means and reasonable prospects’ (2001a: 32).
Note that, similar to the High-level Panel Report, the ICISS Report’s set of 
criteria of military intervention does not contain a criterion of noncombatant 
immunity. However, the ICISS Report includes a jus in bello conception of 
noncombatant immunity in a set of operational (or conduct) principles for a 
doctrine for ‘human protection operations’ (2001a: 67).
Even though directly influenced by the military intervention criteria in 
the ICISS Report, the legitimacy criteria in the High-level Panel Report are 
significantly different. Indeed, the High-level Panel Report incorporates 
broadly the ICISS Report’s criteria of right intention, last resort, proportional 
means and reasonable prospects.
However, only the aforementioned illustration of the High-level Panel 
Report’s threat-seriousness criterion draws directly on the ICISS Report’s 
language about the just cause criterion. Especially because of the wide range 
of kinds of security threats encompassed by the threat-seriousness criterion, 
the High-level Panel Report’s responsibility for security greatly expands the 
ICISS Report’s responsibility to protect.
Also, the High-level Panel Report does not have a criterion of legitimate 
authority. Apparently, it is assumed that the Security Council is the sole 
authority: ‘The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a 
source of authority’ (HLPR 2004: 3). By contrast, the right authority criterion 
in the ICISS Report acknowledges the primacy of the Security Council, albeit 
qualifiedly: on the contingency that ‘the Security Council rejects a proposal 
or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time’, there is a gamut of ‘alternative 
options’ (2001a: xiii) – for instance, ‘consideration of the matter by the 
General Assembly’ or by ‘regional or sub-regional organizations’ (2001a: 
xiii). Further, the ICISS Report recognises (while not forthrightly endorsing) 
the alternative option of ‘a military intervention [that] is undertaken by an ad 
hoc coalition or individual state which does fully observe and respect all the 
criteria we have identified’ (2001a: 55 [emphasis in original]).
Additionally, my view is that a military action to stop mass atrocities 
– one that fully observes and respects just war principles – may be justly 
undertaken by nonstate actors. For example, the threat of genocide within an 
authoritarian state might be justly countered by an armed revolution. This 
view is supported in the fourth part of this chapter, ‘Just War Principles and 
Nonstate Actors’.
B.  PREVENTION VERSUS REACTION
The post-Cold War recognition of the responsibility to protect was an 
epochal event that has been pivotal for just war theory, and so was the Cold 
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War practice of military deterrence. A cosmopolitan just war theory ought 
to morally constrain both actual uses of armed force and deterrent threats to 
actually use armed force.
How should deterrence theory be integrated with R2P theory? According 
to the ICISS Report, there is the responsibility to react to mass atrocities, but 
there also is the responsibility to prevent them. The six criteria for military 
intervention – criteria that govern actual uses of armed force – are discussed 
extensively in the fourth chapter of the ICISS Report, ‘The responsibility 
to react’. Importantly, in the third chapter – ‘The responsibility to prevent’ 
– there is a brief discussion on the subject of threats to actually use armed 
force. Deterrent threats to use armed force comprise an essential tool of 
prevention. How, then, should R2P theory understand such threats?
In this chapter about the responsibility to prevent, there is a useful distinction 
between direct prevention and root-cause prevention. The tools of root-cause 
prevention include political measures (e.g. promoting democracy), economic 
measures (e.g. alleviating poverty), legal measures (e.g. implementing human 
rights in national legal systems) and even military measures (e.g. training 
military personnel about international humanitarian law). The tools of direct 
prevention also include political measures (e.g. crisis diplomacy), economic 
measures (e.g. economic sanctions) and legal measures (e.g. indictments by 
the International Criminal Court). Additionally, deterrent military threats 
comprise a tool of direct prevention: ‘In extreme cases, direct prevention 
might involve the threat to use force’ (ICISS 2001a: 25).
Who are the agents responsible for such preventive measures? Should 
the Security Council have the primary responsibility for prevention? To 
grasp how these questions should be answered, it is crucial to realise that 
the UN Charter mandates that the use of armed force must be a last resort. 
For, according to Chapter VI – ‘Pacific settlement of disputes’ – the parties 
to a peace-endangering dispute should ‘first of all’ attempt to settle their 
dispute ‘by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means’ (Article 33). Significantly, the Security Council is empowered by 
Chapter VI to ‘call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means’ 
(Article 33). Empowered by Chapter VII to endorse military measures, the 
Security Council is also empowered by Chapter VI to endorse peaceful 
measures.
In addition to such peaceful nonmilitary measures, there are nonmilitary 
measures that are coercive – for instance, economic sanctions. If the parties 
to a peace-endangering dispute ‘fail to settle it’ through peaceful measures 
(Article 39), the Security Council is empowered (apparently limitlessly) by 
Article 41 of Chapter VII to ‘decide what [coercive] measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions’. 
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Instead of a dualism between peaceful measures and uses of armed force, 
there is a gamut of nonmilitary measures, from ones that are truly pacific 
(e.g. voluntary judicial settlements) to ones that are highly coercive (e.g. 
aggressive police measures). Finally, if such coercive nonmilitary measures 
‘would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate’ (Article 42), the 
Security Council may authorise the use of armed force. Empowered by Article 
42 of Chapter VII to endorse military measures, the Security Council is also 
empowered by Article 41 of Chapter VII to endorse coercive nonmilitary 
measures.
Recall the last resort criterion in the High-level Panel Report: ‘Has every 
non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored, with 
reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed?’ 
Borrowing words quoted above from the UN Charter, this criterion can 
be rephrased as follows. ‘First of all’, has every nonmilitary measure for 
meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for 
believing that such measures ‘would be inadequate or have proved to be 
inadequate’? Evidently, the UN Charter mandates that the use of armed force 
must be a last resort. A Security Council resolution expressing the intention 
to be guided by a just war principle of last resort would be a reaffirmation of 
what the UN Charter already mandates.
Customarily, just war principles are applied reactively, but they may also 
be applied preventively (Lango 2005). Significantly, the last resort principle 
is standardly conceptualised as applicable reactively, but it should also be 
conceptualised as applicable preventively. Before reactively authorising 
the present use of armed force to counter a security threat – for instance, 
the present occurrence of mass atrocities – the Security Council ought to 
explore peaceful means (e.g. negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration and judicial settlement) and coercive nonmilitary means (e.g. 
economic sanctions).
It is essential to recognise that the very same nonmilitary measures are tools 
of prevention that can be used to counter a future security threat. Suppose 
that mass atrocities are not presently occurring in a given state, but suppose 
also that there is a reasonable forecast (e.g. by the International Crisis Group) 
that mass atrocities are somewhat likely to occur there in future. Before 
preventively authorising the future use of armed force to counter this security 
threat, the Security Council ought to first fully explore peaceful means 
(e.g. negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial 
settlement) and coercive nonmilitary means (e.g. economic sanctions).
A distinguishable type of nonmilitary measures ought to be acknowledged, 
one that is intermediate between the coercive nonmilitary measures of Article 
41 and actual uses of armed force – namely, coercive military threats. For 
example, in Article 42, one of the listed measures is ‘blockade’. Even if 
The Ethics of Armed Conflict.indd   29 09/12/2013   12:10:07
t h e e t h i c s  o f  a r m e d c o n f l i c t30
weapons are not discharged in imposing a blockade, there is often a threat to 
use them against a transgressor.
Typically, a deterrent military threat by agents to targets is conditional: 
if you (the targets) perform a specified action, then we (the agents) will use 
specified armed force against you. Consider, for example, the case of Darfur. 
In SC Resolution 1591 (2005), the Security Council demanded ‘that the 
Government of Sudan . . . immediately cease conducting offensive military 
flights in and over the Darfur region’. The Security Council might have 
enforced this demand by means of roughly the following deterrent threat: 
if the Government of Sudan conducts such flights, then armed force will be 
used against Sudanese military aircraft and airfields. The Security Council is 
empowered by Chapter VII to authorise deterrent threats to use armed force.
A deterrent threat to use armed force can be made reactively. However, it 
also can be made preventively. In order to halt present mass atrocities, the 
Security Council is empowered to threaten to authorise armed humanitarian 
intervention. However, the Security Council is also empowered to threaten 
to authorise armed humanitarian intervention, in order to prevent future mass 
atrocities (Lango and Patterson 2010).
Unhappily, since 11 September 2001, the international responsibility to 
protect has been overshadowed by the global war on terror. Notoriously, 
apparently drawing upon the idea of R2P, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was 
defended by a ‘human rights-based argument’ (Johnson 2005: 56).
Subsequently, there has been a tendency among friends of R2P to stress 
nonmilitary preventive measures. For instance, to counter the misunderstand-
ing that the newer term ‘R2P’ is synonymous with the older term ‘armed 
humanitarian intervention’, Evans explained, in his book The Responsibility 
to Protect, that ‘above all, R2P is about taking effective preventive action’ 
(2008: 56 [emphasis in original]). In his book, he listed a variety of tools 
for combating mass atrocities (2008: 252–3). The tools for reacting to mass 
atrocities include diplomatic peacemaking, economic sanctions and the use 
of military force. The tools for preventing mass atrocities include preventive 
diplomacy and the threat of economic sanctions. Notably absent from the 
list of tools of prevention is the threat of military force. Instead, the threat of 
military force is included in the list of tools of reaction. Should the threat of 
military force also be a tool of prevention?
A main question addressed in this book is whether we should attempt to 
prevent mass atrocities by means of deterrent military threats. In accordance 
with just war theory, such deterrent threats should be restricted to uses of 
armed force that would satisfy just war principles. Even if just war principles 
were to prohibit deterrent threats of massive aerial bombardments, they 
might still permit more limited deterrent threats. Specifically, they might 
permit deterrent threats of targeted military actions. For instance, they might 
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permit targeted deterrent threats that are useful for imposing no-fly zones and 
protecting safe havens.
III .  ANCILLARY JUST WAR PRINCIPLES
My overarching purpose in this book is to develop a particular cosmopolitan 
just war theory. The starting point is the embodiment of just war principles 
in the High-level Panel Report as five basic criteria of legitimacy. In later 
chapters, I examine these legitimacy criteria dialectically, by raising and 
answering controversial questions about them. In so doing, I make some 
proposals about how they ought to be elucidated, revised or supplemented. 
The goal is to formulate generalised just war principles that are applicable 
by all sorts of responsible agents to all forms of armed conflict. In this part, I 
consider how a generalised just cause principle ought to be counterbalanced 
especially by a stringent principle of last resort.
A.  JUST CAUSE VERSUS LAST RESORT
Problematically, the threat-seriousness criterion is abstract and general. 
In particular, to elucidate it adequately, a categorial question needs to be 
answered. What are the kinds of security threats that justify prima facie the 
use of military force, if they are sufficiently clear and serious? One of these 
kinds is declared in the UN Charter: the threat of ‘armed attack’ by one 
state (or group of states) against another state (or group of states) (Article 
51). In the preceding part, another kind of security threat is discussed: mass 
atrocities. Are there additional kinds?
Disputably, among the kinds of threats to the security of states and human 
beings is the threat of environmental degradation – for example, the threat of 
catastrophic climate change. During April 2007, the Security Council held a 
landmark debate about the implications of climate change for global peace 
and security. Strikingly, the representative of Tuvalu, Afelee F. Pita, urged 
the Security Council to ‘review its mandate to fully embrace the concept of 
environmental security’ (SC 2007). Remember also that among the wide 
range of kinds of security threats surveyed in the High-level Panel Report is 
environmental degradation. Should the Security Council have the primary 
responsibility for countering this kind of threat?
Arguably, because the UN Charter empowers the Security Council to 
‘determine the existence of any threat to the peace’ (Article 39), the Security 
Council has the legal authority to determine the existence of threats of the 
following kind: those environmental threats that are, by their very nature, 
threats to international peace and security. In short, the Security Council 
has the primary responsibility for environmental security. A conception of 
environmental security is advocated by Robyn Eckersley (2007). Some of her 
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main points are as follows. In addition to R2P, there is the responsibility to 
protect the environment – for instance, the responsibility to prevent massive 
destruction of an ecosystem. Should peaceful means (such as environmental 
treaties) be inadequate, the Security Council is empowered by Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter to authorise ‘armed ecological intervention’.
Do the legitimacy criteria encompass the threat of environmental 
degradation? Should received just war principles be generalised, so as to be 
morally permissive of armed ecological intervention? To repeat Thakur’s 
warning, there ‘should be curbs on untrammelled authority’ in the Security 
Council (2006: 306). Armed force is a blunt instrument, and military action 
designed to protect the environment could itself extensively damage the 
environment.
Relatedly, to repeat Coates’ warning, there is the grave problem of a ‘one-
sided and exaggerated emphasis on just cause’ (1997: 146). My purpose 
in mentioning the threat of environmental degradation is to illustrate a 
comparable warning: in light of the abstractness and generality of the threat-
seriousness criterion, there is a grave problem of a one-sided and exaggerated 
emphasis on it. Truly, a generalised just war theory that emphasises it unduly 
would be inordinately hawkish.
Traditionally, in just war theory, a just cause is not enough. Even when 
there is a just cause for war, the use of armed force is not morally permissible, 
unless additional just war principles are satisfied – for example, principles of 
last resort and proportionality. Similarly, according to the High-level Panel 
Report, it is necessary for the threat-seriousness criterion to be satisfied, but 
not sufficient. For even when that criterion is satisfied, the Security Council 
must not authorise the use of military force, unless the other legitimacy 
criteria are also satisfied.
Let us consider again the wording of the threat-seriousness criterion: ‘Is 
the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently 
clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of military force?’ To interpret 
this criterion correctly, it is essential to realise the following. Even when the 
Security Council determines that there is such a security threat, the use of 
armed force is only justified prima facie.
What is meant by ‘justify prima facie’? This question can be answered by 
means of epistemic conceptions of moral presumption and burden of proof. 
To override the moral presumption that armed force must not be used, the 
Security Council has the burden of proving that the five legitimacy criteria 
are satisfied. Having proven that the threat-seriousness criterion is satisfied – 
thereby determining that the use of armed force is justified prima facie – there 
remains the burden of proving that the other legitimacy criteria are satisfied.
In particular, having proven that the threat-seriousness criterion is 
satisfied, the Security Council still has the burden of proving that the last 
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resort criterion is satisfied: ‘Has every non-military option for meeting the 
threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that 
other measures will not succeed?’ What is intended by the phrase ‘reasonable 
grounds’? Because of the moral presumption that armed force must not be 
used, the Security Council must make the moral presumption that alternative 
nonmilitary measures will succeed. To override the latter moral presumption, 
the Security Council has the burden of proving – that is, the burden of 
providing reasonable grounds for believing – that alternative nonmilitary 
measures will not succeed.
B. THE COEQUALITY THESIS
To counterbalance overemphasis of the just cause principle, I am emphasising 
the last resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity principles. Just 
war theory is a deontological theory, and the core just war principles are 
deontological principles. According to a deontological theory, fundamental 
moral requirements are stringent moral obligations (duties or rules). Crucially, 
a deontological requirement overrides any requirement of prudence (e.g. 
self-advantage). As deontological principles, the core just war principles 
override prudential requirements of national interest.
Indeed, the just cause principle is a deontological principle, but so are 
the ancillary principles of last resort, proportionality and noncombatant 
immunity. A main thesis is that the just cause principle and these ancillary 
just war principles are deontological principles coequally. None of them has 
priority over any of the others. I call this thesis ‘the coequality thesis’.
Consider, in particular, the coequality of the threat-seriousness and last 
resort criteria. First, applying the former criterion, the use of armed force 
must be justified prima facie. First, applying the latter criterion, every 
reasonable nonmilitary measure must be explored. The two occurrences of 
the word ‘first’ signal that the two criteria are coequal. There is a stringent 
moral obligation to determine that there is a just cause, but there is also a 
stringent moral obligation to explore every reasonable nonmilitary measure. 
Just cause does not have priority over last resort.
By contrast, according to James Turner Johnson, the just war principles 
of just cause, right authority and right intention are ‘deontological require-
ments’, whereas the just war principles of reasonable chance of success, pro-
portionality and last resort are ‘prudential tests’; and deontological principles 
have ‘priority’ over principles that are prudential (1999: 34, 41):
Whereas the older criteria, sovereign authority, just cause, and right 
intention, including the aim of establishing peace, establish duties or 
obligations for the person or people in sovereign authority, the criterion 
of last resort and its associated criteria, equally recent, of reasonable 
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hope of success and overall proportionality of good over harm estab-
lish prudential tests, requiring that a judgment be made as to the con-
sequences both of resorting to force and of not resorting to force. The 
classic criteria tell when a use of armed force is just; the newer criteria 
have to do with whether, even if it is known to be just, a use of armed 
force is likely to be unwise. The prudential criteria are thus secondary 
to and supportive of the classic ones. (Johnson 2005: 57)
In this quotation, the ‘classic’ or ‘older criteria’ that ‘establish duties or 
obligations’ are distinguished from the ‘recent’ or ‘newer’ criteria that ‘establish 
prudential tests’. However, I am not studying here the history of just war 
principles. Instead, I am engaging in the project of examining the embodiment 
of just war principles in the High-level Panel Report as five basic criteria 
of legitimacy. In doing this, it is dubious whether being ‘older’ or ‘newer’ 
matters. But suppose that Johnson’s historical claim about the last resort and 
proportionality principles is correct. Nonetheless, I would advocate a paradigm 
shift from a state-centric approach to a cosmopolitan approach that includes 
a transformation from such prudentialism to a thoroughgoing deontologism. 
Such controversy about the relative weight or stringency of different just war 
principles illustrates the phenomenon of principled moral disagreement that is 
intrinsic to the dialectical process of revising traditional just war theory.
A chief purpose of later chapters of this book is to explain why the last 
resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity principles ought to be 
construed as stringent deontological requirements.
C.  REASONABLENESS STANDARDS
With the aim of attempting both to clarify and resolve principled moral 
disagreement, I have designed this book dialectically. For instance, the 
chapter on the idea of just cause is counterbalanced partly by two chapters 
on the idea of last resort.
On the one hand, the threat-seriousness criterion might appear to be 
overly permissive. On the other hand, the last resort criterion might appear 
to be overly prohibitive. Thus Walzer has challenged the received just war 
principle of last resort:
Taken literally . . . ‘last resort’ would make war morally impossible. 
For we can never reach lastness, or we can never know that we have 
reached it. There is always something else to do: another diplomatic 
note, another United Nations resolution, another meeting. (2004: 88)
However, according to Childress, the last resort principle does not require 
‘that all possible measures have to be attempted and exhausted if there is no 
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reasonable expectation that they will be successful’ (1982: 75). Noting the 
occurrence here of the term ‘reasonable’ – a term that also occurs in the High-
level Panel Report’s last resort criterion – let me raise a crucial question. 
What are the standards for determining whether it is reasonable to attempt an 
alternative nonmilitary measure before resorting to the use of armed force? 
In brief, what are the ‘reasonableness standards’? Rather than jettison the last 
resort principle, Walzer’s challenge shows the need to investigate the topic 
of reasonableness standards. By means of such standards, we should strive 
to determine whether we have reached lastness. By means of such standards, 
we should strive to determine whether it is reasonable to transmit another 
diplomatic note, whether it is reasonable to seek another UN resolution, 
whether it is reasonable to hold another meeting.
In conclusion, when a last resort principle is subject to appropriate 
reasonableness standards, it is not overly prohibitive. The topic of 
reasonableness standards is discussed further in Chapter 6, ‘Last Resort’.
IV.  JUST WAR PRINCIPLES AND NONSTATE ACTORS
My aim is to formulate generalised just war principles that are applicable 
not only to armed conflicts of all forms, but also by all sorts of responsible 
agents. In traditional interstate warfare, the adversaries of states are states, 
and the responsible agents include rulers of states and military commanders. 
By contrast, in contemporary asymmetric warfare, the adversary of a state is 
an ‘asymmetric adversary’ – for example, ‘sub-state actors’, such as terrorist 
groups (Thornton 2007: 3).
In advocating a paradigm shift from a state-centric approach to a 
cosmopolitan approach, I want to emphasise that the Security Council is 
empowered by the UN Charter both to authorise and prohibit asymmetric 
warfare. For example, in order ‘to protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attack’, Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) 
authorised UN Member States to use armed force against an asymmetric 
adversary – namely, Libya.
A main thesis is that generalised just war principles should be applicable 
not only by rulers of states, but also by leaders of such nonstate actors as 
terrorist groups. According to moral universalism, there should be no 
moral asymmetry between states and nonstate actors, whatever the military 
asymmetry.
Why should just war principles be formulated so generally? To begin with, 
let me illustrate why the just cause principle should be generalised, so as to 
be applicable by nonstate actors. Consider the particular case of genocide 
in Rwanda.4 Between 1990 and 1993, there was armed conflict between the 
Hutu Government of Rwanda and a nonstate actor – namely, a Tutsi rebel 
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group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In a formal peace agreement 
signed in August 1993, the Arusha Accords, the Rwandan Government 
and the RPF consented to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission 
(UNAMIR) in Rwanda. However, UNAMIR did not have a Chapter VII 
mandate authorising the use of armed force; UNAMIR was not an armed UN 
peacekeeping mission. Tragically, when genocide began in April 1994, the 
UN peacekeepers had to remain impartial and could not use armed force to 
attempt to stop genocide. By the end of April 1994, UNAMIR was abandoned.
Surely, there was a just cause for the use of armed force to stop genocide in 
Rwanda. ‘From April to mid-July 1994, Rwanda experienced the equivalent 
of three 11 September 2001 attacks every day for 100 days’ (HLPR 2004: 
19). On 17 May 1994, Security Council Resolution 918 (1994) authorised 
a UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR II) in Rwanda with a more robust 
mandate that allowed limited uses of armed force: ‘The Security Council . . . 
Recognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence 
against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations’. 
Surely, UNAMIR II had a just cause for the use of armed force to stop the 
genocide. (Disputably, the military operation in Rwanda begun in June 1994 
by France – Operation Turquoise – had a just cause.) However, because of 
various delays, UNAMIR II was not deployed before the genocide ended in 
mid-July 1994.
Why did genocide in Rwanda end in mid-July 1994? When genocide 
began there in April 1994, armed conflict between the Hutu Government and 
the RPF resumed. By mid-July 1994, the RPF won this civil war. Genocide 
ended because the RPF stopped it (Des Forges 1999: 301–2).
Did the RPF have a just cause for using armed force to stop genocide in 
Rwanda? Presumably, if UNAMIR II had a just cause, then – in accordance 
with moral universalism – the RPF had a just cause. The moral claim that a 
nonstate actor, the RPF, had a just cause illustrates the general moral thesis 
that an adequately generalised just cause principle should be applicable by 
nonstate actors.
Especially because generalised just war principles should be applicable 
by nonstate actors, the set of core just war principles should not contain a 
legitimate authority principle. Each core just war principle is a necessary 
moral criterion for determining whether a particular use of armed force to 
stop genocide would be just. Presumably, as a ‘nonstate’ actor, the RPF was 
not a ‘legitimate’ authority. Suppose that a legitimate authority principle 
were accepted as a core just war principle. Then the use of armed force by 
the RPF to stop genocide in Rwanda would not have been just.
Why should the received noncombatant immunity principle be generalised, 
so as to be applicable by nonstate actors? Consider, as an illustration of 
asymmetric warfare, the specific issue of counterinsurgency operations. 
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Indeed, before a state (or coalition of states) engages in a counterinsurgency 
operation, leaders should ask whether noncombatants would be intentionally 
targeted. But the leaders of the asymmetric adversary of the counterinsurgency 
operation – the insurgency that the operation aims to counter – should also 
ask this question about their insurgency operations. In accordance with 
moral universalism, a noncombatant immunity principle should hold for 
counterinsurgents and insurgents symmetrically, whatever their military 
asymmetry.
Why should the received last resort principle be generalised, so as 
to be applicable by nonstate actors? Consider again the specific issue of 
counterinsurgency operations. Before a state (or coalition of states) engages 
in a counterinsurgency operation, leaders should ask whether it is reasonable 
to attempt an alternative nonmilitary measure. Comparably, the leaders of the 
asymmetric adversary of the counterinsurgency operation should also ask 
this question about their insurgency operations. In accordance with moral 
universalism, a last resort principle should hold for counterinsurgents and 
insurgents symmetrically, whatever their military asymmetry.
V.  TEMPORALISING JUST WAR PRINCIPLES
In addition to being generalised, a main thesis is that received just war 
principles should be temporalised (Lango 2004; 2007b). In this final part of 
the chapter, the concepts of ‘temporal phase’ and ‘temporal standpoint’ are 
introduced. As background, the main thesis that a just war theory should be 
a deontological theory is explained more fully.
A.  TEMPORAL PHASES OF ARMED CONFLICTS
The calculus of proportionality between probable good and evil in a 
war is a continuing one. It should be made before the decision to go 
to war. It must then be reviewed at critical points along the process of 
waging the war.
William V. O’Brien (1981: 27)
As this quotation implies, the process of waging a war is a temporal process. 
A war that initially satisfies the just war principle of proportionality might, at 
some critical juncture while it is being waged, cease to satisfy it (Fisher 2011: 
75). Comparable remarks hold also of the other core just war principles. A 
war that initially has a just cause might, while it is being waged, cease to 
have a just cause, because (for instance) at some critical juncture there is 
inordinate escalation. A war that initially satisfies the last resort principle 
might, while it is being waged, cease to satisfy it, because (for instance) 
at some critical juncture there is a new opportunity for negotiation. A war 
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that initially satisfies the noncombatant immunity principle might, while it is 
being waged, cease to satisfy it, because (roughly) at some critical juncture 
noncombatants are no longer protected sufficiently from violence. The 
process of waging wars is a temporal process, and the process of applying 
just war principles to wars is also a temporal process.
To generalise, the process of performing military actions in armed conflicts 
of all forms is a temporal process and, correlatively, the process of applying 
just war principles to them is a temporal process.
Wars have temporally successive phases. For example, the Korean War 
had three chief temporal phases, which might be called ‘defending South 
Korea’, ‘invading North Korea’ and ‘defending against China’. In general, 
armed conflicts of all forms have temporally successive phases. For instance, 
the civil war in Libya during 2011 had two chief temporal phases – the initial 
phase of armed revolution against the Qaddafi regime and the subsequent 
phase of armed humanitarian intervention.
A main thesis is that just war principles are applicable at each temporal 
phase of any armed conflict. At each temporal phase of any armed conflict, 
the principles of just cause, last resort, proportionality and noncombatant 
immunity must be satisfied. For example, given that there was a just cause for 
defending South Korea, it is still necessary to answer the question: was there 
a just cause for invading North Korea? Given that there was a just cause for 
armed revolution in Libya, it is still necessary to answer the question: was 
there a just cause for armed humanitarian intervention there?
At each temporal phase of any armed conflict, we should determine whether 
just war principles are satisfied. But the thesis holds primarily of temporal 
phases that are critical. (Notice the word ‘critical’ in the block quotation.) As 
one temporal phase is succeeded by another temporal phase – and if the morally 
relevant circumstances remain unchanged – the new temporal phase is not one 
that is critical. On the other hand, as one temporal phase is succeeded by another 
temporal phase – and if some morally relevant circumstances have changed or 
if new morally relevant circumstances have emerged – the new temporal phase 
is one that is critical. Hence the task of applying just war principles to temporal 
phases of armed conflicts need not be unduly burdensome.
Additionally, there are prelude phases (e.g. preparing for war) and aftermath 
phases (e.g. implementing a peace treaty). Roughly, for each armed conflict, 
there are phases of prelude, resort, conduct, halting and aftermath. The concept 
of ‘temporal phase’ is discussed further in Chapter 4, ‘Theory of Action’.
B.  DEONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN AGENCY
What is essentially good in the action consists in the mental disposition 
let the consequences be what they may.
Kant ([1785] 1964: 84 [416])
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Characteristically, armed conflicts are highly destructive. Regularly, when 
we use armed force, we kill or grievously injure human beings. Regularly, 
when we use armed force, we destroy property. And, all too frequently, 
when we use armed force, we wreak havoc on the ‘natural and cultural 
environment’ (Coady 2002: 18). In the memorable words of a classical 
just war theorist, Francisco de Vitoria: ‘all the effects of war are cruel and 
horrible – slaughter, fire, devastation’ (1991: 304). Because armed conflicts 
are so highly destructive, the chief function of a just war theory should be to 
morally constrain uses of armed force.
A just war theory should be a deontological theory. Just war principles 
should be deontological principles, and deontological principles are centred 
primarily on human agents. Deontological principles obligate, permit or 
prohibit the performance of actions by human agents. As agent-centred 
moral principles, just war principles morally obligate human agents not to 
use armed force unjustly, but they also morally obligate human agents to 
use armed force justly. For example, from the standpoint of each and every 
human agent who is deliberating about whether to use armed force, the last 
resort principle is centred on him or her. It is morally obligatory for him or 
her not to use armed force if he or she has not explored every reasonable 
nonmilitary measure. It is from the standpoint of a particular human agent 
– a particular ‘agential standpoint’ – that just war principles are primarily 
applicable.
Also, from the standpoint of each and every human agent who is 
deliberating about whether to use armed force, the noncombatant immunity 
principle is centred on him or her. It is morally obligatory for him or her 
not to kill or grievously injure noncombatants intentionally. Notice the 
term ‘intentionally’. In a deontological theory, it matters whether an action 
is performed intentionally. To use Kant’s phrase ‘mental disposition’, it 
matters whether an action has the mental disposition expressed by the word 
‘intentionally’.
But other mental dispositions (or ‘states of mind’ or ‘mental states’) 
also matter. Specifically, in the moral theory that I am presupposing, it also 
matters whether an action is performed knowingly, recklessly or negligently.
Let me suggest a domestic analogy. In the Model Penal Code of the 
American Law Institute (ALI), the definition of criminal homicide is as 
follows: ‘A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, 
recklessly, or negligently causes the death of another human being’ (ALI 
1962: Section 210.1(1)). Each of the terms ‘purposely’, ‘knowingly’, 
‘recklessly’ and ‘negligently’ refers to a guilty ‘mental state’ (or mens rea). 
My assumption is that the term ‘purposely’ may be replaced by the term 
‘intentionally’ (ALI 1962: Section 1.13(12)).5
The concepts of mental state and agential standpoint are interrelated. The 
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actions performed by human agents are qualified by mental states. Analogous 
to the terms ‘purposely’, ‘knowingly’, ‘recklessly’ and ‘negligently’ in 
domestic criminal law, there are the terms ‘intentionally’, ‘knowingly’, 
‘recklessly’ and ‘negligently’ in a deontological theory. It is from the 
standpoint of a particular responsible agent who would perform a military 
action intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently that just war 
principles are primarily applicable.
In light of these four mental states, let me amplify the introductory paragraph 
to this section. Characteristically, armed conflicts are highly destructive. 
Regularly, when we use armed force, we intentionally kill or grievously 
injure human beings, we knowingly kill or grievously injure human beings, 
we recklessly kill or grievously injure human beings and we negligently kill 
or grievously injure human beings. Regularly, when we use armed force, we 
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly and negligently destroy property. And, 
all too frequently, when we use armed force, we knowingly, recklessly and 
negligently wreak havoc on the environment, even when we do not do this 
intentionally. Because armed conflicts are so highly destructive, the chief 
function of a just war theory should be to morally constrain intentional, 
knowing, reckless and negligent uses of armed force.
C.  AGENTIAL STANDPOINTS AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
In accordance with moral universalism, just war principles are applicable 
from the agential standpoint of every human being anywhere in the world. 
Consider a particular human being who is not herself deliberating about 
whether she herself must not use armed force. Nevertheless, she is still able 
to make moral judgements about such deliberations by other human beings. 
From her own agential standpoint, she may (so to speak) ‘adopt’ a different 
agential standpoint. She may imagine (or hypothesise) that the standpoint of 
a responsible agent, who is himself deliberating about whether he himself 
must not use armed force, is her own agential standpoint. Imaginatively (or 
hypothetically), she may apply just war principles, as if she were that other 
responsible agent.
In a cosmopolitan just war theory, each and every human being is a morally 
responsible agent. A main thesis is that, from your own agential standpoint as 
a human being, you may apply just war principles from the agential standpoints 
of other human beings. From your own agential standpoint, you may adopt 
a different agential standpoint and imagine that you are a responsible agent, 
who is morally constrained by just war principles. For example, from your 
own agential standpoint as a citizen of a particular state, you may adopt the 
agential standpoint of a ruler of that state, a ruler of any other state or a leader 
of an armed revolution in any state, and apply just war principles as if you 
were that ruler or leader. Consequently, you may communicate your moral 
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judgements about uses of armed force to that ruler or leader by means of 
petitions, the ballot box, demonstrations and so forth. In a cosmopolitan just 
war theory, each and every human being is thus (potentially) a global citizen.
D.  TEMPORAL STANDPOINTS IN ARMED CONFLICTS
An agential standpoint is a temporal standpoint. Just war principles are 
primarily applicable from a particular temporal standpoint of a particular 
responsible agent.
From the temporal standpoint of the present, we envisage the past 
retrospectively and the future prospectively. From the temporal standpoint 
of the present, we should apply just war principles both retrospectively to 
past armed conflicts and retrospectively to past military actions in armed 
conflicts that are presently occurring.
Nevertheless, because armed conflicts are so highly destructive, the chief 
function of a just war theory should be to morally constrain uses of armed 
force in the present and future. Most importantly, from the temporal standpoint 
of the present, we should apply just war principles both prospectively to 
military actions in future armed conflicts and prospectively to present and 
future military actions in present armed conflicts.
To illustrate the concept of ‘temporal standpoint’, let me draw upon the 
topic of US targeted airstrikes against insurgents and terrorists. Granted, 
there can be principled moral disagreement among just war theorists about 
the justice or injustice of such targeted military operations. In particular, US 
drone strikes have proven highly controversial. I want to stress that when I 
sketch a (hypothetical or actual) targeted airstrike as an illustration, I do not 
usually mean either to approve or disapprove. There is no space in this book 
to settle relevant disputes about international law, alternative nonmilitary 
measures and so forth. Instead, my purpose is to illustrate how just war 
principles might be applied.
On 21 February 2010, a US ‘helicopter attack’ in Afghanistan ‘killed 23 
Afghan civilians’ and ‘also wounded 12 civilians’ (Drew 2010b). Of course, 
from the temporal standpoint of the present, we should apply just war principles 
retrospectively to this US helicopter attack. For instance, from the temporal 
standpoint of the present, we should determine retrospectively whether this 
helicopter attack satisfied or violated the noncombatant immunity principle.
Most importantly, from the temporal standpoint of the present, we should 
apply just war principles prospectively to present and future US targeted 
airstrikes against insurgents and terrorists. Suppose that, from the temporal 
standpoint of the present, the US President is contemplating prospectively 
whether to authorise a drone strike against terrorists in Somalia. Even 
though such a drone strike would be a targeted military operation, civilians 
could be killed or wounded. Accordingly, the US President should answer 
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the question: would this drone strike satisfy or violate the noncombatant 
immunity principle? Additionally, the question of whether the drone strike 
would satisfy or violate the just cause, last resort and proportionality 
principles should be answered.
In accordance with moral universalism, every human agent anywhere in 
the world may apply just war principles from other agential standpoints. Thus, 
from your own agential standpoint, you may adopt the agential standpoint 
of the US President. In doing so, you are equally entitled to answer the 
question: would this drone strike satisfy or violate these just war principles? 
As a (potential) global citizen, it is your moral responsibility to answer such 
questions as the following: if such a drone strike were authorised by the US 
President, would it satisfy or violate just war principles?
To paraphrase the Preamble of the UN Charter, the chief function of 
just war theory should be to save human beings from the scourge of armed 
conflict. From the temporal standpoint of the present, those civilians who 
were killed or wounded on 21 February 2010 by the cited US helicopter 
attack in Afghanistan cannot be saved from the scourge of armed conflict. 
By contrast, from the temporal standpoint of the present, we are capable 
of striving to save civilians from the scourge of present and future armed 
conflicts, and we are morally obligated by just war principles to do so.
Nonetheless, it is also important to apply just war principles retrospectively, 
both to past armed conflicts and past military actions in present armed 
conflicts.
E. RETROSPECTIVELY IMAGINING PAST TEMPORAL 
STANDPOINTS
The task that I assigned our forces – to protect the Libyan people from 
immediate danger, and to establish a no-fly zone – carries with it a U.N. 
mandate and international support. It’s also what the Libyan opposition 
asked us to do. If we tried to overthrow Qaddafi by force, our coalition 
would splinter. We would likely have to put U.S. troops on the ground 
to accomplish that mission, or risk killing many civilians from the air.
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in
Address to the Nation on Libya (2011b)
It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the 
ultimatum of July 26 [1945] was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders 
promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms 
they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never 
been seen on this earth.
Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President Announcing the
Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima (1945)
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Is Truman morally blameworthy for his decision to use an atomic bomb on 
5 August 1945 to obliterate Hiroshima? Is Obama morally praiseworthy for 
his decision not to ‘risk killing many civilians from the air’ in the Libya 
intervention? From the temporal standpoint of the present, by means of the 
retrospective application of just war principles, we might strive to answer 
such questions of moral blame and moral praise.
Most significantly, from the temporal standpoint of the present, when we 
apply just war principles to a past armed conflict or past military action 
in a present armed conflict, we should strive to answer questions of moral 
constraint. Let me explain.
From the temporal standpoint of the present, there are past temporal 
standpoints. From a past temporal standpoint, an armed conflict that is then 
occurring has past phases, a present phase and future phases. For instance, 
on 17 March 2011, Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) authorised 
armed humanitarian intervention in Libya. On 17 March 2011, the phase 
of armed revolution was envisaged retrospectively, and the phase of armed 
humanitarian intervention was envisaged prospectively.
From our present temporal standpoint, we may adopt a past temporal 
standpoint. That is, we may imagine (or hypothesise) that some past tem-
poral standpoint is our present temporal standpoint. Imaginatively (or hy-
pothetically), we may envisage events from that past temporal standpoint. 
Imaginatively, from that past temporal standpoint, we may envisage earlier 
phases of an armed conflict retrospectively and later phases prospectively. 
For instance, from our present temporal standpoint, we may adopt the past 
temporal standpoint of 17 March 2011. Imagining that we are members of 
the Security Council, we may envisage the phase of armed revolution in 
Libya retrospectively and the phase of armed humanitarian intervention pro-
spectively.
A main thesis is that, from the temporal standpoint of the present, we may 
strive to answer questions of moral constraint from a past temporal standpoint. 
From the temporal standpoint of the present, we may adopt a past temporal 
standpoint and imagine that we are responsible agents, who are, from that past 
temporal standpoint, morally constrained by just war principles.
For example, from the temporal standpoint of the present, we may adopt 
the temporal standpoint of 17 March 2011, imagine that we are members 
of the Security Council and deliberate morally about the Libyan civil war. 
In so doing, we may strive to answer the following questions of moral 
constraint from the temporal standpoint of 17 March 2011. Is there a just 
cause for armed humanitarian intervention in Libya? Before resorting to the 
use of armed force, is there a reasonable nonmilitary measure that should 
be attempted first? Are the principles of proportionality and noncombatant 
immunity satisfied?
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We are imagining that today is 17 March 2011, and so these questions are 
asked in the present tense.
F.  TEMPORAL STANDPOINTS AND NONMILITARY MEASURES
The most obvious and profound benefit of talking to groups that use 
terror is to hasten an end to the violence and produce a sustainable 
peace. This involves the mediator turning the terrorists from being part 
of the problem into being part of the solution by involving them in the 
peace process.
Talking to Groups That Use Terror, United States Institute of Peace 
(Byman et al. 2011: 15)
Consider, for example, the case of US and NATO counterinsurgency 
operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban insurgency from the temporal 
standpoint of 22 June 2011. There are other groups that use terror there – in 
particular, the Haqqani network (Mazzetti et al. 2011) – but, for brevity, I 
will focus on the Taliban.
The preceding sentence begins with the phrase ‘there are’. It does not 
begin with the phrase ‘there were’. In adopting this particular past temporal 
standpoint, we are imagining that our present temporal standpoint is 22 
June 2011. That is, we are imagining that today is 22 June 2011. Therefore, 
sentences expressing what we imagine from this temporal standpoint should 
be in the present tense.
Evidently, the Taliban is a nonstate actor that uses terror. Insurgent 
attacks by means of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan 
‘accounted for the majority of civilians killed in 2010 with 904 killed and 
1662 injured’ (UNAMA 2011: 6). Historically, the United States has used 
terror – for instance, the US firebombings of Tokyo during the Second World 
War (Searle 2002). However, US and NATO policy in Afghanistan eschews 
terror bombing and sanctions only tactical bombing: ‘leaders at all levels 
[are expected] to scrutinize and limit the use of force like close air support 
(CAS) against residential compounds and other locations likely to produce 
civilian casualties’ (McChrystal 2009). Officially, the US and NATO do not 
use terror.
A main thesis is that the just cause principle should be counterbalanced 
by ancillary just war principles. Briefly, the last resort principle mandates 
that, before resorting to the use of armed force, reasonable nonmilitary 
measures must be attempted – for instance, negotiation and mediation. 
When parties to an armed conflict engage in a process of negotiation, 
they should strive to achieve agreement concerning goals, methods and 
principles. Specifically, when one of the parties accepts just war principles, 
it should entreat the other party to accept them. A goal should be to 
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incorporate just war principles in a peace agreement. In accordance with 
moral universalism, just war principles should morally constrain each of 
the negotiating parties equally. While raising just war questions from its 
own point of view, a party to such negotiations should also raise just war 
questions from the point of view of its adversary.
From the temporal standpoint of 22 June 2011, should the US and NATO 
talk to a group that uses terror – namely, the Taliban? In his speech of 22 
June 2011, US President Obama signalled US willingness to negotiate 
with the Taliban: ‘America will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan 
people, including the Taliban’ (Obama 2011a). Officially, the US and 
NATO do not use terror in Afghanistan, but then neither do the Taliban, 
officially: ‘Both in statements and the code of conduct, the Taliban have 
a stated aim to minimize civilian loss’ (UNAMA 2011: 6). Negotiation to 
achieve agreement about a noncombatant immunity principle might pivot 
on this stated aim of the Taliban to minimise civilian loss. Admittedly, 
however, from the temporal standpoint of 22 June 2011, prospects for 
such negotiations are ‘murky’ and ‘confusing’ (Myers and Mazzetti 
2011). Analogously, prospects for uses of armed force are often murky 
and confusing. Truly, there is a ‘fog of negotiation’, as there is a ‘fog of 
war’.
G.  JUST WAR THEORISING AND FUTURE TEMPORAL 
STANDPOINTS
The process of applying just war principles is a temporal process, but so 
is the process of revising just war theory. From the temporal standpoint 
of the present, we may adopt hypothetical future temporal standpoints 
and imagine various cosmopolitan political authorities – for example, a 
globalised NATO (Daalder and Goldgeier 2006) or a world government. 
Conceivably, a suitable global institution might be founded by a treaty 
among all those states that are sufficiently democratic.6 Truly, there can 
be principled moral disagreement among cosmopolitan just war theorists 
about the ideal of global governance.
For the sake of concreteness, I am writing this book from the temporal 
standpoint of the early years of the second decade of the twenty-first century. 
From this temporal standpoint, I am featuring the ideals expressed in the 
UN Charter and affirming that the Security Council should have primary 
responsibility for security.
H.  ILLUSTRATIONS
Because armed conflicts are so highly destructive, the chief function of 
just war principles should be to morally constrain uses of armed force. To 
understand more adequately how they should morally constrain uses of 
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armed force in the present and the future, it is important to study how they 
should morally constrain uses of armed force in the past.
Let me sketch an illustration. To counterbalance overemphasis of the 
just cause principle, I am emphasising the last resort, proportionality and 
noncombatant immunity principles. On 6 June 2011, in the middle of the 
Libyan civil war, an influential nongovernmental organisation (NGO), the 
International Crisis Group (ICG), released a substantial report, Making 
Sense of Libya (ICG 2011).7 From the temporal standpoint of the present, 
we may adopt the temporal standpoint of 6 June 2011 and imagine that we 
are responsible agents who deliberate morally, as follows. We ascertain 
that the Libyan civil war is in a phase of ‘military impasse’ (ICG 2011: 
ii). How, then, is the last resort principle applicable? Before resorting 
to further uses of armed force, we explore whether there are reasonable 
nonmilitary measures that should be attempted first. In particular, based on 
the information in the ICG report, we explore whether there should be ‘an 
immediate ceasefire’ and an ‘immediate search for a negotiated settlement’ 
(ICG 2011: ii). By studying how the last resort principle should morally 
constrain uses of armed force in the Libyan civil war, we could understand 
more adequately how it should morally constrain uses of armed force in 
the present and the future.
In closing, let me sketch another illustration. From the temporal standpoint 
of the crucial days before 5 August 1945, how should Truman’s deliberation 
regarding atomic bombing Hiroshima be morally constrained by the 
noncombatant immunity principle? Note that, in a telegram to Truman dated 
9 August 1945, Samuel McCrea Cavert, General Secretary of the Federal 
Council of the Churches of Christ in America, declared: ‘Many Christians 
deeply disturbed over use of atomic bomb against Japanese cities because 
of their necessarily indiscriminate destructive effects’ (Cavert and Truman 
1945).8 In replying to Cavert on 11 August 1945, Truman explained: ‘When 
you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast’ (Cavert and 
Truman 1945). A chief message of just war theory is that, even if our enemy 
is a beast, we must not be bestial.
NOTES
1. An alternative acronym is ‘RtoP’.
2. A volume of articles about the High-level Panel Report is Danchin and Fischer 
(2010).
3. Henceforth, when this sentence is quoted, the term ‘prima facie’ is not italicised.
4. A book about that particular case is Des Forges (1999).
5. To appreciate the relevance of legal concepts for just war theory, see Kenny 
(1978).
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6. For a detailed proposal of an institutional model involving a ‘democratic 
coalition’ that would supplement the Security Council, see Buchanan and 
Keohane (2004: 18–20).
7. ICG reports are available at http://www.crisisgroup.org (last accessed 22 July 
2013).
8. I have corrected this quotation by replacing the word ‘efforts’ with the word 
‘effects’.
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CHAPTER 3
MORAL THEORY
UNICEF called today [11 April 2011] for an immediate end to the siege 
of Misrata [Libya], warning that tens of thousands of children were at 
risk in the conflict-ridden city. UNICEF said that intensified fighting 
and indiscriminate shelling has led to an increased number of children 
being killed in Misrata, with many others lacking food and safe water, 
and traumatised from the atrocities they have witnessed.
UNICEF Press Centre (2011)
The Security Council [on 17 March 2011] . . . Expressing its 
determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian 
populated areas [in Libya] . . . Demands the immediate establishment 
of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, 
and abuses of, civilians . . . Authorizes Member States . . . to take 
all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attack . . .
Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011)
This news note from the UNICEF Press Centre about armed conflict in Libya 
illustrates, lamentably, the extreme destructiveness of armed conflicts. It 
might seem odd to start a chapter entitled ‘Moral Theory’ with a particular 
case of armed conflict. But a main thesis is that just war theory is interrelated 
intrinsically both with general moral principles and particular cases.
To counterbalance overemphasis of the just cause principle, I am 
emphasising the last resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity 
principles. In the preceding chapter, the idea of last resort is featured. For 
the sake of concreteness, this chapter features the idea of noncombatant 
immunity.1
The preceding chapter raises the question of how the legitimacy criteria in 
the High-level Panel Report should be elucidated, revised or supplemented. 
With the aim of answering this question in later chapters, the present chapter 
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explores a prior question. Why should just war principles be accepted? 
Central to the chapter is an investigation of how just war principles can be 
elucidated by means of general moral principles – in particular, principles of 
nonmaleficence and beneficence. Some other topics discussed in this chapter 
are the moral relevance of particular cases, the process of moral deliberation 
and the problem of moral conflict.
Of course, this book is not a treatise on moral theory, so these topics 
of moral theory are discussed quite incompletely. In later chapters, there 
are additional remarks regarding topics of moral theory. The purpose is to 
introduce a framework of presuppositions.2
To supplement topics from moral theory, some interrelated topics from the 
theory of action are discussed in Chapter 4, ‘Theory of Action’. For example, 
a topic crucial to the noncombatant immunity principle is discussed there: 
the distinction between acts performed intentionally and acts performed 
knowingly. Additionally, interspersed throughout this book are discussions 
of relevant topics from other theories – specifically, theories of human rights, 
global governance, nonviolence and so forth. In brief, the purpose is to root 
just war theory within a broad theoretical framework.
However, I am a philosopher, and I view just war theory especially 
through the lens of moral philosophy. By contrast, there are scholars of just 
war theory who view it especially through the lens of political theory. In 
addition to moral universalism, cosmopolitanism should embrace ideals of 
global governance and global citizenship. Throughout this book, the ideal 
of global governance is illustrated controversially by the Security Council. 
Eventually, in the chapters ‘Proportionality and Authority’ and ‘All Things 
Considered’, the ideal of global citizenship is explored. But I concentrate 
in this chapter on a moral conception of moral universalism. To escape the 
labyrinth of controversies about just war theory, a thread should be woven 
of moral concepts.
I .  CASES AND PRINCIPLES
A. MORAL DELIBERATION CASE BY CASE
In the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN World Summit, the responsibility 
to protect (R2P) is endorsed by UN Member States only qualifiedly. Notably, 
it is stated there that ‘we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis’ (GA Res 2005: para. 
139). What is meant by the qualification ‘on a case-by-case basis’? Why is 
R2P endorsed with this qualification?
To generalise, should the Security Council deliberate about the use of 
armed force only on a case-by-case basis? I want to raise a comparable 
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question for just war theory. Should responsible agents of all sorts deliberate 
morally about the use of armed force only on a case-by-case basis?
The quoted statement about R2P is also qualified by the phrase ‘in 
accordance with the Charter’. Recall that the Preamble of the UN Charter 
expresses the determination ‘to ensure, by the acceptance of principles . . . 
that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’. Should the 
Security Council deliberate about such collective military action by means 
of apposite principles? In the preceding chapter, I maintain that deliberations 
about the use of armed force by the Security Council ought to be governed by 
just war principles. In general, my aim in this book is to articulate generalised 
just war principles that are applicable by all sorts of responsible agents to all 
forms of armed conflict.
But how can the Security Council deliberate about collective military 
action, both on a case-by-case basis and by means of just war principles? 
How can responsible agents of all sorts deliberate morally about the use of 
armed force, both on a case-by-case basis and by means of generalised just 
war principles? With the aim of answering these and related questions of 
just war theory, I also consider some prior questions of moral theory, among 
which are the following. Should a just war theory include comprehensive 
moral principles – for instance, a principle of nonmaleficence? How are 
particular cases and moral principles interrelated? By what process of moral 
deliberation should moral principles be applied to particular cases?
To begin with, let me venture a realpolitik answer to the question of why 
R2P is endorsed in the Outcome Document with the qualification ‘on a case-
by-case basis’. UN Member States are frequently motivated by parochial 
national interests. Consider the case of Darfur. The International Criminal 
Court (ICC) has indicted the President of Sudan, Omar al Bashir, for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. Amongst the charges by 
the ICC Prosecutor is the charge that, when the Sudanese Armed Forces 
carried out attacks against villages in Darfur, ‘on occasion, the [Sudanese] 
Air Force would be called upon to drop bombs on the village as a precursor 
to the attacks’ (ICC 2008: 4). In deliberating about the case of Darfur, should 
the Security Council have authorised the establishment of no-fly zones to 
stop such aerial bombardments?
The United States is a permanent member of the Security Council. Consider 
also the case of US military operations in Afghanistan. US airstrikes in 
Afghanistan have caused civilian casualties. Should Presidents George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama be indicted by the ICC for war crimes or crimes 
against humanity? (This is a moral question and not a legal question, since 
the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC.) It might 
appear to be in the parochial national interests of the United States not to 
have the case of Darfur serve as a precedent for the case of Afghanistan. 
The Ethics of Armed Conflict.indd   50 09/12/2013   12:10:08
m o r a l t u e o rw 51
Similarly, it might appear to be in the parochial national interests of two 
other permanent members of the Security Council, China and Russia, not to 
have the case of Darfur serve as a precedent, respectively, for the cases of 
Tibet and Chechnya. Apparently, if the case-by-case qualification were to be 
observed strictly, moral judgements about the case of Darfur would not serve 
as moral precedents for other cases.
Should moral judgements about a particular case serve as moral precedents 
for other particular cases? Setting motives of realpolitik aside, I want to 
investigate how such questions about the moral relevance of cases should 
be answered by means of moral theory. Indeed, as the cases of Darfur, 
Afghanistan, Tibet and Chechnya evidence, various cases can differ greatly. 
Hence it is not implausible to hold the thesis that real-world moral judgements 
about armed conflict should (usually) be made on a case-by-case basis. In 
contrast to this ‘casuistic thesis’, there is a ‘principlistic thesis’ – namely, 
that real-world moral judgements about armed conflict should be made by 
means of just war principles. Are these two theses compatible? With the aim 
of answering this question, I start with the subject of casuistry.
B. FOUNDATIONALISM
In The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, Albert R. Jonsen 
and Stephen Toulmin distinguished two ways of discussing cases:
We inherit two ways of discussing ethical issues. One of these frames 
these issues in terms of principles, rules, and other general ideas; the 
other focuses on the specific features of particular kinds of moral 
cases. In the first way general ethical rules relate to specific moral 
cases in a theoretical manner, with universal rules serving as ‘axioms’ 
from which particular moral judgments are deduced as theorems. In 
the second, this relation is frankly practical, with general moral rules 
serving as ‘maxims’, which can be fully understood only in terms of 
the paradigmatic cases that define their meaning and force. (1988: 23 
[emphasis in original])
Jonsen and Toulmin strived in their book to rehabilitate the historical art of 
casuistry, and I follow their lead here in using the word ‘casuistry’ not as 
a pejorative, but rather as the name of the second way of discussing cases 
(1988: 12–13). As the words ‘axioms’ and ‘deduced’ indicate, it is appropriate 
to name the first way ‘moral deductivism’. In my book, I presuppose a third 
way – a ‘coherentist’ way of discussing cases and principles reciprocally.
Moral deductivism is a kind of ‘foundationalism’. According to a moral 
foundationalism of principles, there is a fundamental moral principle (or 
principles) that constitutes the foundation of a moral theory, in that it functions 
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as a fixed premise by means of which moral judgements can be made about 
cases (e.g. Bentham’s greatest-happiness principle or Kant’s categorical 
imperative). Moral deductivism supplements this picture of foundationalism 
with a concept of deduction: moral judgements about cases can be deduced 
logically from the fundamental moral principle (or principles).
Let me suggest that the second way of discussing cases – the casuistry of 
Jonsen and Toulmin – is also a kind of foundationalism, a foundationalism 
of paradigm cases. In the above block quotation, note especially the words 
‘define’ and ‘paradigmatic cases’; paradigmatic cases define the meaning 
and force of maxims.
Without attempting to study in detail their lengthy book, but using some of 
their words, I want now to sketch a form of casuistry that I call ‘perceptual 
casuistry’. By analogy with our visual perceptions of physical objects, we 
can have ‘moral perceptions’ of paradigm cases (1988: 24). Just as we 
can visually perceive that a physical object is green, so we can morally 
perceive that a human action is wrong (or right). To avoid using the word 
‘perceive’ ambiguously, let me restate this analogy. By analogy with our 
visual perceptions of a physical object, we can make ‘particular concrete’ 
moral judgements about a case (1988: 18). Perceptual casuistry is a kind of 
foundationalism. Such particular moral judgements about a case constitute a 
foundation, by means of which – through a process sometimes called ‘moral 
induction’ – revisable moral maxims can be obtained. In this way, moral 
judgements about a case can serve as moral precedents for other cases.
C. COHERENTISM
In opposition to these two foundationalist ways of discussing particular 
cases, moral deductivism and perceptual casuistry, I presuppose a third 
way, a kind of ‘coherentism’, a coherentism of principles and cases. Moral 
theory is controversial, and one controversy among moral theorists is that of 
foundationalism versus coherentism.3
According to the kind of coherentism that I am presupposing, there are 
moral principles, but they are not fixed or unrevisable. Indeed, they can be 
used to make particular moral judgements about cases. But particular moral 
judgements about cases can also be used to rethink, revise or supplement 
them. Reciprocally, they can be used to rethink, revise or supplement 
particular moral judgements about cases. To borrow some of John Rawls’ 
words regarding his coherentist notion of ‘reflective equilibrium’, moral 
deliberation about the use of armed force should involve a ‘process of mutual 
adjustment of principles and considered judgments’ about cases (1971: 20). 
In brief, a moral theory can be both principlistic and casuistic.
A just war theory can be both principlistic and casuistic. As Childress 
observed, just war principles ‘constitute a formal framework and structure 
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for moral debates about the use of force’ (1982: 90). Specifically, as C. A. 
J. Coady observed, ‘[t]he just war tradition provides the best framework for 
discussing the moral arguments for and against humanitarian intervention’ 
(2002: 5). Similarly, my view is that, ideally, the set of core just war principles 
constitutes a moral framework, by means of which responsible agents can 
determine whether a proposed use of armed force would be just or unjust. But 
we should not be misled by the word ‘framework’. Despite this word, which 
connotes rigidity, a moral framework of just war principles is not fixed or 
unrevisable. Just war principles can be used to make moral judgements about 
particular cases of armed conflict, but moral judgements about particular 
cases of armed conflict can also be used to rethink, revise or supplement just 
war principles. The aim should be to attain reflective equilibrium.
Complementary to the temporalisation of just war principles, the 
metaethical notion of coherentism should also be temporalised. The process 
of mutual adjustment of just war principles and moral judgements about 
cases is a temporal process. Indeed, there has been, as Johnson observed, a 
‘metamorphosis of the concept of just war over time’ (1984: xxiii). It is from 
the particular temporal standpoint of the early years of the second decade of 
the twenty-first century that I am engaging in the project of revising received 
just war principles.
At present, then, my view is that a cosmopolitan just war theory should 
be SC-centric. In accordance with coherentism, acceptance by the Security 
Council of the five legitimacy criteria proposed in the High-level Panel 
Report would be compatible with moral debate about how those criteria 
should be revised. There can be moral debate about applications of the 
criteria, but there can also be moral debate about the criteria themselves. 
When members of the Security Council deliberate about whether to authorise 
the use of military force in a particular case, they could sometimes engage 
in a process of mutual adjustment of the criteria and their moral judgements 
about that particular case. While applying a criterion to a particular case, they 
could decide that they need to revise the criterion itself. Acceptance of the 
criteria by the Security Council would be compatible with principled moral 
disagreement about whether they should be revised.
In addition to making moral judgements about particular cases of armed 
conflict – for example, the case of armed conflict in Libya – we can make moral 
judgements about specific issues of armed conflict – that is, the specific issues 
of armed humanitarian intervention, pre-emptive first strikes, preventive 
war, weapons of mass destruction, insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, 
terrorism and counterterrorism, cyber warfare, private military companies, 
nonlethal weapons and so forth. According to coherentism, moral principles 
can be used to make moral judgements about specific issues, but also moral 
judgements about specific issues can be used to rethink, revise or supplement 
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moral principles. And, reciprocally, moral principles can be used to rethink, 
revise or supplement moral judgements about specific issues. Moral 
deliberation about the use of armed force should involve a process of mutual 
adjustment of moral principles and moral judgements about particular cases 
and specific issues. In this book, I am able to discuss in significant detail only 
an illustrative selection of specific issues.4
Coherentism extends to the meanings of terms – for instance, the terms 
‘armed conflict’ and ‘noncombatant’. Provisionally, the meaning of a term 
might be defined casuistically, by examining a variety of paradigm cases. 
Provisionally, for instance, the terms ‘combatant’ and ‘noncombatant’ might 
be defined as follows. Combatants engage in combat; they use armed force 
in armed conflicts. And noncombatants do not engage in combat; they do not 
use armed force in armed conflicts. Frequently, such casuistical definitions 
of terms are somewhat ‘indeterminate’ (or ‘inexact’), because of difficult 
or borderline cases. Consequently, it is presupposed that meanings of terms 
can be elucidated, revised or supplemented – for example, by examining 
morally novel cases. By contrast, a foundationalist thesis about definitions is 
rejected – namely, that terms can be explicitly defined by means of primitive 
terms, whose meanings are transparent and indubitable. Notice that the terms 
‘combatant’ and ‘noncombatant’ are provisionally defined above by means 
of terms that are themselves somewhat indeterminate – namely, ‘combat’, 
‘armed force’ and ‘armed conflict’. Moral deliberation about the use of armed 
force should involve a process of mutual adjustment of moral principles, 
moral judgements about particular cases and specific issues and definitions 
of terms. The subject of definition is discussed further in Chapter IV, ‘Theory 
of Action’.
Moreover, there are problems of scale or degree. For instance, to elucidate 
the legitimacy criterion of ‘seriousness of threat’ adequately, the following 
questions need to be answered. Which kinds? How clear? How serious? 
The last two questions are questions of scale or degree. Moral deliberation 
about the use of armed force should involve a process of mutual adjustment 
of moral principles, moral judgements about particular cases and specific 
issues, definitions of terms and moral assessments of scale or degree.
Coherentism also extends to links between a moral theory and other 
relevant theories – for example, a theory of human action and a philosophy 
of time.5 For military actions are human actions, and the process of applying 
just war principles to them is a temporal process.
In theorising about the ethics of armed conflict, I presuppose coherentism.
D. COMPREHENSIVE MORAL PRINCIPLES
Influenced by their work on the National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Jonsen and 
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Toulmin featured biomedical cases. Interestingly, although largely ignoring 
cases of armed conflict, they alluded to Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars as an 
illustration of casuistry (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 13). In an early section, 
‘The locus of moral certitude’, they offered some anecdotal evidence for 
casuistry. When the eleven members of this national commission remained 
on the ‘casuistical level, they usually agreed in their practical conclusions’; 
however, when they ‘explained their individual reasons’ for these conclusions, 
there were significant ‘differences of opinion’ (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 
17–18 [emphasis in original]). Concerning ‘specific types’ of biomedical 
cases, they had ‘practical certitude’; however, concerning relevant moral 
principles, they did not have ‘theoretical certainty’ (1988: 18). That the locus 
of their moral certitude was cases furnishes some anecdotal evidence for 
casuistry.
Relegated to an endnote for one of the paragraphs from which these 
quotations are taken is some anecdotal evidence for coherentism:
On a completely general level, it is true, the members of the commission 
were able to share certain agreements – for example, as to the principles 
of autonomy, justice, and beneficence. But these shared notions were 
too comprehensive and general to underwrite specific moral positions. 
(Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 356 [emphasis in original])
In my book, I presuppose such comprehensive moral principles. We should 
morally deliberate about the use of armed force, both on the completely general 
level of such moral principles and on the particular level of cases of armed 
conflict. Admittedly, because such moral principles are so comprehensive 
and indeterminate, adequate moral judgements about cases cannot simply 
be deduced from them. Nonetheless, they can serve to elucidate just war 
principles. According to a coherentism of principles and cases, there can be 
comparable moral assuredness concerning both particular moral judgements 
about cases and such comprehensive moral principles.
In conclusion, let me preview how this coherentism of principles and cases 
pertains to my cosmopolitan just war theory. As specific moral principles 
about a limited domain of particular cases, just war principles are intermediate 
between moral judgements about particular cases in that domain and moral 
principles that hold comprehensively of all particular cases. On the one hand, 
we can make moral judgements about particular cases of armed conflict, 
in order to rethink, revise or supplement just war principles. On the other 
hand, in order to rethink, revise or supplement just war principles, we can 
also make use of such comprehensive moral principles as autonomy, justice 
and beneficence. Moral deliberation concerning the use of armed force 
should involve a process of mutual adjustment of comprehensive moral 
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principles, just war principles and moral judgements about particular cases. 
Additionally, this process of mutual adjustment should encompass moral 
judgements about specific issues, definitions of terms, moral assessments 
of scale or degree and relevant concepts from the theory of action and other 
theories. The aim should be to attain reflective equilibrium.
Specifically, in later chapters, I discuss how this coherentism of principles 
and cases pertains individually to the core just war principles of just cause, 
last resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity.
E.  NONMALEFICENCE, BENEFICENCE, JUSTICE, AUTONOMY
Which comprehensive moral principles should a just war theory accept? 
Biomedical ethics, with its extensive literature, various journals and 
numerous conferences, is the most developed field of applied ethics. Perhaps 
the most influential book in biomedical ethics is Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (2009). (The sixth edition 
was published in 2009 and the first edition in 1979.) In their book, there 
is a moral theory with four comprehensive moral principles – namely, 
nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice and respect for autonomy. Reflecting 
the Hippocratic Oath, the principle of nonmaleficence is, briefly: do no harm. 
But one can refrain from doing harm without doing good, and so there is need 
for a supplementary principle of beneficence, which is, briefly: do as much 
good as possible. The principle of justice is a principle of distributive justice. 
Finally, the principle of respect for a person’s autonomy mandates respect 
for that person’s own beliefs, choices and actions. Comprehensively, these 
four moral principles encompass all cases, including both biomedical cases 
and cases of armed conflict.
In my book, I presuppose comprehensive moral principles of nonmalefi-
cence, beneficence, distributive justice and autonomy. (What is presupposed 
is a principle of autonomy and not a principle of respect for autonomy.) In 
the next two parts of this chapter, I discuss the principles of nonmaleficence 
and beneficence. The principles of distributive justice and autonomy are dis-
cussed in Chapter 8, ‘Proportionality and Authority’.
In addition to ideals of global governance and global citizenship, 
cosmopolitanism should embrace moral universalism. The Preamble 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognises ‘the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’ (UDHR 
1948). In accordance with moral universalism, these four comprehensive 
moral principles hold equally and inalienably of all members of the human 
family. Everyone, everywhere in the world, must refrain from doing harm 
to anyone, anywhere in the world. Everyone, everywhere in the world, 
must do as much good as possible for anyone, anywhere in the world. The 
principle of justice is a principle of global distributive justice. Everyone, 
The Ethics of Armed Conflict.indd   56 09/12/2013   12:10:08
m o r a l t u e o rw 57
everywhere in the world, is an autonomous moral agent. The moral notion 
of autonomous agency is especially crucial for a political notion of global 
citizenship. These four principles should be endorsed by responsible agents 
of global governance.
II .  NONMALEFICENCE
The injuring of another can be in no case just.
Plato, The Republic (1892b: 12)
If there are things that are bad in themselves we ought, prima facie, 
not to bring them upon others; and on this fact rests the duty of non-
maleficence.
W. D. Ross ([1930] 2002: 26)
In his landmark book The Right and the Good, Ross advocated a ‘duty of 
non-maleficence’ – that is, ‘the duty not to harm others’ ([1930] 2002: 22). 
The moral theory that I am presupposing is influenced substantially by Ross’ 
moral theory, but I have no space here to examine his views thoroughly.
Using the term ‘obligation’ instead of the term ‘duty’, a comprehensive 
principle of nonmaleficence may be formulated provisionally thus: it is 
morally obligatory not to harm other persons. A moral requirement of moral 
universalism is that every human being, everywhere in the world, must 
refrain from harming any human being, anywhere in the world.
A.  A TEMPORALISED NONMALEFICENCE PRINCIPLE
An agential standpoint is a temporal standpoint. From the temporal standpoint 
of the present, moral principles are applicable both retrospectively and 
prospectively. Most significantly, in order to morally constrain uses of armed 
force, a nonmaleficence principle should be applied prospectively. But the 
future is open. Present actions are fraught with risks and uncertainties. In the 
fog of armed conflict, military operations are often (if not always) conducted 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty.
Under conditions of uncertainty, we might only be able to ascertain that a 
proposed military action is ‘likely’ to harm other persons; and so, if we were 
to perform it, we would ‘seriously risk’ harming them. As the terms ‘likely’ 
and ‘seriously risk’ indicate, there are problems of scale or degree.
I want to emphasise that there can be principled moral disagreement 
about how such scale problems should be resolved. Correlative to degrees 
of likelihood, there are degrees of risk. However, there are no mechanical 
decision procedures whereby correlative degrees of likelihood and risk can 
be computed. Presumably, there should be a threshold (or thresholds) above 
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which harm is judged to be likely and below which it is not. Presumably, 
there should be a threshold (or thresholds) above which a risk is judged to 
be serious and below which it is not. Evidently, there can be principled moral 
disagreement about how (or whether) such thresholds should (or can) be 
discerned or demarcated.
My view is that the concept of ‘harming’ should be understood as en-
compassing both ‘actual harming’ and ‘harming seriously risked’. (Compare 
the concept of ‘expected utility’.) By imposing the serious risk of harm on 
other persons, we harm them, even if by chance or luck they are not actually 
harmed. (For illustrations, ponder environmental hazards.)
During the siege of Misrata, UNICEF warned (on 11 April 2011) that 
many ‘children were at risk [from] indiscriminate shelling’ (UNICEF Press 
Centre 2011). From the temporal standpoint of 11 April 2011, it is morally 
obligatory for Libyan Government combatants not to seriously risk killing or 
injuring children in Misrata by indiscriminate shelling. This moral obligation 
holds, even if by chance or luck no child would actually be killed or injured. 
To seriously risk harming is to harm.
Therefore, the comprehensive principle of nonmaleficence that I am 
presupposing is:
Nonmaleficence principle. It is morally obligatory not to actually harm 
or seriously risk harming other persons.
For brevity, the principle can be expressed without the words ‘actually’ and ‘or 
seriously risk harming’, but then it should be read as containing those words 
implicitly. That is, it is morally obligatory not to [actually] harm [or seriously 
risk harming] other persons. A moral requirement of moral universalism is 
that every human being, everywhere in the world, must refrain from both 
actually harming and seriously risking harming any human being, anywhere 
in the world.
How should we morally deliberate about the use of armed force in terms 
of this nonmaleficence principle? More sweepingly, there is the coherentist 
question of how we should morally deliberate about the use of armed 
force on a case-by-case basis, in terms of generalised just war principles 
and in terms of such comprehensive moral principles as the principle of 
nonmaleficence.
Indeed, this nonmaleficence principle is comprehensive, but it is not 
self-evident. For it is, or appears to be, neither conceptually transparent 
nor indisputably acceptable. What should be meant by the term ‘harm’? 
Ordinarily, the loss of a game of chess is a negative consequence that is 
not caused by an act of harming. Which kinds of acts that cause negative 
consequences to persons are acts of harming them? Arguably, the relevant 
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concept of ‘harm’ is a concept that is somewhat indeterminate. Arguably, 
there are difficult or borderline cases where it cannot be determined whether 
the nonmaleficence principle has been violated.
B. THE NONHARM PRINCIPLE
Characteristically, armed conflicts are highly destructive. Because they 
are so highly destructive, a chief function of a just war theory should be to 
morally constrain uses of armed force. Regularly, when armed force is used, 
human beings are killed or otherwise grievously harmed. Accordingly, I want 
to presuppose the following specification of the nonmaleficence principle:
Nonharm principle. It is morally obligatory not to actually harm or 
seriously risk harming other persons grievously.
Again, for brevity, this principle can be expressed using the words ‘actually’ 
and ‘or seriously risk harming’, but then it should be read as containing those 
words implicitly. That is, it is morally obligatory not to [actually] grievously 
harm [or seriously risk grievously harming] other persons.
Even though restricted to acts of grievously harming, the nonharm principle 
also holds comprehensively of all cases. It is a moral requirement of moral 
universalism that every human being, everywhere in the world, must refrain 
from actually grievously harming or seriously risking grievously harming 
any human being, anywhere in the world.
The nonharm principle is a specification of the nonmaleficence principle, 
but what is specification? How are moral principles specified? The relation 
between a moral principle and its specifications is analogous to the relation 
between a genus and its species. In effect, when we specify a moral principle, 
we limit its scope to a specific kind (or kinds) of cases, thereby circumventing 
problems of indeterminateness about other kinds of cases. In effect, the 
nonharm principle limits the scope of the nonmaleficence principle to acts of 
grievously harming, thereby circumventing problems of indeterminateness 
about acts of harming of other kinds.
As R. M. Hare explained, there is a ‘difference between universality and 
generality’ (1981: 41). The distinction between the universal and the particular 
is different from the distinction between the general and the specific. A moral 
principle that specifies a universal moral principle is itself a universal moral 
principle.
In a deontological theory, it matters whether an action is performed 
intentionally, but it also matters whether an action is performed knowingly, 
recklessly or negligently. By analogy with the definition of criminal homicide 
in the ALI Model Penal Code, I propose to specify the nonharm principle as 
follows. It is morally obligatory not to intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or 
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negligently harm other persons grievously. It is a moral requirement of moral 
universalism that every human being, everywhere in the world, must refrain 
from actually grievously harming or seriously risking grievously harming 
any human being, anywhere in the world, whether intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or negligently.
C.  HUMAN RIGHTS THEORY
Which kinds of acts of harming other persons are acts of harming them 
grievously? In paradigmatic armed conflicts, innocent persons are actually 
grievously harmed in many or all of the following ways: they are killed, 
raped, enslaved, tortured, arbitrarily detained, forcibly deprived of crucial 
property, starved, denied essential medical care and so forth. Among the 
human rights listed in the UDHR, such acts of grievously harming are 
expressly prohibited: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person’ (Article 3); ‘No one shall be held in slavery or servitude’ (Article 4); 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture’ (Article 5); ‘No one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’ (Article 9); ‘No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his property’ (Article 17); ‘Everyone has the right to . . . [basic] 
food, clothing, housing and medical care’ (Article 25); and so forth (UDHR 
1948).
Arguably, the concept of grievously harming is a somewhat indeterminate 
concept. Rather than simply presuppose it, I want to sharpen it by means of 
a theory of human rights: acts of grievously harming human beings are acts 
of gravely violating their basic human rights. It is morally obligatory not to 
gravely violate the basic human rights of other persons.
Accordingly, I propose to reformulate the original nonharm principle:
Nonharm principle. It is morally obligatory not to actually violate 
gravely or seriously risk violating gravely the basic human rights of 
other persons.
It is presupposed that this formulation of the nonharm principle and the 
original formulation of it are equivalent. It can be abbreviated as follows. It 
is morally obligatory not to gravely violate the basic human rights of other 
persons.
Moreover, the following specification is presupposed. It is morally 
obligatory not to actually violate gravely or seriously risk violating gravely 
the basic human rights of other persons, whether intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or negligently. Let me provide some examples. Evidently, to 
intentionally or knowingly kill noncombatants is to actually violate their 
right to life. And to intentionally risk or knowingly risk killing them is to 
seriously risk violating their right to life. By recklessly imposing a blockade, 
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responsible agents could seriously risk starving civilians. By negligence of 
command, military officers could seriously risk acts of rape by their soldiers.
To generalise, in accordance with a recent tendency among just war 
theorists (Orend 2006: 5), I presuppose that a just war theory should be 
human-rights based, but the word ‘based’ is potentially misleading.6 I would 
reject the foundationalist thesis that there are principles of human rights 
that constitute (part of) the fixed and unalterable basis of a just war theory. 
Nonetheless, according to coherentism, a just war theory can be elucidated 
by interrelating it with a human rights theory. In particular, I am presupposing 
that the concept of ‘grievously harming’ can be elucidated by interrelating it 
with the concept of ‘gravely violating basic human rights’.
But which kinds of acts of violating basic human rights are acts of violating 
those rights gravely? As the words ‘grievously’ and ‘gravely’ indicate, there 
are problems of scale or degree. Moreover, the human rights expressed in the 
quoted UDHR articles are somewhat indeterminate, although these articles 
are elaborated in later human rights treaties, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Even though sharpened by 
human rights theory, the concept of grievously harming remains somewhat 
indeterminate.
Therefore, acceptance of the nonharm principle by diverse responsible 
agents is compatible with principled moral disagreement among them 
regarding how it should be applied to difficult cases.
D. SUBSUMPTION ARGUMENTS
How should we deliberate morally about the use of armed force in terms 
of the nonharm principle? To answer this question, I start with the idea 
of ‘subsumption’. Apparently, the deliberative process of applying moral 
principles to human actions involves a process of subsumption. Particular 
acts are subsumed under moral principles. Relatedly, more specific moral 
principles are subsumed under more general moral principles. For instance, 
the nonharm principle is subsumed under the nonmaleficence principle. 
Thus, according to just war theory, particular military actions or particular 
uses of armed force are subsumed under just war principles and just war 
principles are subsumed under comprehensive moral principles.
As an illustration of the idea of subsumption, let me examine a moral 
argument, the logical form of which is termed ‘hypothetical syllogism’:
1. If A is an act of grievously harming other persons, then it is morally 
obligatory not to perform A.
2. If A is an act of killing other persons, then A is an act of grievously 
harming other persons.
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3. Therefore, if A is an act of killing other persons, then it is morally 
obligatory not to perform A.
The first premise of this moral argument is a compact reformulation of the 
nonharm principle. The second premise involves the subsumption of a more 
specific kind of act (killing) under a more general kind of act (grievously 
harming). More briefly, the conclusion can be reformulated thus: it is morally 
obligatory not to kill other persons. By means of this hypothetical syllogism, 
this more specific moral principle about killing is logically deduced from 
both a more general moral principle about grievously harming and the stated 
subsumption. I call such arguments involving processes of subsumption 
‘subsumption arguments’.
By what process of moral deliberation should the nonharm principle be 
applied to particular cases of armed conflict? At the start of this chapter, there 
is a block quotation about the particular case of armed conflict during 2011 in 
Libya. Let me summarise, by means of a further process of subsumption, how 
the nonharm principle is applicable to this case. The preceding hypothetical 
syllogism – with the schematic letter ‘A’ – is a schematic moral argument. 
By contrast, the following is a particular moral argument about the case, the 
logical form of which is termed ‘modus ponens’:
1. This particular act of indiscriminate shelling is an act of killing other 
persons.
2. If this particular act of indiscriminate shelling is an act of killing other 
persons, then it is morally obligatory not to perform this particular act 
of indiscriminate shelling.
3. Therefore, it is morally obligatory not to perform this particular act 
of indiscriminate shelling.
The first premise of this moral argument stems from an observation made 
in April 2011 about a particular use of armed force in Misrata, Libya. The 
second premise is obtained by substituting the phrase ‘this particular act of 
indiscriminate shelling’ for the letter ‘A’ in the conclusion of the schematic 
moral argument. In this way, this particular use of armed force is subsumed 
under the schematic moral argument.
Presumably, subsumption arguments are, or are explicable as, deductive 
arguments. Usually, they are stated less tediously, but my purpose here is to 
exhibit clearly how the conclusion of a subsumption argument follows logically 
from the premises. For simplicity, I utilise logical forms from propositional 
logic, but some other type of logic might enable a deeper analysis – for 
instance, a predicate logic, deontic logic or combined deontic-modal logic 
(Lango 2007a). However, there is no space here to explore such complications.
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E. COHERENTISM VERSUS FOUNDATIONALISM
I want to challenge a foundationalist thesis – namely, that wholly adequate 
moral judgements about particular cases can always be obtained entirely 
by means of subsumption arguments. Specifically, I am challenging a 
foundationalist thesis about just war principles – namely, that wholly 
adequate moral judgements about particular cases of armed conflict can 
always be obtained entirely by means of subsumption arguments with fixed 
just war principles as premises.
Admittedly, subsumption arguments are often necessary, but they are often 
not sufficient. In this book, I am defending the coherentist thesis that moral 
deliberation about the use of armed force should involve a process of mutual 
adjustment of moral judgements about particular cases and specific issues, 
generalised just war principles and such comprehensive moral principles as 
nonmaleficence and beneficence. Such moral deliberation includes not only 
subsumption arguments, but also arguments of other types. For instance, there 
are ‘best-justification arguments’ – that is, arguments from moral judgements 
about particular cases or specific issues to the moral principles that explain or 
justify those moral judgements most adequately. Mutual adjustment involves 
both top-down argumentation and bottom-up argumentation.
Additionally, my conception of moral deliberation includes the idea of 
‘overriding’ a moral principle. Let me provide a key illustration. Fundamental 
to the noncombatant immunity principle is a distinction between acts 
performed intentionally and acts performed knowingly. Clearly, an act of 
killing noncombatants is an act of grievously harming them, whether it is 
performed intentionally or it is performed knowingly. Consider, then, the 
following hypothetical syllogism, which closely parallels the one above:
1. If A is an act of grievously harming other persons, then it is morally 
obligatory not to perform A.
2. If A is an act of killing noncombatants knowingly, then A is an act of 
grievously harming other persons.
3. Therefore, if A is an act of killing noncombatants knowingly, then it 
is morally obligatory not to perform A.
May the nonharm principle be overridden when noncombatants are killed 
knowingly (but not intentionally)?
According to the casuistic thesis, real-world moral judgements about 
particular cases of armed conflict should be made on a case-by-case basis. 
Regard, for example, the particular case of US and NATO counterinsurgency 
operations in Afghanistan. According to a UN report about the protection 
of civilians in Afghanistan during 2011, ‘410 civilian deaths resulted from 
the operations of Pro-Government Forces’ (UNAMA 2012: 2). From the 
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temporal standpoint of the year 2011, agents responsible for US and NATO 
counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan should ask: may the nonharm 
principle be overridden when these 410 civilians are killed?
In my cosmopolitan just war theory, the standpoint of the Security 
Council is featured. Presumably, when the Security Council authorised 
military measures in the Libya case, it was anticipated, or ought to have been 
anticipated, that the US and NATO, by launching airstrikes against military 
targets, could knowingly risk, but not intend, harm to noncombatants. To 
countenance such harm to noncombatants, may responsible agents of global 
governance override the nonharm principle?
These are challenging questions for a just war theory. Each of them 
presupposes the idea of ‘overriding’ a moral principle. In the fourth part of this 
chapter, ‘Moral Deliberation’, the general subject of overriding is discussed. 
And in the section ‘Collaterally Damaging Noncombatants’ in Chapter 9 
(‘All Things Considered’), there is a discussion of the specific subject of 
overriding the moral obligation not to kill noncombatants knowingly.
III .  BENEFICENCE
To be beneficent, that is, to promote according to one’s means the 
happiness of others in need, without hoping for something in return, is 
every man’s duty.
Kant ([1797] 1991: 247 [453])
If there are things that are intrinsically good, it is prima facie a duty [of 
beneficence] to bring them into existence rather than not to do so, and 
to bring as much of them into existence as possible.
W. D. Ross ([1930] 2002: 24)
A. A COMPREHENSIVE PRINCIPLE OF BENEFICENCE
As these quotations illustrate, the idea of beneficence is firmly rooted in the 
history of ethics. In this book, I presuppose the following comprehensive 
moral principle of beneficence:
Beneficence principle. It is morally obligatory to attempt as much as 
possible to help other persons.
A moral requirement of moral universalism is that every human being, 
everywhere in the world, must attempt, as much as possible, to help any 
human being, anywhere in the world.
Whereas the nonmaleficence principle is, to use Kant’s terms, a perfect 
duty, this beneficence principle is, as the qualification ‘as much as possible’ 
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implies, an imperfect duty. Similarly, Kant qualified his duty of beneficence 
with the phrase ‘according to one’s means’ and asked: ‘How far should a 
man expend his means in practicing beneficence?’ ([1797] 1991: 248 [454]). 
A comparable question needs to be asked about my beneficence principle: 
when attempting to help, how much is possible?
To repeat, I am investigating the question of principled moral disagreement 
– that is, the question of why well-intentioned, knowledgeable just war 
theorists can profoundly disagree about principles and cases. Let me stress 
here that there can be principled moral disagreement about how the last 
question should be answered. Arguably, the relevant concept of helping is a 
concept that is somewhat indeterminate. Arguably, there are difficult cases 
where it cannot be determined whether a beneficence principle has been 
satisfied.
Obviously, beneficent attempts can fail. Nevertheless, when we attempt, 
as much as possible, to help another person, we could satisfy the beneficence 
principle, even if our attempt were to fail. Consider a stock illustration. 
A person is drowning in a rip tide, so you attempt to rescue him, but you 
are not an expert swimmer. Before you are able to reach him, he drowns. 
Nonetheless, because you attempt as much as possible to rescue him, you 
satisfy the beneficence principle. Paraphrasing Kant, the principle mandates 
that we attempt to help according to our means; when we do this, we satisfy 
the principle, even if it proves beyond our means to help. The beneficence 
principle does not mandate success.
There is a problem of ‘distant strangers’ (O’Neill 1996: 113–21). Human 
beings have personal projects and goals. Surely, each and every human being 
is entitled to promote reasonably his or her own personal well-being. Truly, 
the beneficence principle would be overly demanding, if it morally required 
inordinate sacrifice of personal well-being for the well-being of others. 
Accordingly, I would understand Kant’s question, more explicitly, thus: given 
that we are entitled to expend our means somewhat in pursuit of our own 
well-being (and the well-being of our family and friends), how much should 
we expend our means in practicing beneficence to other persons? In particular, 
how much should we expend our means in practicing beneficence to distant 
strangers in foreign lands – for example, imminent victims of genocide?
Compounding the problem of distant strangers, there is a problem of state 
borders. Comparable to the question about distant strangers in foreign lands, 
there is this question: how much should we expend our means in practicing 
beneficence to distant strangers in our own country – for instance, those who 
lack medical insurance? As a US citizen residing in New York, Montreal is 
less distant from me than Phoenix. Surely, a beneficence principle should 
not be inclusive of more distant compatriots in Phoenix, but exclusive of 
less distant foreigners in Montreal. In accordance with moral universalism, 
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it is presupposed (roughly) that the distinction between distant foreigners 
and distant compatriots is not (usually) morally relevant (Fabre 2012: 31–8).
To summarise, a cosmopolitan just war theory is a morally universalist 
theory. The beneficence principle should hold equally and inalienably of all 
members of the human family, regardless of state borders and no matter how 
distant. It is morally obligatory to attempt to help other persons anywhere in 
the world, as much as it is possible to do so.
B.  THE COUNTERHARM PRINCIPLE
By reflecting on the idea of beneficence, duties to do or promote good can be 
distinguished from duties to prevent or remove harm. Help can be promotive 
or protective. Accordingly, I want to presuppose a specification of the 
comprehensive beneficence principle – namely, that it is morally obligatory 
to attempt, as much as possible, to stop other persons from harming people 
grievously.
Since the term ‘harm’ encompasses both actual harm and harm seriously 
risked, the presupposed principle is, more explicitly, this:
Counterharm principle. It is morally obligatory to attempt as much 
as possible to stop other persons from actually harming or seriously 
risking harming people grievously.
For brevity, the principle can be expressed without the words ‘actually’ and 
‘or seriously risk harming’, but then it should be read as containing those 
words implicitly. That is, it is morally obligatory to attempt, as much as 
possible, to stop other persons from [actually] harming [or seriously risking 
harming] people grievously. The term ‘stop’ is used broadly to include both 
acts of preventing and acts of removing.
Similarly, William Frankena’s ‘principle of beneficence’ includes the 
following parts: ‘One ought to prevent evil or harm’ and ‘One ought to 
remove evil’ (1973: 47). But these moral requirements of beneficence are 
broader than the counterharm principle. For some harms to other persons that 
one ought to prevent or remove occur naturally (e.g. because of hurricanes or 
floods) and some harms to other persons that one ought to prevent or remove 
occur humanly (e.g. by raping or kidnapping). By contrast, the counterharm 
principle specifically morally obligates agents to stop other persons from 
grievously harming people.
There are controversies among moral theorists about the moral import of 
two interrelated distinctions – that between killing and letting die and that 
between doing and allowing. The nonharm principle morally obligates us 
not to ‘do’ grievous harm to people. Does it also morally obligate us not 
to ‘allow’ people to be grievously harmed? Indeed, it is dubious whether 
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this question should be answered affirmatively. By contrast, the counterharm 
principle morally obligates us to stop other persons from grievously harming 
people. Even if it cannot be said that we ‘harm’ people grievously by ‘letting’ 
them be killed by other persons, the counterharm principle morally obligates 
us to attempt, as much as possible, to stop such killing.
Rather than simply presupposing the concept of grievously harming, I 
am sharpening it by means of a theory of human rights. Because people are 
grievously harmed when their basic human rights are gravely violated, we 
are morally obligated by the counterharm principle to attempt, as much as 
possible, to stop other persons from gravely violating basic human rights.
Accordingly, I propose to reformulate the stated counterharm principle:
Counterharm principle. It is morally obligatory to attempt as much 
as possible to stop other persons from actually violating gravely or 
seriously risking gravely violating people’s basic human rights.
It is presupposed that this formulation of the counterharm principle and the 
original formulation are equivalent. It can be abbreviated as follows. It is 
morally obligatory to attempt as much as possible to stop other persons from 
gravely violating people’s basic human rights.
Also, the formulations can be expressed without the qualifying phrase ‘as 
much as possible’, but then they should be understood as implicitly qualified 
by that phrase.
Furthermore, the following specifications are presupposed. It is morally 
obligatory to attempt, as much as possible, to stop other persons from 
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently harming people grievously. 
It is morally obligatory to attempt, as much as possible, to stop other persons 
from gravely violating people’s basic human rights, whether intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly or negligently.
C.  HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DUTIES
Moral theory is controversial. There are controversies among moral 
philosophers about the stringency of beneficence. The view of W. D. Ross 
is that: ‘Non-maleficence is apprehended as a duty distinct from that of 
beneficence, and as a duty of a more stringent character’ ([1930] 2002: 
21). (His view is discussed further in Chapter 9, ‘All Things Considered’.) 
Using his language, let me summarise a more sceptical view: whereas 
nonmaleficence is apprehended as a moral obligation, beneficence is 
apprehended as a moral ideal; and moral obligations are more stringent than 
moral ideals.7 In terms of this sceptical view, let me voice an objection to the 
counterharm principle. That principle is a specification of the beneficence 
principle. Because beneficence is only a moral ideal, we would be morally 
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praiseworthy if we were to counter grievous harm as much as possible, but 
we are under no moral obligation to do so.
In light of such controversy, I have to presuppose the counterharm 
principle. Indeed, that principle can be derived by a subsumption argument 
from the beneficence principle, but I also have to presuppose the beneficence 
principle. Such top-down reasoning by itself is disputable.
In accordance with coherentism, the counterharm principle can be 
elucidated by interrelating it with a human rights theory. Human rights 
entail correlative human duties. Henry Shue has advocated a ‘tripartite 
typology of duties’ – namely, duties to ‘avoid depriving’, duties to ‘protect 
from deprivation’ and duties to ‘aid the deprived’ (1996: 52 [emphasis in 
original]). For example, correlative to the right to life, there is a tripartite 
typology of duties: the duty to avoid taking people’s lives, the duty to protect 
people from threats to their lives and the duty to aid people in preserving 
their lives. In general, correlative to each basic human right, there is such a 
tripartite typology of duties. In particular, correlative to each basic human 
right, there is the duty to protect people from violations of that basic human 
right. The counterharm principle can be supported by a human rights theory 
that includes this conception of a tripartite typology of duties.8 But human 
rights theory is also controversial.
D.  COUNTERING GRIEVOUS HARM
Instructively, Gilbert Ryle distinguished between verbs of ‘achievement’ 
(or ‘success’) and verbs of ‘activity’ (or ‘process’) (1949: 149–53). I am 
regimenting uses of the verbs ‘stop’ and ‘counter’ as follows. The verb ‘stop’ 
is an achievement verb, whereas the verb ‘counter’ is a process verb. When 
we stop an attack, what we achieve is the state of affairs ‘that the attack is 
stopped’. By contrast, when we counter an attack – for instance, by launching 
a counterattack – we engage in a process that might not be successful. A 
counterattack might fail to stop an attack.
As its name suggests, the counterharm principle morally obligates agents 
to ‘counter’ grievous harm. It is morally obligatory (as much as possible) to 
counter grave violations of basic human rights. Of course, when we act so as 
to counter such violations, we might (wholly or partly) fail to stop them. For 
example, a targeted military operation to rescue hostages of Somali pirates 
might fail; in February 2012, two of sixteen hostages were killed in such a 
rescue operation by the Danish Navy (Goodman 2012). Again paraphrasing 
Kant, the counterharm principle mandates that we counter grievous harm 
according to our means. When we do this, we satisfy the principle, even if 
we fail to stop the grievous harm. What is morally obligatory is to engage, as 
much as possible, in the process of countering grievous harm.
Therefore, it is essential that the stated formulations of the counterharm 
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principle are qualified by the verb ‘attempt’, which is a verb of process. When 
we engage in the process of attempting to stop an attack, our attempt might 
fail; the resultant state of affairs might be ‘that the attack is not stopped’. 
What is morally obligatory is to engage, as much as possible, in the process 
of attempting to stop other persons from grievously harming people. But the 
counterharm principle does not mandate success.
E.  MORAL CONFLICT
By what process of moral deliberation should the counterharm principle be 
applied to cases of armed conflict? To begin with, let me illustrate the role 
of the principle in subsumption arguments. Frequently, in the conduct of a 
military operation, enemy combatants kill noncombatants. Evidently, acts of 
stopping enemy combatants from killing noncombatants comprise a specific 
kind that is subsumed under a general kind – namely, acts of stopping other 
persons from grievously harming people. Utilising this subsumption and 
the counterharm principle, a subsumption argument can be constructed, the 
conclusion of which is that it is morally obligatory to attempt to stop enemy 
combatants from killing noncombatants.
In particular cases of armed conflict, there can be moral conflict. For an 
illustration, let me summarise some subsumption arguments about the Libya 
case. From the temporal standpoint of 11 April 2011, consider a particular act 
by the crew of a Libyan Government tank of firing a shell indiscriminately 
into Misrata. Given that this particular act would (actually) kill (or seriously 
risk killing) noncombatants in Misrata, it is morally obligatory to attempt to 
stop the tank crew from performing it.
Now suppose that there are some noncombatants who are close to the tank 
and envisage a pilot of a NATO aircraft contemplating an airstrike against 
the tank. Under the circumstances, the pilot cannot intentionally kill the tank 
crew, without also knowingly killing those nearby noncombatants. Evidently, 
acts of killing nearby noncombatants knowingly comprise a specific kind 
that is subsumed under a general kind – namely, acts of grievously harming 
other persons. Utilising this subsumption and the nonharm principle, a 
subsumption argument can be constructed, the conclusion of which is that 
it is morally obligatory not to kill the nearby noncombatants knowingly. 
(Such a subsumption argument is discussed above in the section entitled 
‘Coherentism Versus Foundationalism’.)
Therefore, the pilot is ensnared in a moral dilemma. One of the horns is 
that it is morally obligatory to attempt to stop the tank crew from killing 
noncombatants in Misrata, and the other horn is that it is morally obligatory 
not to knowingly kill the noncombatants who are close to the tank. To 
satisfy one of these moral obligations is to violate the other. Can such moral 
dilemmas be resolved?
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IV.  MORAL DELIBERATION
War is always a matter of doing evil in the hope that good may come 
of it.
B. H. Liddell Hart (1967: 379)
Characteristically, in armed conflicts, our adversaries perform acts that are 
highly destructive. In stopping them from performing such acts, we could 
perform acts that are highly destructive. In stopping them from harming 
people grievously, we could harm people grievously. In stopping them from 
killing our noncombatants, we could kill their noncombatants. Consequently, 
we could be ensnared in various sorts of moral dilemmas. How should these 
moral dilemmas of armed conflict be resolved? This is a challenging question 
for a cosmopolitan just war theory, one that is addressed in Chapter 9, ‘All 
Things Considered’.
A.  MAY A MORAL PRINCIPLE BE OVERRIDDEN?
The process of moral deliberation is a temporal process. It is from a particular 
temporal standpoint that we deliberate morally about a particular case. From 
the temporal standpoint of 11 April 2011, the pilot is ensnared in this moral 
dilemma about the Libya case.
To generalise, from particular temporal standpoints, we engage in moral 
deliberation about particular cases of armed conflict. Paradigmatically, we 
encounter moral conflict between the nonharm principle and the counterharm 
principle. Therefore, some challenging questions for a just war theory are as 
follows. To obviate moral conflict between these two comprehensive moral 
principles, may we override the nonharm principle? To resolve such moral 
dilemmas as the one about the Libya case, may we override the nonharm 
principle?
I am exploring the question of why well-intentioned, knowledgeable 
just war theorists can profoundly disagree about principles and cases, 
but there can also be principled moral disagreement between just war 
theorists and theorists of other sorts. In introductory works about the 
ethics of war and peace, just war theory is standardly contrasted with 
pacifism (Dower 2009). Of course, there is no single pacifist theory that 
is unanimously accepted, but instead there are various pacifist theories 
(Cady 2010). Arguably, a pacifist theory ought to endorse the nonharm 
principle absolutely. Let me raise some contrasting questions that are 
challenging for such a pacifist theory. To obviate moral conflict between 
the nonharm principle and the counterharm principle, may the counterharm 
principle be overridden? To resolve such moral dilemmas as the one about 
the Libya case, may the counterharm principle be overridden? A main 
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point is that when there is moral conflict between two moral principles, 
there can be principled moral disagreement about which of them may be 
overridden.
B.  PRIMA FACIE MORAL PRINCIPLES
The nonharm principle should not be construed as an absolute moral principle. 
Instead, it should be construed as a prima facie moral principle. More 
generally, a main thesis is that the four comprehensive moral principles – and 
such specifications of them as the nonharm principle and the counterharm 
principle – are prima facie moral principles.
Similarly, the duties of nonmaleficence and beneficence are, according to 
W. D. Ross, prima facie duties. Also, Beauchamp and Childress interpret their 
four principles as prima facie principles (2009: 15). (The threat-seriousness 
criterion contains the phrase ‘justify prima facie’, but the term ‘prima facie’ 
there has a different sense.)
An absolute moral obligation must never be violated, it must always be 
fulfilled, whatever the consequences, whatever the circumstances and, as 
John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, Jr and Germain Grisez add, whatever the good 
intentions (1987: 77).
By contrast, a prima facie moral obligation need not always be fulfilled; 
instead, sometimes it may be violated. Roughly, we ‘fulfill’ the moral 
obligation to perform an action by performing it, and we ‘violate’ the moral 
obligation to perform an action by refraining from performing it.
More exactly, I propose to interpret the term ‘prima facie’ in terms of 
ideas of moral presumption and burden of proof (Childress 1982: 64–73). 
For example, when we deliberate about whether to harm other persons 
grievously, we have to make the moral presumption that we must not. To 
override this moral presumption, we have the burden of proving that we may. 
Central to the meaning of the term ‘prima facie’ is the following conception. 
So long as this burden of proof has not been satisfied, what we morally 
presume to be our obligation actually is our obligation. So long as the burden 
of proof has not been satisfied, we are morally obligated not to harm other 
persons grievously. Accordingly, instead of saying ‘to override the moral 
presumption that the nonharm principle holds’, we can also say, more briefly, 
‘to override the nonharm principle’.
A key point is that there should be a set of necessary and sufficient moral 
criteria for determining whether this burden of proof has been satisfied.
C. WHY ACCEPT JUST WAR PRINCIPLES?
In the preceding chapter, I raised the question of how the legitimacy 
criteria in the High-level Panel Report should be elucidated, revised or 
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supplemented. With the aim of answering this question in later chapters, I 
am exploring the question of why just war principles should be accepted 
in this chapter.
Let me summarise my answer to this last question. Just war principles 
morally constrain responsible agents from using armed force unjustly. When 
we morally deliberate about whether to harm other persons grievously by the 
use of armed force, we have to make the moral presumption that they must 
not. To override this moral presumption, we have the burden of proving that 
we may.
A main thesis is that the core just war principles of just cause, last 
resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity are moral criteria for 
determining whether this burden of proof has been satisfied.
Indeed, these four principles might be supported by subsumption 
arguments. Even if illuminating, such subsumption arguments would not be 
adequate. They do not fully answer the question of why just war principles 
should be accepted. Briefly, the four core just war principles should be 
accepted, so that the nonharm principle may be overridden.
Each core just war principle by itself is a necessary – but not a sufficient 
– moral criterion for determining whether the nonharm principle may be 
overridden. For example, suppose that, in a particular case, it has been proven 
that the just cause principle is satisfied. There is still the burden of proving 
that the ancillary just war principles are satisfied.
D. AN EPISTEMIC STANDARD
To satisfy such burdens of proof, there is need for sufficient evidence. What 
standard of evidence should a just war theory accept?
In domestic jurisprudence, there are different standards of evidence. 
‘Because of the close connection between law and morality’, Lawrence 
Crocker maintained, ‘the law’s burden concepts have particular application 
to various sorts of moral disputes as well as to ethical theory’ (2008: 272). 
Is there a legal concept of burden of proof that has particular application to 
just war theory?
In a criminal trial, the defendant is presumed to be innocent, and the 
prosecution has the burden of proving that the defendant is guilty. This burden 
of proof is subject to a very strong standard: there must be no reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is guilty.
By contrast, for civil trials, there is usually a far weaker standard of the 
preponderance of the evidence. Roughly, plaintiffs in such trials have the 
burden of proving that their claims are ‘more likely than not’, even if by an 
iota (Crocker 2008: 275).
To satisfy burdens of proving that just war principles are satisfied, the 
standard of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is too strong (ICISS 2001a: 35). 
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An armed conflict is a historical event, and historical evidence about past 
historical events is obtained crucially through the testimony of historical 
documents. A present or imminent armed conflict is history in the making or 
history about to be made. Evidence about a present or imminent armed conflict 
is also obtained crucially through testimony – for instance, the testimony 
of journalists, diplomats, spies and turncoats. And such testimony is itself 
often hearsay. In a criminal trial, there is time to corroborate testimony by 
witnesses about the guilt of the defendant; there is time to prove guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. By contrast, a present or imminent armed conflict is, 
paradigmatically, an emergency. There might not be time to prove that a 
military action is just beyond a reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, the standard of ‘preponderance of the evidence’ is too 
weak.
In order to morally constrain uses of armed force effectively, there is need 
for an intermediate standard of evidence. For some civil trials, there is an 
intermediate standard of ‘clear and convincing evidence’. Roughly, in such a 
trial, there is the burden of proving that the claim is ‘highly likely’ (Crocker 
2008: 276). Between the extremes of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and ‘more 
likely than not’, there is the intermediate of ‘highly likely’.
Analogously, a main thesis is that moral deliberation in just war theory 
should be governed by a standard of clear and convincing evidence:
Epistemic standard. The burden of proof must be satisfied by clear and 
convincing evidence.
Admittedly, the legal concepts of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, ‘preponderance 
of the evidence’ and ‘clear and convincing evidence’ are somewhat 
indeterminate. For each of these concepts, there are paradigm cases, but 
there are also difficult or borderline cases. Analogously, my presupposed 
concept of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ is somewhat indeterminate. 
Frequently, to obtain evidence that is clear and convincing, the particular 
circumstances of a particular case have to be examined quite closely. The 
standard of clear and convincing evidence is not a mechanical decision 
procedure. Consequently, acceptance of this epistemic standard by diverse 
responsible agents is compatible with principled moral disagreement among 
them regarding difficult cases.
Let me raise again a key question. How can we deliberate morally 
about the use of armed force, both on a case-by-case basis and in terms 
of generalised just war principles? In domestic jurisprudence, there is an 
analogous question. How can judges deliberate, both on a case-by-case 
basis and in terms of legal principles and statutory laws? Hopefully, these 
analogies with domestic jurisprudence serve to illuminate the main thesis 
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that, in addition to being principlistic, a cosmopolitan just war theory 
should be casuistic.
E.  A SPECIFICITY STANDARD
Interrelated with the epistemic standard, there is a standard of specificity. Our 
real-world moral judgements about particular cases can be complicated and 
controversial when we consider all of the morally relevant details. When we 
apply just war principles to a particular military action, we have to specify 
morally relevant details sufficiently. And when we apply the last resort 
principle to an alternative nonmilitary measure, we also have to specify 
morally relevant details sufficiently. From a particular temporal standpoint, 
when we plan a military action or an alternative nonmilitary measure, we 
must envisage adequately the morally relevant details. Paradigmatically, 
various morally relevant details are entangled in historical cases, and a 
present or imminent case is history in the making or history about to be 
made.
Accordingly, a main thesis is that the process of applying just war principles 
to military actions and alternative nonmilitary measures should be governed 
by a moral requirement of specificity:
Specificity standard. The military action or nonmilitary measure must 
be sufficiently detailed.
How much detail and what sort of detail would be sufficient? This question 
can be answered fully only on a case-by-case basis. Of course, acceptance 
of this specificity standard by diverse responsible agents is compatible with 
principled moral disagreement among them regarding difficult cases.
The specificity standard and the epistemic standard are interrelated. To 
satisfy the various burdens of proving with clear and convincing evidence 
that a particular military action is just, that military action must be sufficiently 
detailed.
F.  FORMULATING JUST WAR PRINCIPLES AS CONDITIONAL 
PROHIBITIONS
To say that it is morally obligatory not to grievously harm other persons is 
equivalent to saying that grievously harming them is morally prohibited. (‘It 
is morally obligatory not to do A’ is equivalent to ‘it is morally prohibited to 
do A’.) The nonharm principle is a moral prohibition.
I propose to formulate just war principles as moral prohibitions. Consider, 
for instance, the following provisional formulation of a just cause principle: 
it is morally obligatory not to perform a military action, if there is not a just 
cause. Notice the word ‘if’ in this principle. What is morally prohibited is 
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the performance of the military action, ‘if’ – that is, on the condition that – 
there is not a just cause. In short, the just cause principle is a ‘conditional 
prohibition’. (By contrast, a pacifist could affirm a moral prohibition that is 
unconditional – namely, that it is morally obligatory not to perform a military 
action.)
In later chapters, each core just war principle is formulated canonically 
as a conditional prohibition. For another example, consider the following 
provisional formulation of a last resort principle: it is morally obligatory not 
to perform a military action, if every reasonable nonmilitary measure has 
not been attempted.
When we morally deliberate about whether to harm other persons 
grievously by means of a particular military action, we have to make the 
moral presumption that we must not. To override this moral presumption, 
we have the burden of proving that the core just war principles are satisfied. 
What should be meant here by ‘satisfy a just war principle’?
A just war principle is a moral prohibition. We satisfy it when we satisfy 
the burden of proving that it does not morally prohibit the military action. 
More exactly, it is a conditional prohibition. We satisfy it when we satisfy 
the burden of proving that the condition does not obtain. For instance, to 
establish that a military action is not morally prohibited by the stated just 
cause principle, we have the burden of proving that the stated condition 
does not obtain – that is, we have the burden of proving that there is a just 
cause. Also, to establish that the military action is not morally prohibited by 
the stated last resort principle, we have the burden of proving that the stated 
condition does not obtain – that is, we have the burden of proving that every 
reasonable nonmilitary measure has been attempted.
A main thesis is that each core just war principle is a necessary – but not 
a sufficient – moral criterion for determining whether the nonharm principle 
may be overridden. By formulating the core just war principles as conditional 
prohibitions, my purpose is to clarify and support this thesis.
A moral prohibition is different from a moral permission. (‘It is morally 
permissible to do A’ is equivalent to ‘it is not morally obligatory not to do 
A’.) Significantly, a conditional prohibition is different from a conditional 
permission. Consider the following schematic conditional prohibition. It is 
morally obligatory not to do A, if C is not the case. Given this conditional 
prohibition, it does not follow (conceptually or logically) that it is not 
morally obligatory not to do A, if C is the case. That is, it does not follow 
(conceptually or logically) that it is morally permissible to do A, if C is 
the case. For instance, given the stated just cause principle, it does not 
follow (conceptually or logically) that it is morally permissible to perform 
the military action, if there is a just cause. Also, given the stated last resort 
principle, it does not follow (conceptually or logically) that it is morally 
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permissible to perform the military action, if every reasonable nonmilitary 
measure has been attempted.
In Chapter 9, ‘All Things Considered’, I investigate the process of 
moral deliberation, whereby the four core just war principles are applied to 
particular cases conjointly.
NOTES
1. For a variety of views on the subject of noncombatant immunity, see Coady 
(2008), Coates (1997), Fabre (2012), Kasher (2007), Kaufman (2003), McMahan 
(2009) and Walzer (1977).
2. For a contrasting way of interrelating moral theory and the ethics of war and 
peace, see Norman (1995).
3. An instructive article relevant to this controversy is Hare (1996).
4. The specific issue of nonlethal weapons is thus interrelated with the idea of 
noncombatant immunity in Lango (2010c).
5. The philosophy of time and just war principles are interrelated in Lango (2004).
6. A classic article about basing just war theory on human rights theory is Luban 
(1980). Human rights theory is interrelated with the ethics of war in Rodin 
(2002).
7. For such a view, see Gert et al. (1997: 82–3). Also, see Beauchamp and Childress 
(2009: 198).
8. That conception is discussed more fully in Lango (2012).
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CHAPTER 4
THEORY OF ACTION
What is an intentional action? Do moral concepts pertain primarily to 
intentional actions and secondarily to their consequences? How are just 
war principles applicable to courses of action and plans of action? In this 
chapter, these and other questions that interrelate moral theory and the theory 
of action are investigated.
However, this book is not exclusively a theoretical study, and topics in the 
theory of action are discussed quite incompletely.1 The purpose is to enlarge 
the framework of presuppositions introduced in the preceding chapter. Again, 
to exhibit the relevance of the current chapter for later chapters, theoretical 
presuppositions are interrelated with topics in just war theory, including 
specific issues and particular cases.
To counterbalance overemphasis of the just cause principle, I am 
emphasising the last resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity 
principles. For the sake of concreteness, this chapter continues to feature the 
idea of noncombatant immunity.
I .  HUMAN ACTIONS
The military actions of groups such as tank crews, regiments and armies are 
emergent from, supervenient on or reducible to actions performed collectively 
by human beings. Preliminary to discussing the subject of military actions 
in the second part of this chapter, I discuss, in this first part, the subject of 
human actions.
A.  MORAL THEORY AND HUMAN ACTIONS
The cosmopolitan just war theory that I am developing is a deontological 
theory. Just war principles are deontological principles, as are the compre-
hensive moral principles. Fundamentally, deontological principles obligate, 
permit or prohibit the performance of actions. Deontological judgements are 
primarily moral judgements of human actions.
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Human actions are performed by human agents. As agent-centred 
deontological principles, just war principles morally constrain human agents 
from performing unjust military actions, but they also morally constrain 
human agents to perform just military actions. Moreover, comprehensive 
moral principles such as the nonharm principle are agent-centred. From the 
agential standpoint of each and every human agent who is contemplating 
the use of armed force, the nonharm principle is centred on him or her. 
It is morally obligatory for him or her not to actually harm or seriously 
risk harming other persons grievously, whether intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or negligently.
Characteristically, armed conflicts are highly destructive. Regularly, 
when human beings use armed force, they intentionally kill other human 
beings. To use armed force intentionally is to perform an intentional action, 
a characteristic consequence of which is destruction. Indeed, military actions 
can have highly destructive consequences.
How should a deontological theory morally evaluate the consequences 
of actions? Specifically, how should a just war theory morally evaluate the 
destructive consequences of the uses of armed force by human beings? 
Just war principles are applicable primarily to human actions, but it is also 
important to address questions about how they are applicable secondarily to 
consequences.
B. ACTIONS, INTENTIONS, CONSEQUENCES
What is an intentional action? I concur broadly with the answer of Alan 
Gewirth: ‘By an action’s being purposive or intentional I mean that the agent 
acts for some end or purpose that constitutes his reason for acting’ (1980: 27). 
(Note that this answer assumes that the term ‘action’ is understood.) What 
should be meant by the ‘end or purpose’ of an action? According to Gewirth: 
‘this purpose may consist in the action itself or in something to be achieved 
by the action’ (1980: 27).
I propose to augment or revise Gewirth’s answer somewhat. The agential 
standpoint is a temporally prospective vantage point on future goals (or 
ends). (Henceforth the term ‘goal’ is used instead of the term ‘end’.) From a 
particular temporal standpoint, a particular human agent performs a particular 
action, intending thereby to achieve a particular future goal.
Among the kinds of goals that can be achieved by an action is a 
‘consequence’ – that is, an event (or state of affairs) brought about by the 
action. The agential standpoint is a temporally prospective vantage point 
on future consequences. For an illustration, let me return to the Libya case 
(utilised in Chapter 3). From the temporal standpoint of 11 April 2011, the tank 
crew fires a shell indiscriminately into Misrata, with the goal of achieving, 
as a consequence, the occurrence of noncombatant deaths. Briefly, firing 
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the shell is the means, and noncombatant deaths are the goal. To generalise, 
from a particular temporal standpoint, a particular human agent (or group of 
human agents) performs a particular action, intending thereby to achieve, as 
a goal, a particular future consequence.
A consequence is a goal that can be achieved by an action, but there are 
goals of another kind. As Gewirth asserted: ‘this purpose may consist in 
the action itself’ (1980: 27). Future actions are also goals. The agential 
standpoint is a temporally prospective vantage point on future actions. By 
performing one action, a human being can have as a goal the performance of 
a second action. One action is performed as a means for performing another 
action as a goal. Actions are interlinked by a relation of means to goal. (In 
other words, they are interlinked by a means-end relation.) For example, the 
tank crew fires a shell indiscriminately into Misrata, with the goal of killing 
noncombatants. By performing the action of firing a shell, the tank crew 
has, as the goal, the performance of the action of killing noncombatants. 
Briefly, firing the shell is the means, and killing noncombatants is the goal. To 
generalise again, from a particular temporal standpoint, a particular human 
agent (or group of human agents) performs a particular action as a means 
of achieving, as a goal, his or her performance of a particular future action.
C.  INTRINSIC RESULTS
Which is the goal of firing the shell: the consequence (noncombatant 
deaths) or the action (killing noncombatants)? In short, my answer is 
that the goal is both the action and the consequence. Necessarily, if the 
action is performed, then the consequence happens. The consequence is 
internally related to the action – the action cannot be performed without 
the consequence happening. That is, the consequence is an ‘intrinsic result’ 
of the action (von Wright 1963: 39–40). The tank crew cannot kill the 
noncombatants without bringing about their deaths. Accordingly, in firing 
the shell, the tank crew cannot have killing them as a goal without having 
bringing about their deaths as a goal.
How, then, are just war principles applicable? Because they are primarily 
applicable to the action – the killing of the noncombatants – they are secondarily 
applicable to the consequence – the deaths of the noncombatants. Specifically, 
the received noncombatant immunity principle is thus applicable. Primarily, 
it is morally obligatory not to intentionally kill the noncombatants. The 
moral obligation not to intentionally kill them entails the moral wrongness of 
intentionally bringing about, as a consequence, their deaths. This entailment 
stems from the internal relation between the happening of the consequence 
and the performance of the action. Necessarily, if it is morally obligatory 
not to intentionally kill them, then it is morally wrong to intentionally bring 
about, as a consequence, their deaths. Secondarily, it is morally wrong for 
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the tank crew to intentionally bring about, as a consequence, the deaths of 
noncombatants.
Firing the shell is the means, and killing noncombatants is the goal. What is 
the moral import of the means-goal (or means-end) relation? In interrelating 
moral theory and the theory of action, it is essential to consider this question. 
If it is morally obligatory not to intentionally kill noncombatants, then it is 
morally obligatory not to fire the shell as a means of achieving the goal of 
killing them. This particular moral judgement may be subsumed under a 
comprehensive moral principle:
Means-goal principle. If it is morally obligatory not to perform action 
A, then it is morally obligatory not to perform action B as a means of 
achieving the goal of performing action A.
To supplement the comprehensive moral principles of nonmaleficence, bene-
ficence, justice and autonomy, I presuppose also this means-goal principle.
D.  EXTRINSIC CONSEQUENCES
The tank crew fires a shell indiscriminately into Misrata, thereby intentionally 
bringing about, as a consequence, the deaths of noncombatants. This 
consequence of their deaths is internally related to the action of killing them, 
but how is it related to the action of firing the shell? My answer is that 
the consequence is externally related to the action – it is possible both to 
perform the action of firing the shell and to fail to bring about the intended 
consequence of noncombatant deaths. It is possibly the case that both the 
tank crew fires the shell and the intended consequence of noncombatant 
deaths does not occur. That is, the consequence is an ‘extrinsic consequence’ 
of the action (von Wright 1963: 39–40). (Note that the term ‘consequence of 
an action’ is used broadly: both extrinsic consequences and intrinsic results 
are consequences.)
How are just war principles applicable here? Specifically, how is the 
received noncombatant immunity principle applicable? It is morally 
obligatory for the tank crew not to intentionally kill noncombatants. It is 
also morally obligatory for the tank crew not to fire the shell as a means of 
achieving the goal of killing noncombatants. But this moral obligation not 
to fire the shell does not in and of itself entail the moral judgement that it is 
morally wrong to intentionally bring about, as a consequence, the occurrence 
of noncombatant deaths. There is no entailment, because the relation between 
the performance of the action and the happening of the consequence is an 
external relation.
Nevertheless, the moral obligation and the moral wrongness are interrelated 
inherently but indirectly by the following two entailments. On the one hand, 
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the moral obligation not to intentionally kill noncombatants entails the moral 
wrongness of intentionally bringing about, as a consequence, their deaths. 
On the other hand – applying the means-goal principle – the moral obligation 
not to intentionally kill them entails the moral obligation not to fire the shell 
as a means of achieving the goal of killing them. In brief, the moral obligation 
about killing entails both the moral obligation about firing the shell and the 
moral wrongness of the consequent deaths. The moral obligation about firing 
the shell and the moral wrongness of the consequent deaths are interrelated 
inherently but indirectly by means of the stated entailments.
The just war theory that I am developing is a deontological theory. It is 
not a consequentialist theory. According to a deontological theory, moral 
judgements should be made primarily about actions. By contrast, according 
to a consequentialist theory, moral judgements should be made entirely 
about consequences. The moral judgement about the moral wrongness of 
intentionally bringing about, as a consequence, the deaths of noncombatants 
might be labelled a ‘consequentialist judgement’, simply because it is a moral 
judgement about a consequence, but such a label would be inappropriate or 
misleading. It is not a standard or orthodox consequentialist judgement. It 
does not stem entirely from a moral appraisal or moral weighing of good and 
bad elements in, or aspects of, the consequence.
A chief aim of subsequent chapters is to formulate generalised just war 
principles that are clearly deontological. In contrast to Johnson’s view that 
the just war principles of last resort and proportionality are prudential tests, 
my view is that they are deontological requirements, or so I argue in later 
chapters.
E.  ATTEMPTING
Our doubts are traitors,
And make us lose the good we oft might win,
By fearing to attempt.
Shakespeare, Measure for Measure (I, iv, 78–9)
This quotation, torn from its original context, resonates with some of this 
chapter’s themes. In the fog of genocidal armed conflict within a failed state, 
members of the Security Council might fear to attempt armed humanitarian 
intervention, thereby losing the good that might be won. On the other hand, 
in the fog of aerial targeting of a terrorist leader from a hovering drone, 
doubts about the absence of proximate noncombatants might not be traitors.
The agential standpoint is a temporally prospective vantage point on future 
contingencies. Frequently, when we apply just war principles prospectively, 
we have to make moral judgements about the use of armed force under 
conditions of uncertainty and urgency. With the best of intentions, projected 
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human actions might be successful or they might be failed attempts. In 
interrelating moral theory and the theory of action, it is important to introduce 
a concept of ‘acting intentionally’, but it is also important to introduce a 
concept of ‘attempting to act’.
The standpoint of the tank crew at the moment when the shell is fired is 
a temporal standpoint. From this particular temporal standpoint, the tank 
crew performs the particular action of firing the shell, intending thereby 
to achieve the particular future goal of killing noncombatants. At the 
moment of firing, there are no deaths. By contrast, at the moment of killing, 
necessarily there are deaths. At the moment of firing, this action of firing 
and the consequence of deaths are externally related. By contrast, at the 
moment of killing, the action of killing and the consequence of deaths are 
internally related. At the moment of firing, the agential standpoint of the tank 
crew is a temporally prospective vantage point on a future contingency: the 
projected action of killing noncombatants might be successful or it might 
be a failed attempt.
What, then, should be meant by ‘attempting to act’? Actions are inter-
linked by a relation of means to goal. The time when the means is used is 
simultaneous with, or earlier than, the time when the goal might be achieved. 
(The past cannot be undone.) Typically, in armed conflict, the time of the 
means is earlier than the time of the goal, if only by a split second. From the 
temporal standpoint of the performance of an action as a means of achieving 
a future action as a goal, a human agent is attempting to perform the future 
action. (Similarly, from the temporal standpoint of the performance of an 
action as a means for bringing about a future consequence, a human agent is 
attempting to bring about the future consequence.) By ‘attempting to act’, I 
mean ‘attempting to perform an action as a goal, by performing an action as 
a means of achieving that goal’.
The subject of attempting is interrelated with a variety of topics in just 
war theory, as later chapters attest. Let me mention some examples. First, 
according to the counterharm principle, it is morally obligatory to attempt, 
as much as possible, to stop other persons from grievously harming people. 
Second, the last resort principle mandates that, before resorting to the use 
of armed force, every reasonable nonmilitary measure must be attempted.
F.  ACTING KNOWINGLY
Even when destroying an obvious insurgent headquarters or command 
center, counterinsurgents must take care to minimize civilian casualties. 
New, precise munitions with smaller blast effects can limit collateral 
damage.
Counterinsurgency (COIN FM 2006: E-6)
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Even a traditionally civilian object such as a house can be a military 
target if it is occupied and used by military forces.
US Department of Defense (DOD 2003: F-1)
In light of these two quotations, let us imagine realistically a particular case 
– a US targeted military operation in Pakistan – from the temporal standpoint 
of a particular day in the year 2012. It is known that a leader of Al Qaeda is 
presently in a civilian object – a house. Aerial surveillance from a hovering 
drone detects the presence of a few noncombatants also in the house. To 
minimise noncombatant casualties, the remote pilot of the drone launches 
a precision-guided missile at the house, thereby intentionally killing the Al 
Qaeda leader. But there is also ‘collateral damage’.
The term ‘collateral damage’ is ambiguous. The word ‘damage’ functions 
as both noun and verb. People damage (the verb) something, and it suffers 
damage (the noun). Military forces collaterally damage (the verb) noncombat-
ants, and the noncombatants suffer collateral damage (the noun). But the term 
‘collateral damage’ is not simply a euphemism for such human damage, for it 
also encompasses collateral damage to property and the environment. Military 
forces collaterally damage (the verb) property and the environment, and prop-
erty and the environment suffers collateral damage (the noun).
In the Pakistan case, does the drone pilot bring about, as a foreseen but 
unintended consequence, collateral damage (the noun) or does he (or she) 
knowingly collaterally damage (the verb)? To collaterally damage is, more 
explicitly, to perform the action of collaterally damaging. In short, my answer 
is that he both brings about the consequence and performs the action. Let me 
explain.
The drone pilot performs the action of launching the missile at the house, 
with the goal of bringing about, as an extrinsic consequence, the death of 
the Al Qaeda leader. Note that this consequence is also an intrinsic result of 
a second action that he performs – namely, his intentional action of killing 
the Al Qaeda leader. Moreover, he performs the action of launching the 
missile at the house, while foreseeing that noncombatant deaths will be an 
unintended consequence. This consequence is also extrinsic to the action; for 
it is possibly the case both that he launches the missile and that noncombatant 
deaths do not occur.
Is this consequence of noncombatant deaths also an intrinsic result of a 
third action that he performs – namely, his knowing (but not intentional) 
action of killing the noncombatants? By launching the missile, does he both 
intentionally kill the Al Qaeda leader and knowingly kill the noncombatants?
To answer this question, I presuppose Gewirth’s concept of ‘voluntary 
action’ (but with a qualification): ‘By an action’s being voluntary or free I 
mean that its performance is under the agent’s control in that he unforcedly 
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chooses to act as he does, knowing the relevant proximate circumstances of 
his action’ (1980: 27). The qualification is that the word ‘unforcedly’ should 
be omitted. When a human agent performs a voluntary action, she knows 
sufficiently the relevant circumstances; she chooses to perform the action, 
for she might have chosen otherwise; and the action is under her control, in 
that it is within her power to refrain from performing the action.
This broad idea of acting ‘voluntarily’ is different from a narrower idea of 
acting ‘willingly’. During the prelude phase of an armed conflict, potential 
belligerents could employ coercive measures; not only coercive nonmilitary 
measures, such as economic sanctions, but also deterrent (or compellent) 
threats to use armed force. When a human being is coerced to perform an action 
by means of a threat of serious harm, she does not perform it ‘willingly’, but 
she does perform it (in a broad sense of the term) ‘voluntarily’. For she might 
have chosen not to perform it; instead, she might have chosen to attempt to stop 
or evade the threatened harm. In the face of coercion, we may submit or resist.
Clearly, an intentional action is a voluntary action. When we act to achieve 
goals, we act voluntarily. When a human agent performs a particular action 
for the sake of achieving a particular goal, that intentional action is under her 
control, in that it is within her power to refrain from attempting to achieve 
that goal.
Acting knowingly is acting voluntarily. At the moment of launching the 
missile, the drone pilot knows a very relevant circumstance – namely, that 
noncombatants will die. Indeed, he does not intend to kill them; killing them 
is not his purpose. Nevertheless, he voluntarily kills them. He chooses to kill 
them, for he might have chosen not to kill them. His action of killing them is 
under his control, in that it is within his power to refrain from killing them. 
By launching the missile, the drone pilot both intentionally kills the Al Qaeda 
leader and knowingly kills the noncombatants.
I am using the military term ‘collateral damage’, but there is a term 
more widely used in writings concerning just war theory: ‘side effect’. The 
occurrence of noncombatant deaths is a ‘side effect’ of the launching of the 
missile by the drone pilot. But the term ‘side effect’ is misleading, insofar 
as it suggests that the deaths merely happen to occur, that their occurrence 
lies outside the drone pilot’s sphere of control. However, because he is able 
to refrain from launching the missile, it is within his power to refrain from 
killing the noncombatants, and he knows this. By saying that he performs the 
action of knowingly killing them, rather than saying merely that he brings 
about the foreseen but unintended occurrence of their deaths as a side effect, 
we give expression to his responsibility for their dying. Even if he neither 
intends nor wants to do this, he kills them.
Is it morally obligatory for the drone pilot not to kill noncombatants 
knowingly? To kill other persons is to grievously harm them, whether 
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intentionally or knowingly. Therefore, by means of a subsumption argument 
with the nonharm principle as a premise, the following conclusion can be 
derived. It is morally obligatory not to kill noncombatants knowingly.
How should this destructive consequence of the drone pilot’s airstrike 
– the foreseen but unintended occurrence of noncombatant deaths – be 
morally evaluated? Primarily, it is morally obligatory not to knowingly kill 
the noncombatants. This moral obligation entails the moral wrongness of 
knowingly bringing about, as a consequence, their deaths. This entailment 
stems from the internal relation between the happening of the consequence 
and the performance of the action. Necessarily, if it is morally obligatory not 
to knowingly kill them, then it morally wrong to knowingly bring about, as a 
consequence, their deaths. Secondarily, it is morally wrong for the drone pilot 
to knowingly bring about, as ‘collateral damage’, the deaths of noncombatants.
G.  RISKING
The subject of the ethics of risk is interrelated with various topics in just 
war theory. Let me mention some examples. First, when a targeted military 
operation is attempted, there is often a risk of escalation. Second, in an 
unstable crisis, one might attempt a preventive first strike, rather than risk 
invasion. Third, in attempting to negotiate, while the adversary is mobilising 
militarily, one might risk military disadvantage.
But the subject of the ethics of risk is complex, in that it interrelates ideas 
of moral theory, the theory of action and the theory of knowledge. In the fog 
of armed conflict, moral judgements are often (if not always) made under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty. In attempting uncertainly to achieve a goal, 
we might risk not achieving it. While attempting uncertainly to counter harm, 
we might risk acting harmfully. Under conditions of uncertainty, we might 
foresee that a proposed military action is ‘likely’ to harm noncombatants and 
so, if we were to attempt to perform it, we would ‘seriously risk’ harming them. 
The ideas of attempting and risking are intertwined. And, problematically, 
the concepts of ‘likelihood’ and ‘risk’ admit of scale or degree. Clearly, there 
can be principled moral disagreement about the likelihood of harms and the 
seriousness of risks.
Consequently, my discussion of the subject of the ethics of risk is 
quite incomplete. For the sake of concreteness, the idea of noncombatant 
immunity is featured. In a study of the doctrine of double-effect (DDE), 
T. A. Cavanaugh reported that ‘in standard contemporary double-effect cases 
(for example, tactical bombing that harms non-combatants) one foresees 
harm as an inevitable consequence’ (2006: 12). By contrast, my view is that 
a noncombatant immunity principle should also encompass grievous harm 
foreseen as a likely consequence. The nonharm principle morally prohibits 
actual grievous harm and grievous harm seriously risked.
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Under conditions of uncertainty, a human agent might seriously risk 
killing noncombatants. In the Pakistan case, the drone pilot foresees with 
certainty that noncombatants will be killed; and so, by using armed force, 
he knowingly kills them. In other cases, the foresight of human agents is 
clouded with uncertainty; they foresee that it is likely that noncombatants 
will be killed; and so, if they were to use armed force, they would seriously 
risk killing them.
In preceding sections, I have interrelated the concept of ‘acting intentionally’ 
with the concept of ‘acting knowingly’. In the following sections, I discuss 
the interrelated concepts of ‘acting recklessly’ and ‘acting negligently’. In 
rethinking or revising the traditional noncombatant immunity principle, it 
is essential to morally prohibit not only military actions that would actually 
grievously harm noncombatants intentionally, but also military actions that 
would seriously risk grievously harming them intentionally (even if, by luck 
or chance, they were not actually grievously harmed).
H.  ACTING RECKLESSLY
Let us imagine realistically another particular case – a US targeted military 
operation in Yemen – from the temporal standpoint of a particular day in 
the year 2012. It is known that a truly dangerous terrorist leader is presently 
in a house. Human intelligence warns that it is likely that noncombatants 
are nearby. Consequently, a drone pilot foresees that, if he were to launch a 
precision-guided missile at the house, it is likely that noncombatants would 
die. Nonetheless, while seriously risking killing noncombatants, he launches 
the missile, with the goal of killing the terrorist leader. Of course, his attempt 
might fail or no noncombatant deaths might occur. Let us imagine, however, 
that he kills the terrorist leader and also that some noncombatants die. Is this 
consequence of noncombatant deaths an intrinsic result of an action that he 
performs – namely, a reckless action of killing the noncombatants?
Acting recklessly is acting voluntarily. When launching the missile, the 
drone pilot is conscious of a very relevant circumstance – namely, that it is 
likely that noncombatants will die. Hence he acts ‘recklessly’, in that ‘he 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that he will kill 
them (ALI 1962: Section 2.02(2)). Indeed, he does not intend to kill them; 
killing them is not his purpose. Nevertheless, he voluntarily risks killing 
them. He chooses to risk killing them, for he might have chosen not to risk 
killing them. His action of killing them is under his control, in that it is within 
his power to refrain from launching the missile. It is within his power to 
refrain from killing the noncombatants. By launching the missile, the drone 
pilot both kills the terrorist leader intentionally and kills the noncombatants 
‘recklessly’.
The time of launching is earlier than the time of killing. Notice that the 
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mental state ‘recklessly’ qualifies both the action of launching and the action 
of killing. The drone pilot launches the missile recklessly, and he kills the 
noncombatants recklessly. Similarly, in the Pakistan case, the mental state 
‘knowingly’ qualifies both the action of missile launching and the action of 
killing noncombatants. Also, the mental state ‘intentionally’ qualifies both 
the action of using a means and the action of achieving the goal.
Moral requirements should be temporalised. In a criminal trial, the idea of 
recklessness is applied retrospectively; the prosecution strives to convince 
the jury that the defendant committed a criminally reckless act. Analogously, 
this moral idea of recklessness can be applied retrospectively to morally 
blame. Combatants can be morally blamed for having killed noncombatants 
recklessly.
Most importantly, the moral idea of recklessness should be applied 
prospectively to morally constrain. To recklessly kill (or seriously risk 
killing) other persons is to grievously harm them. Therefore, by means 
of a subsumption argument with the nonharm principle as a premise, the 
following conclusion can be derived. It is morally obligatory not to seriously 
risk killing noncombatants recklessly. From the temporal standpoint of the 
action of launching the missile, it is morally obligatory for the drone pilot 
not to seriously risk killing noncombatants recklessly.
The idea of noncombatant immunity is embodied in international laws 
regulating the conduct of war (i.e. the ‘laws of war’ or ‘international 
humanitarian law’). In particular, Protocol I (of 8 June 1977) to the Geneva 
Conventions (of 12 August 1949) contains a legal requirement of ‘due care’: 
‘Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack 
with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects’ (ICRC 1977a: 
Article 57(2)). Applied prospectively, this ‘due care’ requirement ought to 
constrain combatants from grievously harming civilians recklessly.
I .  ACTING NEGLIGENTLY
Let us imagine realistically a third particular case – a US targeted military 
operation in Somalia – from the temporal standpoint of a particular day in 
the year 2012. It is known that a truly dangerous terrorist leader is presently 
in a house. Without obtaining intelligence about noncombatants, a drone 
pilot intentionally kills the terrorist leader by launching a precision-guided 
missile. Collaterally, noncombatants die. Is this extrinsic consequence of the 
missile launching an intrinsic result of an action that the drone pilot performs 
– namely, a negligent action of killing?
Acting negligently is acting voluntarily. When launching the missile, the 
drone pilot acts ‘negligently’, in that ‘he should be aware of a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk’ that he might kill noncombatants (ALI 1962: Section 
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2.02(2)). Indeed, he does not intend to kill them; killing them is not his 
purpose. Nevertheless, he voluntarily risks killing them. For he chooses not 
to do what a ‘reasonable person’ would do (ALI 1962: Section 2.02(2)) – 
namely, obtain intelligence about whether noncombatants are nearby. Thus 
his action of killing noncombatants is under his control, in that it is within 
his power to obtain intelligence about noncombatants; if he were to discover 
that noncombatants are nearby, it would be within his power to refrain from 
launching the missile. By launching the missile, he both kills the terrorist 
leader intentionally and kills noncombatants ‘negligently’. Notice that the 
mental state ‘negligently’ qualifies both the action of launching and the action 
of killing. In launching the missile, the drone pilot seriously risks killing 
noncombatants negligently; and by launching it, he kills noncombatants 
negligently.
But should combatants be held to such a ‘reasonable person’ standard? 
Would a ‘reasonable’ drone pilot obtain intelligence about noncombatants? 
To answer this last question, let me consult the new US counterinsurgency 
field manual (COIN FM), which (arguably) every US military officer ought to 
master. (The COIN FM is taught in US military academies.) In Appendix E, 
‘Airpower in counterinsurgency’, there is a specific requirement to mitigate 
the negative effects of air power: ‘Bombing, even with the most precise 
weapons, can cause unintended civilian casualties’, but ‘counterinsurgents 
must take care to minimize civilian casualties’, and such ‘adverse effects’ 
can be mitigated, ‘given timely, accurate intelligence’ (COIN FM 2006: E-5, 
E-6). The imagined Somalia case is realistic; the drone pilot is negligent.
In Protocol I, there is a related legal requirement: ‘Do everything feasible 
to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian 
objects’ (ICRC 1977a: Article 57(2)). Indeed, in a criminal trial by the ICC, 
this requirement can be applied retrospectively. On the other hand, applied 
prospectively, the legal requirement should constrain combatants from 
harming civilians negligently.
Analogously, the moral idea of negligence can be applied retrospectively 
to morally blame. Most importantly, it should be applied prospectively to 
morally constrain. To negligently kill (or seriously risk killing) other persons 
is to grievously harm them. Therefore, by means of another subsumption 
argument with the nonharm principle as a premise, the following conclusion 
can be derived. It is morally obligatory not to seriously risk killing noncom-
batants negligently.
J .  KNOWINGLY RISKING AND INTENTIONALLY RISKING
It is morally obligatory not to intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or neg-
ligently harm other persons grievously. In interpreting this specification of 
the nonharm principle, it is essential to recognise that the four mental states 
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qualify not only actual harming, but also harming seriously risked. A deonto-
logical theory should include concepts of ‘intentionally risking’, ‘knowingly 
risking’, ‘recklessly risking’ and ‘negligently risking’. For brevity, the word 
‘seriously’ is omitted, but these terms should be read as containing that word 
implicitly – for instance, ‘knowingly (seriously) risking’. Similarly, the word 
‘actually’ is omitted in the terms ‘intentionally (actually) harming’, ‘know-
ingly (actually) harming’ and so forth. Obviously, reckless acts can impose 
grievous risks of harm, as can negligent acts. But what should be meant by 
the terms ‘knowingly risking’ and ‘intentionally risking’?
Traditionally, the noncombatant immunity principle is understood as mor-
ally permitting combatants to cause some foreseen but unintended harms to 
noncombatants, but only when those harms satisfy a standard of proportion-
ately – that is (roughly), only when the harms are outweighed by relevant 
benefits. Thus, as the COIN FM mandates: ‘It is wrong to [intentionally] 
harm innocents’, but, under some (‘proportional’) circumstances, US com-
batants ‘may take actions where they knowingly risk, but do not intend, harm 
to noncombatants’ (COIN FM 2006: 7–23). Significantly, the COIN FM uses 
the phrase ‘knowingly risk’.
The moral obligation not to intentionally harm civilians is embodied in 
Protocol I: ‘The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, 
shall not be the object of attack’ (ICRC 1977a: Article 51(2)). Arguably, the 
moral obligation not to intentionally risk harming civilians is also (implicitly) 
embodied in Protocol I: ‘Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited’ (ICRC 
1977a: Article 51(4)). Paradigmatically, for example, the indiscriminate 
bombardment of military targets and civilians involves both the intention to 
destroy military targets and (at least) the intention to risk harming civilians (if 
not also the intention to actually harm them). In brief, a truly indiscriminate 
attack, even when not involving the intention to actually harm civilians, 
involves the intention to risk harming them.
By contrast and paradigmatically, a bombardment that discriminates 
between military targets and civilians involves the intention to destroy 
military targets, while knowingly harming, or knowingly risking the harming 
of, civilians. Whereas the idea of ‘knowingly risking’ is linked with the idea 
of ‘attacking discriminately’, the idea of ‘intentionally risking’ is linked with 
the idea of ‘attacking indiscriminately’.
But what is the difference between ‘knowingly risking discriminately’ and 
‘consciously risking recklessly’? Let me sketch one way that this question 
might be answered. Frequently, in armed conflicts, combatants are so remote 
from their targets that only what is likely can be foreseen. Precision-guided 
munitions can mitigate, but not always obviate, the harming of noncombatants. 
Let us suppose that we consciously risk harming noncombatants recklessly 
when we consciously fail to satisfy the ‘due care’ requirement (in Protocol I). 
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On the other hand, despite taking ‘all feasible precautions’, we might still 
foresee that it is likely that noncombatants will be grievously harmed; 
we might still knowingly risk grievously harming noncombatants. When 
launching an attack – despite attempting to discriminate with ‘due care’ 
between combatants and noncombatants – we might still knowingly risk 
grievously harming noncombatants.
In conclusion, it is morally obligatory not to actually grievously harm 
noncombatants knowingly, but it is also morally obligatory not to seriously 
risk grievously harming them knowingly. It is morally obligatory not to 
actually grievously harm them intentionally, but it is also morally obligatory 
not to seriously risk harming them intentionally. And it is morally obligatory 
not to actually grievously harm or seriously risk grievously harming them 
recklessly or negligently.
In light of these moral prohibitions, how should the received noncombatant 
immunity principle be revised? This question is addressed in Chapter 7, ‘Last 
Resort and Noncombatant Immunity’.
K.  PLANNED COURSES OF ACTIONS
Finally, let me introduce the key concept of a ‘planned course of actions’. 
A voluntary action can be performed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or 
negligently. An intentional action is performed for the sake of some goal. Typi-
cally, an intentional action is part of a ‘planned course of actions’ – that is, a 
course of actions that is followed for the sake of some goal. The actions in a 
planned course of actions are causally interlinked and have interlinked goals 
(e.g. by relations of means to ends). A planned course of actions is mutable: 
at any juncture, while carrying it out, its plan could be revised and so could 
its goal. Some plans are well-formulated in advance and others are partly 
or wholly improvised; some are expressly formulated and others are partly or 
wholly implicit. Usually, a plan is incomplete, in that it does not specify every 
action to be performed in realising its goal. Also, a group of interrelated plans 
is itself a plan, and such a plan could be incomplete, insofar as the component 
plans are incompletely interrelated. Furthermore, in anticipation of contingen-
cies, there is need to provide for alternative courses of action, each of which 
might be followed to realise the goal.2
A main thesis is that just war principles are applicable primarily to planned 
courses of military actions.
II .  MILITARY ACTIONS
First, military might still matters in twenty-first-century geopolitics. The 
security challenges facing Europe include conflicts in its neighborhood, 
such as in Libya; terrorism from failed states further away; and emerging 
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threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
cyberwarfare. What defines these threats is both their diversity and their 
unpredictability. Investing in homeland security and retrenching will 
not be enough to counter them.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary-General of NATO (2011: 3)
In developing a cosmopolitan just war theory, my aim is to formulate 
generalised just war principles that are applicable to all forms of armed 
conflict. As NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen observed, NATO faces a 
‘diversity’ of ‘threats’. To ‘counter them’, NATO might engage in diverse 
sorts of military actions or deterrent threats of military actions. What are 
military actions? Is the concept of ‘military action’ so vague and general as 
to be indeterminate? In this second part of the chapter, these questions and 
related questions are explored.
Indeed, Libya is in Europe’s Mediterranean neighbourhood. However, 
from a cosmopolitan point of view – to echo the title of the landmark report 
of the Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood (CGG 
1995) – our neighbourhood is global. Just as individual states have national 
security strategies, should the Security Council have a global security 
strategy? What is a cosmopolitan security strategy?3
To counter threats of ‘terrorism from failed states’, what should be our 
global counterterrorism strategy? The threats of ‘the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and cyberwarfare’ are extraordinarily dire. What should 
be our global strategy to counter them?
Presumably, in asserting that ‘homeland security’ is not enough, 
Rasmussen is espousing something akin to NATO’s Cold War policy of 
‘forward defence’. Unfortunately, just as one person’s freedom fighter is 
another person’s terrorist, so one person’s forward defence is another 
person’s looming offence. Should the Security Council endorse a proactive 
global security strategy that prioritises targeted military operations?
A strategy is a plan. To address such questions about global security 
strategies – and also other questions about military plans and actions – the 
concept of a ‘planned course of military actions’ is introduced. Complex 
military actions – for instance, military operations – have, as components, 
planned courses of military actions of individual human beings. The process 
of performing any military action in a planned course of military actions is 
a temporal process; correlatively, the process of applying just war principles 
to a planned course of military actions is a temporal process.
A.  WHAT IS A MILITARY ACTION?
According to traditional state-centric just war theories, the primary agents 
that apply just war principles are states (or rulers of states), and the primary 
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targets to which those agents apply the principles are states (or the military 
actions of states). By contrast, my aim in this book is to formulate generalised 
just war principles that are applicable by all sorts of responsible agents to 
all forms of armed conflict. Indeed, interstate wars comprise a paradigm 
form of armed conflict, but so do revolutionary wars. Correspondingly, rulers 
of states comprise a sort of responsible agents, but so do leaders of armed 
revolutions.
Presumably, the term ‘armed conflict’ also encompasses armed 
humanitarian interventions, civil wars, insurgencies and counterinsurgencies 
and so forth. Noting the phrase ‘and so forth’, it might be surmised that there 
are problematic borderline cases. For example, is a military operation by UN 
peacekeepers against peace agreement ‘spoilers’ a form of armed conflict? 
What are armed conflicts? Who are responsible agents? Are the concepts 
of ‘armed conflict’ and ‘responsible agent’ so vague and general as to be 
indeterminate? The subject of indeterminate concepts is discussed in a later 
section, ‘Open Texture and Sufficient Resemblance’.
In order to generalise just war principles sufficiently, it is essential to have 
a sufficiently general concept of ‘military action’. The generalised just war 
principles of a cosmopolitan just war theory should be applicable to military 
actions of all types. To begin with, I list some types of military actions that 
are paradigmatic. Waging a war is a military action. More explicitly, some 
paradigm types of military actions are the waging of an interstate war, the 
waging of a revolutionary war and the waging of a civil war. In general, it is 
presupposed that to wage (or engage in) an armed conflict of any form is to 
perform a military action.
In accordance with coherentism, a just war theory can be elucidated 
by interrelating it with a theory of military affairs. In theorising about the 
waging of wars, different ‘levels’ of military action can be distinguished – 
namely, a tactical level, an operational (or ‘theatre’) level, a strategic level 
and a political level (Smith 2007: 13). At the political level, rulers of states, 
leaders of armed revolutions or other politically responsible agents deliberate 
about political purposes or goals. Traditionally, at this level, jus ad bellum 
principles are applicable; at the other three levels, jus in bello principles are 
applicable. By contrast, in order to generalise just war principles sufficiently, 
a main thesis is that the core just war principles should be applicable at all 
four levels.
At the strategic level, military commanders or other responsible agents 
plan military campaigns; at the operational level, military operations are 
planned. During the waging of an interstate war (e.g. the Second World 
War), there are military campaigns (e.g. the North African Campaign) and 
military operations (e.g. during the Battle of the Bulge). Carrying out such 
a military campaign is a paradigm type of military action, as is conducting 
The Ethics of Armed Conflict.indd   92 09/12/2013   12:10:10
t u e o rw o f  a c t i o n 93
such a military operation. Presumably, there are military campaigns and 
operations in armed conflicts of other forms – for instance, civil wars and 
armed humanitarian interventions. Consider the cases of Libya and Rwanda. 
In carrying out a military campaign in 2011 against the Libyan Government, 
US and NATO air forces conducted military operations. In carrying out 
a military campaign in 1994 against the Rwandan Government, the RPF 
conducted military operations.
To generalise again, it is presupposed that to carry out a military campaign 
or conduct a military operation is to perform a military action, whatever the 
form of armed conflict. Generalised just war principles should be applicable 
to all such military actions.
The relevant concept of ‘military action’ is even more general. At the 
tactical level, during a standard military operation, there are particular 
combats. Fighting a combat is a military action. In participating in a combat, 
individual human agents use armed force. Any use of armed force by an 
individual human agent is a military action. A major in the US Marines, 
Glen G. Butler, in discussing his experiences in the Iraq War, said: ‘I have 
not shot one round without good cause’ (Butler 2004). Suppose that he meant 
by ‘good cause’ a cause that is morally good, although he might have meant 
something different. In this book, I am endorsing such a moral intuition 
regarding the need for a just cause. It should be the purpose of the just cause 
principle to morally constrain his shooting of each round.
Every military action, no matter how large scale or small scale, must 
satisfy the core principles of just cause, last resort, proportionality and 
noncombatant immunity.
B.  MILITARY ACTIONS VERSUS POLICE ACTIONS
Considering accordingly that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that Muammar Gaddafi is criminally responsible as an indirect co-
perpetrator, under article 25(3)(a) of the [Rome] Statute [of the ICC], 
for the following crimes committed by Security Forces under his control 
in various localities of the Libyan territory . . . i. murder as a crime 
against humanity . . . and ii. persecution as a crime against humanity 
. . . the [ICC] Chamber hereby issues a warrant of arrest for Muammar 
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi . . .
Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court
(ICC 2011: 6–7)
On 27 June 2011, the ICC issued this warrant of arrest for Qaddafi (also 
spelled ‘Gaddafi’). Let us consider this particular case from the temporal 
standpoint of that day. At present, there is no international police force that 
is empowered to enforce this arrest warrant by invading the territory of Libya 
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and apprehending Qaddafi, using all necessary means, including armed 
force, if necessary.
Arguably, the Security Council is empowered by the UN Charter to authorise 
the enforcement of this arrest warrant. Let us imagine (hypothetically, of 
course) some crucial elements of a pertinent Security Council resolution, the 
wording of which is mostly borrowed from the aforementioned Resolution 
1973 (2011 [emphasis in original]).
The Security Council,
Recalling its decision to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court,
Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues 
to constitute a threat to international peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
Authorises Member States, acting nationally or through regional organi-
sations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compli-
ance with the warrant of arrest for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar 
Gaddafi issued by the International Criminal Court on 27 June 2011.
From the temporal standpoint of that date, let us imagine prospectively 
(and hypothetically) a future mission by US Special Operations forces, the 
goal of which is to arrest Qaddafi and transport him to The Hague for trial 
by the ICC. Authorised by such a Security Council resolution, this mission is 
authorised, in particular, to take ‘all necessary measures’, including the use 
of armed force, if necessary. Informed by human intelligence about Qaddafi’s 
whereabouts, the human agents involved in this mission invade Tripoli, enter 
the building where he resides, kill some of his bodyguards and wound him. 
Quickly, he is transported to a hospital in The Hague, where he will receive 
medical care and be tried by the ICC.
Is this mission by US Special Operations forces a military action or is it 
a police action? Note that the word ‘or’ in this sentence can be used either 
exclusively or inclusively. I reject an ‘exclusive distinction’: it is either a 
military action or a police action, but not both. Instead, I accept an ‘inclusive 
distinction’: it is either a military action or a police action or both. Briefly, 
my answer is that it is both a military action and a police action. It resembles 
paradigm military actions, but it also resembles paradigm police actions. 
Indeed, this particular case might be called a ‘borderline case’, but I prefer 
to call it an ‘overlap case’. For the class of military actions and the class of 
police actions overlap; this particular case is in this overlap – that is, it is a 
member of both of the two classes. The distinction between military actions 
and police actions is thus inclusive.
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C. JUST WAR THEORY AND HUMAN SECURITY
In her book Human Security, Mary Kaldor rejected just war theory. Instead, she 
advocated ‘a new ethical approach’ (2007: 154) – one that is ‘cosmopolitan’ 
(2007: 122). Specifically, it is a human security approach, because ‘security 
is understood as the defence of individual human beings’ (2007: 122). ‘There 
is still a role for legitimate military force’, she admitted, ‘but the way it is 
used is more akin to domestic law enforcement than war-fighting’ (2007: 
155). Apparently, she interpreted the distinction between law enforcement 
and war-fighting as an exclusive distinction.
By contrast, my view is that, even if the role for legitimate military force 
in a particular case is more akin to law enforcement, it might still be akin to 
war-fighting, albeit less akin. The class of acts of law enforcement and the 
class of acts of war-fighting overlap.
With the aim of formulating cosmopolitan just war principles, I am starting 
with the five criteria of legitimacy proposed in the High-level Panel Report. 
Note that the term ‘human security’ occurs in the criterion of ‘seriousness 
of threat’. Indeed, Kaldor’s human security approach is incompatible with 
traditional just war theory. By contrast, my cosmopolitan approach to just 
war theory is a sort of human security approach, for it too stresses the defence 
of individual human beings.
Consider the criterion of ‘proportional means’: ‘Are the scale, duration 
and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet 
the threat in question?’ Typically, armed conflicts are highly destructive, 
and a chief function of a just war theory should be to morally constrain the 
scale, duration and intensity of uses of armed force. Characteristically, the 
scale, duration and intensity of a military action that is not also a police 
action (briefly, a ‘nonoverlap military action’) are greater than the scale, 
duration and intensity of a military action that is also a police action (briefly, 
an ‘overlap military action’).
In accordance with the proportional means criterion – and by analogy 
with the last resort principle – I support in this book roughly the following 
‘policing resort principle’. Before attempting to achieve a goal by means of 
a nonoverlap military action, we are morally required to attempt to achieve 
the goal by means of an overlap military action, whenever it is reasonable to 
do so. This principle is discussed more fully in Chapter 7, ‘Last Resort and 
Noncombatant Immunity’.
But how can there be such overlap cases?
D. OPEN TEXTURE AND SUFFICIENT RESEMBLANCE
Faced with the question whether the rule prohibiting the use of vehicles 
in the park is applicable to some combination of circumstances in which 
it appears indeterminate, all that the person called upon to answer can do 
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is to consider (as does one who makes use of a precedent) whether the 
present case resembles the plain case ‘sufficiently’ in ‘relevant’ respects.
H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961: 124)
Hart’s notion of the indeterminateness of rules was influenced by Friedrich 
Waismann’s notion of the ‘open texture’ of empirical concepts (Hart 
1961: 249). The concept of ‘vehicle’ has an open texture. An automobile 
is a paradigm case of a vehicle, and an apple is clearly not a vehicle. Is a 
wheelchair a vehicle? Does this rule prohibit the use of wheelchairs in the 
park?
When a concept has an open texture, it cannot be defined with ‘absolute 
precision’ (Waismann 1968: 42). Suppose that, according to our current 
definition of the concept of ‘vehicle’, we cannot determine whether a 
wheelchair is a vehicle. Then, to answer the question, we need to ‘modify our 
definition’ (Waismann 1968: 42). We need to consider whether wheelchairs 
resemble automobiles (or other paradigm cases) sufficiently in relevant 
respects. If they do (or do not), and if we modify our definition accordingly, 
it is no longer indeterminate whether wheelchairs are (or are not) vehicles. It 
is no longer indeterminate whether the rule prohibits them.
What should be meant by ‘resembles sufficiently in relevant respects’? 
There is no space to examine how Hart would answer this question, and 
so I only state my own answer. To begin with, let me illustrate the idea of 
‘resembling sufficiently in relevant respects’ by means of the Qaddafi case.
On the one hand, suppose that, according to our current definition of the 
concept of ‘military action’, we cannot determine whether the hypothetical 
mission by US Special Operations forces to arrest Qaddafi is a military action. 
Does it resemble sufficiently in relevant respects paradigm cases of military 
actions? Consider the case of armed humanitarian intervention in Somalia 
from 1992 to 1994 (Wheeler 2000: 172–207). On 6 June 1993, in response 
to the killing of UN peacekeepers in Somalia, Security Council Resolution 
837 (1993) authorised the taking of ‘all necessary measures against all those 
responsible’. Subsequently, in the Battle of Mogadishu from 3–4 October 
1993, a US Special Forces operation attempted to kill or capture the person 
believed to be most responsible, General Mohamed Fatah Aidid. Arguably, 
the hypothetical US mission to arrest Qaddafi resembles sufficiently in 
relevant respects this US military action against Aidid.
On the other hand, suppose that, according to our current definition of the 
concept of ‘police action’, we cannot determine whether the hypothetical 
US mission to arrest Qaddafi is a police action. Does it resemble sufficiently 
in relevant respects paradigm cases of police actions? Consider the case of 
the arrest of the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, by the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). On 3 March 2003, Taylor was indicted 
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by the Special Court for Sierra Leone – a court approved by the Security 
Council. On 19 September 2003, Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003) 
established UNMIL. However, UNMIL’s mandate does not include the 
phrase ‘all necessary means’. On 29 March 2006, Taylor was ‘apprehended’ 
in Nigeria, transported from Nigeria to Liberia, formally and peacefully 
‘arrested’ by UNMIL and ‘transferred to the custody of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone’ (Open Society 2011). Arguably, the hypothetical US mission 
to arrest Qaddafi resembles sufficiently in relevant respects the police action 
by UNMIL of arresting Taylor.
Arguably, then, the hypothetical US mission to arrest Qaddafi both 
resembles sufficiently in relevant respects a paradigm military action and 
resembles sufficiently in relevant respects a paradigm police action. For 
brevity, the three actions are henceforth termed, respectively, the ‘Qaddafi 
action’, the ‘Aidid action’ and the ‘Taylor action’. Arguably, the Qaddafi 
action is both a military action and a police action – that is, it is an overlap 
military action. To support this last claim more fully, it might be compared 
with other paradigm military actions and police actions.
What are some relevant respects for determining whether a military action 
is also a police action? Paradigmatically, police ‘arrest subjects on evidence 
and submit them to judicial proceedings’ (Bayley and Perito 2010: 53). Thus, 
in the Qaddafi action, Qaddafi is arrested on evidence stated in the ICC 
warrant of arrest and submitted to judicial proceedings of the ICC.
Let me reply to an objection to the idea of overlap cases. Relations of 
resemblance have the formal property of ‘symmetry’ (Armstrong 1989: 
102). (Roughly, a relation R is ‘symmetric’ just in case, if xRy, then yRx.) 
Since the Qaddafi action resembles the Aidid action, it follows, of necessity 
(or conceptually or logically), that the Aidid action resembles the Qaddafi 
action. Therefore, since the Qaddafi action is a police action, so is the Aidid 
action. Clearly, however, the Aidid action is not a police action. Also, since 
the Qaddafi action resembles the Taylor action, it follows, of necessity, that 
the Taylor action resembles the Qaddafi action. Therefore, since the Qaddafi 
action is a military action, so is the Taylor action. Clearly, however, the Taylor 
action is not a military action. To avoid these contradictions, the distinction 
between military actions and police actions has to be an exclusive distinction.
My reply to the objection is as follows. Admittedly, there is a relation of 
‘resembling sufficiently in relevant respects’, but it does not have this formal 
property of ‘symmetry’. Given that we can determine that the Qaddafi action 
is a military action because it resembles sufficiently in relevant respects the 
Aidid action, it does not follow, of necessity (or conceptually or logically), that 
we can determine that the Aidid action is a police action because it resembles 
sufficiently in relevant respects the Qaddafi action. For the relevant respects 
sufficient for determining whether the Qaddafi action is a military action are 
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considerably different than the relevant respects sufficient for determining 
whether the Aidid action is a police action. Similarly, given that we can 
determine that the Qaddafi action is a police action because it resembles 
sufficiently in relevant respects the Taylor action, it does not follow, of 
necessity, that we can determine that the Taylor action is a military action 
because it resembles sufficiently in relevant respects the Qaddafi action. For 
the relevant respects sufficient for determining whether the Qaddafi action is 
a police action are considerably different than the relevant respects sufficient 
for determining whether the Taylor action is a military action. The distinction 
between military actions and police actions is inclusive.
We should not be misled by the word ‘resembles’. The relation of 
‘resembling sufficiently in relevant respects’ is not a relation of ‘exact 
resemblance’. A relation of exact resemblance is reflexive, symmetric and 
transitive – that is, it is an ‘equivalence relation’ (Armstrong 1989: 41). 
(Roughly, a relation R is ‘transitive’ just in case, if xRy and yRz, then xRz; 
and it is ‘reflexive’ just in case xRx.) The classes of objects between which an 
equivalence relation holds are mutually exclusive. In Euclidean geometry, an 
equivalence relation of similarity divides the class of triangles into mutually 
exclusive subclasses – for instance, the subclass of equilateral triangles and 
the subclass of isosceles right triangles. By contrast, because the relation 
of ‘resembling sufficiently in relevant respects’ is neither symmetric nor 
transitive, the classes of cases between which it holds can overlap.
In conclusion, my presupposition of coherentism extends to the process 
of defining concepts. Provisionally, a concept might be defined casuistically, 
by examining paradigm cases. Frequently, concepts thus defined have an 
open texture. For instance, suppose that, according to our current definitions 
of the concepts of ‘military action’ and ‘police action’, we cannot determine 
whether the Qaddafi action is both a military action and a police action. Then 
we need to consider both whether it resembles sufficiently in relevant respects 
paradigm cases of military actions and whether it resembles sufficiently in 
relevant respects paradigm cases of police actions. Consequently, we might 
need to modify our definitions of those concepts. In general, it is presupposed 
that definitions can be elucidated, revised or supplemented. Moral deliberation 
about uses of armed force should involve a process of mutual adjustment of 
moral judgements about particular cases and specific issues, moral principles 
and definitions of concepts.
E. COMPLEX MILITARY ACTIONS
In order to defend and advance our national interests, the Department 
of Defense must balance resources and risk among four priority 
objectives: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare 
to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and 
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preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. These objectives reflect 
a strategic approach that can evolve and adapt in response to a changing 
security environment.
US Department of Defense (DOD 2010a: 11)
Entitled ‘U.S. defense objectives’, this paragraph from the 2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report (QDR) summarises – from the temporal standpoint 
of February 2010, which is the month the QDR was released – the goals of 
US military strategy. The general concept of ‘interest’ has an open texture, as 
does the specific concept of ‘national interest’. Evidently, the US ‘strategic 
approach’ in the QDR is primarily state-centric. By contrast, a cosmopolitan 
strategic approach should ‘defend and advance’ global interests, but the 
specific concept of ‘global interest’ also has an open texture. The paragraph 
is replete with verbs – ‘defend’, ‘advance’, ‘balance’, ‘prevail’, ‘prevent’, 
‘deter’, ‘prepare’, ‘defeat’, ‘succeed’ – each of which expresses a concept 
that has an open texture. A comparable remark holds of such nouns in the 
paragraph as ‘war’, ‘conflict’, ‘adversary’ and ‘contingency’. In the preceding 
section, I focus on the concepts of ‘military action’ and ‘police action’, but 
my main points there are generalisable to a variety of other concepts apposite 
for just war theorising.
In this section, for the sake of concreteness, let us adopt the temporal 
standpoint of February 2010. How are just war principles applicable to such 
goals (or objectives) of military strategy? The paragraph’s initial phrase 
– ‘in order to’ – signals a relation between means and goal. For instance, 
prevailing in today’s wars is a means, the goal of which is defending and 
advancing national interests. In particular, in order to prevail in today’s 
war in Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense is carrying out a 
counterinsurgency campaign there. Carrying out the counterinsurgency 
campaign is the means, the goal of which is prevailing in the Afghan War. 
In general, a military strategy is a plan, and plans involve actions that are 
interlinked by relations of means to goals.
Just war principles are deontological principles, and deontological 
principles obligate, permit or prohibit performances of actions. For example, 
two of the aforementioned military actions may be described more explicitly as 
follows. Performing the military action of carrying out the counterinsurgency 
campaign in Afghanistan is a means of achieving the goal of performing the 
military action of prevailing in today’s wars. When goals of military strategy 
are thus understood as performances of military actions, just war principles 
are applicable. For instance, the proportionality principle requires (roughly) 
that the benefits of a military action must outweigh the harms. Thus, if the 
harms of prevailing in today’s wars would outweigh the benefits, it is morally 
obligatory not to attempt to perform that military action.
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In the preceding paragraph, the singular term ‘the military action’ is used. 
Presumably, however, each of the military actions is ‘complex’. For instance, 
a military campaign is, according to Quincy Wright, ‘a group of military 
operations within a limited period of time connected by a strategic plan under 
the control of a single command’ (1942: 687). Thus a ‘complex’ military 
action (e.g. a military campaign) has ‘component’ military actions (e.g. 
military operations). The counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan is thus 
complex; for example, it has as a component the counterinsurgency operation 
in Marja (a town in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province). The complex military 
action of prevailing in today’s wars has such component military actions as 
prevailing in the Afghan War and prevailing in the Iraq War.
To generalise just war principles sufficiently, the general concept of 
‘military action’ should involve a concept of ‘complex military action’. 
Every military action must satisfy the principles of just cause, last resort, 
proportionality and noncombatant immunity, whatever the complexity.
F.  ARE THERE BASIC MILITARY ACTIONS?
Since there are complex military actions – to adapt Leibniz’s famous 
dictum – must there be ‘simple’ ones? Evidently, there are different levels 
of complexity – for example, battles are components of military operations 
and military operations are components of military campaigns – but is 
there a foundational level? Military actions of groups of human beings are 
emergent from, or supervenient on, military actions performed collectively 
by individual human beings. During various counterinsurgency operations 
in Afghanistan, individual US soldiers fired weapons, searched dwellings, 
policed checkpoints and so forth. Complex military actions have, as 
components, military actions of individual human beings.
First, I summarise a foundationalist answer to this question of whether 
there are ‘simple’ military actions. Consider a particular (but hypothetical) 
case, from a particular temporal standpoint in the year 2010. In order to fire 
an assault rifle at a particular suspected Taliban fighter, a particular US soldier 
squeezes the trigger. Such a particular ‘bodily movement’ as squeezing a 
trigger is a ‘basic action’. Roughly, a human being performs a basic action 
when she intentionally moves her body in a certain way (Moya 1990: 14–17). 
In short, the foundationalist answer is that there are simple military actions 
– namely, such basic military actions of bodily movement.
By contrast, my coherentist answer to the question of ‘simples’ is as 
follows. Indeed, just war principles are applicable to such military actions 
of bodily movement as squeezing the trigger. In order to kill the suspect, the 
soldier squeezes the trigger. Suppose that, by applying just war principles, 
we determine that it is morally obligatory not to kill the suspect. Then, by 
applying the means-goal principle, we determine that it is morally obligatory 
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not to squeeze the trigger. The main point is that, instead of morally evaluating 
a single action, we are morally evaluating a ‘course of actions’. Instead 
of morally evaluating the action of squeezing the trigger by itself, we are 
morally evaluating a course of actions consisting of (at least) squeezing the 
trigger and killing the suspect.
As indicated by the parenthetical phrase ‘at least’, the morally relevant 
course of actions in this particular case is considerably more complex: it 
includes patrolling a neighbourhood, spotting a suspect, deliberating about 
whether to kill him, deciding to kill him, planning how to kill him, aiming the 
weapon, squeezing the trigger, firing the weapon and killing him. In addition 
to ‘outward’ actions of patrolling, spotting, aiming, squeezing, firing and 
killing, this course of actions includes ‘inward’ actions (or ‘mental acts’) of 
deliberating, deciding and planning. (But these concepts of ‘outward’ and 
‘inward’ have open textures.)
G.  PLANNED COURSES OF MILITARY ACTIONS
I call such a course of actions a ‘planned course of military actions’. Complex 
military actions by groups of human beings have as components planned 
courses of military actions of individual human beings.
Truly, there are such ‘mental actions’, for the soldier voluntarily deliberates, 
decides and plans. For instance, to plan is to act voluntarily. When a human 
agent plans to follow a course of actions, she knows sufficiently the relevant 
circumstances; she chooses to plan to follow the course of actions, for she 
might have chosen not to plan to follow it; and her planning is under her 
control, in that it is within her power to refrain from planning to follow it.
How are just war principles applicable to such acts of planning? The 
agential standpoint is a temporal standpoint. In particular, the agential 
standpoint of this soldier during the time of his planning of the killing of 
the suspect is a temporal standpoint. Suppose that, by applying just war 
principles, he determines that it is morally obligatory not to kill the suspect. 
Then, by applying the means-goal principle, he should determine that it is 
morally obligatory not to plan a course of military actions as a means of 
achieving the goal of killing the suspect. In brief, it is morally obligatory not 
to plan to kill the suspect.
At every level of complexity, military actions involve planning. Just 
war principles should be applicable to military plans, whatever the level of 
complexity, up to and including the US military strategy in the QDR. They 
should be applicable to the planning of uses of armed force at the tactical, 
operational, strategic and political levels. To morally constrain responsible 
agents from performing unjust military actions with sufficient effectiveness, 
it is essential to morally constrain them during the times of planning.
Broadly, for each armed conflict, there are prelude, resort, conduct, halting 
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and aftermath phases. The hypothetical case of the killing of a suspected 
Taliban fighter by a US soldier occurs during the conduct phase of the Afghan 
War. I want to emphasise that the idea of military planning is pertinent also 
to prelude, resort, halting and aftermath phases. Just war principles are 
applicable not only to military planning during resort and conduct phases, 
but also to military planning during prelude, halting and aftermath phases.
In light of the concept of ‘mental action’, let me sketch a different 
foundationalist answer to the question of ‘simples’. In accordance with a 
‘volitional theory of action’, the basic actions are ‘volitions’ – for instance, 
the basic action of ‘willing’ to squeeze a trigger (Moya 1990: 19–22). My 
coherentist response is as follows. Typically, instead of a single mental action 
of ‘willing’, there is a course of mental actions of (at least) deliberating, 
deciding, planning and (perhaps) willing. Instead of morally evaluating 
the soldier’s mental action of willing to squeeze the trigger by itself, we 
should morally evaluate a course of the soldier’s mental actions – namely, 
deliberating about whether to kill the suspect, deciding to kill him, planning 
how to kill him and (perhaps) willing to kill him.
In conclusion, rather than a foundationalist conception of basic actions of 
bodily movement (or willing), I am presupposing a coherentist conception of 
planned courses of actions. Each planned course of military actions is itself 
a complex military action. Conversely, each military action involves some 
planning, even if rudimentary. For instance, rather than a ‘basic action’ of 
‘firing a rifle’, there is a planned course of actions, including loading a rifle, 
shouldering it, aiming it and squeezing the trigger. Accordingly, a main thesis 
is that the concept of ‘military action’ should be understood in terms of the 
concept of ‘planned course of military actions’.
Comparably, the concept of ‘nonmilitary measure’ should be understood 
in terms of the concept of ‘planned course of nonmilitary actions’.
Henceforth, the terms ‘military action’ and ‘planned course of military 
actions’ are used interchangeably, as are the terms ‘nonmilitary measure’ 
and ‘planned course of nonmilitary actions’. The former terms abbreviate 
the latter terms.
In a deontological just war theory, the primary unit of moral evaluation is 
a planned course of actions.
H.  REFRAINING
Frequently, when we plan, we envisage alternative courses of actions, we 
deliberate about which of them to follow, we decide to follow one particular 
course of actions and we plan how to follow it. In the hypothetical case, 
rather than the stated course of actions, the soldier might have followed 
an alternative course of actions – namely, patrolling the neighbourhood, 
spotting the suspect, deliberating about whether to kill him, deciding not 
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to kill him, planning not to kill him, refraining from aiming the weapon, 
refraining from squeezing the trigger, refraining from firing the weapon and 
refraining from killing him.
Truly, such refrainings are voluntary actions, albeit ‘negative actions’ 
(or ‘negative acts’) (Vermazen 1985). When a human agent refrains from 
performing an action, she knows sufficiently the relevant circumstances; she 
chooses to refrain from performing it, for she might have chosen otherwise; 
and her refraining from performing it is under her control, in that it is within 
her power to perform it. Thus, when the soldier performs the ‘negative action’ 
of refraining from firing the weapon, he knows sufficiently the relevant 
circumstances; he chooses to perform the negative action, for he might have 
chosen otherwise; and his performing the negative action is under his control, 
in that it is within his power to fire the weapon.
Often, moral requirements of my just war theory are expressed by means of 
the word ‘not’. Canonically, just war principles are expressed as conditional 
prohibitions. Suppose, for example, that a particular agent understands that 
it is morally obligatory not to intentionally kill noncombatants. Then it is 
morally obligatory for him (or her) to intentionally refrain from intentionally 
killing them. Suppose, also, that he understands that it is morally obligatory 
not to knowingly kill noncombatants. Then it is also morally obligatory for 
him to intentionally refrain from knowingly killing them. To generalise, when 
it is morally obligatory for a particular agent not to perform a military action 
– and a reasonable agent should know this – then it is morally obligatory for 
that agent to intentionally refrain from performing it.
I .  TEMPORAL PHASES OF MILITARY ACTIONS
The concept of a ‘planned course of military actions’ is a temporal concept. 
Typically, a planned course of military actions has temporal phases, and 
each of the temporal phases is itself a planned course of military actions. 
Correlatively, the process of applying just war principles at any temporal 
phase of a planned course of military actions is a temporal process. In Chapter 
2 (‘Just War Theory’), a concept of ‘temporal phase’ is introduced. In this 
section, that concept is generalised.
The concept of ‘temporal phase of a planned course of military actions’ has 
an open texture. How, in a particular case, can military actions be grouped 
together into phases? A coherentist answer to this question should involve 
a process of mutual adjustment of a definition of the concept of ‘temporal 
phase’, informed judgements about the particular case, relevant normative 
and empirical theories and so forth.
Answers to the question can be controversial. Consider, for example, 
the following three military actions: the 1991 Gulf War, the intermediate 
period of airstrikes in Iraq to enforce no-fly zones and the 2003 invasion of 
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Iraq. From a temporal standpoint shortly before the 2003 invasion, Thomas 
Nichols argued that ‘Iraq does not accept the no-fly zones . . . the Iraqis have 
fired on coalition aircraft over 700 times since 1998 alone . . . [and therefore] 
the United States and its allies are already at war with the Iraqis’ (2003: 28). 
Accordingly, it might be argued that the Iraq War began in 1991 and ended 
in 2003, and that the military actions of the Iraq War should be grouped into 
three chief temporal phases: ‘defending Kuwait’, ‘enforcing no-fly zones’ 
and ‘invading Iraq’.
A just cause principle should be applicable to all forms of armed conflict, 
however they are categorised or named. Suppose that there was a single war 
between (primarily) the United States and Iraq that began in 1991 and ended 
in 2003. Roughly, according to a just cause principle, it is morally obligatory 
not to perform a military action, if there is not a just cause. Suppose that, from 
the temporal standpoint of the year 1991, there is a just cause for defending 
Kuwait. Nevertheless, from the temporal standpoint of the year 2003, it is 
morally obligatory not to invade Iraq, if there is not a just cause. Granted that 
there was a just cause for defending Kuwait, it does not follow (conceptually 
or logically) that there was a just cause for invading Iraq, however these 
armed conflicts are categorised or named.
To generalise, a main thesis is that the core just war principles of just 
cause, last resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity should be 
applicable at every phase of any planned course of military actions.
J .  TEMPORAL STANDPOINTS AND CONTINGENCY PLANS
From the temporal standpoint of the present, the future is open. When a 
human agent performs a voluntary action, she chooses to perform it, and she 
might have chosen otherwise. When we plan a course of military actions, we 
choose to plan it, and we might have chosen to plan an alternative course of 
military actions.
The agential standpoint is a temporally prospective vantage point on 
future contingencies. The open future is an uncertain future, so there is 
need for contingency planning. In the fog of armed conflict, we have to plan 
contingently. Contingency plans are standardly expressed by conditionals: 
‘if deterrence fails, launch an attack’; ‘if the enemy attacks, counterattack’; 
‘if civilians are present, abort the mission’; and so forth. The concept of 
‘contingency planning’ is interrelated with the concept of ‘attempting to act’. 
An attempt to achieve a goal by means of a planned course of military actions 
might fail, so there is need to plan contingently to achieve the goal by means 
of an alternative course of military actions.
I am emphasising the idea of last resort, in order to counterbalance 
overemphasis of the idea of just cause. The process of applying a last resort 
principle is a temporal process. Roughly, such a principle morally requires 
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that, before using armed force to achieve a goal, every reasonable nonmilitary 
measure must be attempted. More explicitly, the following is morally required. 
Before attempting to achieve a goal by means of a course of military actions, 
it is morally obligatory to attempt to achieve it by means of a course of 
nonmilitary actions, whenever it is reasonable to do so. Suppose that it is 
reasonable to attempt to achieve the goal by means of a course of peaceful 
actions – for instance, a process of negotiation. The future is uncertain, such 
an attempt might fail, so there is need to plan contingently to achieve the goal 
by means of an alternative reasonable course of nonmilitary actions, perhaps 
one that is coercive – for example, a process of imposing targeted economic 
sanctions. The future is uncertain, every reasonable attempt to achieve the 
goal by means of a course of nonmilitary actions might fail, so there is need 
to plan contingently to achieve it by means of a course of military actions. 
The concept of ‘contingency planning’ is integral to the idea of last resort.
Truly, there is a fog of uncertainty shrouding the future, but there is 
also a fog of inevitability shrouding the past. The past is settled. From the 
temporal standpoint of the present, each past military action has happened 
and cannot be undone. Hence, from the temporal standpoint of the present, 
it might appear that what happened had to happen; it might appear that the 
armed conflicts that occurred had to occur; it might appear that, when one 
military action occurs later than another, the later one had to occur because 
the earlier one occurred. But these appearances are illusions – illusions of 
the inevitability of history.
Instead, human beings make history. From the temporal standpoint of the 
present, there are past temporal standpoints. When we imaginatively adopt a 
past temporal standpoint, the future – prospectively, from that past temporal 
standpoint – is open. From a particular temporal standpoint in the past, there 
are present military actions, past military actions and future military actions. 
From that past temporal standpoint, when responsible agents plan a course 
of military actions, they choose to plan it, but they might have chosen to plan 
an alternative course of military actions. Human beings make war, but they 
might not have made war.
For an illustration, regard again the case of genocide in Rwanda. From 
the temporal standpoint of the present, some relevant events are as follows. 
Between 1990 and 1993, armed conflict occurred between the Rwandan 
Government and the Tutsi rebel group (RPF); in August 1993, a peace 
agreement was signed; on 5 October 1993, Security Council Resolution 
872 (1993) authorised UNAMIR; subsequently, UNAMIR was deployed; 
and, from April to mid-July 1994, the genocide happened. In the fog of 
inevitability shrouding the past, it might appear that the genocide had to 
happen, but this appearance is an illusion.
Recall that, on 6 June 1993, in the aforementioned case of armed 
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humanitarian intervention in Somalia, the Security Council authorised the 
taking of all necessary measures. Four months later, the Security Council 
failed to authorise the taking of all necessary measures: UNAMIR was not 
provided with a Chapter VII mandate authorising the use of armed force, if 
necessary.
When we imaginatively adopt the temporal standpoint of the months from 
October 1993 to April 1994, the future (prospectively, from that past temporal 
standpoint) is open. From that past temporal standpoint, agents responsible 
for UNAMIR only plan courses of nonmilitary actions in Rwanda. However, 
the Security Council might have decided otherwise; UNAMIR might have 
been provided with a Chapter VII mandate; UNAMIR might have been 
an armed UN peacekeeping mission. Consequently, from the temporal 
standpoint of the months from October 1993 to April 1994, instead of only 
planning courses of nonmilitary actions, the Force Commander of UNAMIR, 
Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, might have also planned courses of 
military actions contingently, as epitomised by the following conditional: 
‘use armed force to protect civilians, if necessary’. The genocide in Rwanda 
might never have happened.
NOTES
1. An introduction to the theory of action is Moya (1990).
2. For a discussion of the role of a concept of plan in a theory of intention, see 
Bratman (1987).
3. Concerning military strategy, see Smith (2007). Concerning US national security, 
see Betts (2012).
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CHAPTER 5
JUST CAUSE
Our cause is just.
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the
Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan
(1 December 2009) (2009c)
The [Afghan] insurgents in general and Taliban in particular have a 
sense of themselves as being moral and noncorrupt. They generally 
consider themselves to be fighting a just cause.
Michael Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan (2009: 37)
From the temporal standpoint of 1 December 2009, do the counterinsurgency 
operations in Afghanistan by the US and NATO have a just cause? Do the 
insurgents in Afghanistan have a just cause?
A main thesis is that a generalised just cause principle should be applicable 
by all sorts of responsible agents to all forms of armed conflict. Moral 
deliberation should be dialectical. In addition to questioning whether our own 
military operations have a just cause, we should raise the just cause question 
from the agential standpoint of our adversaries. This dialectical approach 
to the subject of just cause is illustrated by the above two block quotations. 
Even if the US and NATO have a just cause for counterinsurgency operations 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is illuminating to raise the just cause question 
from the agential standpoints of the various insurgents.1
What should be meant by the term ‘just cause’? What just cause principle 
should a just war theory accept? How should we determine whether a 
military action has a just cause? My purpose in this chapter is to explore 
such questions concerning the idea of just cause.
The first part contains some preliminary remarks. In the second part, a 
traditional state-centric conception of just cause is critically examined – 
roughly, that a just cause for interstate war is defence against aggression. In 
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the third part, the criterion of seriousness of threat is scrutinised and revised. 
In the fourth part, in terms of that revised criterion, a generalised just cause 
principle is formulated and illustrated.
I .  JUST GOAL
Roughly, a traditional just cause for war is attack by an aggressor. But the 
just cause here is not an event – namely, the occurrence of the attack. Indeed, 
the harms caused by the attack may be evaluated as morally bad, but such a 
moral evaluation of consequences is different from an agent-centred moral 
constraint on action. Instead, the just cause is the just goal of stopping the 
attack.
To generalise, just war principles are agent-centred. Most importantly, they 
morally constrain us from performing unjust military actions. Specifically, 
the just cause principle morally constrains us from performing military 
actions that have unjust goals. For the concept of just cause should be 
understood teleologically; and the term ‘cause’ should be construed to mean 
‘goal’ (Lango 2007b). A just cause is a just goal. A just cause principle should 
be a just goal principle.
It might be objected that, because a teleological theory is a type 
of consequentialist theory, this teleological concept of just cause is a 
consequentialist concept. However, as explained in the preceding chapter, 
the goal of an action is (primarily) another action. For example, when we 
perform the action of using armed force as a means of stopping an aggressor’s 
attack, our just goal is performing the action of stopping the aggressor’s 
attack. A deontological just war theory can incorporate a teleological concept 
of just cause.
More exactly, the primary unit of moral evaluation is a planned course 
of actions – that is, a course of actions that is followed for the sake of some 
goal. To determine whether a projected military action has a just cause, we 
have to morally evaluate not only the goal of the military action, but also 
the planned course of military actions that together comprise the means of 
achieving that goal. A just cause is a just goal pursued by just means. A just 
cause principle should be a principle of just goal and just means. Insofar as 
the idea of just cause has been understood differently in the just war tradition, 
my understanding of it is revisionary.2
Let me provide a real-world illustration (Lango 2010b). From the temporal 
standpoint of 27 March 2009, is there a just cause for US military operations 
in Afghanistan? In a speech given on that particular day, Remarks by the 
President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan (2009a), Obama 
answered such a question as follows:
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We have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al 
Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either 
country in the future. That’s the goal that must be achieved. That is a 
cause that could not be more just.
Noting the linkage between the word ‘goal’ in the second sentence and the 
word ‘cause’ in the third sentence, it would appear that Obama understands 
the concept of just cause teleologically. It would appear that, by the third 
sentence, he meant: ‘that is a goal that could not be more just’.
But should the concept of a just cause be understood instead in terms of 
the concept of a ‘moral reason’? The term ‘just cause’ is a philosophical term 
of art. In the just war tradition, it is used to translate Thomas Aquinas’ term 
‘causa iusta’. What did Aquinas, a medieval originator of just war theory, 
who was greatly influenced by the philosophy of Aristotle, mean by ‘causa’? 
In accordance with Aristotle’s doctrine of four ‘causes’, he might have meant 
‘causa efficiens’ (i.e. ‘efficient’ or ‘moving’ cause) or he might have meant 
‘causa finalis (i.e. ‘final cause’ or goal). (For brevity, the ideas of ‘formal 
cause’ and ‘material cause’ are ignored.) In the Aristotelian tradition, those 
reasons that are final causes (or goals) have explanatory priority.
By contrast, in modern science, those reasons that are efficient causes have 
explanatory priority. Omitting a qualifying adjective such as ‘moving’, the 
term ‘cause’ has become a scientific term of art: the ‘cause’ of a given event 
is an antecedent event that is productive of it as an effect. For example, the 
event of the al Qaeda attack on 11 September 2001 was (partly) productive 
of the event of US military operations in Afghanistan on 27 March 2009.
In light of these different meanings of the term ‘cause’, I would reject the 
view that a just cause for the use of armed force is an antecedent event that 
justly motivated that use of armed force. A just cause is not a moral reason to 
be ‘reactive’. The question of just cause is not a question of ‘just retaliation’ 
or ‘just retribution’. Instead, it is a question of ‘just prevention’. A just cause 
is a moral reason to be ‘proactive’. Granted, a just cause is a moral reason, 
but it is a specific kind of moral reason – namely, a just goal. More precisely, 
to anticipate a main thesis of this chapter, the just cause is the just goal of 
preventing sufficiently grave violations of basic human rights.
I I .  AGGRESSION
In the twentieth century and in most contemporary accounts of just war 
doctrine, the main just cause is self-defence in the event of external 
aggression.
Mary Kaldor (2007: 162)
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Should the received just cause principle voiced by Kaldor be revised? How 
should the concept of ‘aggression’ be defined? Should a just war theory 
accept defence against aggression as a just cause?
A. ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
In developing a cosmopolitan just war theory, I am featuring the moral ideals 
expressed in the UN Charter. To begin with, let me make some remarks 
about Article 2(4): ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations’.
Explicitly, interstate wars – and other uses of force, as well as threats 
to use force – that violate territorial integrity or political independence are 
prohibited by Article 2(4) (May 2008: 10). Implicitly – because of the clause 
‘or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’ 
– other sorts of threats or uses of force are also prohibited. According to 
Article 1, the ‘Purposes of the United Nations’ include the following: ‘To 
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats 
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches 
of the peace’. The concepts of ‘threat to the peace’ and ‘other breach of the 
peace’ are (apparently) all-inclusive (and also have open textures).
Accordingly, Article 2(4) can be read as expressing the following moral 
ideal. It is morally obligatory for each state, in its relations with other states, 
to refrain from threatening to use armed force or using armed force to threaten 
the peace or to breach the peace, whatever the sort of threat or breach.
Nevertheless, Article 51 permits some wars of self-defence against aggres-
sion, albeit temporarily:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Similar to the concept of ‘military action’, the concept of ‘armed attack’ has 
an open texture. Is a cyberattack against a Member State an armed attack or 
a coercive nonmilitary measure or both?
Note that Article 1 includes the phrase ‘acts of aggression’. Paradigmati-
cally, armed attacks by a state against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of another state are acts of aggression. How, then, should the 
concept of ‘act of aggression’ be defined?
To illustrate how coherentism extends to the process of defining concepts, 
let me examine a legal definition proposed at the 2010 Review Conference 
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of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Among the 
‘Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the 
crime of aggression’ proposed at this ICC Review Conference, there is the 
following definition: ‘“act of aggression” means the use of armed force by 
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations’ (ICC 2010: 18).
Interestingly, this ICC definition borrows wording from Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter, but with some significant differences. First, the ICC definition 
contains the word ‘sovereignty’, whereas Article 2(4) does not. Second, 
whereas Article 2(4) prohibits both the use of force and the threat to use 
force, the ICC definition explicitly encompasses only the use of armed force. 
Third, in Article 1 of the UN Charter, the phrase ‘acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace’ implies that there are breaches of the peace that are 
not acts of aggression. By contrast, I read the ICC definition as implying 
that every use of armed force to breach the peace is an act of aggression. 
For the ICC definition includes ‘any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations’ in the meaning of ‘acts of aggression’. And it 
is inconsistent with Article 1 of the UN Charter to use armed force to breach 
the peace.
Should the definition of the concept of ‘act of aggression’ be limited to 
actual uses of armed force or should it encompass both actual uses of armed 
force and threats to use armed force? For instance, should it include (at least 
some) threats to use nuclear weapons? Should it encompass every use of 
armed force that breaches the peace? Should it be accepted by a just war 
theory? A coherentist answer to these questions should involve a process 
of mutual adjustment of the definition of the concept of ‘act of aggression’, 
normative and empirical theories involving the concept and informed 
judgements concerning particular cases of aggression.
I am rejecting a foundationalist thesis about definitions – namely, 
that terms can be explicitly defined by means of primitive terms, whose 
meanings are transparent and indubitable. The ICC definition of the term 
‘act of aggression’ is not so defined, for it presupposes concepts that have 
open textures, especially a concept of ‘use of armed force’ and (implicitly) a 
concept of ‘breach of the peace’. It is indispensable, then, that the paragraph 
stating the definition also states seven specific types of acts of aggression 
– that is, invasion, bombardment, blockade and so forth (ICC 2010: 18). In 
later sections, I focus on the subject of invasion.
B. THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
Acts of aggression by groups of human beings are emergent from, or 
supervenient on, acts of aggression by individual human beings. The 
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International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over individual human beings. 
At the 2010 ICC Review Conference, a resolution was adopted that adds the 
crime of aggression to the crimes in the Rome Statute – namely, Resolution 
RC/Res.6 ‘The crime of aggression’ (ICC 2010: 17). The concept of ‘crime 
of aggression’ as a crime committed by individual human beings is defined 
in the following paragraph (ICC 2010: 18):
For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively 
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
Note that this paragraph presupposes the above definition of the concept of 
‘act of aggression’.
This legal definition of the concept of ‘crime of aggression’ displays a 
moral ideal that a cosmopolitan just war theory ought to accept. It is morally 
obligatory for any human being who effectively exercises control over 
or directs political or military actions of a state to refrain from planning, 
preparing, initiating or executing such an act of aggression.
Illuminatingly, the definition is qualified by the terms ‘character’, ‘gravity’ 
and ‘scale’. To constitute a crime, the act of aggression must be sufficiently 
serious. Presumably, there are thresholds of gravity and scale above which an 
act of aggression is sufficiently serious and below which it is not.
C. SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS THREATENED HARMS OF INVASION
For the sake of concreteness, it is instructive to focus on a paradigm type 
of act of aggression – namely, violating the territorial integrity or political 
independence of a state by means of an armed invasion. Paradigmatically, 
such invasions are highly destructive. Is the goal of stopping an invasion a 
just cause for the use of armed force? Let me raise such a question in the 
language of the threat-seriousness criterion. Is the threatened harm of armed 
invasion of a kind and sufficiently clear and serious to justify prima facie the 
use of armed force?
When is a threatened harm of armed invasion sufficiently serious? A 
just cause for the use of armed force is not simply the goal of stopping 
such an invasion. In accordance with coherentism, I am presupposing that 
a cosmopolitan just war theory can be elucidated by interrelating it with 
a theory of human rights. Paradigmatically, when a state is invaded by 
another state – for example, the invasion of France by Germany during the 
Second World War – basic human rights of the citizens of the invaded state 
are extremely violated. The just cause for using armed force is the goal of 
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preventing sufficiently grave violations of basic human rights, and the means 
of achieving this goal is stopping the invasion.
In conclusion, should a just war theory accept defence against aggression as 
a just cause? Briefly, my answer is that a just cause for the use of armed force 
is defence against a sufficiently serious act of aggression. To be acceptable, 
the concept of ‘defence against aggression’ needs to be qualified by the idea 
of ‘sufficient seriousness’.
I I I .  SERIOUSNESS OF THREAT
With the aim of formulating a just cause principle that is applicable by 
all sorts of responsible agents to all forms of armed conflict, I make some 
proposals in this part about how the criterion of seriousness of threat in the 
High-level Panel Report ought to be elucidated and revised.
Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security 
of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the 
use of military force? (HLPR 2004: 67)
Reportedly, this criterion has ‘an explicit pedigree’ in the just war tradition 
(Evans 2008: 140). The High-level Panel Report was influenced by the ICISS 
Report. In the Supplementary Volume to the ICISS Report, the traditional 
understanding of just cause is summarised thus: ‘In general, then, it was 
understood to depend on the degree of harm inflicted’ (ICISS 2001b: 139).
Although I am not studying the history of just war theories, let me 
mention a conception of just cause that was expressed by a classical just war 
theorist. According to Vitoria, ‘the sole and only just cause for waging war 
is when harm has been inflicted’; however, ‘not every or any injury gives 
sufficient grounds for waging war’ (1991: 303–4). Noting the phrase ‘has 
been inflicted’, it would appear that the question of just cause is, for Vitoria, 
a retrospective question about an antecedent event of sufficiently serious 
harming. By contrast, the corresponding question in the High-level Panel 
Report is a prospective question about a sufficiently serious threatened harm 
in the present or future.
Let me also mention a modern just war theorist who expressed, prior to 
the release of the High-level Panel Report, a conception of just cause that is 
broadly similar to the threat-seriousness criterion. According to Childress, 
there is a just cause for the use of armed force when there is a sufficiently 
‘serious and weighty’ responsibility to counter a threatened harm (1982: 75).
Johnson’s ‘criterion of just cause’ is roughly similar, in that it involves ‘the 
purpose of protecting major values broadly held’, but the idea of ‘protecting 
major values’ is not the same as the idea of ‘stopping serious harms’ (1999: 69).
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Jeff McMahan’s ‘formal concept of just cause’ is roughly similar, in that it 
involves the notion of ‘action that threatens to wrong or has already wronged 
other people in certain ways’, but it also involves a complicating notion of 
‘liability’, and the idea of wrong is not the same as the idea of harm (2005: 8).
With the aim of helping to bridge the divide between abstract theorising by 
academics about the idea of just cause and practical deliberations by political 
and military agents about the use of armed force, I am critically examining 
the criterion of seriousness of threat in the High-level Panel Report. There 
is no space for comparable critical examinations of other versions of a just 
cause principle.
Three questions about the threat-seriousness criterion are explored. Which 
kinds? This is the categorial question of ‘specificity of threat’. How clear? 
This is the epistemic question of ‘clarity of threat’. How serious? This is the 
evaluative question of ‘scale of threat’.
A.  REVISING THE CRITERION OF SERIOUSNESS OF THREAT
In Chapter 3 (‘Moral Theory’), the following presuppositions are intro-
duced. A just war theory can be elucidated by interrelating it with a theory 
of human rights. In particular, the concept of grievously harming can be 
elucidated by interrelating it with the concept of gravely violating basic 
human rights.
Utilising these presuppositions, my purpose in this section is to propose 
some revisions to the threat-seriousness criterion. Specifically, the concept 
of ‘grievously harming state or human security’ can be elucidated by 
interrelating it with the concept of ‘gravely violating basic human rights 
of individual human beings’. Paradigmatically, when armed force is used 
unjustly, basic human rights of individual human beings are gravely violated.
Accordingly, my first proposal is that the criterion ought to be revised thus:
Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to basic human rights of 
a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use 
of armed force?
The just goal for using armed force is preventing sufficiently grave 
violations of basic human rights, and the means of achieving this goal is 
stopping the threatened harm.
More exactly, the primary unit of moral evaluation is a planned course 
of military actions – for instance, gathering intelligence about an imminent 
invasion, mobilising troops to counter the invasion, preparing border 
defences against the invasion, firing weapons at invading military forces, 
stopping the invasion and (thereby) preventing sufficiently grave violations 
of basic human rights.
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Accordingly, I propose to revise the criterion further:
Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to basic human rights 
of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the 
planned course of military actions?
The just goal for using armed force is preventing sufficiently grave 
violations of basic human rights, and the means of achieving this goal is the 
planned course of military actions to stop the threatened harm.
The criterion contains the phrase ‘justify prima facie’. In Chapter 3 
(‘Moral Theory’), such moral principles as the counterharm principle are 
presupposed as prima facie moral principles. It should be recognised that 
these are different uses of the term ‘prima facie’. To avoid confusion, my 
final proposal is that the criterion ought to be rewritten as follows.
Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to basic human rights of a 
kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify tentatively the planned 
course of military actions?
The justification is tentative, and it becomes definitive only if the other 
legitimacy criteria prove satisfied.
B. SCALE OF THREAT
To begin with, I address the evaluative question of ‘scale of threat’. Some 
threatened harms are not sufficiently serious. The concept of ‘seriousness’ is 
a scalar concept. When the threat-seriousness criterion is applied, problems 
of scale or degree have to be addressed. Sometimes basic human rights are 
not violated, or they are violated, but not sufficiently gravely. The concept 
of ‘graveness’ is also a scalar concept.
For the sake of concreteness, let me scrutinise a specific type of threatened 
harm – namely, the threatened harm of armed invasion of uninhabited 
territory. There is not a just cause for war, Larry May contended, ‘merely to 
protect territory or property, unless that territory was occupied’ (2008: 103). 
Granted, his contention holds of some particular cases.
From the temporal standpoint of the year 2011, let us envisage such a 
case, one that involves the territorial dispute between China and Japan about 
some uninhabited islands controlled by Japan, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: 
‘a group of five small volcanic islands and three rocky outcroppings’ (Heflin 
2000: 2). Suppose that Chinese military forces were to invade and occupy 
one of the islands. Suppose further that this armed invasion is not intended as 
a means of achieving some broader military goal. Suppose instead that it is 
intended only as a targeted act of ‘coercive diplomacy’, the goal of which is 
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to pressure Japan to cede control of the islands. Disputably, then, there would 
not be a just cause for the use of armed force merely to counter this military 
operation of targeted invasion.
C. THE JUST-CORRELATIVITY REQUIREMENT
Some threatened harms of invasion are sufficiently serious, but others are not. 
In general, some threatened harms are sufficiently serious, but others are not. 
In order to apply the threat-seriousness criterion correctly, it is presupposed 
that there is a moral requirement of ‘just correlativity’ between the scale (or 
degree) of seriousness of the threatened harm and the scale (or degree) of the 
amount of armed force used to stop it.
Just-correlativity requirement. Given that the threatened harm to basic 
human rights is sufficiently serious, the planned course of military 
actions by means of which the threatened harm is to be stopped must 
be correlatively limited.
In other words, given that the seriousness of the threatened harm is 
sufficiently large scale to satisfy the threat-seriousness criterion, the planned 
course of military actions must be correlatively small scale. How is this just-
correlativity requirement different from a proportionality principle? This 
question is answered in Chapter 8, ‘Proportionality and Authority’.
Roughly, the term ‘correlatively’ can be understood thus: a less serious 
threatened harm must be stopped by a more limited use of armed force, 
and a more serious threatened harm may be stopped by a less limited use of 
armed force.
In brief, the scale of force must be justly correlative to the scale of harm. 
I want to emphasise that acceptance of this just-correlativity requirement by 
diverse responsible agents is compatible with principled moral disagreement 
among them regarding how it should be applied to difficult cases.
D. JUST CORRELATIVITY AND TARGETED INVASIONS
Specifically, there is a moral requirement of ‘just correlativity’ between the 
scale of the seriousness of the threatened harm of invasion and the scale of 
the amount of armed force used to defend against it. Thus, in reaction to a 
targeted invasion of uninhabited territory, there might be a just cause for a 
correlatively small-scale targeted defence.
To illustrate the just-correlativity requirement, let us envisage three 
different hypothetical cases, from the temporal standpoint of the year 2011. 
The three cases involve the aforementioned territorial dispute between 
China and Japan. They share a balance-of-power context. What are the goals 
of Chinese military strategy? ‘In the twenty-first century’, Robert Kaplan 
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predicted, ‘China will project hard power abroad primarily through its navy’ 
(2010: 33). What are the goals of US maritime strategy? According to the 
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, ‘U.S. naval forces likewise will 
continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection 
operations’ (DOD 2010a: x). Indeed, US naval power projection and Chinese 
naval power projection might clash. Is the projection of naval power a threat 
to the peace?
In the context of these potentially conflicting US and Chinese maritime 
strategies, the three cases involve three different US targeted military 
operations against China’s targeted invasion of the uninhabited island. 
First, there is a planned course of military actions that includes imposing 
a naval blockade of the island, patrolling the island’s airspace and firing 
warning shots at supply ships. Second, there is a planned course of military 
actions that includes aerial bombarding of the island, landing ground 
forces and killing, disabling or capturing occupying troops. Third, there 
is a planned course of military actions that includes targeting a destroyer, 
firing cruise missiles at it, sinking it and signalling resolve to escalate, if 
necessary. It is assumed that each of these three different planned courses 
of military actions is intended as a means of achieving the goal of defeating 
China’s invasion of the island; that defeating China’s invasion of the island 
is intended as a means of achieving the goal of containing China’s military 
power; and that containing China’s military power is intended as a means 
of preventing sufficiently grave violations of basic human rights of those 
individual human beings who are threatened by China’s military power. 
Of course, this assumption is highly controversial, but my purpose is only 
illustrative. (Let me be clear that my purpose is not to endorse any of these 
alternatives.)
The just-correlativity requirement is illustrated controversially as follows. 
Conceivably, the threatened harm of invasion of the uninhabited island might 
be sufficiently clear and serious to justify tentatively the first planned course 
of military actions, but not the other two planned courses of military actions. 
For the first planned course of military actions might be sufficiently small 
scale, whereas the other two planned courses of military actions might be 
too large scale.
E.  TARGETED INVASIONS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
In light of the moral ideals expressed in the UN Charter, I am investigating the 
question of whether a cosmopolitan just war theory ought to be SC-centric. 
Apparently, Article 51 permits such defensive targeted military operations by 
a Member State against such a targeted invasion by another Member State, 
but only ‘until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security’. Realistically, the Security Council would 
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most likely fail to take any measure in this hypothetical Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands crisis, because the United States and China are permanent members.
Ideally, nonetheless, the Security Council ought to accept the criterion of 
seriousness of threat. Note that, according to Article 42, the Security Council 
has the power to authorise any of these US targeted military operations. 
Conceivably, then, it might be best if the Security Council were to decide 
to authorise one of them. However, in accordance with the just-correlativity 
requirement, the Security Council must not authorise a targeted military 
operation if it is not sufficiently small scale.
F.  CLARITY OF THREAT
Having addressed the evaluative question of ‘scale of threat’, I want now 
to address the epistemic question of ‘clarity of threat’. In the fog of armed 
conflict, there will always be some unclarity, so the question concerns 
whether there is sufficient clarity.
To interpret the phrase ‘sufficient clarity’, I draw upon conceptions of 
‘moral presumption’ and ‘burden of proof’. When we deliberate about 
whether to use armed force, we should make the moral presumption that we 
must not. To override this moral presumption, we have the burden of proving 
that just war principles are satisfied. In particular, we have the burden of 
proving that there is a just cause. In terms of the threat-seriousness criterion, 
we have the burden of proving that the threatened harm to basic human rights 
is both of a kind and sufficiently serious to justify tentatively the planned 
course of military actions. To satisfy this burden of proof, there has to be 
sufficient clarity.
That is, to satisfy the burden of proof, there has to be sufficient evidence. 
Prospective clarity stems from present evidence. As explained in Chapter 3 
(‘Moral Theory’) in the section ‘An Epistemic Standard’, moral deliberation 
in just war theory should be governed by an ‘epistemic standard’: the burden 
of proof must be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence.
G. CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ABOUT CACHES OF 
WEAPONS IN RWANDA
January 10 [1994]. Belgian UNAMIR officers met with an informant 
[code-] named Jean-Pierre, an Interahamwe commander, who offered to 
show the location [in Kigali] of a weapons cache in return for protection 
for himself and his family.
Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story:
Genocide in Rwanda (1999: 150 [emphasis in original])
In the fog of armed conflict, there can be clear and convincing evidence, 
even when there is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For an elementary 
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illustration of this standard of sufficient clarity, let us return to the case of 
Rwanda.
From the temporal standpoint of 10 January 1994, as the block quotation 
indicates, a just goal for a targeted military operation by UNAMIR is to seize 
weapons. On 5 October 1993, the establishment of UNAMIR was authorised 
by Security Council Resolution 872 (1993). In that resolution, UNAMIR 
was tasked with upholding ‘a weapons-secure area’ in and around Kigali – 
the capital of Rwanda. Disputably, then, UNAMIR was authorised by the 
Security Council to use armed force to seize weapons in the weapons-secure 
area (Barnett 2002: 70–1).
My own moral judgement that there was such a just cause stems from 
the testimony of Dallaire, UNAMIR’s Force Commander, in his book 
Shake Hands with the Devil, which I summarise as follows. The informant, 
a commander of the Interahamwe – the militia of genocidaires – claimed 
that there were ‘four separate arms caches in Kigali’ (2004: 143). From 
this testimony by itself, the existence of these weapons caches might seem 
more likely than not. However, the informant ‘might not be telling the truth 
and this might possibly be a set-up’ (2004: 141). On 13 January 1994, in 
order to verify the testimony, the informant took members of UNAMIR’s 
‘intelligence team’ to the location of ‘one of the arms caches’ and showed 
them the weapons (2004: 150). Indeed, this was proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that, in violation of the weapons-secure area, there was a cache of 
weapons.
‘If we did not react to the reality of the arms caches’, Dallaire argued, ‘the 
weapons could eventually be turned against us and against many innocent 
Rwandans’ (2004: 147). From the temporal standpoint of 13 January 1994, 
Dallaire’s argument is not beyond a reasonable doubt. In the fog of armed 
conflict, how could there be certitude of future massacre? However, when 
the verified testimony of the informant is combined with other contemporary 
evidence related by Dallaire in his book, the standard of ‘clear and convincing 
evidence’ is satisfied. From the temporal standpoint of 13 January 1994, it 
is highly likely that the weapons will be used to massacre many innocent 
Rwandans. This is an emergency – ‘I had to catch these guys off guard’, 
Dallaire explained (2004: 144) – there is no time for proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
Therefore, from the temporal standpoint of 13 January 1994, a just goal 
for the immediate use of armed force by UNAMIR is preventing the future 
massacre of innocent Rwandans, and the means of achieving this goal is 
a justly correlative planned course of military actions, including rapidly 
mobilising UN soldiers, quickly storming the buildings where the weapons 
caches are located and seizing the weapons.
This military operation by UNAMIR did not happen. When Dallaire 
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informed the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations that he was 
planning to seize the weapons, he was ordered ‘to suspend the operation 
immediately’ (Dallaire 2004: 146). Truly, there can be principled moral 
disagreement about armed humanitarian intervention.
It might be objected that such an operation by UNAMIR would have 
been a police operation. My reply is that it would have been both a police 
operation and a military operation. It would have resembled sufficiently both 
paradigm police operations and paradigm military operations. As discussed 
in Chapter 4 (‘Theory of Action’), it would have been an ‘overlap military 
action’. In general, when a military operation authorised by the Security 
Council is sufficiently narrowly targeted, it is, or is tantamount to, a police 
operation.
H.  SPECIFICITY OF THREAT
Having addressed the evaluative question of ‘scale of threat’ and the epistemic 
question of ‘clarity of threat’, I address in this section the categorial question 
of ‘specificity of threat’ – that is, the question: which kinds?
As explained in Chapter 3 (‘Moral Theory’) in the section ‘A Specificity 
Standard’, moral deliberation in just war theory should be governed by a 
‘specificity standard’: the military action or nonmilitary measure must 
be sufficiently detailed. In order to apply the threat-seriousness criterion 
correctly, the planned course of military actions by means of which the 
threatened harm is to be stopped must be sufficiently detailed. To determine 
whether there is a just cause, we must specify sufficiently both the goal and 
the planned course of military actions that together comprise the means of 
achieving that goal.
In particular, the kind of threatened harm to basic human rights has to 
be specified sufficiently. In the High-level Panel Report, the paragraph 
containing the threat-seriousness criterion also contains this illustration: ‘In 
the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale 
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian 
law, actual or imminently apprehended?’ For instance, the threatened harm 
of large-scale killing is of a kind to justify tentatively the use of armed force, 
if it is sufficiently clear and serious. By contrast, the threatened harm of a 
global economic recession, no matter how clear and serious, is (presumably) 
not of a kind to justify, even tentatively, the use of armed force.
Sometimes, a threatened harm is ‘complex’, in that it combines two (or 
more) distinguishable threatened harms. Correspondingly, there can be a 
‘compound’ goal of stopping that complex threatened harm – for instance, 
the (disputable) goal of both stopping terrorism and stopping an insurgency 
in Afghanistan (Lango 2010b).
What, then, are these kinds? The concept of ‘kind of threatened harm to 
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basic human rights’ has an open texture. Indeed, some of these kinds are 
paradigmatic, but others are controversial. In Chapter 3 (‘Moral Theory’), 
the following question is raised. How can we deliberate morally about the 
use of armed force, both on a case-by-case basis and in terms of just war 
principles? In the present section, I want to raise a related question. How 
can we deliberate morally about the use of armed force, both in terms of just 
war principles and on a kind-by-kind basis? A coherentist answer to this last 
question should involve a process of mutual adjustment of moral principles, 
moral judgements about paradigm cases, relevant empirical theories and so 
forth. In this book, I am able to discuss in significant detail only an illustrative 
selection of kinds.
These kinds are quite various. Stereotypically, the actors posing 
sufficiently serious threatened harms are states, but such harms are also 
posed by nonstate actors. Darrel Moellendorf’s ‘cosmopolitan account’ of 
just cause is partly state-centric, in that it involves the goal of ‘advancing 
justice in the basic structure of the state or the international effects of its 
domestic policy’ (2002: 159). By contrast, the concept of ‘kind of threatened 
harm to basic human rights’ is more general. For instance, invoking the 
legitimacy criteria, the Security Council might authorise the use of armed 
force to counter a sufficiently serious threat posed by a transnational criminal 
organisation engaged in human trafficking.3 (Such a military action might 
also be conceptualised as a police action.)
The kind matters. Indeed, the scale (or degree) of a threatened harm 
matters, but so does its nature (or character). For the sake of comparison, 
let me mention a famous controversy in the history of utilitarianism: for 
Jeremy Bentham, only quantity matters; by contrast, for John Stuart Mill, 
quality also matters. According to the deontological moral theory that I am 
presupposing, the nature of an act of murder and the nature of an act of theft 
are such that the former kind of act is intrinsically morally worse than the 
latter kind of act, whatever the scale (or degree).
A single act of murder is intrinsically morally worse than a thousand 
thefts of diamonds. In the UDHR, some basic human rights are expressed 
as follows. ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’ 
(Article 3). A main thesis is that there can be just causes for targeted military 
operations to stop targeted violations of basic human rights. Each and every 
individual human being has the basic human right to life. Specifically, there 
can be a just cause for a targeted military operation to stop the targeted killing 
of a single human being. A threatened harm to the basic human right to life, 
even of a single human being, when it is sufficiently clear and serious, is of 
a kind to justify tentatively the use of armed force. Disputably, for example, 
when Daniel Pearl, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, was kidnapped by 
militants in Pakistan during January 2002 (Eckholm and Barringer 2002), 
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there was a just cause for a sufficiently targeted military operation to rescue 
him. However, such a rescue did not happen, the fog shrouding his kidnapping 
was too thick and he was eventually beheaded.
I .  EXCEPTIONAL OR NORMAL?
Military intervention for human protection purposes must be regarded 
as an exceptional and extraordinary measure.
The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 2001a: 32)
Perhaps, from the temporal standpoint of the year 2001 – the year of the 
release of the ICISS Report – all future armed humanitarian interventions 
should be ‘exceptional and extraordinary’. The ICISS Report was strongly 
influenced by a recent paradigm: the relatively large-scale armed humanitarian 
intervention by NATO in Kosovo during 1999. Perhaps, from the temporal 
standpoint of the year 2013, all large-scale armed humanitarian interventions 
should remain, in future, exceptional and extraordinary.
However, a main thesis is that there is a gamut of armed humanitarian 
interventions, from the very large scale to the very small scale (Weiss 2007: 
8–10). For example, the armed humanitarian intervention by the US and 
NATO in Libya during 2011 was relatively small scale. Perhaps, from the 
temporal standpoint of the year 2013, sufficiently targeted armed humanitarian 
interventions – when authorised by Security Council resolutions and with 
such limited purposes as imposing no-fly zones, establishing safe havens and 
enforcing indictments by the International Criminal Court – should become 
normal and ordinary. Of course, concerning the question of whether armed 
humanitarian interventions should remain exceptional or become normal, 
there can be principled moral disagreement.
It might be objected that the imposition of a no-fly zone is not an armed 
humanitarian intervention. In the ICISS Report, the topic of no-fly zones 
is relegated to a single paragraph: ‘The military intervention phase will 
necessarily be preceded by preventive actions’ – for instance, ‘sanctions’ and 
‘no-fly zones’ (ICISS 2001a: 58). Although these preventive actions are called 
‘military measures’ (ICISS 2001a: 58), it would seem that the imposition 
of a no-fly zone is not conceptualised in the ICISS Report as a military 
intervention. However, as the Supplementary Volume to the ICISS Report 
makes clear, the ICISS Report was also strongly influenced by an earlier 
paradigm of military intervention – ‘the establishment and enforcement of 
no-fly zones in northern Iraq in 1991’ (ICISS 2001b: 166).
Let me respond to the objection by means of an illustration. Recall that, in 
the ICC indictment of the President of Sudan, it is charged that the Sudanese 
‘Air Force would be called upon to drop bombs’ on villages in Darfur (ICC 
2008: 4). Clearly, the dropping of bombs by Sudanese aircraft on innocent 
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villagers gravely violates their basic human rights to life, liberty and security. 
On 29 March 2005, Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005) demanded 
‘that the Government of Sudan . . . immediately cease conducting offensive 
military flights in and over the Darfur region’. Subsequently, an ICG report 
of 12 October 2006, Getting the UN into Darfur, advocated the imposition 
of a no-fly zone (ICG 2006: 11–12). Paradigmatically, a no-fly zone (NFZ) 
is enforced by the use of air power: ‘Enforcing the NFZ would require a 
squadron of twelve to eighteen Harrier fighter aircraft . . . that could force 
aircraft to land, shoot them down or disable their runways’ (ICG 2006: 12). 
Clearly, to shoot down a Sudanese aircraft is to perform a military action. 
Moreover, to shoot down the aircraft as a means of achieving the goal 
of stopping it from violating basic human rights of innocent villagers by 
dropping bombs on them is to engage in armed humanitarian intervention. 
Such an imposition of a no-fly zone should be conceptualised as a military 
intervention.
Interestingly, in this ICG report, the question of ‘whether at this stage 
the situation [in Darfur] is so grave as to justify . . . a major military 
“humanitarian intervention”’ is answered by means of the High-level Panel 
Report’s legitimacy criteria (ICG 2006: 16). To interpret the quoted question, 
it is important to grasp the qualification expressed by the word ‘major’. 
Briefly, it is argued in the ICG report that the threat-seriousness criterion 
is satisfied, but it is also argued that the last resort criterion is not satisfied: 
‘Much more still can and should be done by the international community 
before non-consensual military intervention is considered’ (ICG 2006: 17) – 
that is, before considering a military humanitarian intervention that is major.
By means of the legitimacy criteria, the ICG report should also have 
answered a related question – namely, whether at this stage the situation 
is so grave as to justify the imposition of a no-fly zone. Certainly, from the 
temporal standpoint of 12 October 2006, if the threat-seriousness criterion 
is satisfied for a major armed humanitarian intervention, it is also satisfied 
for a relatively smaller-scale imposition of a no-fly zone. From that temporal 
standpoint, should the international community do more before considering 
the nonconsensual imposition of a no-fly zone? Such a question is addressed 
in the following two chapters about the idea of last resort.
J .  THE PROBLEM OF MULTITUDE
To generalise, a main thesis is that, for every form of armed conflict, there 
is a gamut of military actions, from the very large scale to the very small 
scale. Correspondingly, for every form of armed conflict, there are various 
just causes for the use of armed force to stop sufficiently clear and serious 
threatened harms. The scale of force must be justly correlative to the scale 
of harm. There can be just causes for large-scale military operations to stop 
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large-scale violations of basic human rights, and there can be just causes for 
targeted military operations to stop small-scale violations of basic human 
rights.
Accordingly, the threat-seriousness criterion might appear to be both 
overly demanding and overly permissive. Just causes are inordinately multi-
tudinous, or so it might appear. Let me respond briefly to this problem of 
multitude. When it is proven that a proposed military action satisfies the 
threat-seriousness criterion, the military action is only justified tentatively. 
The burden remains of proving that the other legitimacy criteria are satisfied. 
To counterbalance overemphasis of the just cause principle, I am empha-
sising last resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity principles. 
Dialectically, the present chapter, ‘Just Cause’, is counterbalanced by the 
later chapters ‘Last Resort’, ‘Last Resort and Noncombatant Immunity’ and 
‘Proportionality and Authority’.
IV.  A JUST CAUSE PRINCIPLE
Having critically examined the threat-seriousness criterion, my purpose in 
this part of the chapter is to formulate a generalised just cause principle. For 
the sake of concreteness, the principle is applied to the problem of escalation.
A.  A COSMOPOLITAN JUST CAUSE PRINCIPLE
Canonically, the idea of just cause may be expressed roughly as a conditional 
prohibition: it is morally obligatory not to perform a military action, if there 
is not a just cause.
Provisionally, this rough principle may be amplified in terms of the just-
correlativity requirement: it is morally obligatory not to perform a military 
action, if there is not a just cause; and there is a just cause, when there is 
both a just goal and a justly correlative means. The phrase ‘justly correlative’ 
expresses the just-correlativity requirement. A just cause principle is a 
principle of just goal and justly correlative means.
Finally, by incorporating elements of the revised criterion of seriousness of 
threat, the just cause principle that I am proposing is formulated as follows:
Just cause principle. It is morally obligatory not to perform a military 
action, if there is not a just cause. There is a just cause, when there is both 
a just goal and a justly correlative means. The just goal is preventing 
sufficiently grave violations of basic human rights, and the means of 
achieving it is a justly correlative planned course of military actions.
It is presupposed that, in applying this principle, three questions about 
the threatened harm to basic human rights must be answered – namely, a 
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categorial question of kind of threat, an epistemic question of clarity of threat 
and an evaluative question of scale of threat.
This just cause principle is formulated rather briefly and simply. Similarly, 
for example, in the UN Charter, there is a rather brief and simple formulation of 
a right of self-defence (Article 51). As R. M. Hare argued, there are ‘practical 
and psychological reasons for having relatively simple principles of action if 
we are to learn to behave either morally or skillfully or with prudence’ (1981: 
39). Instead of complicating a relatively simple principle by incorporating 
various qualifications within it, subordinate or elucidatory principles should 
be formulated, which themselves should be relatively simple.
Accordingly, the specificity standard of sufficient detail and the epistemic 
standard of clear and convincing evidence are presupposed as principles that 
are elucidatory of this just cause principle.
The threat-seriousness criterion contains the phrase ‘justify prima facie’, 
and the revised threat-seriousness criterion contains the phrase ‘justify 
tentatively’, but such phrases are potentially misleading, insofar as the term 
‘justify’ is accented and the qualifying term is neglected. By contrast, this 
just cause principle does not contain such a phrase. When it is proven that the 
principle is satisfied, the performance of the military action is not justified, 
even tentatively. The purpose is to ensure that the principle functions clearly 
as a moral constraint. Let me explain.
When we apply the principle to a particular military action, we have to 
morally presume that there is not a just cause, and we have the burden of 
proving that there is. On the one hand, suppose that we fail to satisfy this 
burden of proof. Our moral presumption becomes determinative: we have to 
decide that there is not a just cause for performing the military action. And, 
therefore, we have to conclude that it is morally obligatory not to perform it. 
Formulated thus as a conditional prohibition, the principle functions clearly 
as a moral constraint.
On the other hand, suppose that we succeed in satisfying the burden 
of proving that there is a just cause for the military action. The just cause 
principle is a conditional prohibition. It is not a conditional permission. It 
does not say: ‘it is morally permissible to perform a military action, if there 
is a just cause’. Therefore, we cannot conclude even tentatively that it is 
morally permissible to perform the military action. And there is still the 
burden of proving that the ancillary just war principles are satisfied. Because 
the just cause principle does not include such a moral permission, it functions 
clearly again as a moral constraint.
B.  PREVENTIVE MILITARY ACTIONS
The question of just cause is a question of just prevention. From a particular 
temporal standpoint, we apply just war principles prospectively. Specifically, 
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when we apply the just cause principle, our just goal is one of ‘prevention’ – 
namely, preventing sufficiently grave violations of basic human rights.
It might be objected that a just war theory should not endorse a doctrine 
of preventive war. ‘Preventive war justifications hold’, Buchanan explained, 
‘that it can be permissible to make war to avert a temporally distant harm’ 
(2006: 2). The qualification ‘temporally distant’ is crucial. Truly, we should 
be sceptical about proposals to use armed force to counter threatened harms 
that are temporally distant. To satisfy the just cause principle (and also the 
other core just war principles), the epistemic standard of clear and convincing 
evidence must be satisfied. But the future is shrouded in a fog of uncertainty. 
Paradigmatically, when a threatened harm is temporally distant, the relevant 
evidence is less than clear and convincing. What is problematic about such 
preventive war justifications is not the idea of prevention per se. Instead, 
what is problematic is whether the epistemic standard can be satisfied.
On the other hand, when a threatened harm is not temporally distant, we 
need not be so sceptical. Consider again, for instance, the subject of invasion. 
First, by means of clear and convincing intelligence, we might discover that 
an invasion is imminent; and we might have a just cause for a pre-emptive 
first strike to prevent the imminent invasion from happening. Second, we 
might have a just cause for using armed force to counter an invasion that is 
currently happening – that is, we might have the just goal of preventing the 
invasion from advancing. Third, we might have a just cause for using armed 
force after we have been occupied by an invader – that is, we might have 
the just goal of preventing the occupation from continuing. In this book, the 
terms ‘stop’, ‘counter’ and ‘prevent’ are used broadly.
Even if the just cause principle is satisfied, the last resort principle must 
also be satisfied. Paradigmatically, when a suspected harm is temporally 
distant, there is ample time to explore alternative nonmilitary measures. 
It might be objected that we should also be sceptical about proposals to 
counter temporally distant harms by means of nonmilitary measures. Let me 
summarise my reply to this objection. To establish that the just cause principle 
is satisfied, we have to morally presume that there is not a just cause, and 
we have the burden of proving that there is. By contrast, to establish that 
the last resort principle is satisfied, we have to morally presume that it is 
reasonable to attempt an alternative nonmilitary measure, and we have the 
burden of proving that it is not. Absent clear and convincing evidence that 
an alternative nonmilitary measure will not be successful, it is reasonable to 
attempt it, before using armed force. (These points are explained more fully 
in Chapter 6, ‘Last Resort’.)
Let me sketch an admittedly controversial counterexample to a blanket 
prohibition of preventive military actions with temporally distant goals – 
namely, a targeted military operation to intercept a nuclear weapon in transit 
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at sea. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was developed by the Bush 
administration and has been continued by the Obama administration. The PSI 
has been endorsed by ninety-eight states. The PSI ‘interdiction principles’ 
include a principle concerning actions to ‘stop and/or search’ ships that are 
‘reasonably suspected’ of transporting nuclear weapons and also actions to 
‘seize’ nuclear weapons found on such ships (PSI 2003). Let me add that 
sometimes, if such actions were to be accomplished, armed force would have 
to be used. Under some circumstances, limited uses of armed force to seize a 
nuclear weapon in transit at sea could satisfy the just cause principle. The just 
goal would be to prevent massive violations of the human right to life by the 
detonation of a nuclear weapon in the temporally distant future, and the just 
means of achieving this goal would be a targeted military operation to seize 
that nuclear weapon. (Such a military action might also be conceptualised 
as a police action.)
Having discussed the subject of preventive war elsewhere (Lango 2005), 
my discussion here is brief. In this book, I am able to thoroughly examine 
only an illustrative selection of specific issues. This chapter focuses on the 
specific issue of escalation.
C. RIGHT INTENTION
A main thesis is that the set of core just war principles contains only just 
cause, last resort, noncombatant immunity and proportionality principles. 
Admittedly, this thesis is controversial. Should there be other core just 
war principles – for instance, a traditional principle of right (or proper or 
dominant) intention (or purpose)?
Among the legitimacy criteria in the High-level Panel Report, there is a 
right intention principle:
Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed 
military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other 
purposes or motives may be involved? (HLPR 2004: 67)
Similarly, presupposing the just cause principle, a correlative right 
intention principle might be formulated thus:
Right intention. It is morally obligatory not to perform the military 
action, if the just goal is not the primary goal.
Must agents responsible for the military action have as their ‘dominant 
intention’ achieving the just goal by the justly correlative means (Fisher 
2011: 72)?
Each core just war principle is a necessary moral criterion for determining 
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whether the nonharm principle may be overridden. When we morally 
deliberate about whether to harm other persons grievously by means of the 
use of armed force, we have to make the moral presumption that we must 
not. To override this moral presumption, we have the burden of proving 
that the just cause, last resort, proportionality and noncombatant immunity 
principles are satisfied. To override the moral presumption, should we have 
the additional burden of proving that our just goal is our primary goal?
A military action can be just, even when the just goal is not the primary goal. 
Let me sketch some controversial illustrations. (In each of these illustrations, 
it is supposed that the stated military action would satisfy the four core just 
war principles.) From the temporal standpoint of 10 January 1994, a targeted 
military operation by UNAMIR to seize weapons in Rwanda would still be 
just, even if Dallaire’s primary goal were to win a Nobel Prize. From the 
temporal standpoint of 2 May 2011, the US targeted military operation that 
killed Osama bin Laden would still be just, even if Obama’s primary goal 
were to win re-election. From the temporal standpoint of 17 March 2011, the 
authorisation by the Security Council of armed intervention in Libya would 
still be just, even if the primary goal were to demonstrate the resoluteness (or 
‘credibility’) of the Security Council in matters of war and peace.
In conclusion, the set of core just war principles should not contain a 
separate principle of right intention. A right intention principle is not a 
necessary moral criterion for determining whether a proposed military action 
would be just.
D. ALL RESPONSIBLE AGENTS AND ALL ARMED CONFLICTS
Explicitly, as advocated in the High-level Panel Report, the threat-seriousness 
criterion is applicable only by the Security Council. However, according to 
Gareth Evans, the five legitimacy criteria are ‘equally applicable to individual 
countries’ decisionmaking about the use of force’ (2008: 140).
A main thesis is that the just cause principle formulated above is equally 
applicable by responsible agents of all sorts. Therefore, it is also equally 
applicable by nonstate actors. For instance, during the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda, it was applicable by leaders of the RPF.
In accordance with moral universalism, the just cause principle is equally 
applicable by each and every individual human being. Even if you yourself 
are not engaged in decisionmaking about your own use of armed force, you 
may still make moral judgements about such decisionmaking by other human 
beings. From your own agential standpoint, you may adopt a different agential 
standpoint. You may imagine that the standpoint of responsible agents who 
are themselves engaged in decisionmaking about the use of armed force is 
your own agential standpoint.
For example, anyone, anywhere, may read Dallaire’s Shake Hands with 
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the Devil (and other pertinent writings) and make the moral judgement that 
there was a just cause for a targeted military operation by UNAMIR in 
early January 1994 to seize illegal weapons in the weapons-secure area in 
Kigali. The generalisation of just war principles to all sorts of responsible 
agents is discussed especially in Chapter 8, ‘Proportionality and Authority’. 
Such a generalisation is essential for a cosmopolitan conception of global 
citizenship.
A related main thesis is that the just cause principle is applicable to all forms 
of armed conflict. It is applicable to every military action, however large 
scale or small scale. It is both a resort principle and a conduct principle. Is this 
generalised principle therefore overly general? According to coherentism, 
a resolution of this problem of overgeneralisation should involve a process 
of mutual adjustment of the idea of just cause, general moral principles, 
ancillary just war principles, moral judgements about specific issues and 
particular cases and so forth. In this book, I am able to discuss only an 
illustrative selection of specific issues and particular cases in significant 
detail – for instance, the problem of escalation.
E.  JUST CAUSE AND ESCALATION
Typically, a military action has temporal phases, and each temporal phase 
is itself a military action. The just cause principle is therefore applicable to 
every temporal phase of any military action. In this section, I study how the 
principle is applicable to phases of escalation.
To begin with, let us consider the Cold War subject of nuclear escalation – 
that is, the process of transformation from conventional war to nuclear war. 
Characteristically, large-scale conventional wars are very destructive, but 
nuclear wars are expected to be drastically more destructive. If there had been 
a Third World War between NATO and the Soviet Union, there might have 
been two chief temporal phases – an initial phase of conventional war and 
then a subsequent phase of nuclear war. Because states continue to possess 
nuclear weapons, there is still an alarming danger of nuclear escalation. A 
chief function of just war principles should be to morally constrain nuclear 
escalation.
Coined in the Cold War, the term ‘escalation’ is extendible to armed 
conflicts of all forms (Fisher 1985: 96). For example, there might be 
escalation from a limited war to a major war. A targeted military operation 
has a narrowly focused goal, to be achieved by a course of military actions 
that are narrowly limited in fire-power, length of time, geographical extent 
and so forth. Obviously, there might be escalation from a targeted military 
operation to one that is appreciably more destructive.
Whenever there is armed conflict, there might be a process of transformation 
– that is, an ‘escalation’ – from a temporal phase of smaller-scale military 
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actions to a temporal phase of significantly larger-scale military actions. 
Because phases of escalation are appreciably more destructive, a chief 
function of just war principles should be to morally constrain them.
How is the just cause principle applicable to a phase of escalation? To 
begin with, let me construct a hypothetical case involving the aforementioned 
territorial dispute between China and Japan. (Two of the stated three cases are 
rewritten as two phases of a single case.) The US targeted military operation 
against China’s targeted invasion of the uninhabited island has two chief 
phases. In the first phase, there is a planned course of military actions that 
includes imposing a naval blockade of the island and patrolling the island’s 
airspace. In the second phase, there is a planned course of military actions 
that includes aerial bombarding of the island and landing ground forces. 
Evidently, subsequent to the first phase of ‘encirclement’, the second phase 
of ‘counterattack’ is a phase of escalation. Given that the first phase has a just 
cause, it does not follow conceptually (or logically) that the second phase has 
a just cause. Given that there is a just cause for aerial patrolling, we may still 
ask: is there a just cause for aerial bombardment? Given that there is a just 
cause for a naval blockade, we may still ask: is there a just cause for landing 
ground forces?
F.  UNAMIR II  AND MISSION CREEP
During an armed humanitarian intervention, there might be a somewhat 
gradual process of escalation, sometimes termed ‘mission creep’ (Cushman 
1993). For example, from an initial phase of securing safe havens by the 
defensive use of armed force, there might be a process of escalation to a 
subsequent phase of preventive military intervention in a civil war. Given 
that there is a just cause for securing the safe havens, we may still ask: is 
there a just cause for intervening in the civil war?
For an illustration, let us return to the case of Rwanda. On 17 May 1994 
– in the middle of the genocide that happened there from April to mid-July 
1994 – Security Council Resolution 918 (1994) authorised an armed UN 
peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR II). From the temporal standpoint of 17 
May 1994, let us imagine hypothetically what UNAMIR II might have done.
According to SC Resolution 918 (1994), UNAMIR II has this primary 
responsibility: ‘the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure 
humanitarian areas’. Securing these safe havens is the means of achieving 
as a goal ‘the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and 
civilians at risk in Rwanda’. Military action may be taken by UNAMIR II 
‘in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and 
populations’. Just as the imposition of a no-fly zone is a limited form of 
armed humanitarian intervention, so is the use of armed force to establish 
and maintain safe havens.
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In applying the just cause principle from the temporal standpoint of 
17 May 1994, the categorial, evaluative and epistemic questions must be 
answered. Obviously, stopping genocide is a paradigmatic kind. Surely, a 
just goal for the use of armed force by UNAMIR II is preventing large-scale 
massacres of innocent Rwandans. Evidently, a justly correlative means of 
achieving that just goal is a planned course of military actions that involves 
fortifying safe havens and using armed force when necessary to defend them. 
Furthermore, from the testimony of Dallaire, Human Rights Watch and other 
reliable sources, there is clear and convincing evidence that such targeted 
uses of armed force would stop Hutu genocidaires from massacring some 
(but not all) innocent Rwandans.
There is a problem of mission creep. SC Resolution 918 (1994) demands 
that ‘all parties to the conflict immediately cease hostilities, agree to a cease-
fire, and bring an end to the mindless violence and carnage engulfing Rwanda’. 
However, it is not stated in this Resolution that UNAMIR II is permitted to 
intervene militarily to enforce this demand. According to Michael Barnett, 
the Security Council’s view was that ‘a cease-fire was required before 
UNAMIR II could be deployed’ (2002: 142). Disputably, however, what is 
minimally required is that the Hutu Government and the RPF agree not to 
interfere with the establishment of safe havens and also that they agree to 
cease their hostilities in demilitarised zones around safe havens. Should the 
Security Council permit UNAMIR II to use armed force to compel the Hutu 
Government and the RPF to adhere to such agreements? There is a slippery 
slope here, from the use of armed force against Hutu genocidaires to armed 
intervention in the civil war.
Disputably, then, from the temporal standpoint of 17 May 1994, responsible 
agents for UNAMIR II should plan contingently for two chief temporal 
phases in the implementation of the mandate of UNAMIR II – namely, a 
phase of safe havens initially and (potentially) a subsequent phase of armed 
intervention in the civil war. Given that there is a just cause for the safe 
haven phase, they should still ask: is there a just cause for a phase of civil 
war intervention?
Specifically, there are categorial, evaluative and epistemic questions 
regarding a phase of civil war intervention. Surely, there is still the just goal 
of using armed force to prevent large-scale massacres of innocent Rwandans. 
However, civil war intervention is a quite different and more disputable 
kind. The plan about safe havens involves military actions that are narrowly 
limited in fire-power and geographical extent. By contrast, any plan for civil 
war intervention would most likely involve military actions with appreciably 
greater fire-power – for instance, airstrikes from helicopter gunships – 
extending over a much larger geographical area. It is more disputable, then, 
whether the just-correlativity requirement would be satisfied. Further, any 
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such plan would be obscured by the fog of civil war. Would UNAMIR II 
create ‘an informal alliance with the RPF’ (Barnett 2002: 140)? In light of 
the RPF’s announced opposition to UNAMIR II (Barnett 2002: 137), would 
the troops of UNAMIR II have to engage the RPF in combat? Disputably, the 
epistemic standard of clear and convincing evidence would not be satisfied.
G. THE GOAL OF PEACE
The purpose of war is peace.
Vitoria (1991: 305)
The set of core just war principles contains only just cause, last resort, 
proportionality and noncombatant immunity principles. Let me raise, again, 
the question of whether there should be other core just war principles. In the 
just war tradition, we find the moral requirement that a just war must have 
as the ultimate goal ‘the end of peace’ (Johnson 1984: 18). Should there be a 
core just war principle mandating ‘the goal (or end or aim) of peace’?
To answer this question, a related question needs to be answered. What 
should be meant by the term ‘peace’? On the one hand, as Dower explained, 
there is a significant ‘positive conception’ of peace – namely, that peace 
consists of ‘harmonious relationships between individuals and groups’ (2009: 
138). I am happy to endorse this ideal of harmony. However, harmonious 
relationships between people cannot be imposed through the force of arms. 
A just war theory should not include such a core just war principle as the 
following: ‘it is morally obligatory not to perform a military action, if that 
military action is not intended as a means of achieving the goal of harmonious 
relationships between people’. Instead, the ideal of harmonious relationships 
should be encouraged by peaceful means.
On the other hand, as Dower also explained, there is a minimal ‘negative 
conception’ of peace – namely, the mere ‘absence of war’ (2009: 6). To 
generalise, a minimal goal of peace is the goal of the absence of armed 
conflict. Again, I am happy to endorse this goal. However, there is no need 
to have a separate core just war principle about it.
Is there an intermediate goal of peace that is not so minimal as the mere 
absence of armed conflict, but also not so maximal as the ideal of harmonious 
relationships between people? Interestingly, Dower advocated a ‘middle 
position’ between the negative and positive conceptions of peace – namely, 
a conception of ‘just durable peace’ (2009: 7). My view is that such a peace 
also cannot be imposed through the force of arms, but instead must be 
promoted by peaceful means.4
The just cause principle formulated in this chapter includes an intermediate 
goal of peace. The just goal of preventing sufficiently grave violations of basic 
human rights is a substantive goal of peace. Relationships between individuals 
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and groups are substantively peaceful, even if not fully harmonious, when 
basic human rights are not gravely violated.
Are there additional goals of peace that may be achieved by means of 
armed force – for example, the goals of regime change and democratisation? 
We should beware of an answer that is too expansive. Analogous to the 
process of escalation from properly small-scale military actions to ones that 
are unduly large scale, there might be a process of ‘escalation’ from properly 
circumscribed peace goals to ones that are unduly extensive. Nevertheless, in 
morally deliberating about a particular case, we might judge that the just goal 
of preventing grave violations of basic human rights ought to be achieved 
by means of a course of military actions that includes the action of forcibly 
democratising a regime or the action of forcibly changing a regime. Let me 
emphasise that, in making such a moral judgement, we have the burden of 
proving that the just-correlativity requirement is satisfied. In short, additional 
peace goals for using armed force are thus subordinate to the stated just goal.
In conclusion, the set of core just war principles should not contain a 
separate principle that peace must be the ultimate goal.
NOTES
1. Similarly, according to Sjoberg’s feminist just war theory, the ‘standard of just 
cause’ should be ‘interpreted dialogically’ (2006: 77).
2. Compare this chapter with the chapter entitled ‘Just cause’ in Coates (1997). The 
term ‘just cause’ is interpreted in terms of a conception of ‘goal’ in Kamm (2011: 
119). In surveying the just war tradition, Hensel expresses the idea of just cause 
thus: ‘force may be used only to secure just goals’ (2007: ix).
3. See Kapstein (2006). Compare Sjoberg (2006: 79).
4. Concerning peacebuilding, see Murithi (2009) and Webel and Galtung (2007).
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CHAPTER 6
LAST RESORT
I have always resisted the argument that force is a last resort.
Michael Walzer (2004: 160)
The criterion of last resort underlines the primacy of peace over war in 
just war thinking.
A. J. Coates (1997: 189)
The cosmopolitan just cause principle introduced in the preceding chapter 
might appear to be overly permissive, and the cosmopolitan last resort principle 
introduced in this chapter might appear to be overly prohibitive. Hence, a 
chief purpose here is to explore how the two principles are interrelated. To 
counterbalance overemphasis of the idea of just cause, I am emphasising the 
idea of last resort.
As the block quotations display, there can be principled moral disagree-
ment about the idea of last resort.1 Disputably, in Walzer’s words, ‘we can 
never reach lastness, or we can never know that we have reached it’ (2004: 
88). Another main purpose is to defend the idea of last resort against such 
scepticism.
The idea of last resort is discussed both in this chapter and the next, ‘Last 
Resort and Noncombatant Immunity’. The first part of this chapter contains 
some introductory remarks. In the second part, a cosmopolitan last resort 
principle is formulated. In the third part, the principle is applied to some 
particular cases. In the fourth part, reasonableness standards are proposed. 
The fifth part appends some additional remarks.
I .  PRELIMINARIES
According to Johnson, a last resort principle is ‘not found in classic statements 
of the just war idea’ (2005: 36). Arguably, however, an intimation of last 
resort is found in one of Vitoria’s rules of war:
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First Canon: since princes have the authority to wage war, they should 
strive above all to avoid all provocations and causes of war. If it be 
possible, the prince should seek as much as lieth in him to live peaceably 
with all men, according to Paul’s words in Rom. 12: 18. (1991: 326–7)
But I am not studying the history of the idea of last resort. Instead, I am 
engaging in the project of rethinking, revising or supplementing received 
just war principles, among which is a last resort principle. With the aim 
of formulating a cosmopolitan last resort principle, I want to examine the 
criterion of ‘last resort’ in the High-level Panel Report.
A last resort principle was expressed succinctly by William V. O’Brien: 
‘Every reasonable peaceful alternative should be exhausted’ (1981: 33). 
As Richard Regan underscored: ‘The key word is reasonable’ (1996: 64 
[emphasis in original]). To illuminate this particular word, let me suggest 
a domestic analogy. In a criminal trial, there must be proof ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt’ (ALI 1962: 1.12); and to decide whether a person has 
acted negligently, we have to ascertain how a ‘reasonable person’ would have 
acted (ALI 1962: 2.02). In domestic jurisprudence, the word ‘reasonable’ is 
also a key word.
Accordingly, let me raise a key question. What are the standards for 
determining whether it is no longer reasonable to attempt an alternative 
nonmilitary measure before resorting to the use of armed force? A main 
thesis is that we are able to determine that we have reached lastness by means 
of ‘reasonableness standards’.
Another key word is ‘peaceful’. Paradigmatically, what should be 
exhausted is every reasonable alternative that is peaceful. Whereas military 
actions can be highly destructive, alternative measures that are peaceful 
can be highly constructive.2 During the Cold War, there might have been an 
enormously destructive nuclear war. Fortunately, some peaceful alternative 
measures were attempted, including one that still promises to be strikingly 
constructive – namely, the negotiation and ratification of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By ratifying the NPT, states are committed to 
engage in ‘negotiations in good faith’ about ‘effective measures’ for bringing 
about ‘nuclear disarmament’ (NPT 1968: Article VI).
There is a crucial moral difference between a military action and an 
alternative measure that is peaceful. Regularly, when we perform military 
actions, we intentionally or knowingly kill or otherwise gravely violate basic 
human rights of other persons. According to the nonharm principle, we are 
morally obligated not to gravely violate basic human rights of other persons. 
In order to override the nonharm principle, we have the burden of proving 
that just war principles are satisfied.
By contrast and paradigmatically, when we attempt alternative measures 
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that are peaceful, we do not gravely violate basic human rights. The nonharm 
principle does not have to be overridden. This crucial moral difference helps 
to clarify why before using armed force, every reasonable peaceful alternative 
should be exhausted (Childress 1982: 75).
There are problems of intermediate cases. First, there is a ‘coercion 
problem’. In addition to peaceful measures, there are alternative measures 
that are coercive – notably, economic sanctions. By attempting a coercive 
nonmilitary measure, we might also gravely violate basic human rights of 
other persons – for instance, the human right to ‘food, clothing, housing and 
medical care’ (UDHR 1948: Article 25). Second, there is a ‘threat problem’. 
Should deterrent or compellent threats to use armed force be conceptualised 
as military actions or coercive nonmilitary measures? Third, there is a 
‘concurrence problem’. While a military action is being performed, should 
we also attempt nonmilitary measures? For instance, should we negotiate 
while fighting? Later, I investigate how these three problems might be 
resolved.
II .  A LAST RESORT PRINCIPLE
My purpose in this second part is to formulate and support a cosmopolitan 
last resort principle that is applicable by all sorts of responsible agents to all 
forms of armed conflict.
A. THE CRITERION OF LAST RESORT
To begin with, I want to examine the last resort criterion in the High-level 
Panel Report:
Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in 
question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that 
other measures will not succeed? (HLPR 2004: 67)
In accordance with moral universalism, it is presupposed that this criterion 
is applicable by all sorts of responsible agents to all forms of armed conflict.
Notice the presence of the word ‘reasonable’. Again, a key question should 
be raised. What are the standards for determining whether, in a particular case, 
there are no ‘reasonable grounds’? In short, what are the ‘reasonableness 
standards’? Notice also the absence of the word ‘peaceful’. Apparently, the 
term ‘non-military option’ encompasses both peaceful measures and coercive 
nonmilitary measures.
Correspondingly, I propose to formulate provisionally a cosmopolitan last 
resort principle as a conditional prohibition:
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Last resort principle. It is morally obligatory not to perform a military 
action, if every reasonable nonmilitary measure has not been attempted.
Presumably, the last resort criterion incorporates a reasonableness 
standard of impracticality (or infeasibility) – roughly, that the nonmilitary 
measure ‘will not succeed’. By contrast, instead of complicating the last 
resort principle by incorporating reasonableness standards in it, I propose 
to formulate some reasonableness standards as principles subordinate to, or 
elucidatory of, it – namely, not only an impracticality standard, but also 
standards of disproportionality and awfulness. Additionally, there are the 
epistemic and specificity standards.
B. A COERCIVE RESORT PRINCIPLE
I am featuring moral ideals expressed in the UN Charter. In Chapters VI 
and VII, a conception of peaceful measures is clearly distinguished from a 
conception of coercive nonmilitary measures.
According to Chapter VI, the parties to a sufficiently dangerous dispute are 
required, ‘first of all’, to attempt to settle their dispute by ‘peaceful means’ 
– for instance, through ‘negotiation’ and ‘judicial settlement’ (Article 33). 
Significantly, the Security Council is empowered to ‘call upon the parties to 
settle their dispute by such means’ (Article 33). In brief, the Security Council 
is empowered by Chapter VI to explore peaceful measures.
The Security Council is also empowered by Chapter VII to explore coercive 
nonmilitary measures. Specifically, if the parties ‘fail to settle’ their dispute 
by peaceful measures (Article 39), the Security Council is empowered to 
authorise coercive measures ‘not involving the use of armed force’ to settle 
it – for instance, ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations’ 
(Article 41).
In the UN Charter, these conceptions of peaceful measures and coercive 
nonmilitary measures are clearly distinguished from a conception of 
military actions. As a last resort, if coercive nonmilitary measures ‘would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate’, the Security Council is 
empowered by Chapter VII to authorise military actions (Article 42).
Analogous to the aforementioned crucial moral difference between peaceful 
measures and military actions, there is a crucial moral difference between 
peaceful measures and coercive nonmilitary measures. Paradigmatically, 
when a coercive nonmilitary measure is attempted, the nonharm principle 
has to be overridden. Frequently, particular cases of such coercion involve 
grave violations of basic human rights. By contrast and paradigmatically, 
when a peaceful measure is attempted, the nonharm principle does not have 
to be overridden. The former crucial moral difference helps to clarify why 
before using armed force, every reasonable peaceful alternative should be 
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exhausted. Analogously, the latter crucial moral difference helps to clarify 
why before attempting a coercive nonmilitary measure, every reasonable 
peaceful alternative should be exhausted.
Therefore, analogous to the provisional last resort principle, I propose to 
formulate provisionally a principle concerning coercive nonmilitary measures:
Coercive resort principle. It is morally obligatory not to attempt a 
coercive nonmilitary measure, if every reasonable peaceful measure 
has not been attempted.
‘A feminist understanding of last resort’, Laura Sjoberg explained, ‘would 
require the inclusion of non-coercive strategies to obtain policy goals’ (2006: 
81). Granted, a feminist approach to just war theory is somewhat different 
from my Kantian approach, but there are some concordances, as this coercive 
resort principle illustrates.3
Between military actions and coercive nonmilitary measures, there is not 
such a crucial moral difference, or so it would appear. Before using armed 
force, why should every reasonable coercive nonmilitary measure be ex-
hausted? In some particular cases, economic sanctions might be considerably 
more destructive than targeted military actions. Later, I investigate how this 
‘coercion problem’ might be resolved.
C. THE COEQUALITY OF LAST RESORT AND JUST CAUSE
The criterion of ‘seriousness of threat’ in the High-level Panel Report includes 
the phrase ‘to justify prima facie’, and the revised threat-seriousness criterion 
in the preceding chapter includes the phrase ‘to justify tentatively’. These 
phrases suggest that the threat-seriousness criterion ought to be satisfied 
first, as does the phrase ‘the threat in question’ in the last resort criterion. 
Nonetheless, I think that the last resort criterion ought to be satisfied, even 
when the threat-seriousness criterion is not satisfied.
According to Johnson, the just cause principle is a ‘deontological’ principle, 
whereas the last resort principle is a ‘prudential’ principle; and deontological 
principles have ‘priority’ over prudential principles (1999: 34, 41).
By contrast, I am formulating cosmopolitan just cause and last resort prin-
ciples as coequal deontological principles. Neither has priority over the other.
In his article ‘Just cause for war’, McMahan argued that the requirement 
of just cause has priority over the requirement of necessity – that is, the 
requirement ‘that war be a necessary means of achieving the just cause’ 
(2005: 5). (I read his necessity requirement as a last resort requirement; the 
term ‘last resort’ does not occur in his article.) He claimed that ‘just cause 
has priority over the other valid requirements in this sense: the others cannot 
be satisfied, even in principle, unless just cause is satisfied’ (2005: 5). His 
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argument that just cause has priority over necessity was stated briefly: ‘The 
claim that war is necessary for something other than the achievement of a 
just cause has no justificatory force’ (2005: 5).
Instead of such a priority thesis, I am advocating a coequality thesis – 
namely, that the just cause principle and the other core just war principles 
are deontological principles coequally. None of them has priority over any 
of the others. Therefore, the last resort principle must be satisfied, even when 
the just cause principle is not satisfied. Because armed conflicts are so highly 
destructive, the chief function of just war principles should be to morally 
constrain uses of armed force. Even when agents responsible for a military 
action fail to satisfy the just cause principle, they are still morally constrained 
by the last resort principle. It is still morally obligatory for them not to use 
armed force to achieve a goal that is not a just goal, if they have not attempted 
every reasonable nonmilitary measure.
Let me sketch a controversial illustration. Presumably, China has as a 
goal ‘the fusing of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland’ (Kaplan 2010: 36). 
But China does not have a just cause for the use of armed force, or so I 
believe. Even when the just cause principle is disregarded, China is still 
morally constrained by the last resort principle. Before attacking Taiwan, 
China must negotiate with Taiwan about unification. Hopefully, the temporal 
process of negotiation between China and Taiwan and the time requisite for 
attempting every other reasonable nonmilitary measure would keep ‘Taiwan 
functionally independent until China became a more liberal society’ (Kaplan 
2010: 37). Thus might the destructiveness of war be circumvented.
D.  A COSMOPOLITAN LAST RESORT PRINCIPLE
In this section, the provisional last resort principle is revised, in order to make 
explicit that a just cause is not presupposed.
Admittedly, the just cause and last resort principles are interrelated. The 
idea of just cause should be understood teleologically, but so should the idea 
of last resort. According to the just cause principle, a military action must be 
performed as a means of achieving a just goal. Correlatively, the last resort 
principle morally requires that, before performing that military action as a 
means of achieving that just goal, every reasonable nonmilitary means of 
achieving that just goal must be attempted.
Accordingly, to fortify McMahan’s priority thesis, his necessity 
requirement – namely, ‘that war be a necessary means of achieving the just 
cause’ (2005: 5) – might be reconstructed as follows.
Necessity requirement. It is morally obligatory not to attempt to achieve 
a just goal by means of a military action, if it is reasonable to attempt to 
achieve that just goal by means of a nonmilitary measure.
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By contrast, my conception of last resort is more inclusive. For it also 
morally requires that, before performing a military action as a means of 
achieving a goal that is not just, every reasonable nonmilitary means of 
achieving that goal that is not just must be attempted.
Therefore, in order to make explicit that a just cause is not presupposed, I 
propose to revise the provisional formulation of the cosmopolitan last resort 
principle as follows.
Last resort principle. It is morally obligatory not to attempt to achieve 
a goal by means of a military action, if it is reasonable to attempt to 
achieve that goal by means of a nonmilitary measure.
In accordance with moral universalism, it is presupposed that the principle 
is applicable by all sorts of responsible agents. It is morally obligatory for 
any responsible agent not to attempt to achieve a goal by means of a military 
action, if it is reasonable for that responsible agent to attempt to achieve 
that goal by means of a nonmilitary measure. Moreover, the principle is 
applicable to all forms of armed conflict. It is applicable to every military 
action, however large scale or small scale.
Additionally, let me propose an analogous revision of the principle about 
coercive nonmilitary measures:
Coercive resort principle. It is morally obligatory not to attempt to achieve 
a goal by means of a coercive nonmilitary measure, if it is reasonable to 
attempt to achieve that goal by means of a peaceful measure.
Goal or just goal? The necessity requirement is transformed into the 
last resort principle by deleting the word ‘just’. By juxtaposing these two 
principles, my purpose is to illuminate why there can be principled moral 
disagreement about whether just cause has priority over, or is coequal with, 
last resort.
The primary unit of moral evaluation is a planned course of actions. 
Similar to the concept of a ‘planned course of military actions’, there is the 
concept of a ‘planned course of nonmilitary actions’. The temporal process of 
attempting to achieve a goal by means of a nonmilitary measure is equivalent 
to, or explicable as, the temporal process of attempting to achieve it by means 
of a planned course of nonmilitary actions.
Accordingly, I propose to formulate the last resort principle more explicitly 
as follows.
Last resort principle. It is morally obligatory not to attempt to achieve a 
goal by means of a planned course of military actions, if it is reasonable 
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to attempt to achieve that goal by means of a planned course of 
nonmilitary actions.
E.  JUST GOAL VERSUS RIGHT GOAL
In support of this last resort principle, I want to make some brief remarks 
about some moral terms. Among the goals that are not – in the technical 
sense of a just war theory – ‘just’, there are goals that are meaningfully 
called ‘good’ or ‘right’. Let me draw upon a work of literature for a domestic 
analogy. Concerning the cause for a trial by combat, Shakespeare used such 
words in Richard II: ‘the justice of his cause’ (I, iii, 50); ‘thy cause is right’ 
(I, iii, 55); ‘thy good cause’ (I, iii, 78).
Standardly, in moral philosophy, actions are morally evaluated as ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’, and the consequences of actions are morally evaluated as ‘good’ or 
‘bad’. Hence a goal that is a consequence of an action is morally evaluated 
as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Also, by performing one action, we can have, as a goal, 
the performance of a second action. Hence a goal that is an action is morally 
evaluated as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. For brevity, I am presupposing that the goals 
of actions are themselves (primarily) actions.
When there is not a cause that is – in the technical sense of a just war theory 
– ‘just’, there might still be a cause that is – in the standard terminology of 
a moral theory – ‘right’. To be more explicit, when the goal of a military 
action is not a just goal, it might still be a right goal of a nonmilitary measure. 
Disputably, democratising an authoritarian state is not a just goal of a military 
campaign. Nevertheless, democratising that authoritarian state might still be 
a right goal of a nonmilitary measure (QDDR 2010: 42). Suppose that the 
goal of a proposed armed humanitarian intervention is not a just goal, but 
also that it is a right goal of the nonmilitary measure of negotiation. Surely, it 
might be worthwhile or even imperative to attempt to achieve that right goal 
by means of negotiation. Crucially, the last resort principle morally requires 
that, before performing a military action as a means of achieving a goal that 
is right but not just, every reasonable nonmilitary means of achieving that 
goal must be attempted.
III .  APPLICATIONS
A. MORAL COMPROMISE ABOUT ARMED HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION IN DARFUR
The sporadic fighting that took place between [Sudanese] Government 
and [rebel] movement forces [in Darfur] during the last three months 
[of April to June 2011] caused instability in affected areas, as well as 
protection and humanitarian needs among communities . . . I once again 
reiterate to the belligerent parties that there is no military solution to the 
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Darfur conflict. The continued pursuit of their political objectives by 
military means merely prolongs the suffering of the people of Darfur 
and delays the arrival of peace.
Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (Ban 2011: 14)
In this section, I support the last resort principle by means of some moral 
judgements about the particular case of Darfur. The block quotation is an 
excerpt from a report by Secretary-General Ban to the Security Council that 
is dated 8 July 2011.
From the temporal standpoint of 8 July 2011, let us imagine (quite 
hypothetically) how the just cause and last resort principles might be applied 
prospectively to the conflict in Darfur by members of the Security Council. 
To illustrate the interrelated ideas of principled moral disagreement and 
principled moral compromise, let us suppose that members of the Security 
Council are divided into two groups: those who desire prompt armed 
humanitarian intervention (termed the ‘interventionists’) versus those 
who counsel continued negotiations (termed the ‘negotiationists’). (This 
supposition might be counterfactual, since the set of interventionists in the 
case of Darfur in the Security Council might, in fact, be identical to the null 
set.)
On the one hand, the negotiationists might argue as follows. Indeed, the 
people of Darfur continue to suffer. But the fighting between Sudanese 
Government forces and rebel movement forces during the last three months 
was only sporadic. Although there were grave violations of basic human 
rights, they were not sufficiently grave. In the fog of armed conflict, it would 
appear that fighting will continue to be sporadic. We do not have clear and 
convincing evidence that the present phase of sporadic fighting will escalate 
shortly to a phase of significantly more destructive fighting. Thus we cannot 
make the moral judgement that there will soon be sufficiently grave violations 
of basic human rights. Presently, there is not a just goal for prompt armed 
humanitarian intervention. Even if such intervention were a military solution 
to the Darfur conflict, it would not be a moral solution. Nevertheless, the goal 
of stopping grave violations of basic human rights in Darfur is a goal that 
is right. Concurring with the Secretary-General’s Report – which discusses, 
for instance, the African Union–United Nations Joint Mediation Team and 
the All Darfur Stakeholders Conference (Ban 2011: 1–2) – we believe that 
this right goal must be achieved by means of such nonmilitary measures as 
mediation and negotiation.
On the other hand, the interventionists might argue as follows. During 
the last three months, as the Secretary-General’s Report confirms, Sudanese 
Government aircraft deliberately attacked innocent civilians (Ban 2011: 
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4–6). For instance, on 15 May 2011, such ‘aircraft dropped four bombs at 
Labado [in Southern Darfur] . . . One civilian was killed and another was 
injured’ (Ban 2011: 5). Each and every innocent civilian in Darfur has the 
basic human right to life. There can be a just cause for a targeted military 
operation to stop the targeted killing of a single human being. Despite the 
fog of armed conflict, we have clear and convincing evidence that Sudanese 
Government aircraft will continue to carry out targeted aerial bombardments 
of innocent civilians. Therefore, we believe that there is a just cause for a 
targeted armed humanitarian intervention in Darfur – namely, the imposition 
of a no-fly zone. We appeal to a contemporary precedent: targeted armed 
humanitarian intervention by NATO aircraft in Libya. Presently, NATO 
aircraft are also providing close air support for Libyan rebel forces. As the 
Secretary-General’s Report admits, many of the rebel movement forces 
in Darfur ‘remain outside the peace process’ and continue ‘to pursue their 
objectives through military means’ (Ban 2011: 12–13). Similarly, we believe 
also that there is a just cause for close air support of rebel movement forces 
in Darfur.
Indeed, there is principled moral disagreement between the 
negotiationists and the interventionists about whether there is a just cause 
for armed humanitarian intervention in Darfur. Nevertheless, there might 
still be principled moral compromise between them regarding the alternative 
nonmilitary measures of negotiation and mediation.
For the negotiationists might respond as follows. It is dubious whether the 
goals of those rebel movement forces in Darfur amount to a just goal, so we 
do not think that there is a just cause for close air support. However, stopping 
the aerial bombardment of innocent civilians is a right goal, even though 
presently it is not a just goal. Nonetheless, the last resort principle morally 
requires that, before imposing a no-fly zone, negotiation and mediation must 
be attempted, so long as it is reasonable to do this.
Consequently, the interventionists might compromise as follows. In 
accordance with the last resort principle, we concur that, before armed 
humanitarian intervention, negotiation and mediation must be attempted, so 
long as it is reasonable to do this.
B.  REVOLUTION AND NONVIOLENCE
At the Indian National Congress meeting on December 31 in Lahore, 
Gandhi introduced a motion declaring complete independence to be 
the goal of the Congress. Despite opposition, resolutions in favor of 
independence and endorsing a campaign of civil disobedience were 
passed on December 31, 1929 with Gandhi’s support.
Gene Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle (2005: 102)
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Are the last resort and just cause principles together overly prohibitive? 
Because the last resort and just cause principles are applicable by all sorts of 
responsible agents to all forms of armed conflict, they are also applicable by 
agents responsible for insurgencies, rebellions and revolutions. Before starting 
an armed revolution, must revolutionary groups exhaust every reasonable 
nonmilitary measure? Disputably, democratising an authoritarian state is not 
a just goal of armed humanitarian intervention; analogously, is it also not a 
just goal of armed revolution? From the temporal standpoint of 8 July 2011, 
do rebel movement forces in Darfur have a just cause for rebelling against 
the Sudanese Government? Before using armed force, must they exhaust 
every reasonable nonmilitary measure? From the temporal standpoint of 4 
July 1776, is there a just cause for armed revolution by the British colonies 
in North America against the British Empire? Specifically, are the last resort 
and just cause principles overly prohibitive of armed revolutions?
From the temporal standpoint of 31 December 1929, is there a just cause 
for armed revolution by the Indian National Congress against the British 
Empire? Famously, Mohandas Gandhi supports nonviolent action. And so, 
as reported in the block quotation, the Indian National Congress endorses 
‘a campaign of civil disobedience’. Does the last resort principle morally 
require that, before resorting to armed revolution against the British Empire, 
the Indian National Congress must perform reasonable nonviolent actions?
To generalise, does the concept of nonmilitary measure in the last resort 
principle encompass the idea of nonviolent action? Various specific methods 
of nonviolent action are divided by Gene Sharp, who is widely esteemed 
as a ‘great theoretician of nonviolent power’ (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 
9), into three broad categories – namely, nonviolent protest and persuasion, 
noncooperation and nonviolent intervention (Sharp 2005: 50).
By contrast, the peaceful measures listed in Chapter VI of the UN Charter 
are these:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek 
a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice. (Article 33)
Notably absent from this list of peaceful measures are such methods of 
nonviolent action as civil disobedience.
As the phrase ‘of their own choice’ indicates, the parties to such a dispute 
have to be in agreement about the use of such peaceful measures. Let us 
suppose that there are only two disputing parties. In order for one of the parties 
to perform the peaceful action of negotiating with the other party, there has to 
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be reciprocation; the latter has to perform the peaceful action of negotiating 
with the former. Similar remarks hold of the other peaceful measures. In 
short, these peaceful measures are ‘bilateral’. When there are more than two 
parties, the peaceful measures are ‘multilateral’. In other words, the peaceful 
measures listed in Chapter VI are ‘consensual measures’. To use one of these 
consensual measures, the parties to such a dispute have to interact sufficiently 
peacefully. Their actions have to be sufficiently concordant.
In an ordinary sense of the word ‘nonviolent’, all of the consensual 
measures listed in Chapter VI are nonviolent measures. For instance, to 
negotiate is to act nonviolently.
Paradigmatically, however, acts of civil disobedience are ‘unilateral’ 
or ‘nonconsensual’. Specifically, Sharp’s methods of nonviolent action 
– nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation and nonviolent 
intervention – are ‘unilateral’ or ‘nonconsensual’. (Compare the difference 
between a bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty and a unilateral nuclear 
freeze.) Again, let us suppose that there are only two disputing parties – 
the violent party and the nonviolent party. Typically, the two parties are in 
disagreement about nonviolence and armed force. Their actions could be 
entirely discordant. In order for the nonviolent party to perform actions of 
nonviolent protest and persuasion, there does not have to be reciprocation; 
the violent party may continue to be violent. Similarly, in order for the 
nonviolent party to perform an action of noncooperation, there does not have 
to be reciprocation; the violent party may continue to be violent. And in order 
for the nonviolent party to perform an action of nonviolent intervention, 
there does not have to be reciprocation; the violent party may continue to 
be violent.
Although consensual measures and these nonconsensual methods of 
nonviolent action are thus distinguishable, they are also interrelated. For 
instance, the nonviolent party may advocate negotiation to the violent party 
unilaterally, but negotiation itself is consensual. Correlative to a consensual 
measure is the nonviolent action of advocating it, which is unilateral.
Accordingly, I propose to regiment the term ‘nonviolent action’ as follows. 
A ‘nonviolent action’ is a ‘unilateral’ or ‘nonconsensual’ nonmilitary action. 
Notice that the coercive nonmilitary measures listed in Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter – roughly, economic sanctions and ‘the severance of diplomatic 
relations’ – are also unilateral. Economic sanctions are imposed unilaterally, 
and diplomatic relations are severed unilaterally. Interestingly, among Sharp’s 
particular methods of noncooperation are: ‘international trade embargo’ and 
‘severance of diplomatic relations’ (2005: 58, 61). Although some methods 
of nonviolent action are peaceful – for instance, peaceful demonstrations – 
some are coercive.
In conclusion, my view is that the concept of ‘nonmilitary measure’ in the 
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last resort principle encompasses the idea of ‘(unilateral) nonviolent action’. 
The last resort principle morally requires that, before resorting to the use of 
armed force, every reasonable nonviolent action must be attempted.4
Arguably, then, the last resort and just cause principles are not overly 
prohibitive of nonviolent revolutions. But the question remains: are they 
overly prohibitive of armed revolutions? For with the last resort principle 
as a premise, the following conclusion may be obtained by a subsumption 
argument. It is morally obligatory not to attempt to achieve the goal of 
democratising an authoritarian state by means of an armed revolution, if 
it is reasonable to attempt to achieve that goal by means of a nonviolent 
revolution.5
Let me raise a comparable question. Are the last resort and just cause 
principles overly prohibitive of armed insurgency against foreign occupation? 
Frequently in writings about the issue of jus post bellum, the ethics of 
occupation is discussed largely from the standpoint of the victorious party 
(Orend 2006: 163), but the standpoint of the defeated party also matters. For 
instance, with the last resort principle as a premise, the following conclusion 
may also be obtained by a subsumption argument. It is morally obligatory 
not to attempt to achieve the goal of expelling an occupying power by means 
of an armed insurgency, if it is reasonable to attempt to achieve that goal by 
means of nonviolent action.
When is attempting a nonviolent revolution or nonviolent insurgency not 
reasonable?
C.  NONVIOLENT ACTION VERSUS ARMED REVOLUTION IN 
LIBYA
Few Americans have heard of Mr. [Gene] Sharp. But for decades, his 
practical writings on nonviolent revolution . . . have inspired dissidents 
around the world, including in Burma, Bosnia, Estonia and Zimbabwe, 
and now Tunisia and Egypt.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ‘Shy U.S. intellectual created playbook
used in a revolution’ (2011)
Thousands of Libyan protesters defied threats of violence and arrest 
in several cities on Thursday [17 February 2011], mounting one of the 
sharpest challenges to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s 40-year rule in a 
‘day of rage’ modeled on the uprisings coursing through neighboring 
countries [of Tunisia and Egypt].
Jack Healy, ‘Popular rage is met with violence in mideast’ (2011)
From the temporal standpoint of 17 February 2011, is there a just cause 
for armed revolution in Libya? On this ‘day of rage’, Libyan protesters 
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demonstrate nonviolently. However, their demonstrations are ‘met with 
violence’ and ‘at least four people’ are killed (Healy 2011). Disputably, 
because so few people are killed, the basic human right to life is not violated 
sufficiently gravely.
The Libyan conflict quickly escalated. For example, from mid-March to 
mid-May 2011, ‘[m]ore than 1,000 people reportedly died in the assault on 
Misrata’ (PHR 2011: 7). From the temporal standpoint of mid-March to mid-
May 2011, are the last resort and just cause principles overly prohibitive of 
armed revolution in Libya? When the basic human right to life is so gravely 
violated, is it reasonable for Libyan protesters to continue to attempt to 
achieve the goal of democratising Libya by means of nonviolent actions?
On 17 March 2011, the Security Council authorised armed humanitarian 
intervention in Libya. Subsequently, US and NATO aircraft provided close 
air support for Libyan rebel forces. From the temporal standpoint of mid-
March to mid-May 2011, if it is questionable whether Libyan rebel forces 
have a just cause for armed revolution, then – in accordance with moral 
universalism – it should also be questionable whether there is a just cause for 
close air support by US and NATO aircraft of that armed revolution. And if it 
is questionable whether Libyan rebel forces have exhausted every reasonable 
nonmilitary measure before engaging in armed revolution, it should also be 
questionable whether the Security Council has exhausted every reasonable 
nonmilitary measure before authorising armed humanitarian intervention.
Frequently, moral questions about external intervention are intertwined 
with moral questions about internal conflict. In addition to illustrating the 
last resort principle, the case of Libya serves to illustrate why received just 
war principles should be generalised, so as to be applicable both to armed 
interventions and armed revolutions. Similarly, the cosmopolitan just cause 
and last resort principles are applicable both to counterinsurgencies and 
insurgencies, both to counterterrorism and terrorism and so forth.
But when is attempting a nonmilitary measure not reasonable?
IV.  REASONABLENESS STANDARDS
A. A KEY QUESTION
Because armed conflicts are so highly destructive, the chief function of a 
cosmopolitan just war theory is to morally constrain uses of armed force. 
When we deliberate about whether to use armed force, we have to make the 
moral presumption that we must not. To override this moral presumption, we 
have the burden of proving that just war principles are satisfied.
Specifically, there is the burden of proving that the last resort principle 
is satisfied. To ascertain that the just cause principle is satisfied, we have to 
morally presume that there is not a just cause, and we have the burden of 
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proving that there is. By contrast, to ascertain that the last resort principle 
is satisfied, we have to morally presume that it is reasonable to attempt an 
alternative nonmilitary measure, and we have the burden of proving that it 
is not.
I want to emphasise that the key question here is not: when is attempting 
a nonmilitary measure reasonable? Instead, the key question is: when is 
attempting a nonmilitary measure not reasonable?
More explicitly, to ascertain that the last resort principle is satisfied, we 
have to morally presume that, instead of attempting to achieve a goal by 
means of a military action, it is reasonable to attempt to achieve it by means 
of a nonmilitary measure; and we have the burden of proving that it is not 
reasonable to attempt to achieve it by means of a nonmilitary measure.
On the one hand, suppose that we fail to satisfy this burden of proof. 
Our moral presumption becomes determinative: we have to decide that 
it is reasonable to attempt to achieve the goal by means of a nonmilitary 
measure. And therefore, we have to conclude that it is morally obligatory not 
to perform the military action. Thus, formulated as a conditional prohibition, 
the last resort principle functions clearly as a moral constraint.
On the other hand, suppose that we succeed in satisfying the burden of 
proving that it is not reasonable to attempt to achieve the goal by means of a 
nonmilitary measure. The last resort principle is a conditional prohibition. It 
is not a conditional permission. It does not say: ‘it is morally permissible to 
attempt to achieve a goal by means of a military action, if it is not reasonable 
to attempt to achieve that goal by means of a nonmilitary measure’. Therefore, 
we cannot conclude, even tentatively, that it is morally permissible to perform 
the military action. And there is still the burden of proving that the other 
core just war principles are satisfied. Because the last resort principle does 
not include such a moral permission, it functions clearly again as a moral 
constraint.
A main thesis is that we are able to ascertain that the last resort principle is 
satisfied by means of standards of reasonableness. By means of them, we are 
able to determine that it is not reasonable to attempt alternative nonmilitary 
measures before resorting to the use of armed force. The last resort principle 
is formulated briefly and simply. Instead of complicating it by incorporating 
various qualifications, I am proposing, as subordinate principles, some 
reasonableness standards, which are also formulated briefly and simply.
There are five reasonableness standards. The next section discusses 
 epistemic and specificity standards. Standards of impracticality, dispropor-
tionality and awfulness are discussed in the following three sections. The 
impracticality, disproportionality and awfulness standards are applied dis-
junctively: for each particular alternative nonmilitary measure, it is sufficient 
to prove that one of these three subordinate principles is satisfied. The five 
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standards are not mechanical decision procedures. Acceptance of them by 
diverse responsible agents is compatible with principled moral disagreement 
about difficult cases.
B. CLARITY AND SPECIFICITY
First, there is the epistemic standard of clear and convincing evidence. The 
last resort principle is primarily applicable by particular responsible agents 
from particular temporal standpoints. From the temporal standpoint of the 
present, responsible agents apply the last resort principle prospectively 
to future nonmilitary measures. Prospective clarity stems from present 
evidence. To satisfy the burden of proving that it is not reasonable to attempt 
to achieve a particular goal by means of a particular nonmilitary measure, 
there has to be clear and convincing evidence.
Second, there is the specificity standard of sufficient detail. To satisfy the 
burden of proving that it is not reasonable to attempt to achieve a particular 
goal by means of a particular nonmilitary measure, we have to specify, by 
means of sufficient detail, the planned course of nonmilitary actions that 
together comprise that particular means of achieving that particular goal.
How much detail and what sort of detail would be sufficient? This question 
can be answered fully only on a case-by-case basis. The five reasonableness 
standards are interrelated, and the other standards presuppose relevant detail.
C.  IMPRACTICALITY
Third, there is a standard of impracticality (or infeasibility). In the language 
of the last resort criterion in the High-level Panel Report, there have to be 
‘reasonable grounds’ for determining that the nonmilitary measure ‘will not 
succeed’. Similarly, Childress contends that the last resort principle does not 
require ‘that all possible measures have to be attempted and exhausted if 
there is no reasonable expectation that they will be successful’ (1982: 75).
Accordingly, to ascertain that the last resort principle is satisfied, we have 
the burden of proving that the goal would not be achieved by means of 
a nonmilitary measure. Subordinate to the last resort principle, there is a 
standard concerning the impracticality of nonmilitary measures:
Impracticality standard. The planned course of nonmilitary actions 
would not achieve the goal.
This standard is interrelated with the epistemic standard. To satisfy the 
burden of proving that the goal would not be achieved by means of a particular 
nonmilitary measure, there has to be clear and convincing evidence. And 
both standards are interrelated with the specificity standard. To satisfy the 
burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the goal would 
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not be achieved by means of a particular nonmilitary measure, the particular 
planned course of nonmilitary action has to be sufficiently detailed.
D. DISPROPORTIONALITY
Fourth, there is a standard of disproportionality. Even when a particular 
nonmilitary measure would achieve the goal, it must not be disproportionate.
Accordingly, let me suggest a major revision of the last resort criterion 
in the High-level Panel Report: has every nonmilitary measure for meeting 
the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing 
either that it would not succeed or that it would not be proportionate?
Comparably, to ascertain that the last resort principle is satisfied, we 
have the burden of proving that the goal would be attempted by means of 
a nonmilitary measure that would be disproportionate. Subordinate to the 
last resort principle, there is a standard of disproportionality. Roughly, the 
benefits of a planned course of nonmilitary actions would be outweighed by 
the grievous harms. More precisely, I propose to formulate this standard as 
follows.
Disproportionality standard. Vitally beneficent actions in a planned 
course of nonmilitary actions would be outbalanced by grievously 
harmful actions.
In Chapter 8, ‘Proportionality and Authority’, the terms ‘vitally beneficent 
action’ and ‘outbalanced’ are explained. I record the disproportionality 
standard here for ease of reference.
E.  AWFULNESS
Fifth, there is a standard of awfulness. According to Simon Caney, the last 
resort principle is grounded on ‘the assumption that war is the most awful 
option’ (2005: 202). Indeed, large-scale war is a terrible option – one that is 
correctly thought to be the most awful. However, sometimes a sufficiently 
limited or targeted use of armed force might not be the most awful option; 
sometimes an alternative nonmilitary measure might be more horrific – for 
example, the imposition of large-scale economic sanctions. Even when 
both the impracticality and disproportionality standards are not satisfied, a 
nonmilitary measure could still be substantially more awful than a sufficiently 
limited or targeted military action.
Accordingly, let me suggest another major revision of the last resort 
criterion in the High-level Panel Report: has every nonmilitary measure for 
meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for 
believing either that it would not succeed or that it would not be proportionate 
or that it would be substantially more awful?
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Comparably, to ascertain that the last resort principle is satisfied, we 
have the burden of proving that attempting to achieve a goal by means of a 
nonmilitary measure would be substantially more awful than attempting to 
achieve it by means of military action. To supplement the impracticality and 
disproportionality standards, there is the following standard of comparative 
awfulness.
Awfulness standard. The planned course of nonmilitary actions would 
be substantially more awful.
How is the awfulness standard different from the disproportionality 
standard? Roughly, my answer is as follows. Even when the grievous harms 
of an alternative nonmilitary measure are outweighed by the benefits, those 
grievous harms might still be substantially more awful than the grievous 
harms of the military action. This question is answered more fully in Chapter 
8, ‘Proportionality and Authority’.
What should be meant by the qualification ‘substantially’? To satisfy 
the just cause principle, a threatened harm has to be sufficiently serious. 
The concept of ‘seriousness’ is a scalar concept. Similarly, the concept of 
‘substantialness’ is a scalar concept. Presumably, there is a threshold (or 
thresholds) above which a particular nonmilitary measure would prove 
substantially more awful and below which it would not.
In terms of the awfulness standard, let me briefly answer a stock question 
about nonviolent action: ‘Should the victims of brutal tyranny be expected to 
maintain a strictly nonviolent response?’ (Cortright 2006: 112) Presumably, 
the victims have a just goal for the use of armed force – roughly, stopping the 
brutal tyranny from gravely violating their basic human rights. Even if they 
cannot prove that this goal would not be achieved by means of nonviolent 
action, they might be able to prove that struggling against the brutal tyranny 
by means of nonviolent action would be substantially more awful than 
struggling against it by means of the use of armed force. Frequently, for 
example, it would be substantially more awful to suffer genocide than to 
target genocidaires.
F.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Remember that the impracticality, disproportionality and awfulness standards 
are applied disjunctively. To satisfy the last resort principle, it has to be 
proven that each alternative nonmilitary measure either would not achieve 
the goal or would be disproportionate or would be substantially more awful.
In conclusion, by means of the five reasonableness standards, we are able 
to ascertain that the last resort principle is satisfied. To satisfy that principle, 
we have to prove with clear and convincing evidence that each sufficiently 
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detailed planned course of nonmilitary actions either would not achieve the 
goal or would be disproportionate or would be substantially more awful.
V.  FURTHER OBSERVATIONS
A. PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION VERSUS ARMED 
INTERVENTION IN DARFUR
Sudan, where prospects for peace had looked so promising for much of 
2003, has become a potential horror story in 2004. The rapid onset of 
war in its western region of Darfur has created one of the world’s worst 
humanitarian crises – thousands dead and some 830,000 uprooted from 
homes.
International Crisis Group, 25 March 2004 (ICG 2004: i)
In Darfur, where as many as 10,000 people or more, overwhelmingly 
civilians, continue to die each month, stronger measures are still needed 
to restore security and prevent further mass deaths.
International Crisis Group, 26 April 2005 (ICG 2005: 1)
In this section, I support the awfulness standard by means of some additional 
moral judgements concerning the particular case of Darfur. The general 
question illustrated here is roughly this: under some circumstances, would 
it be substantially more awful to continue negotiating than to intervene 
militarily?
The two block quotations are excerpted from ICG reports dated 25 March 
2004 and 26 April 2005. The first quotation reports the onset of genocide in 
Darfur, and the second quotation reports the continuation of genocide there.
Again, let us imagine how the just cause and last resort principles might 
be applied prospectively by the Security Council. From the temporal 
standpoint of 25 March 2004, the negotiationists and the interventionists are 
in agreement that there is a just cause for armed humanitarian intervention 
to stop genocide in Darfur. In this ICG report, it is recommended that the 
Security Council pass a resolution that ‘calls for internationally facilitated 
political negotiations between government and rebels in Darfur, the initial 
aim of which would be an internationally monitored ceasefire’ (ICG 2004: 
iii). To satisfy the last resort principle, it has to be proven with clear and 
convincing evidence that such negotiations either would not stop the 
genocide or would be disproportionate or would be substantially more awful 
than armed intervention. From the temporal standpoint of 25 March 2004, 
the negotiationists and the interventionists also agree that there is not such 
clear and convincing evidence.
From the temporal standpoint of 26 April 2005, the negotiationists and 
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interventionists still agree that there is a just cause for armed humanitarian 
intervention to stop genocide in Darfur. But now they are in disagreement 
about the last resort principle. On 8 April 2004, a limited peace agreement 
was signed: the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement (ICG 2005: 2). Presently, 
however, ‘efforts to achieve a political solution are stalled. The AU-led 
negotiations in Abuja have not resumed since the unsuccessful December 
2004 round’ (ICG 2005: 3).
On the one hand, the negotiationists maintain that there is still not clear 
and convincing evidence that continuing such negotiations either would not 
stop the genocide or would be disproportionate or would be substantially 
more awful than armed intervention.
On the other hand, the interventionists reason as follows. We agree that 
there is not clear and convincing evidence that continuing such negotiations 
would not stop the genocide. Also, we agree about the disproportionality 
standard. Nonetheless, we disagree about the awfulness standard. In each 
of the months from April 2004 to April 2005, ‘as many as 10,000 people 
or more, overwhelmingly civilians’ died (ICG 2005: 1). Despite the fog of 
armed conflict, there is clear and convincing evidence that large numbers 
of innocent civilians will die in future months. Therefore, continuing to 
negotiate would be substantially more awful than a sufficiently targeted 
armed intervention.
Despite such principled moral disagreement, there might be principled 
moral compromise. For the negotiationists might respond as follows. A 
month ago, the Security Council demanded, in Resolution 1591 (2005), that 
the Sudanese Government ‘immediately cease conducting offensive military 
flights in and over the Darfur region’. The Sudanese Government has failed 
to comply with this demand, so we are now willing to support a resolution 
authorising a highly targeted armed intervention – namely, the imposition 
of a no-fly zone – but only if the resolution also mandates that negotiations 
must continue.
From the temporal standpoint of 26 April 2005, the negotiationists and 
the interventionists agree to authorise a no-fly zone. While this no-fly zone 
is being imposed, should negotiations continue? This question illustrates the 
concurrence problem. While a military action is being performed, should 
nonmilitary measures be attempted? This problem is considered in the next 
section, ‘The Concurrence Problem’.
By contrast, from the later temporal standpoint of 8 July 2011, the negotia-
tionists and the interventionists agree that, before authorising a no-fly zone, 
reasonable negotiation and mediation must be attempted. A comparison of 
what is imagined about the case of Darfur in this section with what is imag-
ined above in the section ‘Moral Compromise about Armed Humanitarian 
Intervention in Darfur’ illustrates why temporal standpoints matter.
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Conceivably, from the earlier temporal standpoint of 25 March 2004, the 
negotiationists and interventionists might also agree about a different kind 
of measure – namely, that the Security Council should ‘threaten’ to impose 
a no-fly zone, in order to ‘deter’ the Sudanese Government from conducting 
offensive military flights (ICG 2006: 1).
Is the ‘deterrent threat’ to impose a no-fly zone a nonmilitary measure? In 
the next chapter (‘Last Resort and Noncombatant Immunity’), I explore such 
questions that interrelate the ideas of ‘coercive military threat’ and last resort.
B.  THE CONCURRENCE PROBLEM
While we perform a military action, should we attempt a nonmilitary measure? 
For instance, while we fight, should we negotiate? It might be thought that 
the last resort principle is applicable only during prelude and resort phases, 
but this thought is incorrect. It is also applicable during conduct, halting and 
aftermath phases. The process of performing a military action is a temporal 
process, and so is the process of applying the last resort principle.
Let me provide a schematic case. During the resort phase, we apply the last 
resort principle: it is morally obligatory not to ‘start to perform’ a proposed 
military action as a means of attempting to achieve a particular goal, if it is 
reasonable to attempt to achieve that goal by means of a nonmilitary measure. 
At each critical juncture, during the conduct phase, we apply the last resort 
principle: it is morally obligatory not to ‘continue to perform’ that military 
action as a means of attempting to achieve that goal, if it is reasonable to 
attempt to achieve that goal by means of a nonmilitary measure.
Even if mental ‘inertia’ makes continuing easier than starting, these moral 
prohibitions are comparably stringent. During the resort phase, we have the 
burden of proving that the last resort principle is satisfied. Before we start 
to perform the proposed military action, we have to morally presume that it 
is reasonable to attempt a nonmilitary measure, and we have the burden of 
proving that it is not. For example, we have to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the nonmilitary measure of negotiation would be impractical 
(or disproportionate or substantially more awful). Comparably, during the 
conduct phase, at each critical juncture, we have the burden of proving 
that the last resort principle is still satisfied. While we continue to perform 
that military action, we have to morally presume that it is reasonable to 
attempt a nonmilitary measure, and we have the burden of proving that it 
is not. For example, we have to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the nonmilitary measure of negotiation would still be impractical (or 
disproportionate or substantially more awful).
Sometimes, during the conduct phase, the most effective way to obtain 
clear and convincing evidence that it is not reasonable to attempt to achieve 
a goal by negotiating is by actually engaging in the process of negotiating. 
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Sometimes, while we are fighting, we should also be negotiating. (Of course, 
there are other reasons for negotiating while fighting.)
C. NEITHER VICTORY NOR DEFEAT
Suppose that, during the conduct phase, at some critical juncture, we fail to 
satisfy the burden of proving that it is not reasonable to attempt to achieve 
our goal by negotiating. Our moral presumption becomes determinative: 
we have to decide that it is reasonable to attempt to achieve our goal by 
negotiating. And therefore, we have to conclude that it is morally obligatory 
to cease performing the military action. At that critical juncture, the conduct 
phase becomes a phase of halting.
Indeed, whenever there is armed conflict, there might be a process of 
escalation, but there might also be a process of de-escalation. Stereotypically, 
wars end in victory or defeat. However, there are various intermediate types 
of armed-conflict termination, including ceasefire, truce and armistice. 
A main thesis is that sometimes, during the conduct phase, when the last 
resort principle is no longer satisfied, it is morally obligatory to de-escalate 
unilaterally. (Comparable theses hold of the other core just war principles.) 
Sometimes, in order to realise a truce, a unilateral initiative – for example, 
cessation of deep strikes – is morally obligatory. Sometimes, a unilateral 
ceasefire is morally obligatory. Even if we scent victory, we must halt.
NOTES
1. Compare this chapter with the chapter ‘Last resort’ in Coates (1997). Most books 
on just war theory devote only a handful of pages to the subject of last resort.
2. A handbook that surveys a wide variety of peaceful measures is Webel and 
Galtung (2007).
3. For some comparisons of Kantian ethics and feminist ethics, see Lango (1998). 
4. For a fuller discussion of this view, see Lango (2009a).
5. Concerning the subject of ‘unarmed insurrections’, see Schock (2005).
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CHAPTER 7
LAST RESORT AND 
NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY
To counterbalance overemphasis of the just cause principle, I am devoting 
two chapters to the last resort principle. In the first part of this chapter, the 
idea of last resort is interrelated with the idea of ‘coercive military threat’. In 
the second part, a ‘penultimate’ (or ‘next-to-last’) resort principle concern-
ing coercive military threats is proposed and supported. Additionally, in the 
second and third parts, four other resort principles are proposed and sup-
ported. In the third part, the idea of last resort is interrelated with the idea of 
noncombatant immunity. Finally, in the fourth part, the core noncombatant 
immunity principle is introduced.
I .  DETERRENCE AND COMPELLENCE
We will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter 
attack on the United States, and on our allies and partners.
Nuclear Posture Review Report (DOD 2010b: vi)
A.  NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
During the Cold War, writings on the subject of ‘nuclear ethics’ were primarily 
concerned with the ethics of nuclear deterrence. The central question was 
this: is it morally permissible to deter a nuclear attack by threatening nuclear 
retaliation? There was also the related question of ‘first use’. Is it morally 
permissible to deter a conventional attack – in particular, a Soviet invasion 
of Western Europe – by threatening nuclear retaliation?
The subject of nuclear ethics might presently appear to be outmoded, now 
that the Cold War has ended. However, it has been revivified by the threat of 
‘rogue states’ and terrorist groups armed with nuclear weapons. Additionally, 
there is the threat of such actors armed with weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) of other sorts – namely, biological, chemical and radiological 
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weapons. Therefore, in this post-Cold War era, it is important to consider a 
broader topic than that of nuclear ethics – namely, the ethics of weapons of 
mass destruction. More briefly, this broader topic may be called ‘the ethics 
of WMD’ (Hasmi and Lee 2004: 1) or ‘WMD ethics’.
Consequently, in addition to the stated questions about nuclear deterrence, 
a just war theory should be concerned with other questions regarding ‘WMD 
deterrence’. For example, is it morally permissible to deter an attack with 
chemical and biological weapons (CBW) by threatening nuclear retaliation? 
That this question is not fanciful is evidenced by an implicit declaratory 
threat made by the United States to ‘states not in compliance with their 
nuclear non-proliferation obligations’ (e.g. North Korea) – namely, that ‘U.S. 
nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW 
attack against the United States or its allies and partners’ (DOD 2010b: viii).
My view is that the mere possession of nuclear weapons by any state – 
whether by a ‘rogue state’, such as North Korea, or by a ‘responsible’ member 
of the international community, such as the United States – is a grave threat to 
world peace. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty incorporates the goal of 
the abolition of nuclear weapons. Significantly, during his speech in Prague 
on 5 April 2009, Obama promulgated the goal of ‘a world without nuclear 
weapons’, but he also stated: ‘This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps 
not in my lifetime’ (2009b). Accordingly, immediately preceding the block 
quotation from the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review Report, there is the 
following sentence: ‘Until such time as the Administration’s goal of a world 
free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained 
as a core mission for the Department of Defense’ (DOD 2010b: vi).
B.  CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE
In addition to questions about WMD deterrence, a just war theory should 
address questions about conventional deterrence. For example, is it morally 
permissible to deter an armed invasion by threatening to use conventional 
weapons?
Even if it is morally obligatory not to threaten to use nuclear weapons, 
it does not follow (conceptually or logically) that it is morally obligatory 
not to threaten to use conventional weapons. The ethics of conventional 
deterrence is distinguishable from, albeit interrelated with, the ethics of 
nuclear deterrence.
Arguably, under some circumstances, it is morally permissible – and 
sometimes even morally obligatory – to threaten to use conventional 
weapons. For instance, should the Security Council threaten to authorise 
armed humanitarian intervention, in order to deter genocide? Consider 
again the case of Darfur, from the temporal standpoint of 29 March 2005. 
In Resolution 1591 (2005), the Security Council demands that the Sudanese 
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Government ‘immediately cease conducting offensive military flights in and 
over the Darfur region’. Should the Security Council also threaten to impose 
a no-fly zone, in order to deter the Sudanese Government from continuing 
to conduct such flights?
In general, then, a just war theory should address moral questions about 
military deterrence. Is it morally permissible to deter the use of armed force 
by threatening to use armed force? Additionally, moral questions about 
‘compellent’ threats should be addressed.
C.  ARE MILITARY THREATS NONMILITARY MEASURES?
Today [1965] we are beginning again the comprehensive pursuit of new 
ideas and new procedures. We realize that, terrible as these [nuclear] 
weapons are, they exist, and therefore they may be used. In any case, 
their use will be threatened, and such threats are a kind of use.
Herman Kahn, On Escalation (1965: 199)
Herman Kahn – a prestigious but controversial Cold War military strategist – 
was especially concerned with nuclear threats. Granted that nuclear weapons 
still exist and that they still might be used, I want to distinguish two questions. 
Is the threat to use them a kind of use of them? Alternatively, is the threat to 
use them a kind of nonmilitary measure?
In this section, I investigate a generalisation of these questions. Is the 
threat to use armed force a kind of use of armed force or a kind of nonmilitary 
measure? In other words, should ‘coercive military threats’ be conceptualised 
as military actions or as coercive nonmilitary measures? As a clue to how 
these questions might be answered, let me add that the word ‘or’ is used 
inclusively.
The concept of ‘coercive military threat’ encompasses both deterrent 
threats and ‘compellent’ threats. As Thomas Schelling explained, the usual 
idea of deterrence can be distinguished from a conception of ‘compellence’ 
(1966: 70–1). For example, during the Cold War, NATO made (roughly) 
the following deterrent threat: if the Soviet Army invades Western Europe, 
NATO might counterattack with tactical nuclear weapons. And had the 
Soviet Army invaded Western Europe, NATO could have made (roughly) 
the following compellent threat: if the Soviet Army does not withdraw 
from Western Europe immediately, NATO might counterattack with tactical 
nuclear weapons.
Some coercive threats to use armed force are both deterrent and compellent. 
For instance, from the temporal standpoint of 25 March 2004, imagine that 
the Security Council threatens to impose a no-fly zone in Darfur. The purpose 
of this coercive military threat may be described as either ‘to deter the 
Sudanese government from continuing to conduct offensive military flights’ 
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or ‘to compel the Sudanese government to cease conducting offensive 
military flights’.
In addition to such ‘declaratory threats’, the concepts of deterrence 
and compellence encompass a wide range of actions of other kinds – for 
example, troop mobilisations and ‘demonstration shots’. For instance, 
from the temporal standpoint of 25 March 2004, imagine that the Security 
Council calls upon members of NATO to transport ‘a squadron of twelve 
to eighteen Harrier fighter aircraft’ to an airfield in Chad (ICG 2006: 12). 
The mobilisation of these aircraft would signal the resolve of the Security 
Council to authorise the imposition of a no-fly zone in Darfur, if necessary. 
Imagine also that the Security Council calls upon the United States to launch 
a single cruise missile against parked Sudanese military aircraft, thereby 
‘demonstrating the resolve’ to enforce a no-fly zone by means of the use of 
armed force, if necessary.
During the Cold War, McGeorge Bundy developed a conception of 
‘existential [nuclear] deterrence’ – roughly, that the mere existence of nuclear 
weapons, apart from any explicit threat or intention or commitment to use 
them, generates ‘terrible and unavoidable uncertainties’, uncertainties that 
suffice to deter attacks (1984: 8–9). Comparably, there is a conception of 
‘existential conventional deterrence’. For example, the mere existence of 
military forces that might be used to counter aggression poses, even if only 
implicitly, a deterrent threat to counter aggression, if necessary.
Also, the mere presence in a Chad airfield of NATO aircraft that might be 
used to counter Sudanese aircraft poses, even if only implicitly, a deterrent 
(or compellent) threat to counter them, if necessary.
Analogously, the mere firing of a demonstration shot against a military 
target poses, even if only implicitly, a deterrent (or compellent) threat to 
use armed force against other military targets, if necessary. Inherently, a 
demonstration shot is both a use of armed force and a threat to use armed 
force. In short, demonstration shots are overlap cases.
Let me return to the main question of this section. Is a threat to use armed 
force a use of armed force or a nonmilitary measure? My answer is that, 
seemingly paradoxically, coercive military threats are coercive nonmilitary 
measures. According to the last resort principle, it is morally obligatory not 
to use armed force, if every reasonable threat to use armed force has not been 
attempted.
However, I want to stress that some coercive military threats are overlap 
cases, in that they are both coercive nonmilitary measures and military actions 
– for instance, demonstration shots. Thus cases of coercive military threats 
are intermediate cases, in that they are neither paradigm cases of coercive 
nonmilitary measures nor paradigm cases of military actions. A main thesis 
is that, among the various kinds of coercive nonmilitary measures, coercive 
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military threats resemble military actions most closely. (This use of the term 
‘resemble’ is inclusive of ‘identity’, since some coercive military threats are 
military actions.)
D.  A LAST RESORT THREAT
Sincere and credible commitment to the last resort principle constitutes a form 
of existential deterrence. Suppose that, in a particular case, the other core 
just war principles are satisfied. Roughly, the last resort principle mandates 
that, before we (the responsible agents) resort to the use of armed force 
against you (our adversaries), we must attempt every reasonable nonmilitary 
measure. Accordingly, we could make (explicitly or implicitly) the following 
deterrent threat: if we satisfy the burden of proving that we have attempted 
every reasonable nonmilitary measure, we will use armed force against you. 
This ‘last resort threat’ does not have to be voiced, for it is inherent in the 
very idea of ‘attempting every reasonable nonmilitary measure, before using 
armed force’. A concept of ‘deterrent military threat’ is inherent in the idea 
of last resort.
I I .  A LADDER OF RESORTS
In addition to morally constraining uses of armed force, a just war theory 
should morally constrain threats to use armed force. Characteristically, uses 
of armed force are highly destructive, and threats to use armed force are 
highly dangerous. The arms races of the Cold War, the mobilisation race that 
was a proximate cause of the First World War and the ‘coercive diplomacy’ 
of Vietnam War aerial bombardments evidence that acts of deterrence and 
compellence can be extremely dangerous and even destructive. There is a 
slippery slope from the existential threat of the mere possession of military 
forces to greatly destructive acts of ‘intrawar’ deterrence and compellence.
Paradigmatically, a deterrent military threat by agents to targets is 
conditional: ‘if’ you (the targets) perform a specified action, ‘then’ we (the 
agents) will use specified armed force against you. Presumably, when such a 
conditional threat is made, harms of armed conflict would be avoided were 
the targets to refrain from performing the action specified in the condition. 
Furthermore, by endeavouring to make the threat credible, not only would 
the agents intend to coerce the targets to refrain from performing the specified 
action, but they also might expect and even predict that the targets will refrain 
from performing it. Nonetheless, even though unintended, unexpected or 
unpredicted, the targets could still perform it. Deterrence could fail. And then 
the agents could respond by using the specified armed force against the targets, 
especially because their threat was meant to be credible. Consequently, in 
making the deterrent threat, agents create for themselves the serious risk 
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of having to perform acts of killing or grievously injuring human beings. 
Paradigmatically, such deterrent threats are highly dangerous. (For brevity, 
I make remarks about deterrent threats, but parallel remarks also hold of 
compellent threats.)
A.  A PENULTIMATE RESORT PRINCIPLE
Truly, among the various kinds of coercive nonmilitary measures, coercive 
military threats resemble military actions most closely. Accordingly, a main 
thesis is that coercive military threats should be a ‘next-to-last’ resort. Before 
threatening to use armed force, every reasonable ‘nonforceful’ measure 
should be exhausted. The term ‘nonforceful measure’ is stipulated to mean 
‘a nonmilitary measure that is not a coercive military threat’. Specifically, the 
set of ‘coercive nonforceful measures’ contain all those coercive nonmilitary 
measures that are not coercive military threats.
Therefore, supplementary to the last resort principle for actual uses of 
armed force, I propose to formulate a principle of ‘penultimate resort’ for 
deterrent and compellent threats to use armed force as follows.
Penultimate resort principle. It is morally obligatory not to attempt to 
achieve a goal by means of a threat to use armed force, if it is reasonable 
to attempt to achieve that goal by means of a nonforceful measure.
Because threats to use armed force can be highly dangerous, a just war 
theory should morally constrain them. When we deliberate about whether 
to threaten to use armed force, we have to make the moral presumption that 
we must not. To override this moral presumption, we have the burden of 
proving that the penultimate resort principle is satisfied. To ascertain that 
the principle is satisfied, we have to morally presume that it is reasonable 
to attempt a nonforceful measure, and we have the burden of proving that 
it is not.
What are the standards for determining that it is not reasonable to attempt 
a nonforceful measure? The reasonableness standards for the last resort 
principle are also standards of reasonableness for the penultimate resort 
principle. To satisfy the penultimate resort principle, we have to prove with 
clear and convincing evidence that each sufficiently detailed nonforceful 
measure either would not achieve the goal or would be disproportionate or 
would be substantially more awful.
In the preceding chapter, a related principle is advocated:
Coercive resort principle. It is morally obligatory not to attempt to achieve 
a goal by means of a coercive nonmilitary measure, if it is reasonable to 
attempt to achieve that goal by means of a peaceful measure.
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The reasonableness standards for the last resort principle are also standards 
of reasonableness for the coercive resort principle. To satisfy the coercive 
resort principle, we have to prove with clear and convincing evidence that 
each sufficiently detailed peaceful measure either would not achieve the goal 
or would be disproportionate or would be substantially more awful.
Indeed, there is a gamut of kinds of nonmilitary measures, from ones 
that are genuinely pacific to ones that are exceedingly coercive. Together, 
the coercive resort, penultimate resort and last resort principles establish a 
‘ladder of resorts’ – roughly, peaceful measures before coercive nonforceful 
measures, coercive nonforceful measures before threats to use armed force 
and threats to use armed force before uses of armed force.
Instead of a simple dichotomy between nonmilitary measures and uses 
of armed force, I am advocating what may be termed a ‘polychotomy’. A 
dichotomy has two primary parts, whereas a polychotomy has many primary 
parts. The resort ladder involves a polychotomy, the primary parts of which 
are peaceful measures, coercive nonforceful measures, threats to use armed 
force and uses of armed force. Although jointly exhaustive, these primary 
parts are not mutually exclusive, insofar as there are overlap cases.
B.  COMPOUND NONMILITARY MEASURES
The impasse over deploying a major UN peacekeeping force to Darfur 
results directly from the international community’s three-year failure 
to apply effective diplomatic and economic pressure on Sudan’s 
government and its senior officials . . . [for example] targeted sanctions 
against regime leaders and their business interests.
Getting the UN into Darfur, 12 October 2006 (ICG 2006: 1)
Let us consider again the case of Darfur, but from the temporal standpoint 
of 12 October 2006. Presumably, deploying a UN peacekeeping mission 
is a nonmilitary measure, as is imposing targeted economic sanctions. 
The block quotation illustrates the idea of a ‘compound nonmilitary 
measure’ – for example, imposing targeted economic sanctions, in order 
to ‘pressure’ the Sudanese Government to consent to the deployment of a 
UN peacekeeping mission. Another example is ‘pressuring’ the Sudanese 
Government to consent to that deployment, by ‘immediately planning for the 
establishment and enforcement of a no-fly zone over Darfur’ (ICG 2006: 1). 
Paradigmatically, as the term ‘pressure’ signals, peaceful measures can be 
buttressed by coercive nonmilitary measures. (Often, the verb ‘pressure’ is 
used as a euphemism for the verb ‘coerce’.)
Compound nonmilitary measures involve relations of means to goals – for 
instance, imposing targeted economic sanctions, ‘in order to’ deploy a UN 
peacekeeping mission. More explicitly, the compound nonmilitary measure 
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is as follows. Imposing targeted economic sanctions is intended as a means of 
achieving the goal of deploying a UN peacekeeping mission, and deploying 
the UN peacekeeping mission is intended as a means of achieving the goal of 
stopping sufficiently grave violations of basic human rights. Another example 
is threatening prosecution by the International Criminal Court, in order to 
‘pressure’ parties to an armed conflict to negotiate a peace agreement. More 
explicitly, this compound nonmilitary measure is as follows. Threatening 
ICC prosecution is intended as a means of achieving the goal of negotiating 
a peace agreement, and negotiating the peace agreement is intended as a 
means of achieving the goal of stopping sufficiently grave violations of basic 
human rights. In each example, two nonmilitary measures are compounded 
by relations of means to goals.
Significantly, coercive military threats and nonforceful measures can be 
thus compounded. Let me sketch an important illustration. From the temporal 
standpoint of 12 October 2006, imagine that the Security Council threatens 
to authorise armed humanitarian intervention in Darfur, if the Sudanese 
Government does not allow a UN peacekeeping mission to deploy there. 
Threatening to authorise armed humanitarian intervention is intended as a 
means of achieving the goal of deploying a UN peacekeeping mission, and 
deploying the UN peacekeeping mission is intended as a means of achieving 
the goal of stopping sufficiently grave violations of basic human rights.
Furthermore, peaceful measures can be buttressed by peaceful measures 
– for instance, diplomatic measures to facilitate negotiations. Coercive 
nonforceful measures can be buttressed by coercive nonforceful measures – 
for example, a threat of economic sanctions against a spoiler of an economic 
sanctions regime. And so forth.
C.  A PROXIMATE RESORT PRINCIPLE
Paradigmatically, when military measures are employed, basic human 
rights are gravely violated; whereas, when peaceful measures are employed, 
basic human rights are not gravely violated. Although there is this crucial 
moral difference between paradigmatic military measures and paradigmatic 
peaceful measures, there are problems in cases that are not paradigmatic.
Under some circumstances, when we buttress peaceful measures by 
coercive nonmilitary measures, we actually violate gravely or seriously risk 
gravely violating basic human rights. For example, economic pressure to 
negotiate might actually violate gravely or seriously risk gravely violating 
basic economic rights.
I call such compound nonmilitary measures ‘coercive–peaceful measures’. 
A ‘coercive–peaceful measure’ is a compound nonmilitary measure that 
employs a coercive nonmilitary measure as a means of achieving, as a 
goal, the employment of a peaceful measure. Coercive–peaceful measures 
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are ‘indirectly’ coercive. In the preceding example, imposing economic 
sanctions is intended as a means of achieving the goal of negotiating a peace 
agreement, and negotiating a peace agreement is intended as a means of 
achieving the goal of stopping sufficiently grave violations of basic human 
rights. Despite the word ‘peaceful’, coercive–peaceful measures are coercive 
nonmilitary measures, even if not paradigmatic ones.
By contrast, some nonmilitary measures are ‘entirely peaceful’ and some 
are ‘entirely coercive’. Roughly, a peaceful measure is ‘entirely peaceful’ 
when it is not compounded with a coercive measure, and a coercive 
nonmilitary measure is ‘entirely coercive’ when it is not compounded with a 
peaceful measure. Entirely coercive nonmilitary measures can be ‘directly’ 
coercive. Under some circumstances, imposing targeted economic sanctions 
on adversaries is directly intended as a means of achieving the goal of 
stopping those adversaries from gravely violating basic human rights.
Among the various kinds of coercive nonmilitary measures, coercive–
peaceful measures resemble entirely peaceful measures most closely. 
Analogous to the crucial moral difference between peaceful measures and 
coercive nonmilitary measures, there is a crucial moral difference between 
coercive–peaceful measures and entirely coercive nonmilitary measures. 
Accordingly, a main thesis is that coercive–peaceful measures should be a 
‘proximate’ (or ‘next-to-first’) resort. Before attempting an entirely coercive 
nonmilitary measure, every reasonable coercive–peaceful measure should 
be exhausted.
Therefore, I propose to formulate a resort principle about coercive–
peaceful measures as follows.
Proximate resort principle. It is morally obligatory not to attempt to 
achieve a goal by means of an entirely coercive nonmilitary measure, if 
it is reasonable to attempt to achieve that goal by means of a coercive-
peaceful measure.
What are the standards for determining that it is not reasonable to attempt 
a coercive–peaceful measure? The reasonableness standards for the last 
resort principle are also standards of reasonableness for the proximate 
resort principle. To satisfy the latter principle, we have to prove with clear 
and convincing evidence that each sufficiently detailed coercive–peaceful 
measure either would not achieve the goal or would be disproportionate or 
would be substantially more awful.
Nonviolent actions are nonmilitary measures. Under some circumstances, 
we could buttress consensual peaceful measures by means of peaceful 
actions that are unilateral. For instance, we might promote negotiations 
by means of demonstrations. Analogous to the proximate resort principle, 
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should there also be a ‘nonviolent resort principle’? I would answer this 
question negatively. Paradigmatically, when we perform nonviolent actions, 
we do not gravely violate basic human rights.
In conclusion, because there are now four resort principles, the ladder of 
resorts needs to have additional rungs – roughly, entirely peaceful meas-
ures before coercive–peaceful measures, coercive–peaceful measures before 
entirely coercive nonforceful measures and so forth. Correspondingly, the 
stated polychotomy needs to be more fine-grained. Together, the four resort 
principles partition the set of nonmilitary and military measures into the fol-
lowing primary parts: entirely peaceful measures, coercive–peaceful meas-
ures, entirely coercive nonforceful measures, entirely coercive threats to use 
armed force and uses of armed force. These primary parts are jointly exhaus-
tive, but they are not mutually exclusive, insofar as there are overlap cases.
According to the coequality thesis, the just cause principle and the other 
core just war principles are deontological principles coequally. Therefore, 
the last resort principle must be satisfied, even when the just cause principle 
is not satisfied. Let me extend this coequality thesis as follows. Even when 
we fail to satisfy the just cause principle, we are still morally constrained 
by the four resort principles. It is still morally obligatory for us not to use 
armed force to achieve a goal that is not a just goal, if we have not attempted 
(first) every reasonable entirely peaceful measure, (second) every reasonable 
coercive–peaceful measure, (third) every reasonable entirely coercive 
nonforceful measure and (fourth) every reasonable entirely coercive threat 
to use armed force. Under some circumstances, because of the time requisite 
for attempting all of the nonmilitary measures that are reasonable, the 
destructiveness of unjust armed conflict could be circumvented.
D. THRESHOLDS
And as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital 
national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. 
After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the 
resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan 
capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of 
Afghanistan.
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the
Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan
(1 December 2009) (2009c)
A presupposition of the ladder of resorts is that the set of nonmilitary measures 
is partitioned into four primary parts. Should the set of military measures also 
be partitioned into primary parts? Should the stated polychotomy be even 
more fine-grained?
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There is a ‘spectrum’ of military actions, ranging from actions that are very 
small-scale to ones that are very large-scale. Frequently, when there is armed 
conflict, there is a process of escalation from smaller-scale to larger-scale 
military actions. A chief function of just war principles should be to morally 
constrain processes of escalation – notably, ‘nuclear escalation’.
The block quotation above provides another illustration – namely, the 
US ‘surge strategy’ in Afghanistan. From the temporal standpoint of 1 
December 2009, the sending of 30,000 additional US troops to Afghanistan 
is part of a process of escalating the US counterinsurgency operation there. 
Disputably, even if this military operation satisfies just war principles 
presently, it might cease to satisfy them after this ‘surge’. A chief function 
of just war principles should be to morally constrain such processes of 
‘conventional escalation’.
During the Cold War, Kahn studied a ‘spectrum of international crises’, 
from ‘low-level’ crises to ‘all-out’ wars (1965: 37). Instructively, he arranged 
international crises in ‘roughly increasing levels of intensity’ on an ‘escalation 
ladder’ with forty-four rungs (1965: 38–9). As we climb, rung by rung, up 
the escalation ladder, we cross ‘six basic thresholds’ – most importantly, the 
‘nuclear threshold’ (1965: 94). Each threshold on the escalation ladder is a 
sharp ‘line of demarcation’ in the spectrum of international crises (1965: 95). 
Significantly, these thresholds can function as ‘constraints’ or ‘restraints’ on 
the process of escalation (1965: 97). As a US military strategist, he constructed 
this escalation ladder primarily from the standpoint of US national security.
Disputably, during the Cold War, it was vital to have such thresholds as 
practical constraints. Presently, there is a spectrum of crises, both international 
and internal – for instance, crises of genocide, terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation. In terms of a cosmopolitan conception of global security, 
an escalation ladder might be constructed, with thresholds as practical 
constraints. In Chapter 5 (‘Just Cause’), I mentioned the idea of ‘mission 
creep’ – that is, a somewhat gradual process of escalation, which might occur 
during a military operation. Thresholds on a cosmopolitan escalation ladder 
might function as practical constraints on mission creep.
From the universalist moral standpoint of a cosmopolitan just war theory, 
I want to raise a key question. Given that there are practical constraints on 
the process of escalation, what are the moral constraints? In answer to this 
question, I propose to enlarge the ladder of resorts, by constructing rungs 
within the spectrum of military actions. In what follows, two resort principles 
concerning military measures are proposed and supported. Additionally, the 
stated polychotomy is augmented, by partitioning the set of military measures 
into primary parts.
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E. A POLICING RESORT PRINCIPLE
Analogous to compound nonmilitary measures, there are compound military 
measures. A coercive–peaceful measure is a compound nonmilitary measure 
that employs a coercive nonmilitary measure as a means of achieving, as 
a goal, the employment of a peaceful measure. Analogously, a ‘circuitous 
military measure’ is a compound military measure that employs a military 
measure as a means of achieving, as a goal, the employment of a nonmilitary 
measure. Even though a nonmilitary measure is employed, such a compound 
measure should be conceptualised as a military measure, because a military 
measure is also employed. Circuitous military measures use armed force 
‘indirectly’.
For example, an armed humanitarian intervention might be circuitous. 
From the temporal standpoint of 12 October 2006, let me consider again 
the ‘impasse over deploying a major UN peacekeeping force to Darfur’ 
(ICG 2006: 1). Imagine that the Security Council authorises very limited 
military strikes against a few military targets in Sudan, in order to ‘convince’ 
the Sudanese Government to allow the deployment of such a peacekeeping 
mission. More explicitly, this circuitous military measure is as follows. 
Relatively small-scale military strikes are intended as a means of achieving the 
goal of deploying the peacekeeping mission, and deploying the peacekeeping 
mission is intended as a means of achieving the goal of stopping sufficiently 
grave violations of basic human rights.
Frequently, when armed force is used, the overarching goal is to ‘defeat’ 
adversaries, or ‘prevail’ against them. Frequently, by contrast, circuitous 
military measures can involve goals of compromise and accommodation. For 
an illustration, let us return to the case of Rwanda. On 9 April 1994, Dallaire 
attempted unsuccessfully to obtain additional troops and logistical support. 
‘If we were given a new mandate and the necessary force’, he remarked, 
‘we might be able to get the two parties back to the negotiating table’ (2004: 
276). When the purpose is to ‘pressure’ adversaries to negotiate, circuitous 
military measures should not be employed so destructively as to undermine 
or obviate negotiation. Comparable remarks hold for peaceful measures of 
other kinds. In brief, sometimes military measures that are circuitous should 
also be sufficiently targeted.
Disputably, the imagined circuitous armed humanitarian intervention in 
Darfur is an ‘overlap military action’: it resembles sufficiently in relevant 
respects paradigm military actions, but it also resembles sufficiently in 
relevant respects paradigm police actions. To generalise, some circuitous 
military measures can also be conceptualised as police actions. As another 
example, armed force might be used to police an economic sanctions regime.
Furthermore, some targeted military operations that are not circuitous 
military measures can be conceptualised as police actions. Disputably, 
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for instance, the one that killed Osama bin Laden – although resembling 
sufficiently in relevant respects paradigm military actions – also resembles 
sufficiently in relevant respects paradigm police actions.
Characteristically, the scale, duration and intensity of a military action that 
is also a police action (i.e. an ‘overlap military action’) are less than the scale, 
duration and intensity of a military action that is not also a police action (i.e. 
a ‘nonoverlap military action’). Paradigmatically, large-scale nonoverlap 
military actions are significantly more destructive than small-scale overlap 
military actions. A main thesis is that, among the various kinds of military 
actions, overlap military actions resemble coercive nonmilitary measures 
most closely. Indeed, there is a crucial moral difference between overlap 
military actions and nonoverlap military actions.
Therefore, supplementary to the last resort principle about military actions 
generally, I propose to formulate a ‘first-of-last’ resort principle about overlap 
military actions specifically.
Policing resort principle. It is morally obligatory not to attempt to 
achieve a goal by means of a military action that is not also a police 
action, if it is reasonable to attempt to achieve that goal by means of a 
military action that is also a police action.
That there can be armed interventions that conform to this principle is 
confirmed by the case of ‘light intervention’ in Bougainville (Regan 2010).
The last resort principle is a core just war principle, whereas the policing 
resort principle is not. The last resort principle is a necessary moral criterion 
for determining whether a proposed military action would be just. By contrast, 
the policing resort principle is especially relevant to a question explored in 
Chapter 9, ‘All Things Considered’: among alternative proposed military 
actions, each of which would be just, which one would be best?
In conclusion, there are now five resort principles, so the ladder of resorts 
needs to have an additional rung – roughly, overlap military actions before 
nonoverlap military actions. In the next part, the set of military measures is 
further polychotomised.
III .  LAST RESORT AND NONCOMBATANTS
In accordance with coherentism, it is illuminating to investigate how 
the last resort principle is interrelated with other just war principles. 
In this part of the chapter, the idea of last resort is interrelated with the 
idea of noncombatant immunity. Specifically, a resort principle protecting 
noncombatants is proposed and supported. In the fourth part of this chapter, 
the core noncombatant immunity principle is introduced. A purpose of the 
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two parts is to elucidate how the permissiveness of the just cause principle is 
counterbalanced by the prohibitiveness of the last resort and noncombatant 
immunity principles.
As explained in Chapter 3 (‘Moral Theory’), the concept of ‘harming’ 
encompasses both the concept of ‘actually harming’ and the concept of 
‘seriously risking harming’. Roughly, noncombatants should be protected 
not only from actual grievous harm, but also from the serious risk of grievous 
harm. Accordingly, the phrase ‘grievously harm’ should be understood as 
abbreviating the phrase ‘actually grievously harm or seriously risk grievously 
harming’. Similarly, the phrase ‘gravely violate basic human rights’ should be 
understood as abbreviating the phrase ‘actually violate gravely or seriously 
risk gravely violating basic human rights’.
A.  CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN AFGHANISTAN
I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the use of force 
like close air support (CAS) against residential compounds and other 
locations likely to produce civilian casualties . . . Following this intent 
requires a cultural shift within our forces – and complete understanding 
at every level – down to the most junior soldiers.
General Stanley McChrystal, Commander of NATO’s International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 6 July 2009 
(McChrystal 2009)
A main thesis is that the core just war principles are applicable to all forms 
of armed conflict by all sorts of responsible agents. In the words of the above 
block quotation, these principles are applicable ‘down to the most junior 
soldiers’. Every combatant, no matter how subordinate in the hierarchy 
of command, must satisfy the just cause, last resort, proportionality and 
noncombatant immunity principles.
In January 2009, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) reported that, during the year 2008, there were 2,118 ‘civilian 
casualties’, 1,160 caused by ‘antigovernment elements’ and 828 caused by ‘pro-
government forces’ (UNAMA 2009a: ii). In July 2009, UNAMA reported ‘an 
increase of 24% of civilian casualties in the first six months of 2009 as com-
pared to the same period in 2008’ (UNAMA 2009b: 1).
On 6 July 2009, with the goal of reducing civilian casualties in Afghanistan, 
General McChrystal issued a ‘Tactical Directive’ to US and NATO forces 
there; the block quotation is taken from this directive. (He was Commander 
then and is now retired.)
In March 2011, UNAMA reported that, during the year 2010, there were 
2,777 civilian deaths, 2,080 caused by ‘Anti-Government Elements’ and 
440 caused by ‘Pro-Government Forces’ (UNAMA 2011: i). Apparently, the 
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Tactical Directive was effective. ‘Notably’, as UNAMA reported, ‘there was 
a 52 per cent decline in civilian deaths from air attacks compared to 2009’ 
(UNAMA 2011: i). The number of civilians killed by the 2010 air attacks 
was 171 (UNAMA 2011: i).
What do such numbers mean? In the Second World War, the US firebombing 
of Tokyo during 9–10 March 1945 killed ‘at least 83,793 Japanese civilians’ 
(Searle 2002: 103). Is there a morally relevant difference between the larger 
number of 83,793 and the smaller number of 171? Because the number 171 
is so small, did the US and NATO air attacks in Afghanistan during 2010 
satisfy the received noncombatant immunity principle? Plainly, there can 
be principled moral disagreement about how such questions should be 
answered.
B.  A SINGULAR MORAL DILEMMA
Every citizen of Afghanistan must know ISAF will continue to do all 
we can to reduce casualties that affect the Afghan civilian population. 
This data is promising but there is more work to be done . . . Even one 
civilian casualty is a tragedy and I will continue to direct each member 
of the coalition to work to drive the number of ISAF-caused civilian 
casualties to zero.
General John R. Allen, Commander of NATO’s International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (4 February 2012)1
My view is that the death of a single noncombatant is one death too many. 
For each and every noncombatant has the basic human right to life. And 
according to the nonharm principle, it is morally obligatory not to gravely 
violate basic human rights, even of a single noncombatant.
It is also my view (as explained in Chapter 5, ‘Just Cause’) that there 
can be a just cause for a targeted military operation to stop the killing of a 
single human being. For according to the counterharm principle, it is morally 
obligatory to attempt, as much as possible, to stop other persons from gravely 
violating the basic human right to life, even of a single human being.
Therefore, it is my view (as explained in Chapter 3, ‘Moral Theory’) that 
there can be a moral dilemma about even a single noncombatant. Let me 
sketch one schematically. Under the particular circumstances of a particular 
targeted military operation, it is impossible to stop the killing of a single 
innocent human being without killing a single noncombatant. One of the 
horns of the moral dilemma is that it is morally obligatory to stop the killing 
of the single innocent human being; and the other horn is that it is morally 
obligatory not to kill the single noncombatant. The subject of moral dilemmas 
is discussed further in Chapter 9, ‘All Things Considered’.
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C. A NONCOMBATANT RESORT PRINCIPLE
Therefore, supplementary to the last resort principle, I propose to formulate 
a resort principle about noncombatants as follows.
Noncombatant resort principle. It is morally obligatory not to attempt 
to achieve a goal by means of a military action that would grievously 
harm noncombatants, if it is reasonable to attempt to achieve that 
goal by means of a military action that would not grievously harm 
noncombatants.
More explicitly, it is morally obligatory not to attempt to achieve a goal by 
means of a planned course of military actions that would actually violate 
gravely (or seriously risk gravely violating) noncombatants’ basic human 
rights (whether intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently), if it is 
reasonable to attempt to achieve that goal by means of a planned course of 
military actions that would not thus harm noncombatants.
Roughly, the noncombatant immunity principle morally prohibits 
grievously harming noncombatants intentionally. Even if we ignore, reject 
or otherwise fail to satisfy the noncombatant immunity principle, we are still 
morally constrained by the noncombatant resort principle.
In light of the great destructiveness of the most memorable armed 
conflicts, it might be thought that the noncombatant resort principle is 
pointless or naively aspirational, but this thought is mistaken. Domestically, 
police officers must attempt to stop criminals without any collateral damage 
whatsoever. Analogously, when we perform a military action that is also 
a police action, it is not pointless, nor is it naively aspirational, that we 
must satisfy the noncombatant resort principle. Relatedly, targeted military 
operations are narrowly limited in fire-power, length of time, geographical 
extent and so forth. It is neither pointless nor naively aspirational to mandate 
that they must satisfy the noncombatant resort principle.
Let me sketch an illustration. Truly, US drone strikes against military 
targets have produced collateral damage. Drones are also employed in 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. When drones 
are employed in targeted military operations, they ‘can linger over an area 
with their video cameras gathering intelligence for as long as 20 hours, and 
then strike without warning’ (Drew 2010a). On the other hand, they can 
hover over a target, gather intelligence about the presence of noncombatants 
and ensure that a mission is safely aborted (Chivers 2012). Therefore, it 
is not pointless, nor is it naively aspirational, to command human agents 
responsible for remotely piloting drones to satisfy the noncombatant resort 
principle.
The last resort principle is a core just war principle, whereas the 
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noncombatant resort principle is not. The last resort principle is a necessary 
moral criterion for determining whether a proposed military action would be 
just. By contrast, the noncombatant resort principle is especially relevant to a 
question explored in Chapter 9, ‘All Things Considered’: among alternative 
proposed military actions, each of which would be just, which one would 
be best?
D. THE NONCOMBATANT AND POLICING RESORT PRINCIPLES
The noncombatant resort principle should be applied conjointly with 
the policing resort principle. In light of these two principles, we may 
distinguish military actions that both are police actions and do not grievously 
harm noncombatants from military actions that either grievously harm 
noncombatants or are not police actions. Together, the two principles partition 
the set of military measures into the following primary parts: (type 1) military 
actions that are police actions and do not grievously harm noncombatants; 
(type 2) military actions that do not grievously harm noncombatants, but 
are not police actions; (type 3) military actions that are police actions, but 
grievously harm noncombatants; and (type 4) military actions that are not 
police actions and grievously harm noncombatants.
The metaphor of a ‘ladder’ suggests that the primary parts of a polychot-
omy are ordered ‘linearly’ (or ‘serially’). Nevertheless, for the sake of full 
generality, it is presupposed that a polychotomy can have primary parts that 
are ordered ‘nonlinearly’. Generally, actions of type 1 are less harmful than 
actions of the other three types, actions of type 2 are less harmful than ac-
tions of type 4 and actions of type 3 are less harmful than actions of type 
4. Generally, however, actions of type 2 are neither more harmful than, nor 
less harmful than, actions of type 3. Metaphorically, a ‘ladder’ of resorts can 
have branches.
More precisely, it is presupposed that a polychotomy can have primary 
parts that are ordered ‘partially’. A relation is a ‘partial ordering’ just in case 
it is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive (Suppes 1957: 221). (Roughly, 
a relation R is ‘antisymmetric’ just in case, if xRy and x is not identical to y, 
then it is not the case that yRx.) Note that the subsets of a set are partially 
ordered by the relation of set-inclusion. Accordingly, the primary parts of a 
polychotomy may be depicted on a Venn diagram (Suppes 1957: 195–201).
In the first chapter, I conjecture that the cluster of recent targeted military 
operations might prove to be an epochal event that is pivotal for just war 
theory. A chief function of a just war theory should be to morally constrain 
processes of conventional escalation. A main thesis is that a cosmopolitan 
just war theory should morally constrain escalation from a military operation 
that is fittingly targeted to one that is unwarrantedly not targeted. Specifically, 
when a proposed targeted military operation would be a police action 
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that would not grievously harm noncombatants (type 1), the policing and 
noncombatant resort principles should together morally constrain escalation. 
When a proposed targeted military operation would not grievously harm 
noncombatants, but would not be a police action (type 2), the noncombatant 
resort principle should morally constrain escalation. And when a proposed 
targeted military operation would be a police action that would grievously 
harm noncombatants (type 3), the policing resort principle should morally 
constrain escalation.
In summary, there is a spectrum of nonmilitary measures, from ones that 
are very pacific to ones that are very coercive. And there is also a spectrum 
of military measures, from ones that are very small-scale to ones that are 
very large-scale. In short, there is a spectrum of measures, from nonmilitary 
measures that are very pacific to military measures that are very large-scale. To 
control or stop escalation from less destructive measures to more destructive 
measures, there should be various moral constraints. Supplementary to the 
last resort principle, I am proposing five additional resort principles: the 
coercive resort principle, the proximate resort principle, the penultimate 
resort principle, the policing resort principle and the noncombatant resort 
principle. Together, these six resort principles establish a (nonlinear) ‘ladder 
of resorts’.
IV.  NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not 
be the object of attack.
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions
(ICRC 1997a and ICRC 1997b)
That civilians are not to be targeted is an old, very salient rule, and can 
be crucial to the kind of peace that follows a war.
Herman Kahn, On Escalation (1965: 161)
In the just war tradition, the targeting of civilians is morally prohibited by 
a noncombatant immunity principle. Such a moral prohibition is embodied 
in international humanitarian law (IHL). The first block quotation above is 
from the two 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. In Protocol I, the 
quoted legal prohibition pertains to ‘International Armed Conflicts’ (ICRC 
1977a: Article 51). In Protocol II, the quoted legal prohibition is extended to 
‘Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (ICRC 1977b: Article 13).
In this final part, a noncombatant immunity principle is introduced. A 
goal is to elucidate how the prohibitiveness of this principle can serve 
to counterbalance the permissiveness of the just cause principle. But the 
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controversial subject of noncombatant immunity is discussed incompletely. 
In various writings about just war theory, there is a labyrinth of argumentation 
about this subject, a labyrinth with many corridors, only some of which can 
be explored in this book.2
A.  TARGETING NONCOMBATANTS
In Chapter 2 (‘Just War Theory’), I suggest that the five legitimacy criteria 
in the High-level Panel Report should be augmented by a sixth criterion: 
is it clear that the proposed military action will not involve the deliberate 
targeting of noncombatants? Presumably, the words ‘deliberate’ and 
‘intentional’ may be used interchangeably. Provisionally, a noncombatant 
immunity principle might be formulated as follows. It is morally obligatory 
not to target noncombatants intentionally.
My view is that the received noncombatant immunity principle should be 
revised, so as to allow (under some circumstances) the intentional targeting 
of noncombatants by ‘nonlethal’ weapons (Lango 2010c). The website of the 
US Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Program provides some 
examples, which ‘range from non-lethal munitions and acoustic devices to 
non-lethal optical distractors and vehicle stopping devices’ – for instance, 
the M-84 Flash Bang Grenade and the Portable Vehicle Arresting Barrier.3 
Granted, nonlethal weapons might unintentionally or inadvertently cause 
deaths, injuries and other damage. Accordingly, alternative terms – for 
instance, ‘less than lethal weapon’ – are sometimes used instead (Koplow 
2006: 9–10).
Apparently, before effective nonlethal weapons were sufficiently 
envisaged, many just war theorists assumed (roughly) that to target means 
to (intend to) kill. Consider, for instance, the following relationship between 
targeting and killing stated by Douglas Lackey: ‘the killing of civilians is 
intentional if, and only if, they are the chosen targets of military force’ (1989: 
60 [emphasis in original]). Now that effective nonlethal weapons have been 
envisaged, it should be clear that there is no conceptual (or logically necessary) 
connection between intentionally targeting and intentionally killing. For 
when nonlethal weapons are used, there can be intentional targeting without 
intentional killing.
B.  A NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY PRINCIPLE
Therefore, I think that a noncombatant immunity principle should only 
morally prohibit targeting that would kill or otherwise gravely violate basic 
human rights of noncombatants. Moreover, in accordance with the nonharm 
principle, targeting that would seriously risk gravely violating their basic 
human rights should also be morally prohibited. Accordingly, a noncombatant 
immunity principle might be formulated as follows. It is morally obligatory 
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not to actually harm grievously or seriously risk grievously harming 
noncombatants intentionally.
Heretofore, I have formulated noncombatant immunity principles as 
unconditional prohibitions. More revealingly, I propose now to formulate a 
cosmopolitan noncombatant immunity principle as a conditional prohibition:
Noncombatant immunity principle. It is morally obligatory not to 
perform a military action, if that military action would grievously harm 
noncombatants intentionally.
In other words:
Noncombatant immunity principle. It is morally obligatory not to 
follow a planned course of military actions, if noncombatants would be 
grievously harmed intentionally.
More explicitly, it is morally obligatory not to perform a military action, 
if that military action would actually harm grievously or seriously risk 
grievously harming noncombatants intentionally. Even more explicitly, it 
is morally obligatory not to perform a military action, if that military action 
would actually violate gravely or seriously risk gravely violating basic 
human rights of noncombatants intentionally.
In accordance with moral universalism, it is presupposed that this principle 
is applicable by all sorts of responsible agents. It is morally obligatory for any 
responsible agent not to perform a military action, if he or she would thereby 
grievously harm noncombatants intentionally. Moreover, the principle is 
applicable to all forms of armed conflict. It is applicable to every military 
action, however large scale or small scale. The most junior soldier must not 
grievously harm noncombatants intentionally, but also the loftiest head of 
state must not devise a war plan that involves the intention to grievously 
harm noncombatants.
The noncombatant immunity principle and the other core just war principles 
are coequal deontological principles. According to this coequality thesis, each 
must be satisfied, even when others are not satisfied. For instance, even when 
we fail to satisfy the just cause principle, we are still morally constrained by 
the noncombatant immunity principle. It is still morally obligatory for us not 
to use armed force to achieve a goal that is not just – even if that goal is a right 
goal – if we would grievously harm noncombatants intentionally.
When we apply the principle to a particular military action, we have to 
morally presume that we would grievously harm noncombatants intentionally, 
and we have the burden of proving that we would not. On the one hand, 
suppose that we fail to satisfy this burden of proof. Our moral presumption 
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becomes determinative: we have to decide that we would grievously harm 
noncombatants intentionally. Therefore, we have to conclude that it is 
morally obligatory not to perform the military action. Formulated thus as a 
conditional prohibition, the principle functions clearly as a moral constraint.
On the other hand, suppose that we succeed in satisfying the burden of 
proving that we would not grievously harm noncombatants intentionally. 
The noncombatant immunity principle is a conditional prohibition. It is 
not a conditional permission. It does not say: ‘it is morally permissible 
to perform a military action, if that military action would not grievously 
harm noncombatants intentionally’. Therefore, we cannot conclude, even 
tentatively, that it is morally permissible to perform the military action. 
Because the principle does not include such a moral permission, it functions 
clearly again as a moral constraint.
C.  IMMUNITY STANDARDS
What are the standards for determining whether we have satisfied this 
burden of proof? In brief, what are the ‘immunity standards’? In addition 
to the epistemic standard of clear and convincing evidence, there is the 
specificity standard of sufficient detail. Sometimes, for example, to ensure 
that a sufficiently detailed targeted military action (e.g. a drone strike) does 
not violate the noncombatant immunity principle, we must obtain clear and 
convincing battlefield intelligence (Lango 2011).
There is a third immunity standard. Admittedly, the concepts of ‘combatant’ 
and ‘noncombatant’ are somewhat indeterminate. Notice that Protocol I 
asserts that, ‘in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall 
be considered to be a civilian’ (ICRC 1977a: Article 50(1)). In other words, 
it must be presumed that the person is a civilian. ‘Protocol I of 1977 expands 
protection of civilians considerably’, Ingrid Detter de Lupis explained, 
‘especially by a paramount presumption that anyone who is not proved to be 
a combatant has civilian status’ (1987: 243). Analogously, when we apply the 
noncombatant immunity principle, we must morally presume that any person 
whom we would grievously harm by our military action is a noncombatant, 
and we have the burden of proving that he or she is a combatant. Therefore, 
I propose to formulate a third immunity standard as follows.
Indeterminacy standard. Human beings must be classified as non-
combatants, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that they are 
combatants.
D.  NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
According to a traditional noncombatant immunity principle, it is morally 
permissible to cause foreseen proportionate but unintended harms to non-
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combatants. However, I prefer not to complicate a noncombatant immunity 
principle by incorporating such a qualification. Instead, for simplicity and 
clarity, I am proposing proportionality and noncombatant immunity princi-
ples as separate core just war principles. Suppose that, when we apply the 
core just war principles to a particular military action, we succeed in satisfy-
ing the burden of proving that we would not grievously harm noncombatants 
intentionally. We still have the burden of proving (among other things) that 
we would not collaterally damage noncombatants disproportionately.
I return to the subject of noncombatant immunity in the section ‘Risk 
 Acceptance and Noncombatant Immunity’ within Chapter 8 (‘Proportional-
ity and Authority’) and the sections ‘Noncombatants and Stringency’ and 
‘Collaterally Damaging Noncombatants’ within Chapter 9 (‘All Things Con-
sidered’).
NOTES
1. Quoted in ISAF (2012).
2. Compare this part with the chapter entitled ‘Noncombatant immunity’ in Coates 
(1997). 
3. See http://jnlwp.defense.gov/current/default.html (accessed 17 April 2013).




The set of core just war principles contains a proportionality principle, but not 
a legitimate authority principle. In this chapter, the ideas of proportionality 
and authority are elucidated by means of comprehensive moral principles of 
distributive justice and autonomy.
I .  PROPORTIONALITY
Refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (ICRC 1977a: Article 57(2))
Presumably, in this quotation, the term ‘incidental’ adumbrates the legal 
requirement that such harmful effects must not be intended, and the term 
‘excessive’ adumbrates a legal standard of proportionality. In addition to 
mandating that civilians ‘shall not be the object of attack’ (ICRC 1977a: Article 
51(2)), Protocol I mandates that civilians must be spared from unintended but 
disproportionate harm. In Protocol I, the idea of noncombatant immunity is 
interrelated with the idea of proportionality.
But the two ideas are different. Instead of complicating the noncombatant 
immunity principle formulated in the preceding chapter by incorporating a 
qualification concerning proportionality, my view is that a proportionality 
principle should be formulated separately. A purpose of this first part of the 
present chapter is to propose and support a generalised just war principle 
of proportionality that is applicable by all sorts of responsible agents to all 
forms of armed conflict.
Traditionally, an ad bellum proportionality principle is distinguished from 
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an in bello proportionality principle. By contrast, a main thesis is that this 
generalised proportionality principle should be both a resort principle and 
a conduct principle.1 Very roughly, a proportionality principle requires that 
harms must be outweighed by benefits. But the phrase ‘the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated’ in the block quotation above is potentially 
misleading. As a conduct principle, a proportionality principle should not 
simply require that (anticipated) harms must be outweighed merely by 
(anticipated) concrete and direct military advantages. When we attempt to 
attain a concrete and direct military advantage, we must do so for the sake 
of a goal of stopping sufficiently grave violations of basic human rights. 
The benefits that are weighed should encompass this human rights goal. For 
an example, consider again the Libya case. Suppose that a Libyan tank that 
is indiscriminately shelling Misrata is destroyed by a NATO airstrike and, 
collaterally, some noncombatants are knowingly killed. A proportionality 
principle should not simply require that these noncombatant deaths must 
be outweighed merely by the concrete and direct military advantage of 
destroying the tank. For the tank is destroyed with the goal of stopping the 
tank crew from gravely violating basic human rights of noncombatants in 
Misrata.
Another main thesis is that a just cause principle should be counterbalanced 
by last resort, noncombatant immunity and proportionality principles. In 
writings about just war theory, there is a tendency to neglect or devalue the 
subject of last resort, so I am discussing that subject extensively. By contrast, 
in writings on moral philosophy and political theory, a customary subject 
is that of weighing costs and benefits. Accordingly, my discussion of the 
subject of proportionality can be more concise.
In light of controversies among moral philosophers and political theorists 
about such weighing, it should not be surprising that there is principled 
moral disagreement among just war theorists concerning the idea of 
proportionality. In this chapter, I formulate a proportionality principle that is 
fully deontological. In different just war theories, proportionality principles 
are formulated differently. Those who reject my proportionality principle 
might still find much of my just war theory acceptable. For the just cause, 
last resort and noncombatant immunity principles proposed in preceding 
chapters are, I submit, compatible with some (even if not all) of the alternative 
proportionality principles endorsed by other just war theorists.
A. PROPORTIONAL MEANS AND BALANCE OF 
CONSEQUENCES
Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed 
military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military 
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action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the 
consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences 
of inaction?
A More Secure World (HLPR 2004: 67)
In developing a cosmopolitan just war theory, my starting point is the 
embodiment of received just war principles in the High-level Panel Report 
as five basic criteria of legitimacy. In this section, I make some remarks about 
the two quoted legitimacy criteria.
Entangled in these criteria are three ideas that need to be disentangled 
– namely, ideas of proportionality, minimality and feasibility. The words 
‘proportional’ and ‘balance’ in the titles are misleading, in that the criteria 
also include moral requirements other than that of proportionality.
First, an idea of feasibility is expressed by the words ‘reasonable chance 
of the military action being successful’. Among received just war principles, 
there is one that is called the principle of ‘reasonable chance (or likelihood or 
hope or prospect) of success’. For brevity, I call it the ‘feasibility principle’. 
Controversially, because a military action cannot be proportionate without 
being feasible, a proportionality principle should incorporate a feasibility 
principle (Hurka 2005: 37). In a later section, I return to the subject of 
feasibility.
Second, an idea of minimum force (or necessity) is expressed by the 
sentence with the phrase ‘minimum necessary’. This idea is different from the 
idea of proportionality. Sometimes a minimum necessary use of armed force 
is disproportionate, and sometimes a proportionate use of armed force is not 
the minimum necessary. In this book, I prefer not to formulate a separate just 
war principle of minimum force. Instead, I strive to realise or approximate a 
moral ideal of minimising harm in diverse ways. For instance, to control or 
stop escalation from less destructive military measures to more destructive 
military measures, I am advocating a ladder of resorts.
Third, the idea of proportionality is implicit in the phrase ‘the consequences 
of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction’. Noting 
the term ‘consequences’, it might be thought that a proportionality principle 
should be a consequentialist principle. In this book, I am engaging in the 
dialectical process of rethinking, revising or supplementing received just 
war principles. Even if there is a received proportionality principle that is a 
consequentialist principle, my view is that a cosmopolitan proportionality 
principle should instead be a deontological principle. Briefly, instead of 
simply ‘weighing’ consequences of actions, the actions themselves must be 
‘balanced’. In this first part of the chapter, my aim is to explain this brief 
sentence.
Different just war theorists formulate proportionality principles differently. 
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In a seminal article, Thomas Hurka claimed that a proportionality principle 
should ‘incorporate the other just war conditions about consequences’; 
specifically, it should incorporate not only a feasibility principle, but also a 
last resort principle (2005: 37). Admittedly, a just war theory might accept 
a proportionality principle of such complexity. However, for the sake of 
clarity and simplicity, my view is that a proportionality principle should be 
formulated as a separate core just war principle. (Additionally, I propose 
some ‘proportionality standards’ as subordinate principles.)
B.  A PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
By means of some succinct remarks about the idea of proportionality, 
my purpose in this section is to formulate straightaway a generalised 
proportionality principle that is applicable by all sorts of responsible agents 
to all forms of armed conflict. It is both a conduct principle and a resort 
principle. And it is pertinent also to the prelude, halting and aftermath phases.
The gist of this idea is that harms must not outweigh benefits. Provisionally, 
a proportionality principle may be formulated as follows. The harms of a 
military action must be outweighed by the benefits. More exactly, because 
the unit of moral evaluation is a planned course of military actions, the harms 
of a planned course of military actions must be outweighed by the benefits.
Just war theory is a deontological moral theory. In this book, I am engaged 
in the dialectical process of revising received just war principles. Indeed, 
the received proportionality principle might be a consequentialist principle. 
Nevertheless, my view is that a proportionality principle should instead 
be a deontological principle. Moral judgements of proportionality should 
be made primarily about actions. Instead of primarily comparing harmful 
consequences and beneficial consequences, what should be primarily 
compared are harmful actions and beneficent actions. That is, what should 
be primarily compared are actions that violate the nonmaleficence principle 
and actions that satisfy the beneficence principle.
Consequently, the provisional principle needs to be revised. The harmful 
actions in a planned course of military actions must be outweighed by the 
beneficent actions.
Indeed, quantity matters, but quality also matters (Coates 1997: 176). Hence 
the term ‘outweighed’, which suggests that only quantity matters, should be 
replaced by the term ‘outbalanced’. The harmful actions in a planned course of 
military actions must be outbalanced by the beneficent actions.
In accordance with coherentism, it is illuminating to interrelate the 
proportionality principle with the nonharm and counterharm principles. 
Typically, a planned course of military actions includes ones that are 
grievously harmful and ones that (are attempts to) stop grievous harming. 
(This distinction is inclusive.) Typically, when we make a proportionality 
The Ethics of Armed Conflict.indd   181 09/12/2013   12:10:16
t h e e t h i c s  o f  a r m e d c o n f l i c t182
judgement, we have to compare actions that violate the nonharm principle 
with actions that satisfy the counterharm principle. To coin a term, actions 
of the latter kind are called ‘vitally beneficent’ actions.
A main thesis is that, in making a proportionality judgement, we should 
only compare grievously harmful actions and vitally beneficent actions. 
Only grievously harmful and vitally beneficent actions matter. When 
harmful actions that are not grievously harmful are ignored, proportionality 
judgements can be more focused and achievable.
Therefore, the provisional principle needs to be further revised. The 
grievously harmful actions in a planned course of military actions must be 
outbalanced by the vitally beneficent actions. Now imagine a stock illustration. 
In a tactical bombing mission, bombings that (actually) grievously harm (or 
seriously risk grievously harming) noncombatants must be outbalanced by 
bombings of military targets that are vitally beneficent.
In writings on moral philosophy and political theory, a familiar subject is 
that of weighing costs and benefits. But the idea of a costly action is different 
from the idea of a grievously harmful action. Some costly actions violate the 
nonharm principle, but some do not. Frequently, when we weigh costs and 
benefits, we do not plan to violate any moral principle. By contrast, when 
we plan a course of military actions, we plan (paradigmatically) to kill some 
human beings, in order to save the lives of other human beings. We plan to 
violate the nonharm principle, in order to satisfy the counterharm principle. 
We are thus ensnared in a moral dilemma. The proportionality principle is 
a necessary moral criterion for determining whether the nonharm principle 
may be overridden.
Just war principles morally constrain the full range of voluntary actions. 
Specifically, the proportionality principle morally prohibits a planned 
course of military actions that would be intentionally disproportionate, but 
it also morally prohibits a planned course of military actions that would be 
disproportionate knowingly, recklessly or negligently. In short, voluntary 
actions that are grievously harmful must be outbalanced by voluntary actions 
that are vitally beneficent.
In light of these remarks concerning the idea of proportionality, I propose to 
formulate a just war principle of proportionality canonically as a conditional 
prohibition.
Proportionality principle. It is morally obligatory not to follow a 
planned course of military actions, if those that are grievously harmful 
are not outbalanced by those that are vitally beneficent.
Acts of grievously harming human beings are acts of gravely violating 
their basic human rights. It is morally obligatory not to follow a planned 
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course of military actions, if those that gravely violate basic human rights 
are not outbalanced by those that (are attempts to) stop grave violations of 
basic human rights. More explicitly, then, the proportionality principle may 
be formulated equivalently as follows.
Proportionality principle. It is morally obligatory not to follow a 
planned course of military actions, if those that actually violate gravely 
(or seriously risk gravely violating) people’s basic human rights are 
not outbalanced by those that (are attempts to) stop other persons 
from actually violating gravely (or seriously risking gravely violating) 
people’s basic human rights.
As discussed in Chapter 4 (‘Theory of Action’), just war principles are 
applicable primarily to actions, but they are also applicable secondarily 
to consequences. Implicit in this principle is the following conditional 
prohibition. It is morally obligatory not to follow a planned course of military 
actions, if the bad intrinsic results of the ones that are grievously harmful 
are not outbalanced by the good intrinsic results of the ones that are vitally 
beneficent.
Let me summarise very roughly how this proportionality principle is 
both a resort principle and a conduct principle. Whether we are planning to 
use armed force or conducting a military operation, our own human rights 
violations must be outbalanced sufficiently by our attempts to stop human 
rights violations.
When we apply the principle to a particular planned course of military 
actions, we have to morally presume that it is not thus proportionate, and 
we have the burden of proving that it is. On the one hand, suppose that 
we fail to satisfy this burden of proof. Our moral presumption becomes 
determinative: we have to decide that the planned course of military actions 
is not proportionate. And, therefore, we have to conclude that it is morally 
obligatory not to follow it. Formulated thus as a conditional prohibition, the 
principle functions clearly as a moral constraint.
On the other hand, suppose that we succeed in satisfying the burden of 
proving that the planned course of military actions is thus proportionate. The 
proportionality principle is a conditional prohibition. It is not a conditional 
permission. It does not say: ‘it is morally permissible to follow a planned 
course of military actions, if those that are grievously harmful are outbalanced 
by those that are vitally beneficent’. Therefore, we cannot conclude, even 
tentatively, that it is morally permissible to follow the planned course of 
military actions. And there is still the burden of proving that the other just war 
principles are satisfied. Because the principle does not include such a moral 
permission, it functions clearly again as a moral constraint.
The Ethics of Armed Conflict.indd   183 09/12/2013   12:10:16
t h e e t h i c s  o f  a r m e d c o n f l i c t184
The proportionality principle is formulated briefly and simply. Arguably, 
it is overly abstract and indeterminate. Instead of complicating it by 
incorporating within it various qualifications, I propose to make it more 
concrete and determinate by means of some subordinate principles, termed 
‘proportionality standards’, which I also formulate briefly and simply.
C. PROPORTIONALITY STANDARDS
The proportionality principle is a moral prohibition. We have the burden 
of proving that it does not morally prohibit the planned course of military 
actions. More exactly, we have the burden of proving that the stated condition 
does not obtain. That is, we have the burden of proving that the grievously 
harmful actions are outbalanced by the vitally beneficent actions. A main 
thesis is that we are able to satisfy this burden of proof by means of four 
proportionality standards. These standards are not mechanical decision 
procedures. Acceptance of them by diverse responsible agents is compatible 
with principled moral disagreement about difficult cases. Analogously, there 
are controversies among social scientists about how people’s well-being 
should be ascertained.2
First, there is the epistemic standard of clear and convincing evidence. 
Because of this standard, there must be clear and convincing evidence that 
grievously harmful actions are outbalanced by vitally beneficent actions.
The proportionality principle is applicable primarily to actions, but it is 
also applicable secondarily to consequences. Implicit in the standard is the 
following moral requirement. There must be clear and convincing evidence 
that bad intrinsic results of grievously harmful actions are outbalanced by 
good intrinsic results of vitally beneficent actions.
The proportionality principle is primarily applicable from particular 
temporal standpoints. From the temporal standpoint of the present, the 
principle is applicable prospectively to a future planned course of military 
actions or to a planned course of military actions that is presently being 
followed. A prospective judgement of proportionality stems from present 
evidence.
Despite the fog of prospective armed conflict, there must be clear and 
convincing evidence. Is the epistemic standard overly demanding? The 
proportionality principle morally constrains voluntary actions. Each 
grievously harmful or vitally beneficent action is a voluntary action. When a 
human agent performs an action voluntarily, the intrinsic result of that action 
is under his or her control. In comprehending the nature of the action, he or 
she comprehends the nature of its intrinsic result.
Of course, in the fog of prospective armed conflict, there will always 
be some uncertainty. Especially uncertain are the extrinsic consequences 
of actions. However, the epistemic standard does not say: ‘there must be 
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clear and convincing evidence that bad extrinsic consequences (and intrinsic 
results) are outbalanced by good extrinsic consequences (and intrinsic 
results)’. Instead, a main thesis is that, in making proportionality judgements, 
only intrinsic results matter. More precisely, what matters are the intrinsic 
results of grievously harmful and vitally beneficent actions. Because extrinsic 
consequences are thus ignored, proportionality judgements can be more 
focused and achievable.
Second, there is a standard about degrees of rightness and wrongness.
Scale standard. The degree of wrongness of each grievously harmful 
action must be ascertained, as must the degree of rightness of each 
vitally beneficent action.
For the concept of ‘moral balancing’ is a scalar (or ordinal) concept. Different 
grievously harmful actions have different ‘moral degrees’, as do different 
vitally beneficent actions. (The concept of ‘moral degree’ is inclusive of 
zero.) The moral balance could be tipped erroneously by the failure to assess 
the degree of wrongness or rightness of a relevant action correctly.
Frequently, the degree of rightness or wrongness of an action is somewhat 
indeterminate. Evidently, there can be principled moral disagreement about 
such moral balancing. There are no mechanical decision procedures for 
making judgements of proportionality.
Different intrinsic results of grievously harmful actions have different 
moral degrees, as do different intrinsic results of vitally beneficent actions. 
Applicable primarily to actions, the scale standard is also applicable 
secondarily to intrinsic results. Implicit in that standard is the following moral 
requirement. The degree of badness of the intrinsic result of each grievously 
harmful action must be ascertained, as must the degree of goodness of the 
intrinsic result of each vitally beneficent action.
Third, there is the specificity standard of sufficient detail. The nature (or 
character) of each grievously harmful or vitally beneficent action must be 
specified sufficiently. The degree of wrongness or rightness of the action 
matters, but so does its nature (or character). Presumably, for example, an 
act of knowingly killing noncombatants is intrinsically morally worse than 
an act of intentionally killing enemy combatants.
Acts of grievously harming human beings are acts of gravely violating 
their basic human rights. To specify sufficiently how an action would be 
grievously harmful, we must specify sufficiently how basic human rights 
would be gravely violated. Additionally, to specify sufficiently how an action 
would be vitally beneficent, we must specify sufficiently how that action 
would be performed with the goal of attempting, as much as possible, to stop 
grave violations of basic human rights.
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In planning a course of military actions, we must envisage every morally 
relevant grievously harmful action and every morally relevant vitally 
beneficent action. By the failure to envisage a relevant grievously harmful 
action, the moral balance could be tipped erroneously. And the moral balance 
could be tipped erroneously by the failure to envisage a relevant vitally 
beneficent action. To prove that the proportionality principle is satisfied, we 
must prove that all of the grievously harmful actions relevant to a planned 
course of military actions are outbalanced by all of the vitally beneficent 
actions relevant to it.
How much detail and what sort of detail would be sufficient? This question 
can be answered fully only on a case-by-case basis.
The Preamble of the UDHR proclaims: ‘the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family’. In accordance with moral universalism, 
the proportionality principle holds equally and inalienably of all persons in 
any battlespace and any homeland. The basic human rights of noncombatants 
matter, but so do the basic human rights of combatants. The basic human 
rights of each and every person matter, even those who are enemies.
Fourth, there is a proportionality standard of ‘fairness’, which is discussed 
in the next section.
D.  GLOBAL DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
I am presupposing comprehensive moral principles of nonmaleficence, 
beneficence, distributive justice and autonomy. Different theorists formulate 
principles of distributive justice differently (Beauchamp and Childress 
2009: 242–3). It is sufficient for my purposes to presuppose a roughly 
formulated egalitarian principle of just distribution – namely, that the costs 
and benefits of an action must be apportioned among the people affected ‘as 
widely and equally as possible’ (Frankena 1973: 43). In accordance with 
cosmopolitanism, it is a principle of global distributive justice (Caney 2005: 
102).
A stock criticism of the classical utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill is that 
some actions that maximise happiness are distributively unjust. For instance, 
some actions that apportion benefits widely and equally also allocate costs 
narrowly and unequally.
Similarly, it might be objected that the proportionality principle is thus 
distributively unjust. To circumvent such an objection, I am proposing, as 
a fourth subordinate principle, a standard of fairness. This standard is a 
specification of the egalitarian principle of global distributive justice. The 
grievous harms and vital benefits of a planned course of military actions must 
be apportioned among the people affected as widely and equally as possible. 
Accordingly, the standard is formulated thus:
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Fairness standard. The bad intrinsic results of the grievously harmful 
actions and the good intrinsic results of the vitally beneficent actions 
must be fairly distributed.
The fairness standard is not a mechanical decision procedure. Acceptance 
of it by diverse responsible agents is compatible with principled moral 
disagreement concerning difficult cases.
Let us ponder a domestic disanalogy. There is a related criticism of 
classical utilitarianism – namely, that sometimes, in order to bring about the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number of people, human rights have to 
be violated. Paradigmatically, in peacetime, we pursue happiness without 
violating human rights.
Disanalogously, when we plan a course of military actions, we plan (para-
digmatically) to violate the human right to life of some persons, in order to 
satisfy the human right to life of other persons. For instance, ‘to save American 
lives, the United States Government conducts targeted strikes against specific 
al-Qaida terrorists’ (Brennan 2012), and (let me add) some of these targeted 
strikes take the lives of noncombatants. To satisfy the human right to life of 
Americans, the United States has violated (presumably unintentionally or in-
advertently) the human right to life of innocent Afghans, Pakistanis, Somalis, 
Yemenis and so forth. Of course, there can be principled moral disagreement 
about whether such targeted strikes are proportionate or disproportionate.
The fairness standard requires that grave violations of basic human rights 
during a planned course of military actions must be fairly distributed. In the 
next section, this standard is illustrated.
E.  RISK ACCEPTANCE AND NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY
The hard question in war is what degree of risk we are willing to accept 
for our own soldiers in order to reduce the risks we impose on enemy 
civilians.
Michael Walzer, ‘Terrorism and just war’ (2006: 11)
According to the traditional noncombatant immunity principle, it is morally 
permissible for an agent to cause foreseen proportionate but unintended harms 
to noncombatants. In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer revised the traditional 
principle by adding a moral requirement of risk acceptance: ‘aware of the 
evil involved, he seeks to minimize it, accepting costs to himself’ (1977: 
155). Similarly, in the new US counterinsurgency field manual (COIN FM), 
risk acceptance is morally required: ‘Combat, including counterinsurgency 
and other forms of unconventional warfare, often obligates Soldiers and 
Marines to accept some risk to minimize harm to noncombatants’ (COIN 
FM 2006: 7–21).3
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But how much risk should combatants be required to accept? Obviously, 
there can be principled moral disagreement about how this question should 
be answered. For example, the COIN FM answers: ‘At the same time, 
combatants are not required to take so much risk that they fail in their 
missions or forfeit their lives’ (2006: 7–23). By contrast, Walzer answers: ‘If 
saving civilian lives means risking soldier’s lives, the risk must be accepted’ 
(1977: 156).
I am formulating noncombatant immunity and proportionality principles 
as separate core just war principles. Moreover, I prefer not to complicate the 
noncombatant immunity principle by incorporating within it a qualification 
about risk acceptance. Instead, my view is that this question should be 
answered by means of the proportionality principle, and especially by means 
of the fairness standard. Let me explain.
Truly, enemy noncombatants have the human right to life, but so do our 
own soldiers (Dubik 1982). Even enemy soldiers are human beings; even they 
have the human right to life. When we make a proportionality judgement, 
we should compare actions that are grievously harmful and actions that 
are vitally beneficial to our noncombatants, enemy noncombatants, our 
combatants and enemy combatants. According to the fairness standard, both 
the bad and good intrinsic results of these actions must be fairly distributed 
among our noncombatants, enemy noncombatants, our combatants and 
enemy combatants.
The proportionality principle is both a conduct principle and a resort 
principle. It pertains both to battlespaces and homelands. In the language 
of the block quotation, an equally hard question in armed conflict is what 
degree of risk we are willing to accept for our own civilians in our own 
homeland, in order to reduce the risks we impose on enemy civilians in 
foreign battlespaces.
For example, I live in Manhattan in an apartment located several miles 
from the site of the World Trade Center. During the afternoon of 11 September 
2001, while walking along the north edge of the Reservoir in Central Park, 
I witnessed pillars of smoke. While visiting London during June and July 
2005, I rode occasionally on Underground trains. On 7 July 2005, terrorists 
detonated bombs on some London Underground trains. Living in New York 
City, I ride frequently on subway trains. Apparently, I am personally at risk 
of a terrorist attack. How much risk should I accept?
To generalise, how much risk should Americans (and others) accept, in 
order to minimise the grievous harms that US targeted counterterrorism 
strikes inflict on innocent citizens of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen 
and so forth?
My purpose, in proposing the four proportionality standards, is to make 
the proportionality principle more concrete and determinate. Granted, these 
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standards are themselves somewhat abstract and indeterminate. Acceptance 
of them by diverse responsible agents is compatible with principled moral 
disagreement concerning how this last question and other difficult questions 
should be answered. In accordance with the casuistic thesis, real-world 
judgements by means of that principle and those standards can be made 
fully only on a case-by-case basis (Lackey 1989: 41).
In the following five sections, the proportionality principle is elucidated 
further by means of remarks about other moral requirements.
F.  REASONABLE HOPE OF SUCCESS
Different just war theorists formulate proportionality principles differently. In 
particular, Hurka claimed that a proportionality principle should incorporate 
‘hope-of-success considerations’ (2005: 37–8).
Among received just war principles, there is one that is called the principle 
of ‘reasonable hope (or chance or likelihood or prospect) of success’. For 
brevity, I call it the ‘feasibility principle’. My proportionality principle does 
not incorporate a feasibility principle.
Granted, under some circumstances, a judgement that a planned course of 
military actions is proportionate can involve the judgement that it is feasible. 
However, when we make a proportionality judgement, we are morally 
evaluating our own voluntary actions. By contrast, in order to make a feasibility 
judgement, we have to scrutinise voluntary actions of our adversaries. Whether 
we have a reasonable hope of being successful might depend on whether they 
are likely to decide to flee from the battlefield, whether they are likely to decide 
to surrender under bombardment and so forth.
A main thesis is that the set of core just war principles should not contain 
a separate feasibility principle. Occasionally, to oppose extraordinarily grave 
violations of basic human rights, a military operation that is demonstrably 
hopeless can still be just – for example, the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1943).
G. PROPORTIONALITY VERSUS JUST CORRELATIVITY
How is the proportionality principle different from the just-correlativity 
requirement for the just cause principle?
The four core just war principles are coequal deontological principles. 
According to the coequality thesis, the proportionality principle must 
be satisfied, even when the just cause principle is not satisfied. Because 
armed conflicts are so highly destructive, the chief function of just war 
principles should be to morally constrain uses of armed force. Even when 
responsible agents fail to satisfy the just cause principle, they are still 
morally constrained by the proportionality principle. It is still morally 
obligatory for them not to attempt to achieve an unjust goal by means 
of a particular planned course of military actions, if grievously harmful 
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military actions are not outbalanced by vitally beneficent military actions. 
Reportedly, in many historical cases of unjust armed conflicts, responsible 
agents believed that their unjust causes were just. Responsible agents who 
believe falsely in the justice of their unjust goals should still be morally 
constrained by the proportionality principle.
Whereas the proportionality and just cause principles are coequal, the moral 
requirements of just goal and justly correlative means are not. If there is no just 
goal, there cannot be a justly correlative means. According to the just cause 
principle, a just goal is a goal of preventing sufficiently grave violations of 
basic human rights, and the means of achieving the goal is a justly correlative 
planned course of military actions. Roughly, less serious violations must be 
prevented by more limited uses of armed force, and more serious violations 
may be prevented by less limited uses of armed force. Even when a planned 
course of military actions is not thus justly correlative, grievously harmful 
military actions must still be outbalanced by vitally beneficent military actions. 
For instance, a planned course of military actions, the goal of which is right 
but not just, must still be proportionate. The proportionality principle must be 
satisfied, even when the just-correlativity requirement is not satisfied.
On the other hand, when the just-correlativity requirement is satisfied, the 
proportionality principle might not be satisfied. For example, when a just 
goal is attempted by means of a justly correlative planned course of military 
actions, bad intrinsic results and good intrinsic results might not be fairly 
distributed.
H.  MINIMUM FORCE
In developing a cosmopolitan just war theory, my starting point is the 
embodiment of received just war principles in the High-level Panel Report 
as five basic criteria of legitimacy. Despite the word ‘proportional’, a 
proportionality principle is not embodied in the criterion of ‘proportional 
means’: ‘Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action 
the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?’ (HLPR 2004: 67) 
For the idea of minimum force is different from the idea of proportionality. 
Sometimes a minimum necessary use of armed force is disproportionate, 
and sometimes a proportionate use of armed force is not the minimum necessary.
Because of the fairness standard (among other reasons), my just war theory 
does not include a separate just war principle of minimum force. Sometimes, 
in order to distribute grievous harms and vital benefits fairly, the scale, 
duration or intensity of a planned course of military actions has to be greater 
than the minimum necessary. Instead, I strive to realise or approximate a 
moral ideal of minimising harm in diverse ways. For instance, to control or 
stop escalation from less destructive military measures to more destructive 
military measures, I am advocating a ladder of resorts.
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I.  ALTERNATIVE MILITARY ACTIONS
Both a proportionality principle and a feasibility principle are embodied in 
the High-level Panel Report’s criterion of ‘balance of consequences’: ‘Is 
there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting 
the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be 
worse than the consequences of inaction?’ (HLPR 2004: 67) Notice that this 
criterion is a comparative principle, in that it compares ‘the consequences of 
[military] action’ and ‘the consequences of inaction’. But inaction is not the 
only alternative. Frequently, instead of a proposed military action, there are 
various alternative military actions.
Interestingly, Hurka’s proportionality principle is a ‘comparative’ 
principle; according to his principle, ‘comparative’ judgements must be 
made about alternative military actions (2005: 37–8). (Similarly, a minimum 
force principle is a comparative principle.)
But the requirement that benefits of a particular military action must 
outweigh harms is different from the requirement that the sum of benefits and 
harms of that particular military action must outweigh the sum of benefits 
and harms of every alternative military action.
For the sake of simplicity and clarity, I prefer to formulate a proportionality 
principle that is not a comparative principle. The question of how alternative 
planned courses of military action should be compared is explored in Chapter 
9, ‘All Things Considered’.
J .  PROPORTIONALITY AND LAST RESORT
Additionally, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, I prefer to formulate 
proportionality and last resort principles as separate core just war principles. 
By contrast, according to Hurka’s proportionality principle, ‘comparative’ 
judgements must be made not only concerning alternative military actions, 
but also concerning alternative nonmilitary actions; thereby, his principle 
incorporates ‘last-resort considerations’ (2005: 38).
In Chapter 6 (‘Last Resort’), the idea of last resort is interrelated with 
the idea of proportionality. Subordinate to the last resort principle, there is 
a disproportionality standard – namely, that vitally beneficent nonmilitary 
actions would be outbalanced by grievously harmful nonmilitary actions.
Admittedly, the last resort principle is a ‘comparative’ principle, in that 
it involves a comparison of a military action with alternative nonmilitary 
measures. To satisfy the principle, we have to prove (with clear and 
convincing evidence) that each (sufficiently detailed) alternative nonmilitary 
measure either would not achieve the goal of the military action or would be 
disproportionate or would be substantially more awful.
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K. PROPORTIONALITY VERSUS DISPROPORTIONALITY 
VERSUS AWFULNESS
How, then, is the disproportionality standard different from the awfulness 
standard? And how are both different from the proportionality principle? 
To indicate briefly how these questions should be answered, let me sketch a 
schematic case. A particular planned course of military actions is proportionate 
– that is, grievously harmful military actions are outbalanced by vitally 
beneficent military actions. But there is also an alternative planned course of 
nonmilitary actions that is not disproportionate – that is, vitally beneficent 
nonmilitary actions are not outbalanced by grievously harmful nonmilitary 
actions. Nevertheless, the grievously harmful nonmilitary actions of the latter 
are substantially more awful than the grievously harmful military actions of 
the former. Under some circumstances, the imposition of large-scale economic 
sanctions is substantially more awful than a sufficiently limited military 
operation, even when both the latter and the former are proportionate.
I I .  AUTHORITY
Generalised just war principles are applicable to all forms of armed conflict 
by all sorts of responsible agents. The idea of ‘responsible agent’ is implicit 
in the canonical formulations of core just war principles as conditional 
prohibitions. The main clause of each principle should be understood thus: 
‘It is morally obligatory [for responsible agents] not to follow a planned 
course of military actions’.
Who in the real world of states, intergovernmental organisations, revolu-
tionary groups, terrorist networks and so forth are the ‘primary’ responsible 
agents? In short, who is ‘primarily responsible’? Should the set of core just 
war principles contain a principle of ‘legitimate (or right or proper or com-
petent) authority’? Especially because of my negative answer to the latter 
question, my discussion of the subject of authority can also be more concise.4
A.  MORAL AUTHORITY
The first criterion of a just war is right or legitimate authority, which is 
really a presupposition of the rest of the criteria. In fact, it determines 
who is primarily responsible for judging whether the other criteria are 
met.
James Childress, Moral Responsibility in Conflicts
(1982: 74 [emphasis in original])
Autonomy of the will is the property the will has of being a law to itself.
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
([1785] 1964: 108 [440])
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According to Kant’s moral theory, the will of every human being is 
autonomous. Every human being has the capacity to determine for him 
or herself what is or is not moral law. In addition to moral principles of 
nonmaleficence, beneficence and distributive justice, I am presupposing a 
Kantian moral principle of autonomy. Every human being has moral authority.
The just war theory that I am developing is influenced appreciably by 
the just war theory of James Childress (1982). However, I disagree with 
his quoted remarks about legitimate authority. Instead, a main thesis is that 
the autonomy principle determines who is primarily responsible for judging 
whether the core just war principles are satisfied. Every human being is 
primarily responsible. Everyone has the moral authority to apply those 
principles to cases of armed conflict.
By contrast, the traditional legitimate authority principle is autocratic 
(or monarchical), in that it bestows on rulers (or princes) of states (or 
commonwealths) the primary responsibility for judging whether other just 
war principles are satisfied. For example, according to Vitoria, ‘any person, 
even a private citizen, may declare and wage defensive war’; moreover, ‘any 
commonwealth has the authority to declare and wage war’; nevertheless, 
‘where the commonwealth has a legitimate prince, all authority rests in his 
hands, and no public action can be taken, whether in peace or war, without 
him’ (1991: 299–301).
A main thesis is that the received monarchical idea of legitimate authority 
should be revised in two interrelated cosmopolitan ways: it should be both 
globalised and democratised. Even if a cosmopolitan just war theory should 
be SC-centric, it should also be (global) citizen-centric.
Let me sketch an illustration. Concerning US counterterrorism operations 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Obama declared that ‘our cause is just’ (2009c). 
In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, he endorsed just war theory 
(2009d). Under his presidential authority, a US counterterrorism operation 
killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Perhaps, acting as US President, he 
judged that this military operation satisfied just war principles (Becker and 
Shane 2012). However, according to the autonomy principle, every human 
being, anywhere in the world – not only Obama, but also every US citizen, 
every citizen of Pakistan and so forth – has the moral authority to judge 
whether the killing of Osama bin Laden satisfied just war principles.
Human beings everywhere are the morally primary responsible agents.
B.  LEGAL AUTHORITY
Just-war theory requires that decisions to wage war be made by those 
who are legally authorized to do so.
Richard Regan, Just War: Principles and Cases (1996: 20)
The Ethics of Armed Conflict.indd   193 09/12/2013   12:10:16
t h e e t h i c s  o f  a r m e d c o n f l i c t194
It might be objected that, although everyone has the moral authority to apply 
just war principles, only rulers of states have the legal authority. Truly, the 
idea of moral authority is different from the idea of legal authority. Should 
the set of core just war principles contain a principle of ‘legal authority’?
Which responsible agents have legal authority? Regan’s answer is 
found in the remainder of the paragraph containing the quoted sentence: 
‘The constitution and laws of nation-states specify the institutions and 
personnel authorized to make their war decisions’ (1996: 20). This answer 
might be enough for a state-centric just war theory, but Regan’s full answer 
is (apparently) SC-centric: ‘and the U.N. Charter authorises the Security 
Council to make the international community’s war decisions’ (1996: 20).
Nevertheless, a particular use of armed force is not just because the 
Security Council decides that it is just. Instead, the Security Council ought 
to decide that it is just because it truly is just. To decide that it is just, the 
Security Council has the burden of proving that it has a just cause, that it is 
a last resort, that it would be proportionate and that it would not grievously 
harm noncombatants intentionally. To decide that it is just, there is not 
the additional burden of proving that the Security Council has the legal 
authority to decide whether it is just. If it is just, it would still be just, even 
if the Security Council did not have the legal authority to decide whether 
it is just.
According to the autonomy principle, every human being, anywhere in the 
world, has the moral authority to decide whether that particular use of armed 
force is just. To decide that it is just, he or she has the burden of proving that 
it has a just cause, that it is a last resort, that it would be proportionate and 
that it would not grievously harm noncombatants intentionally. To decide 
that it is just, he or she does not have the additional burden of proving that 
he or she has the legal authority to decide whether it is just.
In conclusion, the set of core just war principles does not contain a legal 
authority principle. Core just war principles are applicable to all forms of 
armed conflict – for example, armed revolutions. And they are applicable by 
all sorts of responsible agents – for example, leaders of armed revolutions. 
A core legal authority principle is rejected, because (among other reasons) 
an armed revolution could not satisfy it.
C.  GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP AND ARMED REVOLUTION
Old John Brown’s body lies moldering in the grave,
While weep the sons of bondage whom he ventured all to save;
But tho he lost his life while struggling for the slave,
His soul is marching on.
William W. Patton, ‘John Brown’ (1861)
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A basic human right expressed in the UDHR is as follows: ‘No one shall be 
held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited 
in all their forms’ (Article 4). Before the US Civil War, this basic human 
right was massively violated in the United States. In the middle of October 
1859, the abolitionist John Brown led ‘a twenty-two man raid on Harpers 
Ferry, Virginia’, in a ‘doomed heroic effort to free the slaves’ (Reynolds 
2005: 3). Clearly, John Brown had no legal authority. Nevertheless, from a 
cosmopolitan point of view, abolitionism was a global movement, and John 
Brown had moral authority as a global citizen. The advent of abolitionism 
in the eighteenth century was simultaneously the dawn of the human rights 
movement.
From the temporal standpoint of October 1859, does this raid satisfy just 
war principles? Let me sketch an answer. Countering US slavery is a just 
cause, and noncombatants would not be grievously harmed intentionally. 
Nonetheless, even if the raid would be proportionate, it is still reasonable to 
attempt nonmilitary measures. That John Brown has legal authority is not a 
necessary moral criterion for deciding whether the raid would be just.
To generalise, a main thesis is that every human being has the moral authority 
to determine for him or herself whether an armed revolution (or armed 
insurrection) is just. Is this thesis overly permissive? In the contemporary 
world, there are authoritarian states that gravely violate basic human rights. 
Correspondingly, there can be just causes for armed revolutions.
D. NONMILITARY MEASURES AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
We send international volunteers to areas of conflict, providing protec-
tive accompaniment to human rights defenders threatened by political 
violence.
Peace Brigades International5
However, to counterbalance overemphasis of the just cause principle, I 
am emphasising the ancillary just war principles. Before starting an armed 
revolution, the last resort principle mandates that reasonable nonmilitary 
measures must be attempted – for instance, nonviolent actions (Lango 
2009a). Every human being has the moral authority to determine whether, 
before engaging in armed revolution, it would be reasonable to engage in 
nonviolent revolution (or nonviolent resistance).
In light of the multitude of nonviolent actions that might be attempted 
before resorting to armed revolution, the last resort principle might appear 
to be overly prohibitive. Although I am strongly supportive of the use 
of nonmilitary measures, I am not advocating nonviolence as a panacea. 
Memorably, die Weiße Rose (the White Rose), a nonviolent group in Nazi 
Germany, whose ‘crime’ was distributing anti-Nazi leaflets, was crushed by 
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imprisonment and execution (Gill 1994). Truly, under some circumstances, 
struggling against an authoritarian state by means of nonviolent actions 
would be substantially more awful than struggling against it by means of 
armed revolution.
To generalise further, a main thesis is that every human being has the 
moral authority to determine for him or herself the justice or injustice 
of any use of armed force by the Security Council, by any state, by any 
revolutionary group, by any terrorist network and so forth. Acting as global 
citizens, we human beings may communicate our moral evaluations of uses 
of armed force to relevant leaders by such peaceful means as petitions, the 
ballot box, demonstrations and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). As 
an illustration, representatives of NGOs in the NGO Working Group on the 
Security Council (sponsored by the Global Policy Forum) – for instance, 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Global Centre on 
the Responsibility to Protect – have been meeting regularly with Security 
Council ambassadors since 1996 (Paul 2010).
Additionally, instead of merely communicating, a global citizen might par-
ticipate directly – for example, by joining one of Peace Brigades International’s 
team of volunteers. Let me sketch a famous illustration. To resist underground 
nuclear weapons testing by France in 1985 at an uninhabited atoll in the South 
Pacific, the organisation Greenpeace planned to sail the ship Rainbow Warrior 
into the testing zone. France counterresisted violently: the Rainbow Warrior 
was sunk by French Government agents and a photographer onboard the ship, 
Fernando Pereira, drowned. However, the French act of violence ‘backfired, 
sparking worldwide outrage’.6 The tragedy of the Rainbow Warrior illustrates 
both the value of nonviolent action and its dangerousness.
To fulfil the ideal of global citizenship, there are many different kinds of 
actions that might be attempted.
E.  REFORMING THE SECURITY COUNCIL MORALLY
Even though the set of core just war principles does not contain a legitimate 
authority principle, legitimate authority still matters. In addition to 
conceptions of moral universalism and global citizenship, a cosmopolitan 
just war theory should include a conception of global governance.
From the temporal standpoint of the early years of the second decade of the 
twenty-first century, I am featuring a real-world global political institution 
– the Security Council. It might be objected that, although endowed by 
the UN Charter with legal authority, the Security Council lacks sufficient 
moral authority. Indeed, the UN Secretary-General is often perceived as 
having ‘moral authority’ (Evans 2008: 176). By contrast, the five permanent 
members of the Security Council are often perceived as being motivated 
mainly by parochial national interests.
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Ideally, the Security Council should be reformed, so that it is invested 
with considerable moral authority (Lango 2009c: 222–4). Let me sketch 
(albeit incompletely) a project of moral reform. The General Assembly is 
empowered by the UN Charter to elect the Security Council’s nonpermanent 
members. The provisions for this election include one concerning: ‘due 
regard being specially paid . . . to equitable geographical distribution’ (Article 
23). Importantly, there is also a provision concerning: ‘due regard being 
specially paid . . . to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to 
the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes 
of the Organization’ (Article 23).
To offset the five permanent members, the General Assembly should 
elect five nonpermanent members that are stable democracies, obey 
international laws, pursue alternatives to war, reject nuclear weapons, support 
environmentalism and respect human rights – for example, Botswana, 
Canada, Costa Rica, Japan and the Netherlands. Imagine, additionally, that 
each of these nonpermanent members selects as its UN ambassador a Nobel 
Peace Prize recipient – for example, Mohamed ElBaradei, Jimmy Carter, 
Kofi Annan, Jody Williams, Aung San Suu Kyi and Mikhail Gorbachev.
Instead of serving parochial national interests, these five UN ambassa-
dors ought to serve global interests – namely, the common interests of every 
human being, everywhere in the world. Concerning threats to international 
peace and security, they should make moral judgements that satisfy just war 
principles. To epitomise the traditional military function of the Security 
Council, the five permanent members might be called ‘the Circle of War-
riors’. And, to epitomise the moral purpose of the UN Charter, these five 
UN ambassadors might be called ‘the Circle of Judges’. Just as the words 
and actions of the Secretary-General can have significant moral authority, so 
the words and actions of this Circle of Judges might have significant moral 
authority.
F.  GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Unfortunately, in the fog of international relations, prospects for significant 
Security Council reform are obscure. Consequently, at present, there is a 
crucial question, which is voiced in the ICISS Report regarding military 
interventions, but which is generalisable to all uses of armed force: if the 
Security Council ‘fails to act’, ‘what are the options’ (2001a: 53)? There is a 
related question, which also is crucial: what are the options, if the Security 
Council acts wrongly?
The ICISS Report acknowledges the primacy of the Security Council. 
However, if ‘the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it 
in a reasonable time’, the ICISS Report also recommends some ‘alternative 
options’ – in particular, ‘consideration of the matter by the General Assembly’ 
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or by ‘regional or sub-regional organizations’ (2001a: xiii). Further, the ICISS 
Report recognises (while not forthrightly endorsing) alternative options of 
military interventions by ‘ad hoc coalitions’ or ‘individual states’ (2001a: 
54). Also, let me mention controversial alternative options of military 
interventions by nonstate actors – for instance, revolutionary groups or 
‘private military companies’ (PMCs).7
Arguably, the ‘principle of state sovereignty’ is still the ‘cornerstone’ of 
the ‘traditional legal order of international relations’ (Hoffman 1996: 12). 
Customarily, rulers of sovereign states have also been motivated by parochial 
national interests. Conceivably, however, this traditional legal order might 
be morally reformed. Conceivably, there might be a different system of 
sovereign states governed by cosmopolitan rulers motivated by global 
interests. At present, in the fog of international relations, prospects for such 
moral reform are similarly obscure.
At present, is the United Nations system the best system of global 
governance? In accordance with coherentism, this question should be 
answered by interrelating a political theory of global governance with 
comprehensive moral principles. At present, which realisable system of 
global governance would best satisfy the principles of nonmaleficence, 
beneficence, distributive justice and autonomy? At present, is the UN system 
more nonmaleficent, beneficent, fair (distributive justice) and representative 
(autonomy) than any other realisable system of global governance? I want 
to stress that acceptance of the set of core just war principles is compatible 
with principled moral disagreement about how such questions should be 
answered. In this book, I have to presuppose that the last question can be 
answered affirmatively, since I have no space to explore the controversial 
subject of global governance thoroughly.
In conclusion, the Security Council is a key institution in the UN system, 
and the UN system is, at present, the best system of global governance, or so 
I am presupposing. At present, in the real world of states, intergovernmental 
organisations, revolutionary groups, terrorist networks and so forth, the 
Security Council should have primary responsibility for security. However, 
if the Security Council fails to act or acts wrongly, there may be alternative 
responsible agents – for instance, regional organisations, ad hoc coalitions 
of states and the United States alone. A main thesis is that a cosmopolitan 
just war theory can be thus SC-centric, even though the set of core just war 
principles does not contain a legitimate authority principle.
NOTES
1. Compare this part with the two chapters on proportionality in Coates (1997).
2. For example, see Stiglitz et al. (2009).
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3. I discuss the topic of risk acceptance, with reference to Walzer and the COIN 
FM, in Lango (2011).
4. Compare this part with the chapter ‘Legitimate authority’ in Coates (1997). The 
traditional concept of legitimate authority is contested by both Fabre (2012) and 
Pattison (2010).
5. This quotation is from http://www.peacebrigades.org/index.php (last accessed 
22 July 2013).
6. This quotation is from http://www.greenpeace.org/international/about/ships/the-
rainbow-warrior (last accessed 22 July 2013).
7. Concerning PMCs, see the chapter ‘Commodified wars’ in Fabre (2012).
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CHAPTER 9
ALL THINGS CONSIDERED
We may find in History, almost in every Page, the dismal Calamities of 
War, whole Cities destroyed, or their Walls thrown down to the Ground, 
Lands ravaged, and every Thing set on fire.
Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace ([1625] 2005: 1303–4)
Truly, our military actions can be highly destructive. To establish prospectively 
that a proposed military action would be just, we have the burden of proving, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that all of the core just war principles 
would be satisfied.
In the first part of this chapter, our shared responsibility for global human 
security is elucidated. For the sake of concreteness, a contemporary case 
is detailed: the case of Sudan versus South Sudan. In the second and third 
parts, the question of how the core just war principles are applied conjointly 
to particular cases is investigated. In applying them conjointly, two questions 
need to be distinguished. Would a proposed military action be just? Among 
alternative proposed military actions, each of which would be just, which 
one would be best? The former question is considered in the second part and 
the latter in the third part. Real-world moral judgements regarding particular 
cases can be complicated and controversial, when all things are considered.1
I .  OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
According to the High-level Panel Report, the subtitle of which includes 
the phrase ‘our shared responsibility’, ‘the front-line actors in dealing with 
all the threats we face, new and old, continue to be individual sovereign 
States’ (HLPR 2004: 1). How should the responsibility for preventing grave 
violations of basic human rights be shared among sovereign states? For a 
state-centric approach, this question is crucial.
For a cosmopolitan approach, a different question is also crucial. How 
should the responsibility for preventing grave violations of basic human 
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rights be shared among all human beings everywhere in the world? As global 
citizens, how do we share responsibility for global human security?
Both questions are answerable in terms of the egalitarian principle of 
global distributive justice. Paradigmatically, the military actions performed 
by (groups of) human beings as agents have as targets other (groups of) 
human beings. In the preceding chapter, a question is raised about human 
beings as targets – namely, how should the grievous harms and vital benefits 
of a planned course of military actions be apportioned among the people 
affected? To answer this question, a fairness standard is formulated by 
specifying the principle of distributive justice. In the first part of this chapter, 
a comparable question is raised about human beings as agents – roughly, how 
should the burdens and benefits of a planned course of military actions be 
apportioned among the people responsible?
Because the use of armed force must be a last resort, a related fairness 
question is raised about human beings as agents – roughly, how should the 
burdens and benefits of attempting reasonable nonmilitary measures be 
apportioned among the people responsible?
A. MUTUAL DEFENCE TREATIES
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them 
all . . .
North Atlantic Treaty (NATO 1949: Article 5)
As secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I travel 
often to Washington. Every time I do, I hear voices expressing concern 
about burden-sharing in the trans-Atlantic alliance. Their message is 
clear: the Europeans do too little.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘Taking stock of the Atlantic Alliance’ 
(2012)
First, let me address the question of shared responsibility among sovereign 
states. As Article 51 of the UN Charter acknowledges, there is a distinction 
between ‘individual’ self-defence and ‘collective’ self-defence. In Chapter 5 
(‘Just Cause’), I examine a traditional type of just cause: self-defence by an 
individual sovereign state against aggression. In this section, a distinguishable 
type of just cause is considered: collective self-defence by several sovereign 
states against aggression.
As the North Atlantic Treaty exemplifies, the purpose of collective self-
defence is often formalised by a mutual defence treaty. Each state party to 
a mutual defence treaty agrees to defend each of the other states parties to 
the treaty against aggression. The word ‘other’ is significant. Conceptually, 
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the idea of individual self-defence against aggression is different than the 
idea of ‘other defense against aggression’ (Orend 2006: 32). Why should a 
just war theory accept ‘other defence’ against aggression as a just cause? It 
might be answered that, because states parties to a mutual defence treaty have 
committed themselves to other defence, they are duty-bound to honour this 
commitment, but this answer is inadequate. Given that there is such a treaty-
based duty of other defence, it does not follow (conceptually or logically) 
that there is a moral obligation of other defence. Why should a just war theory 
morally permit treaty commitments to other defence?
My cosmopolitan approach to just war theory is a sort of human security 
approach, because it prioritises the defence of individual human beings. 
In accordance with coherentism, it is presupposed that a cosmopolitan 
just war theory can be elucidated by means of a theory of human rights. 
Paradigmatically, for example, when a state party to a mutual defence treaty is 
invaded by an aggressor, basic human rights are gravely violated. In general, 
acts of defence against aggression are emergent from, or supervenient on, 
acts of preventing grave violations of basic human rights. According to 
the counterharm principle, it is morally obligatory to attempt, as much as 
possible, to stop other persons from gravely violating basic human rights. 
Therefore, it is morally obligatory for each state party to a mutual defence 
treaty to attempt, as much as possible, to defend each of the other states 
parties against such aggression.
To generalise, it is morally obligatory for any sovereign state to attempt, as 
much as possible, to defend any other sovereign state against uses of armed 
force that would gravely violate basic human rights. The UN Charter is a 
mutual defence treaty among 193 sovereign states, as the following passage 
from the Preamble attests: ‘to unite our strength to maintain international 
peace and security’. How should the responsibility for defence against 
aggression be shared among UN Member States? As the quotation by NATO 
Secretary-General Rasmussen evidences, burden-sharing among states 
parties to a mutual defence treaty can be quite contentious.
To generalise further, it is morally obligatory for any sovereign state 
to attempt, as much as possible, to defend individual human beings in, or 
citizens of, any other sovereign state against uses of armed force that would 
gravely violate their basic human rights. Arguably, the UN Charter is also 
a human security treaty, as the following passage from the Preamble may 
be read as implying: ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights’. How 
should the responsibility for armed humanitarian intervention be shared 
among UN Member States?
Relatedly, there is the question of how the burdens of UN peacekeeping 
missions and other reasonable nonmilitary measures should be shared.
Briefly, my answer to these questions about our shared responsibility is as 
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follows. In accordance with the egalitarian principle of just distribution, the 
burdens and benefits must be shared as widely and equally as possible. In 
subsequent sections, this answer is illustrated.
B.  THE CASE OF SUDAN VERSUS SOUTH SUDAN
The Security Council [on 2 May 2012] . . .
Determining that the prevailing situation along the border between 
Sudan and South Sudan constitutes a serious threat to international 
peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that Sudan and South Sudan shall take the following 
actions . . .
 (i) Immediately cease all hostilities, including aerial bombard-
ments  . . .
 (ii) Unconditionally withdraw all of their armed forces to their side 
of the border . . .
2. Decides that Sudan and South Sudan shall unconditionally resume 
negotiations, under the auspices of the AUHIP [the African Union High-
level Implementation Panel] . . .
Security Council Resolution 2046 (2012 [emphasis in original])
From the temporal standpoint of 2 May 2012, let us consider the case of 
Sudan versus South Sudan (briefly, ‘the South Sudan case’). (This case should 
not be confused with the Darfur case discussed in preceding chapters.) My 
purpose here is to make illustrative comments. Because the South Sudan 
case is so complex, I am not able to apply just war principles conclusively.2
Looking backwards, some key dates are as follows. On 14 July 2011, South 
Sudan became the 193rd Member State of the United Nations. On 9 July 
2011, South Sudan, formerly part of Sudan, became an independent sovereign 
state. On 8 July 2011, Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011) authorised a 
new UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). During January 
2011, the people of South Sudan voted for independence from Sudan. On 9 
January 2005, a terrible civil war between South Sudan and (North) Sudan 
was formally ended by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which 
provided for an independence referendum and a UN peacekeeping mission 
in South Sudan (UNMISS). From 1983 to 2005, South Sudan and (North) 
Sudan were locked in (a second) civil war, during which more than two 
million civilians died. (Earlier, there was a first civil war.)
Usually, the ethics of armed humanitarian intervention in internal conflicts 
is sharply distinguished from the ethics of military intervention in interstate 
wars. Intriguingly, the South Sudan case blurs this distinction. Originally 
a case of internal conflict, the South Sudan case has evolved into a case 
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of interstate conflict. From the temporal standpoint of (say) the year 2002, 
should the Security Council authorise armed humanitarian intervention in 
the civil war between (North) Sudan and South Sudan, ‘one of the deadliest 
conflicts since World War II’ (ICG 2002: i)? From the temporal standpoint 
of 2 May 2012, should the Security Council authorise military intervention 
to counter the threat of interstate war between Sudan and South Sudan? A 
human security approach to the ethics of armed conflict should regard these 
two questions as closely similar. For the just goals of both sorts of armed 
interventions should be preventing sufficiently grave violations of basic 
human rights.
The South Sudan case illustrates the question of how responsibility for 
alternative nonmilitary measures should be shared among UN Member States. 
Disputably, sovereign states closer to, or more impacted by, a security threat 
have greater responsibility. Fittingly, Resolution 2046 (2012) mandates that 
negotiations shall resume under the auspices of a regional organisation – the 
African Union (AU). Similarly, the negotiations that resulted in the CPA were 
held under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), a regional organisation of nearby African states – namely, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and also Sudan itself. Other supporters of 
the process of negotiating and implementing the CPA include the AU, the 
UN, the EU, the Arab League, Britain, Egypt, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway 
and (importantly) the United States.
Resolution 2046 (2012) condemns ‘the repeated incidents of cross-border 
violence between Sudan and South Sudan’. Nonetheless, it fails to authorise 
the use of armed force, or the threat to use armed force, to prevent future 
incidents of such violence. The earlier Resolution 1996 (2011) provides 
the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with a Chapter 
VII mandate, but only for human protection purposes within South Sudan. 
Truly, the clause ‘Acting under Chapter VII’ in Resolution 2046 (2012) is 
misleading.
C.  ARMED INTERVENTION, ARMED PEACEKEEPING AND 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Following bombardments [by Sudan] in Unity State [in South Sudan], 
some South Sudanese authorities and communities criticized UNMISS 
for not responding adequately to protect civilians. Significant outreach 
was required to explain that the UNMISS protection mandate exists 
within South Sudan and does not include protection of territory or 
borders, nor protection against aerial bombardment.
Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan,
26 June 2012 (Ban 2012: 18)
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From the temporal standpoint of 26 June 2012, should the Security Council 
authorise the use of armed force to protect South Sudan from aerial 
bombardment by Sudan? Should the use of armed force for protection of 
territory or borders be authorised? For instance, should the establishment of 
a no-fly zone or precision airstrikes be authorised? This case illustrates the 
question of how UN Member States should share responsibility for targeted 
military operations. Sufficiently limited uses of armed force to protect 
borders are a sort of policing, so this case also illustrates the question of how 
responsibility should be shared for overlap military actions.
The process of applying just war principles to particular cases is a temporal 
process. Broadly, there are temporal phases of prelude, resort, conduct, 
halting and aftermath, but such phases might intertwine. The day of 26 June 
2012 is a day in both an aftermath phase and a prelude phase. What sort of 
military operation might the Security Council authorise, both to keep the 
peace of the CPA and counter the threat of interstate war?
In addition to the threat of interstate war, there is the threat of internal 
conflict, both in Sudan and South Sudan. Resolution 2046 (2012) expresses 
‘deep concern’ about ‘continued fighting in the states of Southern Kordofan 
and Blue Nile, in Sudan’. Thus this case illustrates the question of how 
UN Member States should share responsibility for armed humanitarian 
interventions.
In South Sudan, there is the threat of inter-communal violence (Hsiao et al. 
2012), but there are also threats of violence by militia groups and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA). Accordingly, Resolution 1996 (2011) includes 
among the tasks that UNMISS is authorised to perform, by ‘all necessary 
means’, the following: ‘protecting civilians under imminent threat of physi-
cal violence’. Hence the case illustrates the question of how UN Member 
States should share responsibility for armed UN peacekeeping missions.
D.  HUMAN SECURITY AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
In this section, I address the question of how responsibility for human 
security should be shared among all human beings everywhere in the world. 
As global citizens, how should we share responsibility for preventing grave 
violations of basic human rights?
In the Libya case, when massacre threatened, Obama declared: ‘It was not 
in our national interest to let that happen’ (2011b). In the South Sudan case, 
even if it is not in the (perceived) US national interest to protect civilians, 
surely it is in the global interest.
As of 31 May 2012, military personnel from fifty-three states were serving 
in UNMISS, but none from the United States. As Secretary-General Ban 
reported: ‘the continued absence of military helicopters [for UNMISS] is of 
great concern’ (2012: 11). Arguably, in light of the huge US military budget 
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and the vast US arsenal (and despite the ‘great recession’), US taxpayers 
should share financial responsibility for the contribution of several military 
helicopters. To generalise, the UN peacekeeping budget – recently, ‘about $8 
billion a year’ (Goldstein 2011: 309) – should be substantially increased, and 
the consequent economic burden should be shared fairly by human beings 
everywhere.
To be sufficiently effective, individual human beings should share 
responsibility for human security by acting collectively in groups. Again, 
the South Sudan case is illustrative. From the temporal standpoint of the 
year 2005, George W. Bush’s ‘crowning achievement’ as US President, 
Nicholas Kristof affirmed, ‘was ending one war in Sudan, between north 
and south’ (Kristof 2005). The Sudan policy of the Bush administration 
was strongly influenced by evangelical Christian groups, but also by some 
African-American, Jewish and humanitarian groups (Huliaras 2006). Later, 
in the Obama administration’s 2010 National Security Strategy – under the 
heading ‘Peacekeeping and armed conflict’ – the South Sudan case was 
featured (NSS 2010: 48). Acting collectively in groups – for instance, United 
to End Genocide (see http://endgenocide.org) – individual human beings 
might significantly influence future South Sudan policy.
In viewing just war theory through the lens of moral philosophy, I am 
stressing moral ideals. Sovereign states are often motivated by their 
(perceived) national interests, but they ought to be motivated primarily by 
(universal) global interests. Analogously, such groups of individual human 
beings are often motivated by divisive special interests, but they ought to be 
motivated primarily by universalist (cosmopolitan) ideals. Ideally, we human 
beings, acting collectively as global citizens, should attempt, as much as 
possible, to prevent grave violations of basic human rights worldwide.
Finally, let me mention an especially controversial question. For the sake 
of human security, should a cosmopolitan just war theory morally permit 
global citizens to act collectively in ‘armed groups’? For example, imagine 
that South Sudan forms a ‘foreign legion’. May individual human beings, 
acting as global citizens, volunteer for it? (In the Spanish Civil War, there 
were International Brigades – for instance, the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.) 
The relevant concept of ‘armed group’ is somewhat indeterminate. Should 
that concept be understood as including groups of insurgents? Should it be 
understood as including ‘private military companies’ (PMCs)? In addition 
to for-profit PMCs, can there be non-profit PMCs? For example, imagine 
that Human Rights Watch has a ‘military wing’. May individual human 
beings, acting as global citizens, join it and collectively intervene in South 
Sudan? Evidently, there can be principled moral disagreement about how 
such questions should be answered.
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II .  MORAL JUDGEMENTS ABOUT PARTICULAR CASES
As the South Sudan case indicates, real-world moral judgements about 
particular cases of armed conflict can be complicated and controversial, all 
things considered. In this part and the next part, I investigate the question 
of how the core just war principles are applicable to particular cases 
conjointly. When we apply them conjointly, we need to distinguish two 
questions. Would a proposed military action be just? Among alternative 
proposed military actions, each of which would be just, which one would 
be best? The former question is considered in this part and the latter in the 
next part. Discussions in these two parts draw upon relevant discussions 
in earlier chapters – most importantly, Part IV (‘Moral Deliberation’) of 
Chapter 3 (‘Moral Theory’). Consequently, my answer to the question of 
how the core just war principles are applicable conjointly to particular 
cases can be relatively concise.
A.  ARMED CONFLICT AND MORAL CONFLICT
In armed conflict, there is moral conflict. According to the just cause principle, 
the just goal for a planned course of military actions is preventing sufficiently 
grave violations of basic human rights. And according to the counterharm 
principle, it is morally obligatory to attempt, as much as possible, to achieve 
that just goal. Let me term such a moral obligation a ‘just-goal obligation’.
Paradigmatically, when we plan a course of military actions, we plan to 
gravely violate basic human rights. However, according to the nonharm 
principle, it is morally obligatory not to gravely violate basic human rights. 
Let me term such a moral obligation a ‘grievous-harm prohibition’.
Therefore, in particular cases of armed conflict, we can be ensnared in moral 
dilemmas. We cannot satisfy the counterharm principle without violating the 
nonharm principle. We cannot fulfil a just-goal obligation without failing to 
fulfil a grievous-harm prohibition.
Specifically, when our proposed military action would gravely violate 
basic human rights of noncombatants, we are ensnared in a moral dilemma. 
Moreover, even if our proposed military action is so narrowly targeted that 
only basic human rights of enemy combatants would be gravely violated, we 
are still ensnared in a moral dilemma.
Such moral dilemmas have the following logical form. It is morally 
obligatory to do A, and it is morally obligatory not to do B, but A cannot be 
done without doing B. The term ‘dilemma’ is appropriate, because both of 
these moral obligations cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. More exactly, 
both cannot be simultaneously fulfilled, under the ‘dilemmatic circumstance’ 
that A cannot be done without doing B. If we fulfil the moral obligation to 
do A, we fail to fulfil the moral obligation not to do B, for we cannot do A 
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without doing B; or if we fulfil the moral obligation not to do B, we fail to 
fulfil the moral obligation to do A, for we cannot refrain from doing B without 
refraining from doing A.
Truly, a moral dilemma is an ensnarement. Either we do A or we do not do 
A. If we do not do A, we violate our moral obligation to do A. Alternatively, 
if we do A – thereby doing B – we violate our moral obligation not to do B. 
There is no third alternative. We are ensnared in the moral dilemma.
In his landmark article ‘War and massacre’, Thomas Nagel conceptualised 
moral dilemmas of warfare as moral conflicts ‘between [deontological] 
absolutism and utilitarianism’ (1979: 56). By contrast, I am conceptualising 
moral dilemmas of armed conflict as moral conflicts between deontological 
moral requirements – for example, moral conflict between a just-goal 
obligation and a grievous-harm prohibition. Whereas utilitarianism’s greatest 
happiness principle mandates beneficial consequences, the deontological 
beneficence principle mandates beneficent actions. Instead of the idea of 
clashes between harmful actions and beneficial consequences, I am utilising 
the idea of clashes between harmful actions and beneficent actions. Indeed, 
there can be principled moral disagreement among moral theorists about the 
nature of moral dilemmas.
B.  FULFILLING JUST-GOAL OBLIGATIONS AND OVERRIDING 
GRIEVOUS-HARM PROHIBITIONS
The counterharm and nonharm principles are prima facie (non-absolute) 
moral requirements. Specifically, a just-goal obligation and a grievous-harm 
prohibition are prima facie moral requirements. In particular cases of armed 
conflict, we can be ensnared in moral dilemmas, the logical form of which 
is as follows. Because we cannot do A without doing B, we cannot fulfil 
both the just-goal obligation to do A and the grievous-harm prohibition of 
the doing of B. Let me term such a moral dilemma a ‘just-war dilemma’. 
To resolve the just-war dilemma and fulfil the just-goal obligation, may the 
grievous-harm prohibition be overridden?
Usually, according to the casuistic thesis, real-world moral judgements 
about armed conflict should be made on a case-by-case basis. In deliberating 
morally about a particular case, just-goal obligations have to be specified 
sufficiently. For instance, as the South Sudan case illustrates, the question 
of who specifically shares responsibility for fulfilling the obligation has to 
be answered. Correlatively, in deliberating morally about a particular case, 
grievous-harm prohibitions have to be specified sufficiently.
Therefore, in deliberating morally about a particular case, just-war 
dilemmas have to be specified sufficiently. Suppose that, under a particular 
dilemmatic circumstance, we cannot fulfil a specific just-goal obligation 
without failing to fulfil a specific grievous-harm prohibition. To resolve this 
The Ethics of Armed Conflict.indd   208 09/12/2013   12:10:17
a l l t u i n t s c o n s i d e r e d 209
specific just-war dilemma and fulfil the specific just-goal obligation, may the 
specific grievous-harm prohibition be overridden?
This question of overriding is not merely a question of weighing. Of 
course, scales (or degrees) matter, but so do natures (or kinds). The question 
of whether the grievous-harm prohibition may be overridden is not merely 
a question of whether it is (quantitatively) ‘outweighed’ by the just-goal 
obligation.
Instead, the question of overriding is a question of whether the 
grievous-harm prohibition is ‘outbalanced’ by the just-goal obligation. 
For the nature of the just-goal obligation matters. Additionally, the nature 
of the grievous-harm prohibition matters. The question of overriding is 
primarily a question of ‘qualitative’, not ‘quantitative’, moral judgement, 
all things considered.
A grievous-harm prohibition is stringent. A main thesis is that the concept 
of ‘stringency’ admits of degrees. The concept of ‘stringency’ is a scalar 
concept. To say that one prima facie moral requirement ‘overrides’ (or 
‘outbalances’) another prima facie moral requirement is to say that the former 
is ‘more stringent’ than the latter. The question of overriding is a question of 
‘comparative stringency’ (Ross [1930] 2002: 41). To resolve a specific just-
war dilemma, the following question has to be answered. Which prima facie 
moral requirement is more stringent by its very nature: the specific just-goal 
obligation or the specific grievous-harm prohibition? Another main thesis is 
that this question should be answered by means of the epistemic conceptions 
of moral presumption and burden of proof.
C.  BURDEN OF PROOF
Military force when employed has only two immediate effects: it kills 
people and destroys things.
General Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (2007: 8)
When we deliberate about whether to fulfil a prima facie moral obligation, 
we have to make the moral presumption that we must fulfil it. To override 
this moral presumption, we have the burden of proving that we need not 
fulfil it. Central to the meaning of the term ‘prima facie’ is the following 
conception. So long as this burden of proof has not been satisfied, what we 
morally presume to be our obligation actually is our obligation.
Accordingly, a prima facie just-goal obligation may be defended 
‘negatively’ as follows. When we deliberate about whether to fulfil it, we 
have to make the moral presumption that we must fulfil it. To override this 
moral presumption, we have the burden of proving that we need not fulfil 
it. So long as this burden of proof has not been satisfied, what we morally 
presume to be our obligation actually is our obligation.
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Because armed conflicts are so highly destructive – because people are 
killed and things are destroyed – the chief function of a just war theory 
should be to morally constrain uses of armed force. A main thesis is that a 
grievous-harm prohibition is, by its very nature, highly stringent. When we 
are ensnared in a just-war dilemma – and if we only defend the just-goal 
obligation negatively – the grievous-harm prohibition is, by its very nature, 
more stringent.
Therefore, for the sake of greater stringency, the just-goal obligation must 
be defended ‘affirmatively’. Let me sketch a domestic analogy. In US federal 
law, an insanity defence is an affirmative defence: ‘The defendant has the 
burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence’ 
(18 USC §17).3 Metaphorically, war is collective insanity, and so this analogy 
seems fitting, rhetorically.
Presupposing an epistemic standard of clear and convincing evidence, the 
just cause principle mandates an ‘affirmative defence’ of a prima facie just-
goal obligation. When we apply the just cause principle to a planned course 
of military actions, we have to morally presume that there is not a just cause, 
and we have the burden of proving (by clear and convincing evidence) that 
there is. There is a just cause when there is both a just goal and a justly 
correlative means. Accordingly, we have to morally presume that there is not 
a just goal, and we have the burden of proving that there is. The just goal is 
preventing sufficiently grave violations of basic human rights. Accordingly, 
we have to morally presume that there are not sufficiently grave violations of 
basic human rights, and we have the burden of proving that there are. The just 
cause principle mandates such an ‘affirmative defence’ of a prima facie moral 
obligation to attempt, as much as possible, to achieve a goal of preventing 
sufficiently grave violations of basic human rights.
D. APPLYING CORE JUST WAR PRINCIPLES CONJOINTLY
Non-maleficence is apprehended as a duty distinct from that of 
beneficence, and as a duty of a more stringent character.
W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good ([1930] 2002: 21)
In preceding chapters, the core just war principles are studied separately. 
They are coequal deontological principles. According to the coequality 
thesis, each of them must be satisfied, even when the others are not satisfied. 
Each of them is applicable disjointly, even to military actions that would be 
unjust. By contrast, in the present chapter, my purpose is to study how they 
are applicable conjointly, in order to establish that military actions would 
be just.
Let us return to the question of overriding. To resolve a just-war dilemma 
and fulfil a just-goal obligation, may a grievous-harm prohibition be 
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overridden? More explicitly, the question is whether a prima facie moral 
obligation not to gravely violate basic human rights may be overridden.
A prima facie grievous-harm prohibition may be defended ‘negatively’ as 
follows. When we deliberate about whether to gravely violate basic human 
rights, we have to make the moral presumption that we must not. To override 
this moral presumption, we have the burden of proving that we may. So long 
as this burden of proof has not been satisfied, what we morally presume to 
be a prohibition actually is a prohibition.
A main thesis is that this negative defence is sufficient. A grievous-harm 
prohibition is, by its very nature, highly stringent. Even when it is only 
negatively defended, it is, by its very nature, sufficiently stringent. When 
we are ensnared in a just-war dilemma – and even if we have defended the 
just-goal obligation affirmatively – the negatively defended grievous-harm 
prohibition is still, by its very nature, more stringent. A proven just goal is 
not enough.
Therefore, an affirmative answer to the question of overriding has to 
be defended affirmatively. To resolve the just-war dilemma and fulfil the 
just-goal obligation, we have the burden of proving that the grievous-harm 
prohibition may be overridden. A main thesis is that the four core just war 
principles are moral criteria for determining whether we have satisfied this 
burden of proof.
Let me summarise this affirmative defence. To override the grievous-harm 
prohibition, we have to prove that the core just war principles are satisfied 
conjointly. Each of them is a conditional prohibition. To prove that they are 
satisfied conjointly, we have to prove that none of their conditions obtain. More 
explicitly, we have to prove that there is a just cause, that every reasonable 
nonmilitary measure has been attempted, that noncombatants would not be 
grievously harmed intentionally and that grievously harmful military actions 
would be outbalanced by vitally beneficent military actions. By proving that 
the core just war principles are satisfied conjointly, we prove that the just-
goal obligation is more stringent than the grievous-harm prohibition.
In the preceding section, I explain how the just cause principle mandates 
an affirmative defence of a just-goal obligation. However, there is a just cause 
when there is both a just goal and a justly correlative means. Accordingly, let 
me now explain how the just cause principle also mandates an affirmative 
defence of a justly correlative means. When we apply the principle to a 
planned course of military actions, we have to morally presume that there 
is not a justly correlative means, and we have the burden of proving that 
there is. That is, we have to prove (by clear and convincing evidence) that 
our means of achieving our just goal is a justly correlative planned course of 
military actions. If our means were not justly correlative, the grievous-harm 
prohibition would be more stringent than the just-goal obligation.
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E. PROPORTIONALITY AND DEONTOLOGY
The question of overriding is a question of whether the grievous-harm 
prohibition is outbalanced by the just-goal obligation. The term ‘outbalanced’ 
also occurs in the proportionality principle. It is morally obligatory not to 
follow a planned course of military actions, if those that are grievously 
harmful are not outbalanced by those that are vitally beneficent.
The proportionality principle is a conditional prohibition. To prove that it 
is satisfied, we have to prove that its condition does not obtain. To prove that 
its condition does not obtain, we have to prove that vitally beneficent military 
actions outbalance grievously harmful military actions.
In light of the two occurrences of the term ‘outbalanced’, the following 
equivalency might be conjectured. The just-goal obligation outbalances 
the grievous-harm prohibition ‘if and only if’ vitally beneficent military 
actions outbalance grievously harmful military actions. Admittedly, different 
cosmopolitan just war theories might accept different core just war principles. 
Conceivably, there might be a cosmopolitan just war theory that endorses this 
conjecture and accepts only the proportionality principle. Accordingly, the 
proportionality principle would be both a necessary and a sufficient moral 
criterion for determining whether the just-goal obligation is more stringent 
than the grievous-harm prohibition. Nevertheless, such a truncated just 
war theory would still be a deontological theory, since the proportionality 
principle is a deontological principle.
By contrast, my view is that the proportionality principle is a necessary 
– but not a sufficient – moral criterion for determining whether the just-
goal obligation is more stringent than the grievous-harm prohibition. The 
obligation outbalances the prohibition ‘only if’ – not ‘if and only if’ – vitally 
beneficent military actions outbalance grievously harmful military actions. To 
prove that the obligation is more stringent than the prohibition, it is necessary 
– but not sufficient – that we prove (by clear and convincing evidence) that 
vitally beneficent military actions outbalance grievously harmful military 
actions. Proportionality is not enough.
The proportionality principle is applicable primarily to military actions, 
but it is also applicable secondarily to their consequences. Good intrinsic 
results of vitally beneficent military actions must outbalance bad intrinsic 
results of grievously harmful military actions. Accordingly, the just-goal 
obligation outbalances the grievous-harm prohibition ‘only if’ – not ‘if and 
only if’ – such good intrinsic results outbalance such bad intrinsic results. 
Even though applicable thus to consequences, the proportionality principle 
is a deontological principle.
Different just war theories accept different just war principles. For instance, 
a consequentialist just war theory might accept only a consequentialist 
proportionality principle, according to which a military action is just 
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‘if and only if’ (expected) good consequences outweigh (expected) bad 
consequences.
Alternatively, in addition to an ‘absolutist’ just cause principle, a just 
war theory might accept a ‘utilitarian’ proportionality principle, according 
to which a military action is just ‘only if’ good consequences outweigh 
bad consequences. Alternatively, in addition to ‘absolutist’ just cause and 
noncombatant immunity principles, a just war theory might accept such a 
‘utilitarian’ proportionality principle. Indeed, these two just war theories 
might conceptualise moral dilemmas of armed conflict as moral conflicts 
‘between absolutism and utilitarianism’ (Nagel 1979: 56).
By contrast, the proportionality principle that I am proposing is a 
deontological principle. It is not merely a ‘prudential test’ (Johnson 1999: 34). 
It is not merely a precautionary principle that ‘urges a sober caution’ (Orend 
2006: 241). Instead, it is crucial for answering the question of overriding – a 
question that is essentially deontological. To fulfil a deontological obligation, 
may a morally conflicting deontological prohibition be overridden?
I realise that, because my discussion of the subject of proportionality in the 
preceding chapter is so brief, my proportionality principle might not prove 
acceptable. Nevertheless, my view is that those who reject it could still find 
the other three core just war principles acceptable. Let me explain.
Although making moral judgements primarily about actions, the 
deontologist does not entirely disregard consequences. While accepting my 
just cause, last resort and noncombatant immunity principles, a different 
just war theory – one that is still deontological – could accept a different 
proportionality principle – one that is wholly about consequences. Even 
though wholly about consequences, such a proportionality principle would not 
be merely a prudential test. It would not be merely a precautionary principle. 
For it would be crucial for answering the stated question of overriding – a 
question that is essentially deontological. Such an answer is summarised 
(roughly) as follows. The just-goal obligation outbalances the grievous-harm 
prohibition only if good consequences outbalance bad consequences. To 
prove that the obligation is more stringent than the prohibition, it is necessary 
that we prove (by clear and convincing evidence) that good consequences 
outbalance bad consequences.
F.  NONMILITARY MEASURES
Because military actions are so destructive, a grievous-harm prohibition is, 
by its very nature, highly stringent. To prove that a just-goal obligation is 
even more stringent, we also have to prove that the last resort principle is 
satisfied.
Let me sketch a schematic case. We are ensnared in a just-war dilemma; 
we have defended the just-goal obligation affirmatively; we have proven that 
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our means of achieving our proven just goal is a justly correlative planned 
course of military actions; and we have proven that vitally beneficent military 
actions outbalance grievously harmful military actions.
Nevertheless, because our planned course of military actions would be 
so destructive, we must attempt reasonable nonmilitary measures first. To 
answer the question of overriding affirmatively, we still have the burden of 
proving that our planned course of military actions is a last resort. According 
to the last resort principle, we are morally obligated not to attempt to achieve 
our proven just goal by means of our planned course of military actions, if 
it is reasonable to attempt to achieve it by means of a nonmilitary measure.
The last resort principle is a conditional prohibition. To prove that it is 
satisfied, we have to prove that its condition does not obtain. To prove that its 
condition does not obtain, we have to prove that it is not reasonable to attempt 
to achieve the proven just goal by means of a nonmilitary measure. More 
explicitly, we have the burden of proving (by clear and convincing evidence) 
that each sufficiently detailed planned course of nonmilitary actions either 
would not achieve the proven just goal or would be disproportionate or would 
be substantially more awful than our planned course of military actions.
The last resort principle is a deontological principle. It is not merely a 
‘prudential test’ (Johnson 1999: 34). It is not merely a precautionary principle 
that exhorts agents ‘not to be precipitate in their resort to force’ (Orend 
2000: 195).4 Instead, it is a necessary – but not a sufficient – moral criterion 
for determining whether our just-goal obligation is more stringent than 
the grievous-harm prohibition. To prove that this deontological obligation 
overrides this deontological prohibition, we have to prove that the last resort 
principle is satisfied.
Since the subject of last resort is discussed at great length in preceding 
chapters, I am assuming that these brief comments here are adequate.
G.  NONCOMBATANTS AND STRINGENCY
In a deontological moral theory, intention matters. The moral obligation not 
to grievously harm other persons intentionally is inherently more stringent 
than the moral obligation not to grievously harm them knowingly, recklessly 
or negligently. Specifically, the moral obligation not to grievously harm 
noncombatants intentionally is more stringent. The nature of a grievous-harm 
prohibition matters, and some grievous-harm prohibitions are, by their very 
natures, more stringent than others. Concurring broadly with traditional just 
war theory, a main thesis is that a moral prohibition of grievously harming 
noncombatants intentionally is, by its very nature, extraordinarily stringent.
Therefore, to answer the question of overriding affirmatively, there is also 
the burden of proving that the noncombatant immunity principle is satisfied. 
According to this principle, we are morally obligated not to follow our planned 
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course of military actions, if we would grievously harm noncombatants 
intentionally. It is a conditional prohibition. To prove that it is satisfied, we 
have to prove that its condition does not obtain. To prove that its condition 
does not obtain, we have to prove (by clear and convincing evidence) that 
we would not grievously harm noncombatants intentionally. If we were to 
grievously harm noncombatants intentionally, the grievous-harm prohibition 
would be more stringent than our just-goal obligation. The noncombatant 
immunity principle is a necessary – but not a sufficient – moral criterion for 
determining whether our just-goal obligation overrides the grievous-harm 
prohibition.
There is a difficulty. The nonharm principle is a prima facie moral 
requirement. Arguably, any moral requirement that follows by means of 
a subsumption argument from a prima facie moral requirement is itself a 
prima facie moral requirement. Therefore, because a moral prohibition of 
grievously harming noncombatants intentionally is derivable by means of a 
subsumption argument from the nonharm principle, it is itself a prima facie 
moral requirement. Even though it is extraordinarily stringent, it might still 
be outbalanced by an even more stringent just-goal obligation. Arguably, 
then, the noncombatant immunity principle is a prima facie moral principle. 
Accordingly, the difficulty is this. In making moral judgements about 
particular cases of armed conflict, may the noncombatant immunity principle 
ever be overridden? Obviously, there can be principled moral disagreement 
about how this question should be answered. Let me distinguish four answers.
First, there is an ‘absolutist’ answer – namely, that the noncombatant 
immunity principle is an absolute moral principle. The other three answers 
presuppose that it is a prima facie moral principle.
Second, there is a ‘quasi absolutist’ answer – namely, that the burden of 
proving that the noncombatant immunity principle may be overridden can 
never be satisfied, whatever the consequences, whatever the circumstances 
and whatever the good intentions. If this answer is accepted, the scale of 
comparative stringency should be understood as having (in effect) an upper 
bound. Even though the noncombatant immunity principle is a prima facie 
moral principle, it is tantamount to an absolute moral principle, in that it is 
so stringent that it can never be overridden.
Third, there is a ‘fantasy’ answer. Arguably, any moral requirement can be 
demolished by a fantastic counterexample. Disputably, for instance, the moral 
prohibition of torture can be demolished by a ‘ticking-bomb’ scenario (Lango 
2010a). Let us imagine a fantastic counterexample to the noncombatant 
immunity principle: the entrance to a room containing a ticking nuclear bomb 
is blocked by a baby, and the bomb cannot be defused without killing the 
baby intentionally. As Walzer remarked: ‘philosophers delight in inventing 
such cases to test out our moral doctrines’ (1977: 262). Accordingly, the 
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fantasy answer is summarised as follows. Admittedly, in real-world cases, the 
stated burden of proof can never be satisfied; nevertheless, the noncombatant 
immunity principle may sometimes be overridden in fantastic cases.
Fourth, there is an ‘emergency’ answer. Notably, Walzer contended that 
the laws of war may be overridden in a ‘supreme emergency’ (1977: 251). He 
defined supreme emergencies by means of ‘two criteria’: their ‘imminence’ 
and their being dangers ‘of an unusual and horrifying kind’ (1977: 252–
3). His choice of the term ‘supreme emergency’ stemmed from Winston 
Churchill’s use of it at the outbreak of the Second World War to interpret 
a danger that appeared to be both imminent and unusual and horrifying – 
namely, the danger posed to Britain by Nazi Germany (1977: 245). Thus, 
a controversial issue is whether that danger morally legitimated the British 
decision to engage in the deliberate strategic bombardment of civilians living 
in German cities, terror bombing designed to undermine morale (1977: 253–
63). Briefly, the emergency answer is that the stated burden of proof can be 
satisfied in a sufficiently extreme emergency.
Which answer is correct: the absolutist, quasi absolutist, fantasy or 
emergency? I have no space to try to settle principled moral disagreement 
concerning this question. However, I do need to reconsider the main thesis 
that, to resolve a just-war dilemma, the four core just war principles are 
moral criteria for determining whether the just-goal obligation overrides 
the grievous-harm prohibition. If the emergency answer is accepted, this 
main thesis holds, except for sufficiently extreme emergencies; nevertheless, 
when there is a sufficiently extreme emergency, the other three core just war 
principles are such moral criteria. If the fantasy answer is accepted, the main 
thesis holds for all real-world cases; nevertheless, for fantastic cases, the 
other three core just war principles (at least) are such moral criteria. If the 
quasi absolutist answer or the absolutist answer is accepted, the main thesis 
holds unqualifiedly.
H. COLLATERALLY DAMAGING NONCOMBATANTS
Intention matters, but so do other mental states. According to the nonharm 
principle, it is also morally obligatory not to actually grievously harm or 
seriously risk grievously harming noncombatants knowingly, recklessly or 
negligently. A related main thesis is that this moral prohibition is also, by its 
very nature, extraordinarily stringent.
Traditionally, the idea of noncombatant immunity has been linked with 
an idea of ‘foresight’. As discussed in Chapter 4, ‘Theory of Action’, we 
‘foresee’ not only when we act knowingly, but also when we act recklessly. 
For instance, when a drone pilot launches a missile recklessly – foreseeing 
that it is likely that noncombatants will die – he seriously risks killing them 
recklessly. Moreover, the concept of acting negligently is interrelated with 
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the idea of choosing not to foresee what a reasonable person would foresee. 
In this section, I focus on the mental state expressed by the word ‘knowingly’.
The traditional idea of noncombatant immunity has been supported by the 
doctrine of double-effect (DDE) (Walzer 1977: 152–3). For brevity, I utilise 
the compact formulation of the DDE by Cavanaugh (2006: 26):
1. the act in itself is good or indifferent;
2. the agent intends the good effect [of the act] and not the evil effect;
3. the good effect is not produced by the evil effect; and
4. there is a proportionately grave reason for causing the evil effect.
In various writings about the controversial subject of noncombatant 
immunity, there is labyrinthine argumentation about the DDE, but I have 
space only for a few remarks. Clearly, the DDE morally prohibits grievously 
harming noncombatants intentionally. However, under some circumstances, 
the DDE morally permits causing foreseen but unintended grievous harm to 
noncombatants, but only if there is a ‘proportionately grave reason’. I find 
(something like) this notion of a ‘proportionately grave reason’ acceptable, 
when it is adapted suitably. Let me explain.
To begin with, it is instructive to consider just-war dilemmas of a specific 
kind. Frequently, when we plan a course of military actions, we plan to 
grievously harm noncombatants knowingly. Therefore, in particular cases 
of armed conflict, we can be ensnared in moral dilemmas of the following 
specific kind. We cannot fulfil a just-goal obligation without failing to fulfil a 
grievous-harm prohibition of grievously harming noncombatants knowingly. 
To resolve this dilemma and fulfil the obligation, may the prohibition be 
overridden? In the language of the DDE, this question of overriding can be 
amplified as follows. May the prohibition be overridden by a proportionately 
grave reason?
The word ‘proportionately’ is potentially misleading. This moral 
requirement of a proportionately grave reason should not be understood 
as the moral requirement that only the proportionality principle must be 
satisfied. To prove that the obligation overrides the prohibition, we have to 
prove that all of the core just war principles are satisfied.
Moreover, the word ‘grave’ should be understood in terms of the concept 
of stringency. Even though the moral prohibition of grievously harming 
noncombatants knowingly is, by its very nature, extraordinarily stringent, 
it might still be outbalanced by an even more stringent just-goal obligation. 
In brief, a proportionately grave reason is an overridingly stringent just-goal 
obligation.
In conclusion, the core just war principle of noncombatant immunity only 
morally constrains acts performed intentionally. My purpose in this section 
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is to elucidate how the just war theory that I am developing also morally 
constrains acts of gravely violating basic human rights of noncombatants 
knowingly. Even though the moral obligation not to grievously harm them 
intentionally is inherently more stringent than the moral obligation not 
to grievously harm them knowingly, the latter is still, by its very nature, 
extraordinarily stringent. (For brevity, I omit discussions of reckless and 
negligent acts of grievously harming noncombatants, but comparable 
conclusions hold of them.)
III .  AMONG JUST ALTERNATIVES,  WHICH IS BEST?
Would a proposed military action be just? In the preceding part, I explain how 
such questions should be answered, by means of the core just war principles. 
Among alternative proposed military actions, each of which would be just, 
which one would be best? In the present part, I explain how such questions 
should be answered, by means of the comprehensive moral principles of 
nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice and autonomy.
A. JUST ALTERNATIVES
Let me start with a domestic analogy. In ordinary life, when we plan to achieve 
a goal, we might envisage alternative means of achieving it. Analogously, in 
cases of armed conflict, when responsible agents plan to achieve a goal, they 
might envisage alternative courses of military actions as means of achieving it.
Returning to the South Sudan case, let me sketch an illustration. From 
the temporal standpoint of 26 June 2012, imagine that the Security Council 
authorises the use of armed force to protect South Sudan from aerial 
bombardment by Sudan. Reflecting the distinction between ‘frontline 
defence’ and ‘deep strikes’, two means of stopping such aerial bombardments 
may be distinguished – namely, destroying Sudanese military aircraft as they 
enter a no-fly zone (NFZ) imposed over South Sudan (the ‘NFZ plan’) or 
launching precision airstrikes (PAS) against military aircraft on Sudanese 
airfields (the ‘PAS plan’).
Conceivably, both the NFZ plan and the PAS plan would be just. Both 
might have the just goal of preventing sufficiently grave violations of basic 
human rights of people in South Sudan. Either might be a last resort, each 
might be proportionate and neither might grievously harm noncombatants 
intentionally. Which just alternative would be best?
B. JUST ARMED UN PEACEKEEPING VERSUS JUST ARMED US 
INTERVENTION
Let me furnish another illustration by imagining, in the case of Rwanda, what 
might have happened, but did not.
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First, from the temporal standpoint of April 1994, when genocide begins in 
Rwanda, imagine (counterfactually) that UNAMIR is an armed peacekeeping 
mission. Imagine that, in Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993, the Security 
Council provided UNAMIR with a Chapter VII mandate authorising the 
use of armed force, if necessary. Imagine that UNAMIR has ‘four thousand 
effective troops’, enough to ‘stop the killing’ (Dallaire 2004: 289), and also 
sufficient armoured personnel carriers (APCs). Finally, imagine a planned 
course of military actions by UNAMIR – the goal of which is to stop the 
genocide. To decide that this armed UN peacekeeping mission is just, the 
Security Council has the burden of proving that it has a just cause, that it is 
a last resort, that it would be proportionate and that it would not grievously 
harm noncombatants intentionally. If it is just, it would still be just, even if 
the Security Council were not primarily responsible for security. Suppose 
that it would be just.
Second, from the temporal standpoint of April 1994, imagine (counter-
factually) an alternative option – namely, prompt unilateral armed interven-
tion, without Security Council authorisation, by the United States. Effective 
armed intervention requires a force of ‘5,000 well-trained and armed troops’ 
(Frye 2000: 28); 300 US Marines are stationed in a neighbouring country 
(Des Forges 1999: 606); and sufficient additional armed troops and APCs 
can be transported by large US cargo aircraft. Finally, imagine a planned 
course of military actions by the United States – the goal of which is to stop 
the genocide. To decide that this armed humanitarian intervention is just, 
the United States has the burden of proving that it has a just cause, that it is 
a last resort, that it would be proportionate and that it would not grievously 
harm noncombatants intentionally. That it should be legally authorised by 
the Security Council is not a necessary moral criterion for deciding whether 
it would be just. Suppose that it would be just.
From the temporal standpoint of April 1994, the future is open. The goal 
of stopping genocide might be achieved by a just armed UN peacekeeping 
mission, but it also might be achieved by a just armed US intervention. 
Which of these two just planned courses of military actions would be best?
C. THE BEST JUST MILITARY ACTION, ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED
In accordance with coherentism, a main thesis is that such questions about 
which alternative just planned course of military actions would be best 
should be answered by applying the nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice and 
autonomy principles conjointly. From the temporal standpoint of April 1994, 
which would be less harmful, more beneficial, fairer (distributive justice) and 
more representative (autonomy): a just armed UN peacekeeping mission or 
a just armed US intervention?
The Ethics of Armed Conflict.indd   219 09/12/2013   12:10:18
t h e e t h i c s  o f  a r m e d c o n f l i c t220
Having determined that there are just alternatives, there is the burden of 
proving, by means of those comprehensive moral principles, that one of them 
is best. A related main thesis is that moral deliberation about the best just 
military action should also be governed by the epistemic standard of clear 
and convincing evidence.
It might be objected that a question of whether one just military action 
would be better than another should be answered solely in terms of their 
comparative harmfulness. However, a moral requirement of comparative 
harmfulness is not enough. As explained in the preceding chapter, the 
set of core just war principles should not contain a separate principle of 
minimum force. In addition to comparative harmfulness, there should be 
moral requirements of comparative beneficialness, comparative fairness and 
comparative responsibility.
For example, I am presupposing that, at present, the UN system is the 
best system of global governance and that the Security Council should have 
the primary responsibility for security. Accordingly, from the temporal 
standpoint of April 1994, a just armed UN peacekeeping mission might be 
more beneficial, if the authority of the Security Council would thereby be 
buttressed. Such a mission might be fairer, if troop casualties and economic 
costs would be more justly distributed worldwide. As illustrated by the South 
Sudan case, such a mission might be more representative. Nevertheless, if the 
Security Council were to fail to deal effectively with the genocide in Rwanda 
within a reasonable time period, a just armed US intervention might prove to 
be best, all things considered.
Usually, when we act beneficently, we want our act to be effective. 
Sometimes, to accord sufficiently with the beneficence principle, the best 
just military action might be the one that is most effective. Sometimes, in 
cases of genocide, a truly effective just armed humanitarian intervention 
without Security Council authorisation might be better than a comparatively 
ineffective but still just armed UN peacekeeping mission.5
Indeed, a quest for the best just military action should include a quest for 
the best responsible agents. Even though the set of core just war principles 
does not contain a legitimate authority principle, morally right authority 
still matters. However, a moral requirement of comparative responsibility 
is not enough. Sometimes, when the nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice 
and autonomy principles are applied conjointly, it might be determined 
that the best just military action is one that would have to be performed by 
responsible agents who are not themselves best.6
Relatedly, it would be best if the just goal of a just military action were 
the primary goal. Even though the set of core just war principles does not 
contain a right intention principle, it matters whether responsible agents have 
morally right intentions. Sometimes, however, when these comprehensive 
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moral principles are applied conjointly, it might be determined that the best 
just military action is one that would have to be performed by responsible 
agents with ulterior motives or disparate interests – for instance, to win 
re-election or secure access to oil. Representativeness matters, but so do 
fairness, beneficialness and harmfulness.
Let me respond to another objection – namely, that my cosmopolitan 
just war theory is overly permissive of armed humanitarian intervention. 
For the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN World Summit prohibited 
such intervention, unless (among other conditions) ‘national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ (GA Res 2005: 30). My view 
is that this extreme harmfulness condition is overly prohibitive. Instead, to 
balance state sovereignty and SC-authority correctly, the nonmaleficence, 
beneficence, justice and autonomy principles should be applied conjointly. In 
cases of sufficiently grave violations of basic human rights within a state, the 
following question should be answered. Which would be less harmful, more 
beneficial, fairer and more representative: a just use of armed force by the 
national authority or a just SC-authorised armed humanitarian intervention? 
Of course, this question is readily answered, if the national authority is 
incapable of using armed force justly. Sometimes, however, it might be 
determined that the best just military action would have to be performed by 
a quite imperfect national authority.
D.  THE GOAL OF PEACE AND THE LADDER OF RESORTS
The set of core just war principles does not contain a separate principle that 
peace must be the ultimate goal. Nevertheless, the quality or nature of the 
peace that would be achieved still matters. In some cases of armed conflict, 
a just alternative employing minimum force would only achieve a minimal 
peace, whereas a different just alternative employing force more robustly 
would achieve a peace that is sufficiently ‘durable’ (Dower 2009: 7). Among 
just alternatives, which would be the most pacific, all things considered? In 
terms of the beneficence and distributive justice principles especially, my 
answer is, roughly, that the most pacific just alternative is the one that would 
most benefit people fairly.
Concordantly, let me sketch a resolution of the concurrence problem. While 
a military action is being performed, should nonmilitary measures also be 
attempted? Consider, for instance, the following question about a schematic 
case of armed conflict. Which of these two just alternatives would be best: 
fighting without negotiating or fighting while negotiating? Sometimes, when 
we apply the comprehensive moral principles conjointly, we might determine 
that the best just military action is one that would be performed concurrently 
with the attempting of a nonmilitary measure. Sometimes, when we negotiate 
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while justly fighting, our purpose should be to achieve a more durable peace.
How is moral deliberation about the best just military action governed by 
the ladder of military resorts? First, let me summarise how the policing resort 
principle is applicable. It is morally obligatory not to attempt to achieve a 
just goal by means of a just military action that is not also a police action, 
if it is reasonable to attempt to achieve that just goal by means of a just 
military action that is also a police action. Would the latter be less harmful, 
more beneficial, fairer and more representative than the former? If we fail 
to prove with clear and convincing evidence that this question should be 
answered negatively, the better just alternative is the military action that is 
also a police action.
Second, the noncombatant resort principle is comparably applicable. It is 
morally obligatory not to attempt to achieve a just goal by means of a just 
military action that would grievously harm noncombatants, if it is reasonable 
to attempt to achieve that just goal by means of a just military action that 
would not grievously harm noncombatants. Would the latter be less harmful, 
more beneficial, fairer and more representative than the former? If we fail 
to prove with clear and convincing evidence that this question should be 
answered negatively, the better just alternative is the military action that 
would not grievously harm noncombatants.
E.  CONCLUDING SUMMARY
Our real-world moral judgements about particular cases of armed conflict can 
be complicated and controversial, when we consider all of the things that are 
morally relevant. Typically, various morally relevant details are entangled in 
historical cases, and a present or imminent case is history in the making or 
history about to be made. Usually, then, prospective moral judgements have 
to be made on a case-by-case basis.
To determine whether a proposed military action would be just, the 
core just war principles should be applied. And to determine whether a 
proposed military action that would be just is also the one that would be 
best, the comprehensive moral principles should be applied. There are no 
uncontroversial recipes for applying these principles.
The process of applying just war principles is a temporal process, and so is 
the process of revising them. From the particular temporal standpoint of the 
early years of the second decade of the twenty-first century, I am developing 
a particular cosmopolitan just war theory.
Many questions are raised, only some of which are investigated. Only an 
illustrative selection of particular cases and specific issues is considered. 
This book is not intended as a definitive treatise that settles all controversies. 
Much remains to be accomplished.
The Ethics of Armed Conflict.indd   222 09/12/2013   12:10:18
a l l t u i n t s c o n s i d e r e d 223
NOTES
1. Concerning the idea of ‘all things considered’ in moral theory, see Chang (2004).
2. An overview of the case is Hsiao (2012). The case is discussed from the earlier 
temporal standpoint of August 2010 in Lango and Patterson (2010).
3. See www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/17 (last accessed 22 July 2013).
4. See also Orend (2006: 58, 241).
5. For a defence of the importance of ‘effectiveness’ in armed humanitarian 
intervention, see Pattison (2010: 79–97).
6. For a book focused on the question of who should be the agents of armed 
humanitarian intervention, see Pattison (2010).
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